diff options
66 files changed, 1337 insertions, 411 deletions
@@ -1,3 +1,187 @@ +Changes in version 0.3.1.4-alpha - 2017-06-29 + Tor 0.3.1.4-alpha fixes a path selection bug that would allow a client + to use a guard that was in the same network family as a chosen exit + relay. This is a security regression; all clients running earlier + versions of 0.3.0.x or 0.3.1.x should upgrade to 0.3.0.9 + or 0.3.1.4-alpha. + + This release also fixes several other bugs introduced in 0.3.0.x + and 0.3.1.x, including others that can affect bandwidth usage + and correctness. + + o New dependencies: + - To build with zstd and lzma support, Tor now requires the + pkg-config tool at build time. (This requirement was new in + 0.3.1.1-alpha, but was not noted at the time. Noting it here to + close ticket 22623.) + + o Major bugfixes (path selection, security): + - When choosing which guard to use for a circuit, avoid the exit's + family along with the exit itself. Previously, the new guard + selection logic avoided the exit, but did not consider its family. + Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016- + 006 and CVE-2017-0377. + + o Major bugfixes (compression, zstd): + - Correctly detect a full buffer when decompressing a large zstd- + compressed input. Previously, we would sometimes treat a full + buffer as an error. Fixes bug 22628; bugfix on 0.3.1.1-alpha. + + o Major bugfixes (directory protocol): + - Ensure that we send "304 Not modified" as HTTP status code when a + client is attempting to fetch a consensus or consensus diff, and + the best one we can send them is one they already have. Fixes bug + 22702; bugfix on 0.3.1.1-alpha. + + o Major bugfixes (entry guards): + - When starting with an old consensus, do not add new entry guards + unless the consensus is "reasonably live" (under 1 day old). Fixes + one root cause of bug 22400; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. + + o Minor features (bug mitigation, diagnostics, logging): + - Avoid an assertion failure, and log a better error message, when + unable to remove a file from the consensus cache on Windows. + Attempts to mitigate and diagnose bug 22752. + + o Minor features (geoip): + - Update geoip and geoip6 to the June 8 2017 Maxmind GeoLite2 + Country database. + + o Minor bugfixes (compression): + - When compressing or decompressing a buffer, check for a failure to + create a compression object. Fixes bug 22626; bugfix + on 0.3.1.1-alpha. + - When decompressing a buffer, check for extra data after the end of + the compressed data. Fixes bug 22629; bugfix on 0.3.1.1-alpha. + - When decompressing an object received over an anonymous directory + connection, if we have already decompressed it using an acceptable + compression method, do not reject it for looking like an + unacceptable compression method. Fixes part of bug 22670; bugfix + on 0.3.1.1-alpha. + - When serving directory votes compressed with zlib, do not claim to + have compressed them with zstd. Fixes bug 22669; bugfix + on 0.3.1.1-alpha. + - When spooling compressed data to an output buffer, don't try to + spool more data when there is no more data to spool and we are not + trying to flush the input. Previously, we would sometimes launch + compression requests with nothing to do, which interferes with our + 22672 checks. Fixes bug 22719; bugfix on 0.2.0.16-alpha. + + o Minor bugfixes (defensive programming): + - Detect and break out of infinite loops in our compression code. We + don't think that any such loops exist now, but it's best to be + safe. Closes ticket 22672. + - Fix a memset() off the end of an array when packing cells. This + bug should be harmless in practice, since the corrupted bytes are + still in the same structure, and are always padding bytes, + ignored, or immediately overwritten, depending on compiler + behavior. Nevertheless, because the memset()'s purpose is to make + sure that any other cell-handling bugs can't expose bytes to the + network, we need to fix it. Fixes bug 22737; bugfix on + 0.2.4.11-alpha. Fixes CID 1401591. + + o Minor bugfixes (linux seccomp2 sandbox): + - Permit the fchmod system call, to avoid crashing on startup when + starting with the seccomp2 sandbox and an unexpected set of + permissions on the data directory or its contents. Fixes bug + 22516; bugfix on 0.2.5.4-alpha. + - Fix a crash in the LZMA module, when the sandbox was enabled, and + liblzma would allocate more than 16 MB of memory. We solve this by + bumping the mprotect() limit in the sandbox module from 16 MB to + 20 MB. Fixes bug 22751; bugfix on 0.3.1.1-alpha. + + o Minor bugfixes (logging): + - When decompressing, do not warn if we fail to decompress using a + compression method that we merely guessed. Fixes part of bug + 22670; bugfix on 0.1.1.14-alpha. + - When decompressing, treat mismatch between content-encoding and + actual compression type as a protocol warning. Fixes part of bug + 22670; bugfix on 0.1.1.9-alpha. + - Downgrade "assigned_to_cpuworker failed" message to info-level + severity. In every case that can reach it, either a better warning + has already been logged, or no warning is warranted. Fixes bug + 22356; bugfix on 0.2.6.3-alpha. + - Demote a warn that was caused by libevent delays