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-rw-r--r--changes/bug271654
-rw-r--r--changes/bug276494
-rw-r--r--changes/bug276586
-rw-r--r--changes/ticket275477
-rw-r--r--doc/tor.1.txt30
-rw-r--r--src/core/mainloop/connection.c12
-rw-r--r--src/core/or/channelpadding.c2
-rw-r--r--src/ext/tinytest.c12
-rw-r--r--src/feature/hs/hs_service.c5
-rw-r--r--src/feature/stats/rephist.c30
-rw-r--r--src/lib/time/tvdiff.c22
-rw-r--r--src/lib/time/tvdiff.h2
-rw-r--r--src/rust/protover/protoset.rs17
-rw-r--r--src/rust/protover/protover.rs4
-rw-r--r--src/rust/protover/tests/protover.rs14
-rw-r--r--src/test/test_protover.c22
-rw-r--r--src/test/test_tortls_openssl.c45
17 files changed, 188 insertions, 50 deletions
diff --git a/changes/bug27165 b/changes/bug27165
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9e78d17e9d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changes/bug27165
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+ o Minor bugfixes (C correctness):
+ - Use time_t for all values in predicted_ports_prediction_time_remaining().
+ Rework the code that computes difference between durations/timestamps.
+ Fixes bug 27165; bugfix on 0.3.1.1-alpha.
diff --git a/changes/bug27649 b/changes/bug27649
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..55bfc3a842
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changes/bug27649
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+ o Minor bugfixes (rust):
+ - The protover rewrite in 24031 allowed repeated votes from the same
+ voter for the same protocol version to be counted multiple times in
+ protover_compute_vote(). Fixes bug 27649; bugfix on 0.3.3.5-rc.
diff --git a/changes/bug27658 b/changes/bug27658
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8cc0aa4714
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changes/bug27658
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+ o Minor bugfixes (testing):
+ - If a unit test running in a subprocess exits abnormally or with a
+ nonzero status code, treat the test as having failed, even if
+ the test reported success. Without this fix, memory leaks don't cause
+ cause the tests to fail, even with LeakSanitizer. Fixes bug 27658;
+ bugfix on 0.2.2.4-alpha.
diff --git a/changes/ticket27547 b/changes/ticket27547
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f60d4a482e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changes/ticket27547
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+ o Major feature (hidden service v3):
+ - Implement client authorization at the descriptor level. A new torrc
+ option was added to control this client side: ClientOnionAuthDir <path>.
+ On the service side, if the "authorized_clients/" directory exists in
+ the onion service directory path, client configuration are read from the
+ files within. See the manpage for more details. Closes ticket 27547.
+ Patch done by Suphanat Chunhapanya (haxxpop).
diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt
index 869a8cedd7..37f21742b2 100644
--- a/doc/tor.1.txt
+++ b/doc/tor.1.txt
@@ -1087,6 +1087,16 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
services can be configured to require authorization using the
**HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient** option.
+[[ClientOnionAuthDir]] **ClientOnionAuthDir** __path__::
+ Path to the directory containing the hidden service authorization file. The
+ files MUST have the suffix ".auth_private". Each file is for a single
+ onion address and their format is:
+ +
+ <onion-address>:descriptor:x25519:<base32-encoded-privkey>
+ +
+ The <onion-address> MUST NOT have the ".onion" suffix. See the
+ rend-spec-v3.txt Appendix G for more information.
+
[[LongLivedPorts]] **LongLivedPorts** __PORTS__::
A list of ports for services that tend to have long-running connections
(e.g. chat and interactive shells). Circuits for streams that use these
@@ -2896,6 +2906,26 @@ The following options are used to configure a hidden service.
including setting SOCKSPort to "0". Can not be changed while tor is
running. (Default: 0)
+Client Authorization
+--------------------
+
+(Version 3 only)
+
+To configure client authorization on the service side, the
+"<HiddenServiceDir>/authorized_clients/" needs to exists. Each file in that
+directory should be suffixed with ".auth" (the file name is irrelevant) and
+its content format MUST be:
+
+ <auth-type>:<key-type>:<base32-encoded-public-key>
+
+The supported <auth-type> are: "descriptor". The supported <key-type> are:
+"x25519". Each file MUST contain one line only. Any malformed file will be
+ignored.
