diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | changes/bug9366 | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | changes/bug9543 | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | changes/bug9546 | 11 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/channeltls.c | 14 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/config.c | 17 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/connection_or.c | 9 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/or.h | 3 |
7 files changed, 59 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/changes/bug9366 b/changes/bug9366 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..acc919e77f --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug9366 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor features (usability): + - Warn and fail if a server is configured not to advertise any + ORPorts at all. (We need *something* to put in our descriptor, or + we just won't work.) diff --git a/changes/bug9543 b/changes/bug9543 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..753947f6fd --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug9543 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - Avoid overflows when the user sets MaxCircuitDirtiness to a + ridiculously high value, by imposing a (ridiculously high) 30-day + maximum on MaxCircuitDirtiness. diff --git a/changes/bug9546 b/changes/bug9546 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2145e35d8f --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug9546 @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ + o Major bugfixes: + + - When a relay is extending a circuit to a bridge, it needs to send a + NETINFO cell, even when the bridge hasn't sent an AUTH_CHALLENGE + cell. Fixes bug 9546; bugfix on 0.2.3.6-alpha. + + - Bridges send AUTH_CHALLENGE cells during their handshakes; previously + they did not, which prevented relays from successfully connecting + to a bridge for self-test or bandwidth testing. Fixes bug 9546; + bugfix on 0.2.3.6-alpha. + diff --git a/src/or/channeltls.c b/src/or/channeltls.c index 7303c5a721..ca9e10b3fc 100644 --- a/src/or/channeltls.c +++ b/src/or/channeltls.c @@ -1289,8 +1289,8 @@ channel_tls_process_versions_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan) const int send_versions = !started_here; /* If we want to authenticate, send a CERTS cell */ const int send_certs = !started_here || public_server_mode(get_options()); - /* If we're a relay that got a connection, ask for authentication. */ - const int send_chall = !started_here && public_server_mode(get_options()); + /* If we're a host that got a connection, ask for authentication. */ + const int send_chall = !started_here; /* If our certs cell will authenticate us, we can send a netinfo cell * right now. */ const int send_netinfo = !started_here; @@ -1501,6 +1501,16 @@ channel_tls_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan) /* XXX maybe act on my_apparent_addr, if the source is sufficiently * trustworthy. */ + if (! chan->conn->handshake_state->sent_netinfo) { + /* If we were prepared to authenticate, but we never got an AUTH_CHALLENGE + * cell, then we would not previously have sent a NETINFO cell. Do so + * now. */ + if (connection_or_send_netinfo(chan->conn) < 0) { + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } + } + if (connection_or_set_state_open(chan->conn) < 0) { log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, "Got good NETINFO cell from %s:%d; but " diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index e746da220a..657bc60396 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -2326,6 +2326,10 @@ compute_publishserverdescriptor(or_options_t *options) * will generate too many circuits and potentially overload the network. */ #define MIN_MAX_CIRCUIT_DIRTINESS 10 +/** Highest allowable value for MaxCircuitDirtiness: prevents time_t + * overflows. */ +#define MAX_MAX_CIRCUIT_DIRTINESS (30*24*60*60) + /** Lowest allowable value for CircuitStreamTimeout; if this is too low, Tor * will generate too many circuits and potentially overload the network. */ #define MIN_CIRCUIT_STREAM_TIMEOUT 10 @@ -2847,6 +2851,12 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, options->MaxCircuitDirtiness = MIN_MAX_CIRCUIT_DIRTINESS; } + if (options->MaxCircuitDirtiness > MAX_MAX_CIRCUIT_DIRTINESS) { + log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "MaxCircuitDirtiness option is too high; " + "setting to %d days.", MAX_MAX_CIRCUIT_DIRTINESS/86400); + options->MaxCircuitDirtiness = MAX_MAX_CIRCUIT_DIRTINESS; + } + if (options->CircuitStreamTimeout && options->CircuitStreamTimeout < MIN_CIRCUIT_STREAM_TIMEOUT) { log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "CircuitStreamTimeout option is too short; " @@ -5830,6 +5840,13 @@ check_server_ports(const smartlist_t *ports, "listening on one."); r = -1; } + if (n_orport_listeners && !n_orport_advertised) { + log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "We are listening on an ORPort, but not advertising " + "any ORPorts. This will keep us from building a %s " + "descriptor, and make us impossible to use.", + options->BridgeRelay ? "bridge" : "router"); + r = -1; + } if (n_dirport_advertised && !n_dirport_listeners) { log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "We are advertising a DirPort, but not actually " "listening on one."); diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index 7912bfb7fc..120f732ce6 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -2112,6 +2112,12 @@ connection_or_send_netinfo(or_connection_t *conn) tor_assert(conn->handshake_state); + if (conn->handshake_state->sent_netinfo) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Attempted to send an extra netinfo cell on a connection " + "where we already sent one."); + return 0; + } + memset(&cell, 0, sizeof(cell_t)); cell.command = CELL_NETINFO; @@ -2153,6 +2159,7 @@ connection_or_send_netinfo(or_connection_t *conn) } conn->handshake_state->digest_sent_data = 0; + conn->handshake_state->sent_netinfo = 1; connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(&cell, conn); return 0; @@ -2281,7 +2288,7 @@ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn, const tor_cert_t *id_cert=NULL, *link_cert=NULL; const digests_t *my_digests, *their_digests; const uint8_t *my_id, *their_id, *client_id, *server_id; - if (tor_tls_get_my_certs(0, &link_cert, &id_cert)) + if (tor_tls_get_my_certs(server, &link_cert, &id_cert)) return -1; my_digests = tor_cert_get_id_digests(id_cert); their_digests = tor_cert_get_id_digests(conn->handshake_state->id_cert); diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 041421ed42..922ae4cb91 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -1399,6 +1399,9 @@ typedef struct or_handshake_state_t { /* True iff we've received valid authentication to some identity. */ unsigned int authenticated : 1; + /* True iff we have sent a netinfo cell */ + unsigned int sent_netinfo : 1; + /** True iff we should feed outgoing cells into digest_sent and * digest_received respectively. * |