to info if + netflow padding is less than 4.5 seconds late, or to notice + if it is more (4.5 seconds is the amount of time that a netflow + record might be emitted after, if we chose the maximum timeout). + Fixes bug 22212; bugfix on 0.3.1.1-alpha. + + o Minor bugfixes (process behavior): + - When exiting because of an error, always exit with a nonzero exit + status. Previously, we would fail to report an error in our exit + status in cases related to __OwningControllerProcess failure, + lockfile contention, and Ed25519 key initialization. Fixes bug + 22720; bugfix on versions 0.2.1.6-alpha, 0.2.2.28-beta, and + 0.2.7.2-alpha respectively. Reported by "f55jwk4f"; patch + from "huyvq". + + o Documentation: + - Add a manpage description for the key-pinning-journal file. Closes + ticket 22347. + - Correctly note that bandwidth accounting values are stored in the + state file, and the bw_accounting file is now obsolete. Closes + ticket 16082. + - Document more of the files in the Tor data directory, including + cached-extrainfo, secret_onion_key{,_ntor}.old, hidserv-stats, + approved-routers, sr-random, and diff-cache. Found while fixing + ticket 22347. + + +Changes in version 0.3.0.9 - 2017-06-29 + Tor 0.3.0.9 fixes a path selection bug that would allow a client + to use a guard that was in the same network family as a chosen exit + relay. This is a security regression; all clients running earlier + versions of 0.3.0.x or 0.3.1.x should upgrade to 0.3.0.9 or + 0.3.1.4-alpha. + + This release also backports several other bugfixes from the 0.3.1.x + series. + + o Major bugfixes (path selection, security, backport from 0.3.1.4-alpha): + - When choosing which guard to use for a circuit, avoid the exit's + family along with the exit itself. Previously, the new guard + selection logic avoided the exit, but did not consider its family. + Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016- + 006 and CVE-2017-0377. + + o Major bugfixes (entry guards, backport from 0.3.1.1-alpha): + - Don't block bootstrapping when a primary bridge is offline and we + can't get its descriptor. Fixes bug 22325; fixes one case of bug + 21969; bugfix on 0.3.0.3-alpha. + + o Major bugfixes (entry guards, backport from 0.3.1.4-alpha): + - When starting with an old consensus, do not add new entry guards + unless the consensus is "reasonably live" (under 1 day old). Fixes + one root cause of bug 22400; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. + + o Minor features (geoip): + - Update geoip and geoip6 to the June 8 2017 Maxmind GeoLite2 + Country database. + + o Minor bugfixes (voting consistency, backport from 0.3.1.1-alpha): + - Reject version numbers with non-numeric prefixes (such as +, -, or + whitespace). Disallowing whitespace prevents differential version + parsing between POSIX-based and Windows platforms. Fixes bug 21507 + and part of 21508; bugfix on 0.0.8pre1. + + o Minor bugfixes (linux seccomp2 sandbox, backport from 0.3.1.4-alpha): + - Permit the fchmod system call, to avoid crashing on startup when + starting with the seccomp2 sandbox and an unexpected set of + permissions on the data directory or its contents. Fixes bug + 22516; bugfix on 0.2.5.4-alpha. + + o Minor bugfixes (defensive programming, backport from 0.3.1.4-alpha): + - Fix a memset() off the end of an array when packing cells. This + bug should be harmless in practice, since the corrupted bytes are + still in the same structure, and are always padding bytes, + ignored, or immediately overwritten, depending on compiler + behavior. Nevertheless, because the memset()'s purpose is to make + sure that any other cell-handling bugs can't expose bytes to the + network, we need to fix it. Fixes bug 22737; bugfix on + 0.2.4.11-alpha. Fixes CID 1401591. + + Changes in version 0.3.1.3-alpha - 2017-06-08 Tor 0.3.1.3-alpha fixes a pair of bugs that would allow an attacker to remotely crash a hidden service with an assertion failure. Anyone @@ -1996,7 +2180,7 @@ Changes in version 0.3.0.1-alpha - 2016-12-19 subprotocol-versions mechanism, so that clients can tell which relays can identity themselves by Ed25519 ID. Closes ticket 20552. - o Minor features (fingerprinting resistence, authentication): + o Minor features (fingerprinting resistance, authentication): - Extend the length of RSA keys used for TLS link authentication to 2048 bits. (These weren't used for forward secrecy; for forward secrecy, we used P256.) Closes ticket 13752. @@ -5062,7 +5246,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.6.8 - 2015-05-21 o Major bugfixes (hidden services, backport from 0.2.7.1-alpha): - Revert commit that made directory authorities assign the HSDir - flag to relay without a DirPort; this was bad because such relays + flag to relays without a DirPort; this was bad because such relays can't handle BEGIN_DIR cells. Fixes bug 15850; bugfix on 0.2.6.3-alpha. @@ -5103,7 +5287,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.7.1-alpha - 2015-05-12 o Major bugfixes (hidden services): - Revert commit that made directory authorities assign the HSDir - flag to relay without a DirPort; this was bad because such relays + flag to relays without a DirPort; this was bad because such relays can't handle BEGIN_DIR