+
+Note that once you've configured client authorization, anyone else with the
+address won't be able to access it from this point on. If no authorization is
+configured, the service will be accessible to all.
+
TESTING NETWORK OPTIONS
-----------------------
diff --git a/src/core/mainloop/connection.c b/src/core/mainloop/connection.c
index ffc9010fb8..7ef7423b13 100644
--- a/src/core/mainloop/connection.c
+++ b/src/core/mainloop/connection.c
@@ -1506,8 +1506,13 @@ connection_listener_new(const struct sockaddr *listensockaddr,
*/
connection_check_oos(get_n_open_sockets(), 0);
- log_notice(LD_NET, "Opened %s on %s",
- conn_type_to_string(type), fmt_addrport(&addr, usePort));
+ if (conn->socket_family == AF_UNIX) {
+ log_notice(LD_NET, "Opened %s on %s",
+ conn_type_to_string(type), conn->address);
+ } else {
+ log_notice(LD_NET, "Opened %s on %s",
+ conn_type_to_string(type), fmt_addrport(&addr, usePort));
+ }
return conn;
err:
@@ -2895,6 +2900,9 @@ retry_all_listeners(smartlist_t *new_conns, int close_all_noncontrol)
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn);
smartlist_free(listeners);
+ /* Cleanup any remaining listener replacement. */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(replacements, listener_replacement_t *, r, tor_free(r));
+ smartlist_free(replacements);
if (old_or_port != router_get_advertised_or_port(options) ||
old_or_port_ipv6 != router_get_advertised_or_port_by_af(options,
diff --git a/src/core/or/channelpadding.c b/src/core/or/channelpadding.c
index 0a7e93d391..7c3a77f62c 100644
--- a/src/core/or/channelpadding.c
+++ b/src/core/or/channelpadding.c
@@ -657,6 +657,8 @@ channelpadding_get_circuits_available_timeout(void)
// 30..60min by default
timeout = timeout + crypto_rand_int(timeout);
+ tor_assert(timeout >= 0);
+
return timeout;
}
diff --git a/src/ext/tinytest.c b/src/ext/tinytest.c
index 052fb6483f..16f11e4639 100644
--- a/src/ext/tinytest.c
+++ b/src/ext/tinytest.c
@@ -218,12 +218,20 @@ testcase_run_forked_(const struct testgroup_t *group,
r = (int)read(outcome_pipe[0], b, 1);
if (r == 0) {
printf("[Lost connection!] ");
- return 0;
+ return FAIL;
} else if (r != 1) {
perror("read outcome from pipe");
}
- waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
+ r = waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
close(outcome_pipe[0]);
+ if (r == -1) {
+ perror("waitpid");
+ return FAIL;
+ }
+ if (! WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
+ printf("[did not exit cleanly.]");
+ return FAIL;
+ }
return b[0]=='Y' ? OK : (b[0]=='S' ? SKIP : FAIL);
}
#endif
diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c
index 30d23eb771..b01f9f0adf 100644
--- a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c
+++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_ope.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
#include "feature/dircache/directory.h"
#include "core/mainloop/main.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h"
@@ -1799,6 +1800,10 @@ build_service_desc_superencrypted(const hs_service_t *service,
smartlist_add(superencrypted->clients, desc_client);
}
+ /* Shuffle the list to prevent the client know the position in the
+ * config. */
+ smartlist_shuffle(superencrypted->clients);
+
return 0;
}
diff --git a/src/feature/stats/rephist.c b/src/feature/stats/rephist.c
index e24728ca76..405efc26ec 100644
--- a/src/feature/stats/rephist.c
+++ b/src/feature/stats/rephist.c
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@
#include "lib/container/order.h"
#include "lib/math/fp.h"
#include "lib/math/laplace.h"
+#include "lib/time/tvdiff.h"
#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
#include <fcntl.h>
@@ -1548,7 +1549,7 @@ typedef struct predicted_port_t {
/** A list of port numbers that have been used recently. */
