diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/buffers.c | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/circuituse.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/connection.c | 12 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/dns.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/geoip.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/main.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/networkstatus.c | 8 |
7 files changed, 11 insertions, 29 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/buffers.c b/src/or/buffers.c index ecbbdc1f03..17d5b3a9a6 100644 --- a/src/or/buffers.c +++ b/src/or/buffers.c @@ -1083,14 +1083,6 @@ buf_find_pos_of_char(char ch, buf_pos_t *out) tor_assert(out); if (out->chunk) { if (out->chunk->datalen) { - /*XXXX020 remove this once the bug it detects is fixed. */ - if (!(out->pos < (off_t)out->chunk->datalen)) { - log_warn(LD_BUG, "About to assert. %p, %d, %d, %p, %d.", - out, (int)out->pos, - (int)out->chunk_pos, out->chunk, - out->chunk?(int)out->chunk->datalen : (int)-1 - ); - } tor_assert(out->pos < (off_t)out->chunk->datalen); } else { tor_assert(out->pos == 0); diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index 42a7aac6e8..6e2c96392e 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ circuit_get_best(edge_connection_t *conn, int must_be_open, uint8_t purpose, /** Check whether, according to the policies in <b>options</b>, the * circuit <b>circ makes sense. */ -/* XXXX021 currently only checks Exclude{Exit}Nodes. */ +/* XXXX currently only checks Exclude{Exit}Nodes. It should check more. */ int circuit_conforms_to_options(const origin_circuit_t *circ, const or_options_t *options) @@ -933,7 +933,7 @@ circuit_launch_by_extend_info(uint8_t purpose, if ((extend_info || purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL) && purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING && !onehop_tunnel) { /* see if there are appropriate circs available to cannibalize. */ - /* XXX020 if we're planning to add a hop, perhaps we want to look for + /* XXX if we're planning to add a hop, perhaps we want to look for * internal circs rather than exit circs? -RD */ circ = circuit_find_to_cannibalize(purpose, extend_info, flags); if (circ) { diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index c540dbf311..7090e9135b 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -1990,16 +1990,6 @@ loop_again: /* The other side's handle_write will never actually get called, so * we need to invoke the appropriate callbacks ourself. */ connection_t *linked = conn->linked_conn; - /* XXXX020 Do we need to ensure that this stuff is called even if - * conn dies in a way that causes us to return -1 earlier? -NM - * No idea. -RD */ - /* Actually, I'm pretty sure not. The big things here are to - * tell the linked connection, "yes, you wrote some stuff!" so that - * it can succeed as a appropriate. But if this side of the link - * returned -1, then it couldn't process the data it got. That's - * fairly rare, and doesn't really count as "success" for the other - * side. -NM - */ if (n_read) { /* Probably a no-op, but hey. */ @@ -2043,7 +2033,7 @@ connection_read_to_buf(connection_t *conn, int *max_to_read, int *socket_error) if (at_most == -1) { /* we need to initialize it */ /* how many bytes are we allowed to read? */ - /* XXXX020 too many calls to time(). Do they hurt? */ + /* XXXX too many calls to time(). Do they hurt? */ at_most = connection_bucket_read_limit(conn, time(NULL)); } diff --git a/src/or/dns.c b/src/or/dns.c index 9f22e28f01..490444f752 100644 --- a/src/or/dns.c +++ b/src/or/dns.c @@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ dns_resolve(edge_connection_t *exitconn) if (!exitconn->_base.marked_for_close) { connection_free(TO_CONN(exitconn)); - //XXX020 ... and we just leak exitconn otherwise? -RD + // XXX ... and we just leak exitconn otherwise? -RD // If it's marked for close, it's on closeable_connection_lst in // main.c. If it's on the closeable list, it will get freed from // main.c. -NM @@ -1015,7 +1015,7 @@ dns_found_answer(const char *address, uint8_t is_reverse, uint32_t addr, assert_resolve_ok(resolve); if (resolve->state != CACHE_STATE_PENDING) { - /* XXXX020 Maybe update addr? or check addr for consistency? Or let + /* XXXX Maybe update addr? or check addr for consistency? Or let * VALID replace FAILED? */ int is_test_addr = is_test_address(address); if (!is_test_addr) diff --git a/src/or/geoip.c b/src/or/geoip.c index a4c1e2794d..055b977f3b 100644 --- a/src/or/geoip.c +++ b/src/or/geoip.c @@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ geoip_load_file(const char *filename, or_options_t *options) /* FFFF track full country name. */ geoip_parse_entry(buf); } - /*XXXX020 abort and return -1 if no entries/illformed?*/ + /*XXXX abort and return -1 if no entries/illformed?*/ fclose(f); smartlist_sort(geoip_entries, _geoip_compare_entries); diff --git a/src/or/main.c b/src/or/main.c index 3427cfd292..762e14f801 100644 --- a/src/or/main.c +++ b/src/or/main.c @@ -958,7 +958,7 @@ run_scheduled_events(time_t now) */ if (time_to_check_for_expired_networkstatus < now) { networkstatus_t *ns = networkstatus_get_latest_consensus(); - /*XXXX020 this value needs to be the same as REASONABLY_LIVE_TIME in + /*XXXX RD: This value needs to be the same as REASONABLY_LIVE_TIME in * networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus(), but that value is way * way too high. Arma: is the bridge issue there resolved yet? -NM */ #define NS_EXPIRY_SLOP (24*60*60) diff --git a/src/or/networkstatus.c b/src/or/networkstatus.c index e1488adfcb..b325e5620d 100644 --- a/src/or/networkstatus.c +++ b/src/or/networkstatus.c @@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ router_reload_consensus_networkstatus(void) or_options_t *options = get_options(); const unsigned int flags = NSSET_FROM_CACHE | NSSET_DONT_DOWNLOAD_CERTS; - /* XXXX020 Suppress warnings if cached consensus is bad. */ + /* FFFF Suppress warnings if cached consensus is bad? */ filename = get_datadir_fname("cached-consensus"); s = read_file_to_str(filename, RFTS_IGNORE_MISSING, NULL); @@ -1024,7 +1024,7 @@ update_v2_networkstatus_cache_downloads(time_t now) if (connection_get_by_type_addr_port_purpose( CONN_TYPE_DIR, &addr, ds->dir_port, DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_V2_NETWORKSTATUS)) { - /* XXX020 the above dir_port won't be accurate if we're + /* XXX the above dir_port won't be accurate if we're * doing a tunneled conn. In that case it should be or_port. * How to guess from here? Maybe make the function less general * and have it know that it's looking for dir conns. -RD */ @@ -1082,7 +1082,7 @@ update_consensus_networkstatus_downloads(time_t now) return; /* There's an in-progress download.*/ if (consensus_waiting_for_certs) { - /* XXXX020 make sure this doesn't delay sane downloads. */ + /* XXXX make sure this doesn't delay sane downloads. */ if (consensus_waiting_for_certs_set_at + DELAY_WHILE_FETCHING_CERTS > now) return; /* We're still getting certs for this one. */ else { @@ -1252,7 +1252,7 @@ networkstatus_get_live_consensus(time_t now) return NULL; } -/* XXXX020 remove this in favor of get_live_consensus. But actually, +/* XXXX remove this in favor of get_live_consensus. But actually, * leave something like it for bridge users, who need to not totally * lose if they spend a while fetching a new consensus. */ /** As networkstatus_get_live_consensus(), but is way more tolerant of expired |