cells. Fixes bug 15850; bugfix on 0.2.6.3-alpha. diff --git a/ReleaseNotes b/ReleaseNotes index 1e56ffaf89..80c3e4c72d 100644 --- a/ReleaseNotes +++ b/ReleaseNotes @@ -2,6 +2,60 @@ This document summarizes new features and bugfixes in each stable release of Tor. If you want to see more detailed descriptions of the changes in each development snapshot, see the ChangeLog file. +Changes in version 0.3.0.9 - 2017-06-29 + Tor 0.3.0.9 fixes a path selection bug that would allow a client + to use a guard that was in the same network family as a chosen exit + relay. This is a security regression; all clients running earlier + versions of 0.3.0.x or 0.3.1.x should upgrade to 0.3.0.9 or + 0.3.1.4-alpha. + + This release also backports several other bugfixes from the 0.3.1.x + series. + + o Major bugfixes (path selection, security, backport from 0.3.1.4-alpha): + - When choosing which guard to use for a circuit, avoid the exit's + family along with the exit itself. Previously, the new guard + selection logic avoided the exit, but did not consider its family. + Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016- + 006 and CVE-2017-0377. + + o Major bugfixes (entry guards, backport from 0.3.1.1-alpha): + - Don't block bootstrapping when a primary bridge is offline and we + can't get its descriptor. Fixes bug 22325; fixes one case of bug + 21969; bugfix on 0.3.0.3-alpha. + + o Major bugfixes (entry guards, backport from 0.3.1.4-alpha): + - When starting with an old consensus, do not add new entry guards + unless the consensus is "reasonably live" (under 1 day old). Fixes + one root cause of bug 22400; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. + + o Minor features (geoip): + - Update geoip and geoip6 to the June 8 2017 Maxmind GeoLite2 + Country database. + + o Minor bugfixes (voting consistency, backport from 0.3.1.1-alpha): + - Reject version numbers with non-numeric prefixes (such as +, -, or + whitespace). Disallowing whitespace prevents differential version + parsing between POSIX-based and Windows platforms. Fixes bug 21507 + and part of 21508; bugfix on 0.0.8pre1. + + o Minor bugfixes (linux seccomp2 sandbox, backport from 0.3.1.4-alpha): + - Permit the fchmod system call, to avoid crashing on startup when + starting with the seccomp2 sandbox and an unexpected set of + permissions on the data directory or its contents. Fixes bug + 22516; bugfix on 0.2.5.4-alpha. + + o Minor bugfixes (defensive programming, backport from 0.3.1.4-alpha): + - Fix a memset() off the end of an array when packing cells. This + bug should be harmless in practice, since the corrupted bytes are + still in the same structure, and are always padding bytes, + ignored, or immediately overwritten, depending on compiler + behavior. Nevertheless, because the memset()'s purpose is to make + sure that any other cell-handling bugs can't expose bytes to the + network, we need to fix it. Fixes bug 22737; bugfix on + 0.2.4.11-alpha. Fixes CID 1401591. + + Changes in version 0.3.0.8 - 2017-06-08 Tor 0.3.0.8 fixes a pair of bugs that would allow an attacker to remotely crash a hidden service with an assertion failure. Anyone @@ -538,7 +592,7 @@ Changes in version 0.3.0.6 - 2017-04-26 - Select 200 fallback directories for each release. Closes ticket 20881. - o Minor features (fingerprinting resistence, authentication): + o Minor features (fingerprinting resistance, authentication): - Extend the length of RSA keys used for TLS link authentication to 2048 bits. (These weren't used for forward secrecy; for forward secrecy, we used P256.) Closes ticket 13752. @@ -3185,7 +3239,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.7.5 - 2015-11-20 o Major bugfixes (hidden services): - Revert commit that made directory authorities assign the HSDir - flag to relay without a DirPort; this was bad because such relays + flag to relays without a DirPort; this was bad because such relays can't handle BEGIN_DIR cells. Fixes bug 15850; bugfix on 0.2.6.3-alpha. - When cannibalizing a circuit for an introduction point, always @@ -3800,7 +3854,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.6.8 - 2015-05-21 o Major bugfixes (hidden services, backport from 0.2.7.1-alpha): - Revert commit that made directory authorities assign the HSDir - flag to relay without a DirPort; this was bad because such relays + flag to relays without a DirPort; this was bad because such relays can't handle BEGIN_DIR cells. Fixes bug 15850; bugfix on 0.2.6.3-alpha. diff --git a/changes/15554 b/changes/15554 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c7ae7e5579 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/15554 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor features (testing): + - Add a unit test to verify that we can parse a hardcoded v2 + hidden service descriptor. Closes ticket 15554. + diff --git a/changes/bug1667 b/changes/bug1667 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..368f9e35b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug1667 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor features (control port): + - If the control port is used as the HTTP proxy, responds with + a meaningful "This is the Tor control port" message, and log + the event. Closes