static smartlist_t *predicted_ports_list=NULL;
/** How long do we keep predicting circuits? */
-static int prediction_timeout=0;
+static time_t prediction_timeout=0;
/** When was the last time we added a prediction entry (HS or port) */
static time_t last_prediction_add_time=0;
@@ -1558,30 +1559,30 @@ static time_t last_prediction_add_time=0;
int
predicted_ports_prediction_time_remaining(time_t now)
{
- time_t idle_delta;
+ time_t seconds_waited;
+ time_t seconds_left;
/* Protect against overflow of return value. This can happen if the clock
* jumps backwards in time. Update the last prediction time (aka last
* active time) to prevent it. This update is preferable to using monotonic
* time because it prevents clock jumps into the past from simply causing
* very long idle timeouts while the monotonic time stands still. */
- if (last_prediction_add_time > now) {
+ seconds_waited = time_diff(last_prediction_add_time, now);
+ if (seconds_waited == TIME_MAX) {
last_prediction_add_time = now;
- idle_delta = 0;
- } else {
- idle_delta = now - last_prediction_add_time;
+ seconds_waited = 0;
}
/* Protect against underflow of the return value. This can happen for very
* large periods of inactivity/system sleep. */
- if (idle_delta > prediction_timeout)
+ if (seconds_waited > prediction_timeout)
return 0;
- if (BUG((prediction_timeout - idle_delta) > INT_MAX)) {
+ seconds_left = time_diff(seconds_waited, prediction_timeout);
+ if (BUG(seconds_left == TIME_MAX))
return INT_MAX;
- }
- return (int)(prediction_timeout - idle_delta);
+ return (int)(seconds_left);
}
/** We just got an application request for a connection with
@@ -1595,7 +1596,8 @@ add_predicted_port(time_t now, uint16_t port)
// If the list is empty, re-randomize predicted ports lifetime
if (!any_predicted_circuits(now)) {
- prediction_timeout = channelpadding_get_circuits_available_timeout();
+ prediction_timeout =
+ (time_t)channelpadding_get_circuits_available_timeout();
}
last_prediction_add_time = now;
@@ -1679,7 +1681,7 @@ rep_hist_get_predicted_ports(time_t now)
smartlist_t *out = smartlist_new();
tor_assert(predicted_ports_list);
- predicted_circs_relevance_time = prediction_timeout;
+ predicted_circs_relevance_time = (int)prediction_timeout;
/* clean out obsolete entries */
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(predicted_ports_list, predicted_port_t *, pp) {
@@ -1765,7 +1767,7 @@ rep_hist_get_predicted_internal(time_t now, int *need_uptime,
{
int predicted_circs_relevance_time;
- predicted_circs_relevance_time = prediction_timeout;
+ predicted_circs_relevance_time = (int)prediction_timeout;
if (!predicted_internal_time) { /* initialize it */
predicted_internal_time = now;
@@ -1787,7 +1789,7 @@ int
any_predicted_circuits(time_t now)
{
int predicted_circs_relevance_time;
- predicted_circs_relevance_time = prediction_timeout;
+ predicted_circs_relevance_time = (int)prediction_timeout;
return smartlist_len(predicted_ports_list) ||
predicted_internal_time + predicted_circs_relevance_time >= now;
diff --git a/src/lib/time/tvdiff.c b/src/lib/time/tvdiff.c
index 8617110e52..bc8a1166e7 100644
--- a/src/lib/time/tvdiff.c
+++ b/src/lib/time/tvdiff.c
@@ -165,3 +165,25 @@ tv_to_msec(const struct timeval *tv)
conv += ((int64_t)tv->tv_usec+500)/1000L;
return conv;
}
+
+/**
+ * Return duration in seconds between time_t values
+ * <b>t1</b> and <b>t2</b> iff <b>t1</b> is numerically
+ * less or equal than <b>t2</b>. Otherwise, return TIME_MAX.
+ *
+ * This provides a safe way to compute difference between
+ * two UNIX timestamps (<b>t2</b> can be assumed by calling
+ * code to be later than <b>t1</b>) or two durations measured
+ * in seconds (<b>t2</b> can be assumed to be longer than
+ * <b>t1</b>). Calling code is expected to check for TIME_MAX
+ * return value and interpret that as error condition.