ticket 1667. Patch from Ravi Chandra Padmala. diff --git a/changes/bug22006 b/changes/bug22006 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..912bdd87bd --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug22006 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor features (ed25519): + - Add validation function that checks for torsion components in ed25119 + public keys. Currently unused but will be used by prop224 client-side + code. Addresses ticket #22006. Math help by Ian Goldberg. diff --git a/changes/bug22410 b/changes/bug22410 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..678a26dce6 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug22410 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (portability): + - Check at configure time whether uint8_t is unsigned char. Lots + of existing code already assumes this, and there could be strict + aliasing issues if they aren't the same type. Fixes #22410. diff --git a/changes/bug22461 b/changes/bug22461 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5454682810 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug22461 @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (client, usability): + - Refrain from needlessly rejecting SOCKS5-with-hostnames and SOCKS4a + requests that contain IP address strings, even when SafeSocks in + enabled, as this prevents user from connecting to known IP addresses + without relying on DNS for resolving. SafeSocks still rejects SOCKS + connections that connect to IP addresses when those addresses are _not_ + encoded as hostnames. Fixes bug 22461, bugfix on Tor 0.2.6.2-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug22746 b/changes/bug22746 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b036460c30 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug22746 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (crypto): + - Properly detect and refuse to blind bad ed25519 keys. The key blinding + code is currently unused, so this bug does not affect tor clients or + services on the network. Fixes bug 22746; bugfix on 0.2.6.1-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug22750 b/changes/bug22750 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..426cae6f1e --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug22750 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (linux seccomp2 sandbox, logging): + - Fix some messages on unexpected errors from the seccomp2 + library. Fixes bug 22750; bugfix on 0.2.5.1-alpha. Patch + from "cypherpunks". + diff --git a/changes/bug3056 b/changes/bug3056 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..62bec20d51 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug3056 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Minor features (exit relay, DNS): + - Improve the clarity and safety of the log message from evdns when + receiving an apparent spoofed DNS reply. Closes ticket 3056. diff --git a/changes/bug4019 b/changes/bug4019 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fef736ff66 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug4019 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (logging): + - Remove duplicate log messages regarding opening non-local SocksPorts + upon parsing config and opening listeners at startup. Fixes bug 4019; + bugfix on tor-0.2.3.3-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug5847 b/changes/bug5847 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..782fc7b721 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug5847 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor features (control port): + - Provide better error message for GETINFO desc/(id|name) when + microdescriptors are in use and router descriptors are not fetched. + Closes ticket 5847. Patch by Kevin Butler. + diff --git a/changes/bug7890 b/changes/bug7890 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1daec58ae2 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug7890 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (logging): + - Use a more comprehensible log message when telling the user they've + excluded every running exit node. Fixes bug 7890; bugfix on + 0.2.2.25-alpha. diff --git a/changes/ticket20575 b/changes/ticket20575 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bfbf03f6b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket20575 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Deprecation (config): + - Deprecate HTTPProxy/HTTPProxyAuthenticator config options. It only + applies to direct unencrypted HTTP connections to your directory server, + which your Tor probably isn't using. Fixes bug 20575. diff --git a/changes/ticket22311 b/changes/ticket22311 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0bfd465f83 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket22311 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Code simplification and refactoring: + - Remove several now-obsolete functions for asking about old variants + directory authority status. Closes ticket 22311; patch from "huyvq". diff --git a/changes/ticket22608 b/changes/ticket22608 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5aa9db27f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket22608 @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + o Code simplification and refactoring: + - Extract the code for handling newly-open channels into a separate + function from the general code to handle channel state transitions. + This change simplifies our callgraph, reducing the size of the largest + strongly connected component by roughly a factor of two. + Closes ticket 22608 diff --git a/changes/ticket22684 b/changes/ticket22684 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f1d9d21abb --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket22684 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor features (control): + - Add GETINFO desc/download-enabled and md/download-enabled, to + inform the controller whether try to download router descriptors + and microdescriptors respectively. Closes ticket 22684. + diff --git a/changes/ticket22750 b/changes/ticket22750 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6bc1fb2639 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket22750 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (logging, sandbox): + - Use the correct system call in sandbox error messages. Fixes bug + 22750; bugfix on 0.2.5.1-alpha. diff --git a/changes/ticket22804 b/changes/ticket22804 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a5d71c5120 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket22804 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Code simplification and refactoring: + + - Split the enormous circuit_send_next_onion_skin() function into + multiple subfunctions. Closes ticket 22804. diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac index fc95491c17..4092d10af6 100644 --- a/configure.ac +++ b/configure.ac @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ dnl Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. dnl See LICENSE for licensing information AC_PREREQ([2.63]) -AC_INIT([tor],[0.3.1.4-alpha-dev]) +AC_INIT([tor],[0.3.2.0-alpha-dev]) AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([src/or/main.c]) AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIR([m4]) @@ -1552,6 +1552,24 @@ if test "$tor_cv_sign_extend" != "no"; then [Define to 1 iff right-shifting a negative value performs sign-extension]) fi +# Is uint8_t the same type as unsigned char? +AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether uint8_t is the same type as unsigned char], tor_cv_uint8_uchar, +[AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ +#include <stdint.h> +extern uint8_t c; +unsigned char c;]])], + [tor_cv_uint8_uchar=yes], + [tor_cv_uint8_uchar=no], + [tor_cv_uint8_uchar=cross])]) + +if test "$tor_cv_uint8_uchar" = "cross"; then + AC_MSG_NOTICE([Cross-compiling: we'll assume that uint8_t is the same type as unsigned char]) +fi + +if test "$tor_cv_uint8_uchar" = "no"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([We assume that uint8_t is the same type as unsigned char, but your compiler disagrees.]) +fi + # Whether we should use the dmalloc memory allocation debugging library. AC_MSG_CHECKING(whether to use dmalloc (debug memory allocation library)) AC_ARG_WITH(dmalloc, diff --git a/contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in b/contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in index d6c0217264..9f3a86a695 100644 --- a/contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in +++ b/contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ !include "LogicLib.nsh" !include "FileFunc.nsh" !insertmacro GetParameters -!define VERSION "0.3.1.4-alpha-dev" +!define VERSION "0.3.2.0-alpha-dev" !define INSTALLER "tor-${VERSION}-win32.exe" !define WEBSITE "https://www.torproject.org/" !define LICENSE "LICENSE" diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index 2459969f98..f0b7fa8e46 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -521,13 +521,14 @@ GENERAL OPTIONS [[HTTPProxy]] **HTTPProxy** __host__[:__port__]:: Tor will make all its directory requests through this host:port (or host:80 if port is not specified), rather than connecting directly to any directory - servers. + servers. (DEPRECATED: As of 0.3.1.0-alpha you should use HTTPSProxy.) [[HTTPProxyAuthenticator]] **HTTPProxyAuthenticator** __username:password__:: If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTP proxy authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of HTTP proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you - want it to support others. + want it to support others. (DEPRECATED: As of 0.3.1.0-alpha you should use + HTTPSProxyAuthenticator.) [[HTTPSProxy]] **HTTPSProxy** __host__[:__port__]:: Tor will make all its OR (SSL) connections through this host:port (or diff --git a/src/common/compress.c b/src/common/compress.c index 7926faaa60..472268a439 100644 --- a/src/common/compress.c +++ b/src/common/compress.c @@ -574,6 +574,12 @@ tor_compress_process(tor_compress_state_t *state, if (BUG((rv == TOR_COMPRESS_OK) && *in_len == in_len_orig && *out_len == out_len_orig)) { + log_warn(LD_GENERAL, + "More info on the bug: method == %s, finish == %d, " + " *in_len == in_len_orig == %lu, " + "*out_len == out_len_orig == %lu", + compression_method_get_human_name(state->method), finish, + (unsigned long)in_len_orig, (unsigned long)out_len_orig); return