+ */
+time_t
+time_diff(const time_t t1, const time_t t2)
+{
+ if (t1 <= t2)
+ return t2 - t1;
+
+ return TIME_MAX;
+}
+
diff --git a/src/lib/time/tvdiff.h b/src/lib/time/tvdiff.h
index d78330d7d8..a15ce52ad6 100644
--- a/src/lib/time/tvdiff.h
+++ b/src/lib/time/tvdiff.h
@@ -18,4 +18,6 @@ long tv_udiff(const struct timeval *start, const struct timeval *end);
long tv_mdiff(const struct timeval *start, const struct timeval *end);
int64_t tv_to_msec(const struct timeval *tv);
+time_t time_diff(const time_t from, const time_t to);
+
#endif
diff --git a/src/rust/protover/protoset.rs b/src/rust/protover/protoset.rs
index db33592f95..d3eb8b649c 100644
--- a/src/rust/protover/protoset.rs
+++ b/src/rust/protover/protoset.rs
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ impl ProtoSet {
if low == u32::MAX || high == u32::MAX {
return Err(ProtoverError::ExceedsMax);
}
- if low < last_high {
+ if low <= last_high {
return Err(ProtoverError::Overlap);
} else if low > high {
return Err(ProtoverError::LowGreaterThanHigh);
@@ -521,7 +521,6 @@ mod test {
test_protoset_contains_versions!(&[1], "1");
test_protoset_contains_versions!(&[1, 2], "1,2");
test_protoset_contains_versions!(&[1, 2, 3], "1-3");
- test_protoset_contains_versions!(&[0, 1], "0-1");
test_protoset_contains_versions!(&[1, 2, 5], "1-2,5");
test_protoset_contains_versions!(&[1, 3, 4, 5], "1,3-5");
test_protoset_contains_versions!(&[42, 55, 56, 57, 58], "42,55-58");
@@ -597,9 +596,9 @@ mod test {
#[test]
fn test_protoset_contains() {
- let protoset: ProtoSet = ProtoSet::from_slice(&[(0, 5), (7, 9), (13, 14)]).unwrap();
+ let protoset: ProtoSet = ProtoSet::from_slice(&[(1, 5), (7, 9), (13, 14)]).unwrap();
- for x in 0..6 {
+ for x in 1..6 {
assert!(protoset.contains(&x), format!("should contain {}", x));
}
for x in 7..10 {
@@ -615,10 +614,10 @@ mod test {
}
#[test]
- fn test_protoset_contains_0_3() {
- let protoset: ProtoSet = ProtoSet::from_slice(&[(0, 3)]).unwrap();
+ fn test_protoset_contains_1_3() {
+ let protoset: ProtoSet = ProtoSet::from_slice(&[(1, 3)]).unwrap();
- for x in 0..4 {
+ for x in 1..4 {
assert!(protoset.contains(&x), format!("should contain {}", x));
}
}
@@ -640,8 +639,8 @@ mod test {
}
#[test]
- fn test_protoset_from_vec_0_315() {
- assert_protoset_from_vec_contains_all!(0, 1, 2, 3, 15);
+ fn test_protoset_from_vec_1_315() {
+ assert_protoset_from_vec_contains_all!(1, 2, 3, 15);
}
#[test]
diff --git a/src/rust/protover/protover.rs b/src/rust/protover/protover.rs
index 157027750f..8f99a8a8eb 100644
--- a/src/rust/protover/protover.rs
+++ b/src/rust/protover/protover.rs
@@ -862,10 +862,10 @@ mod test {
#[test]
fn test_protoentry_all_supported_unsupported_low_version() {
- let protocols: UnvalidatedProtoEntry = "Cons=0-1".parse().unwrap();
+ let protocols: UnvalidatedProtoEntry = "HSIntro=2-3".parse().unwrap();
let unsupported: Option<UnvalidatedProtoEntry> = protocols.all_supported();
assert_eq!(true, unsupported.is_some());
- assert_eq!("Cons=0", &unsupported.unwrap().to_string());
+ assert_eq!("HSIntro=2", &unsupported.unwrap().to_string());
}
#[test]
diff --git a/src/rust/protover/tests/protover.rs b/src/rust/protover/tests/protover.rs
index a091e692d6..5d6c2c9e70 100644
--- a/src/rust/protover/tests/protover.rs
+++ b/src/rust/protover/tests/protover.rs
@@ -106,10 +106,10 @@ fn protocol_all_supported_with_unsupported_versions() {
#[test]
fn protocol_all_supported_with_unsupported_low_version() {
- let protocols: UnvalidatedProtoEntry = "Cons=0-1".parse().unwrap();
+ let protocols: UnvalidatedProtoEntry = "HSIntro=2-3".parse().unwrap();
let unsupported: Option<UnvalidatedProtoEntry> = protocols.all_supported();
assert_eq!(true, unsupported.is_some());
- assert_eq!("Cons=0", &unsupported.unwrap().to_string());
+ assert_eq!("HSIntro=2", &unsupported.unwrap().to_string());
}
#[test]
@@ -364,18 +364,18 @@ fn protover_all_supported_should_exclude_some_versions_and_entire_protocols() {
#[test]
fn protover_all_supported_should_not_dos_anyones_computer() {
- let proto: UnvalidatedProtoEntry = "Sleen=0-2147483648".parse().unwrap();
+ let proto: UnvalidatedProtoEntry = "Sleen=1-2147483648".parse().unwrap();
let result: String = proto.all_supported().unwrap().to_string();