TOR_COMPRESS_ERROR; } diff --git a/src/common/crypto_ed25519.c b/src/common/crypto_ed25519.c index 188e18c710..d61549b797 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto_ed25519.c +++ b/src/common/crypto_ed25519.c @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #include "crypto_format.h" #include "torlog.h" #include "util.h" +#include "util_format.h" #include "ed25519/ref10/ed25519_ref10.h" #include "ed25519/donna/ed25519_donna_tor.h" @@ -57,6 +58,9 @@ typedef struct { int (*pubkey_from_curve25519_pubkey)(unsigned char *, const unsigned char *, int); + + int (*ed25519_scalarmult_with_group_order)(unsigned char *, + const unsigned char *); } ed25519_impl_t; /** The Ref10 Ed25519 implementation. This one is pure C and lightly @@ -77,6 +81,7 @@ static const ed25519_impl_t impl_ref10 = { ed25519_ref10_blind_public_key, ed25519_ref10_pubkey_from_curve25519_pubkey, + ed25519_ref10_scalarmult_with_group_order, }; /** The Ref10 Ed25519 implementation. This one is heavily optimized, but still @@ -97,6 +102,7 @@ static const ed25519_impl_t impl_donna = { ed25519_donna_blind_public_key, ed25519_donna_pubkey_from_curve25519_pubkey, + ed25519_donna_scalarmult_with_group_order, }; /** Which Ed25519 implementation are we using? NULL if we haven't decided @@ -491,7 +497,8 @@ ed25519_public_key_from_curve25519_public_key(ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey, * service descriptors are encrypted with a key derived from the service's * long-term public key, and then signed with (and stored at a position * indexed by) a short-term key derived by blinding the long-term keys. - */ + * + * Return 0 if blinding was successful, else return -1. */ int ed25519_keypair_blind(ed25519_keypair_t *out, const ed25519_keypair_t *inp, @@ -502,7 +509,9 @@ ed25519_keypair_blind(ed25519_keypair_t *out, get_ed_impl()->blind_secret_key(out->seckey.seckey, inp->seckey.seckey, param); - ed25519_public_blind(&pubkey_check, &inp->pubkey, param); + if (ed25519_public_blind(&pubkey_check, &inp->pubkey, param) < 0) { + return -1; + } ed25519_public_key_generate(&out->pubkey, &out->seckey); tor_assert(fast_memeq(pubkey_check.pubkey, out->pubkey.pubkey, 32)); @@ -522,8 +531,7 @@ ed25519_public_blind(ed25519_public_key_t *out, const ed25519_public_key_t *inp, const uint8_t *param) { - get_ed_impl()->blind_public_key(out->pubkey, inp->pubkey, param); - return 0; + return get_ed_impl()->blind_public_key(out->pubkey, inp->pubkey, param); } /** @@ -754,3 +762,47 @@ ed25519_init(void) pick_ed25519_impl(); } +/* Return true if <b>point</b> is the identity element of the ed25519 group. */ +static int +ed25519_point_is_identity_element(const uint8_t *point) +{ + /* The identity element in ed25159 is the point with coordinates (0,1). */ + static const uint8_t ed25519_identity[32] = { + 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }; + tor_assert(sizeof(ed25519_identity) == ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN); + return tor_memeq(point, ed25519_identity, sizeof(ed25519_identity)); +} + +/** Validate <b>pubkey</b> to ensure that it has no torsion component. + * Return 0 if <b>pubkey</b> is valid, else return -1. */ +int +ed25519_validate_pubkey(const ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey) +{ + uint8_t result[32] = {9}; + + /* First check that we were not given the identity element */ + if (ed25519_point_is_identity_element(pubkey->pubkey)) { + log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "ed25519 pubkey is the identity"); + return -1; + } + + /* For any point on the curve, doing l*point should give the identity element + * (where l is the group order). Do the computation and check that the + * identity element is returned. */ + if (get_ed_impl()->ed25519_scalarmult_with_group_order(result, + pubkey->pubkey) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "ed25519 group order scalarmult failed"); + return -1; + } + + if (!ed25519_point_is_identity_element(result)) { + log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "ed25519 validation failed"); + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + diff --git a/src/common/crypto_ed25519.h b/src/common/crypto_ed25519.h index 77a3313adc..3a439207b3 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto_ed25519.h +++ b/src/common/crypto_ed25519.h @@ -127,6 +127,8 @@ void ed25519_pubkey_copy(ed25519_public_key_t *dest, void ed25519_set_impl_params(int use_donna); void ed25519_init(void); +int ed25519_validate_pubkey(const ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey); + #ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS void crypto_ed25519_testing_force_impl(const char *name); void crypto_ed25519_testing_restore_impl(void); diff --git a/src/common/sandbox.c b/src/common/sandbox.c index 52caa4fcc6..fb57902593 100644 --- a/src/common/sandbox.c +++ b/src/common/sandbox.c @@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ sb_chmod(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter) rc = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(chmod), SCMP_CMP_STR(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value)); if (rc != 0) { - log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add open syscall, received " + log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add chmod syscall, received " "libseccomp error %d", rc); return rc; } @@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ sb_chown(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter) rc = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(chown), SCMP_CMP_STR(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value)); if (rc != 0) { - log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add open syscall, received " + log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add chown syscall, received " "libseccomp error %d", rc); return rc; } @@ -1037,7 +1037,7 @@ sb_stat64(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter) rc = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(stat64), SCMP_CMP_STR(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value)); if (rc != 0) { - log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add open syscall, received " + log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add stat64 syscall, received " "libseccomp error %d", rc); return rc; } diff --git a/src/ext/ed25519/donna/ed25519_donna_tor.h b/src/ext/ed25519/donna/ed25519_donna_tor.h index d225407b1c..7d7b8c0625 100644 --- a/src/ext/ed25519/donna/ed25519_donna_tor.h +++ b/src/ext/ed25519/donna/ed25519_donna_tor.h @@ -30,4 +30,9 @@ int ed25519_donna_blind_public_key(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *inp, int ed25519_donna_pubkey_from_curve25519_pubkey(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *inp, int signbit); + +int +ed25519_donna_scalarmult_with_group_order(unsigned char *out, + const unsigned char *pubkey); + #endif diff --git a/src/ext/ed25519/donna/ed25519_tor.c b/src/ext/ed25519/donna/ed25519_tor.c index 9537ae66a1..6bc22675ae 100644 --- a/src/ext/ed25519/donna/ed25519_tor.c +++ b/src/ext/ed25519/donna/ed25519_tor.c @@ -304,7 +304,9 @@ ed25519_donna_blind_public_key(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *inp, /* No "ge25519_unpack", negate the public key. */ memcpy(pkcopy, inp, 32); pkcopy[31] ^= (1<<7); - ge25519_unpack_negative_vartime(&A, pkcopy); + if (!ge25519_unpack_negative_vartime(&A, pkcopy)) { + return -1; + } /* A' = [tweak] * A + [0] * basepoint. */ ge25519_double_scalarmult_vartime(&Aprime, &A, t, zero); @@ -340,5 +342,32 @@ ed25519_donna_pubkey_from_curve25519_pubkey(unsigned char *out, return 0; } +/* Do the scalar multiplication of <b>pubkey</b> with the group order + * <b>modm_m</b>. Place the result in <b>out</b> which must be at least 32 + * bytes long. */ +int +ed25519_donna_scalarmult_with_group_order(unsigned char *out, + const unsigned char *pubkey) +{ + static const bignum256modm ALIGN(16) zero = { 0 }; + unsigned char pkcopy[32]; + ge25519 ALIGN(16) Point, Result; + + /* No "ge25519_unpack", negate the public key and unpack it back. + * See ed25519_donna_blind_public_key() */ + memcpy(pkcopy, pubkey, 32); + pkcopy[31] ^= (1<<7); + if (!ge25519_unpack_negative_vartime(&Point, pkcopy)) { + return -1; /* error: bail out */ + } + + /* There is no regular scalarmult function so we have to do: + * Result = l*P + 0*B */ + ge25519_double_scalarmult_vartime(&Result, &Point, modm_m, zero); + ge25519_pack(out, &Result); + + return 0; +} + #include "test-internals.c" diff --git a/src/ext/ed25519/ref10/blinding.c b/src/ext/ed25519/ref10/blinding.c index ee3e8666fa..31332a2719 100644 --- a/src/ext/ed25519/ref10/blinding.c +++ b/src/ext/ed25519/ref10/blinding.c @@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ int ed25519_ref10_blind_public_key(unsigned char *out, unsigned char pkcopy[32]; ge_p3 A; ge_p2 Aprime; + int retval = -1; ed25519_ref10_gettweak(tweak, param); @@ -62,15 +63,57 @@ int ed25519_ref10_blind_public_key(unsigned char *out, * "ge_frombytes", we'd use that, but there isn't. */ memcpy(pkcopy, inp, 32); pkcopy[31] ^= (1<<7); - ge_frombytes_negate_vartime(&A, pkcopy); + if (ge_frombytes_negate_vartime(&A, pkcopy) != 0) { + goto done; + } /* There isn't a regular ge_scalarmult -- we have to do tweak*A + zero*B. */ ge_double_scalarmult_vartime(&Aprime, tweak, &A, zero); ge_tobytes(out, &Aprime); + retval = 0; + + done: memwipe(tweak, 0, sizeof(tweak)); memwipe(&A, 0, sizeof(A)); memwipe(&Aprime, 0, sizeof(Aprime)); memwipe(pkcopy, 0, sizeof(pkcopy)); + return retval; +} + +/* This is the group order encoded in a format that + * ge_double_scalarmult_vartime() understands. The group order m is: + * m = 2^252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493 = + * 0x1000000000000000000000000000000014def9dea2f79cd65812631a5cf5d3ed + */ +static const uint8_t modm_m[32] = {0xed,0xd3,0xf5,0x5c,0x1a,0x63,0x12,0x58, + 0xd6,0x9c,0xf7,0xa2,0xde,0xf9,0xde,0x14, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10}; + +/* Do the scalar multiplication of <b>pubkey</b> with the group order + * <b>modm_m</b>. Place the result in <b>out</b> which must be at least 32 + * bytes long. */ +int +ed25519_ref10_scalarmult_with_group_order(unsigned char *out, + const unsigned char *pubkey) +{ + unsigned char pkcopy[32]; + unsigned char zero[32] = {0}; + ge_p3 Point; + ge_p2 Result; + + /* All this is done to fit 'pubkey' in 'Point' so that it can be used by + * ed25519 ref code. Same thing as in blinding