- assert_eq!(result, "Sleen=0-2147483648".to_string());
+ assert_eq!(result, "Sleen=1-2147483648".to_string());
}
#[test]
fn protover_all_supported_should_not_dos_anyones_computer_max_versions() {
- let proto: UnvalidatedProtoEntry = "Sleen=0-4294967294".parse().unwrap();
+ let proto: UnvalidatedProtoEntry = "Sleen=1-4294967294".parse().unwrap();
let result: String = proto.all_supported().unwrap().to_string();
- assert_eq!(result, "Sleen=0-4294967294".to_string());
+ assert_eq!(result, "Sleen=1-4294967294".to_string());
}
#[test]
@@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ fn protover_unvalidatedprotoentry_should_err_entirely_unparseable_things() {
#[test]
fn protover_all_supported_over_maximum_limit() {
- let proto: Result<UnvalidatedProtoEntry, ProtoverError> = "Sleen=0-4294967295".parse();
+ let proto: Result<UnvalidatedProtoEntry, ProtoverError> = "Sleen=1-4294967295".parse();
assert_eq!(Err(ProtoverError::ExceedsMax), proto);
}
diff --git a/src/test/test_protover.c b/src/test/test_protover.c
index 38bc02f1d7..9a2b6f6be3 100644
--- a/src/test/test_protover.c
+++ b/src/test/test_protover.c
@@ -298,13 +298,13 @@ test_protover_all_supported(void *arg)
tor_free(msg);
/* We shouldn't be able to DoS ourselves parsing a large range. */
- tt_assert(! protover_all_supported("Sleen=0-2147483648", &msg));
- tt_str_op(msg, OP_EQ, "Sleen=0-2147483648");
+ tt_assert(! protover_all_supported("Sleen=1-2147483648", &msg));
+ tt_str_op(msg, OP_EQ, "Sleen=1-2147483648");
tor_free(msg);
/* This case is allowed. */
- tt_assert(! protover_all_supported("Sleen=0-4294967294", &msg));
- tt_str_op(msg, OP_EQ, "Sleen=0-4294967294");
+ tt_assert(! protover_all_supported("Sleen=1-4294967294", &msg));
+ tt_str_op(msg, OP_EQ, "Sleen=1-4294967294");
tor_free(msg);
/* If we get a (barely) valid (but unsupported list, we say "yes, that's
@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ test_protover_all_supported(void *arg)
/* If we get a completely unparseable list, protover_all_supported should
* hit a fatal assertion for BUG(entries == NULL). */
tor_capture_bugs_(1);
- tt_assert(protover_all_supported("Sleen=0-4294967295", &msg));
+ tt_assert(protover_all_supported("Sleen=1-4294967295", &msg));
tor_end_capture_bugs_();
/* Protocol name too long */
@@ -556,11 +556,11 @@ test_protover_vote_roundtrip(void *args)
{ "Zn=4294967295-1", NULL },
{ "Zn=4294967293-4294967295", NULL },
/* Will fail because of 4294967295. */
- { "Foo=1,3 Bar=3 Baz= Quux=9-12,14,15-16,900 Zn=0,4294967295",
+ { "Foo=1,3 Bar=3 Baz= Quux=9-12,14,15-16,900 Zn=1,4294967295",
NULL },
- { "Foo=1,3 Bar=3 Baz= Quux=9-12,14,15-16,900 Zn=0,4294967294",
- "Bar=3 Foo=1,3 Quux=9-12,14-16,900 Zn=0,4294967294" },
- { "Zu16=0,65536", "Zu16=0,65536" },
+ { "Foo=1,3 Bar=3 Baz= Quux=9-12,14,15-16,900 Zn=1,4294967294",
+ "Bar=3 Foo=1,3 Quux=9-12,14-16,900 Zn=1,4294967294" },
+ { "Zu16=1,65536", "Zu16=1,65536" },
{ "N-1=1,2", "N-1=1-2" },
{ "-1=4294967295", NULL },
{ "-1=3", "-1=3" },
@@ -597,9 +597,9 @@ test_protover_vote_roundtrip(void *args)
{ "Sleen=1-501", "Sleen=1-501" },
{ "Sleen=1-65537", NULL },
/* Both C/Rust implementations should be able to handle this mild DoS. */
- { "Sleen=0-2147483648", NULL },
+ { "Sleen=1-2147483648", NULL },
/* Rust tests are built in debug mode, so ints are bounds-checked. */
- { "Sleen=0-4294967295", NULL },
+ { "Sleen=1-4294967295", NULL },
};
unsigned u;
smartlist_t *votes = smartlist_new();
diff --git a/src/test/test_tortls_openssl.c b/src/test/test_tortls_openssl.c
index 6086252882..abe1fb7889 100644
--- a/src/test/test_tortls_openssl.c
+++ b/src/test/test_tortls_openssl.c
@@ -1007,6 +1007,7 @@ test_tortls_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(void *ignored)
tt_assert(cert == c1);
tt_assert(id_cert);
X509_free(cert); /* decrease refcnt */
+ X509_free(id_cert); /* decrease refcnt */
done:
sk_X509_free(sess->cert_chain);
@@ -1848,16 +1849,44 @@ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate(crypto_pk_t *rsa,
(void)cname;
(void)cname_sign;
(void)cert_lifetime;
- return fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[
+ X509 *result = fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[
fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result_index++];
+ if (result)
+ return X509_dup(result);
+ else
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void
+fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_results_free(void)
+{
+ unsigned i;
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_LENGTH(fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result); ++i) {
+ X509 *cert = fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[i];
+ if (cert)
+ X509_free(cert);
+ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[i] = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_results_free(void)
+{
+ unsigned i;
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_LENGTH(fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result); ++i) {
+ tor_x509_cert_free(fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[i]);
+ }
}
static tor_x509_cert_t *
fixed_tor_x509_cert_new(tor_x509_cert_impl_t *x509_cert)
{
(void) x509_cert;
- return fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[
- fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result_index++];
+ tor_x509_cert_t **certp =
+ &fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result_index++];
+ tor_x509_cert_t *cert = *certp;
+ *certp = NULL;
+ return cert;
}
static void
@@ -1937,6 +1966,7 @@ test_tortls_context_new(void *ignored)
fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[2] = X509_new();
ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0);
tt_assert(!ret);
+ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_results_free();
fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0;
fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk7;
@@ -1949,6 +1979,7 @@ test_tortls_context_new(void *ignored)
fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[2] = X509_new();
ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0);
tt_assert(!ret);
+ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_results_free();
fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0;
fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk9;
@@ -1961,6 +1992,7 @@ test_tortls_context_new(void *ignored)
fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[2] = NULL;
ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0);
tt_assert(!ret);
+ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_results_free();
MOCK(tor_x509_cert_new, fixed_tor_x509_cert_new);
fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0;
@@ -1978,6 +2010,7 @@ test_tortls_context_new(void *ignored)
fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[2] = NULL;
ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0);
tt_assert(!ret);
+ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_results_free();
fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0;
fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk13;
@@ -1994,6 +2027,8 @@ test_tortls_context_new(void *ignored)
fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[2] = NULL;
ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0);
tt_assert(!ret);
+ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_results_free();
+ fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_results_free();
fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0;
fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk15;
@@ -2010,6 +2045,8 @@ test_tortls_context_new(void *ignored)
fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[2] = NULL;
ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0);
tt_assert(!ret);
+ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_results_free();
+ fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_results_free();
fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0;
fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk17;
@@ -2028,6 +2065,8 @@ test_tortls_context_new(void *ignored)
tt_assert(!ret);
done:
+ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_results_free();
+ fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_results_free();
UNMOCK(tor_x509_cert_new);
UNMOCK(tor_tls_create_certificate);
UNMOCK(crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits);
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