function */ + memcpy(pkcopy, pubkey, 32); + pkcopy[31] ^= (1<<7); + if (ge_frombytes_negate_vartime(&Point, pkcopy) != 0) { + return -1; /* error: bail out */ + } + + /* There isn't a regular scalarmult -- we have to do r = l*P + 0*B */ + ge_double_scalarmult_vartime(&Result, modm_m, &Point, zero); + ge_tobytes(out, &Result); + return 0; } diff --git a/src/ext/ed25519/ref10/ed25519_ref10.h b/src/ext/ed25519/ref10/ed25519_ref10.h index af7e21a2ad..5965694977 100644 --- a/src/ext/ed25519/ref10/ed25519_ref10.h +++ b/src/ext/ed25519/ref10/ed25519_ref10.h @@ -27,4 +27,8 @@ int ed25519_ref10_blind_public_key(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *inp, const unsigned char *param); +int +ed25519_ref10_scalarmult_with_group_order(unsigned char *out, + const unsigned char *pubkey); + #endif diff --git a/src/or/buffers.c b/src/or/buffers.c index 12a6c0239b..d5ecfb8488 100644 --- a/src/or/buffers.c +++ b/src/or/buffers.c @@ -1478,6 +1478,32 @@ socks_request_set_socks5_error(socks_request_t *req, req->reply[3] = 0x01; // ATYP field. } +static const char SOCKS_PROXY_IS_NOT_AN_HTTP_PROXY_MSG[] = + "HTTP/1.0 501 Tor is not an HTTP Proxy\r\n" + "Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1\r\n\r\n" + "<html>\n" + "<head>\n" + "<title>Tor is not an HTTP Proxy</title>\n" + "</head>\n" + "<body>\n" + "<h1>Tor is not an HTTP Proxy</h1>\n" + "<p>\n" + "It appears you have configured your web browser to use Tor as " + "an HTTP proxy.\n\n" + "This is not correct: Tor is a SOCKS proxy, not an HTTP proxy.\n" + "Please configure your client accordingly.\n" + "</p>\n" + "<p>\n" + "See <a href=\"https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html\">" + "https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html</a> for more " + "information.\n" + "<!-- Plus this comment, to make the body response more than 512 bytes, so " + " IE will be willing to display it. Comment comment comment comment " + " comment comment comment comment comment comment comment comment.-->\n" + "</p>\n" + "</body>\n" + "</html>\n"; + /** Implementation helper to implement fetch_from_*_socks. Instead of looking * at a buffer's contents, we look at the <b>datalen</b> bytes of data in * <b>data</b>. Instead of removing data from the buffer, we set @@ -1684,15 +1710,7 @@ parse_socks(const char *data, size_t datalen, socks_request_t *req, req->port = ntohs(get_uint16(data+5+len)); *drain_out = 5+len+2; - if (string_is_valid_ipv4_address(req->address) || - string_is_valid_ipv6_address(req->address)) { - log_unsafe_socks_warning(5,req->address,req->port,safe_socks); - - if (safe_socks) { - socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, SOCKS5_NOT_ALLOWED); - return -1; - } - } else if (!string_is_valid_hostname(req->address)) { + if (!string_is_valid_hostname(req->address)) { socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, SOCKS5_GENERAL_ERROR); log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, @@ -1814,7 +1832,7 @@ parse_socks(const char *data, size_t datalen, socks_request_t *req, log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: Everything is here. Success."); strlcpy(req->address, startaddr ? startaddr : tmpbuf, sizeof(req->address)); - if (!tor_strisprint(req->address) || strchr(req->address,'\"')) { + if (!string_is_valid_hostname(req->address)) { log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Your application (using socks4 to port %d) gave Tor " "a malformed hostname: %s. Rejecting the connection.", @@ -1834,32 +1852,8 @@ parse_socks(const char *data, size_t datalen, socks_request_t *req, case 'H': /* head */ case 'P': /* put/post */ case 'C': /* connect */ - strlcpy((char*)req->reply, -"HTTP/1.0 501 Tor is not an HTTP Proxy\r\n" -"Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1\r\n\r\n" -"<html>\n" -"<head>\n" -"<title>Tor is not an HTTP Proxy</title>\n" -"</head>\n" -"<body>\n" -"<h1>Tor is not an HTTP Proxy</h1>\n" -"<p>\n" -"It appears you have configured your web browser to use Tor as an HTTP proxy." -"\n" -"This is not correct: Tor is a SOCKS proxy, not an HTTP proxy.\n" -"Please configure your client accordingly.\n" -"</p>\n" -"<p>\n" -"See <a href=\"https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html\">" - "https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html</a> for more " - "information.\n" -"<!-- Plus this comment, to make the body response more than 512 bytes, so " -" IE will be willing to display it. Comment comment comment comment " -" comment comment comment comment comment comment comment comment.-->\n" -"</p>\n" -"</body>\n" -"</html>\n" - , MAX_SOCKS_REPLY_LEN); + strlcpy((char*)req->reply, SOCKS_PROXY_IS_NOT_AN_HTTP_PROXY_MSG, + MAX_SOCKS_REPLY_LEN); req->replylen = strlen((char*)req->reply)+1; /* fall through */ default: /* version is not socks4 or socks5 */ @@ -2022,6 +2016,34 @@ parse_socks_client(const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen, return -1; } +/** Return true if <b>cmd</b> looks like a HTTP (proxy) request. */ +int +peek_buf_has_http_command(const buf_t *buf) +{ + if (peek_buf_startswith(buf, "CONNECT ") || + peek_buf_startswith(buf, "DELETE ") || + peek_buf_startswith(buf, "GET ") || + peek_buf_startswith(buf, "POST ") || + peek_buf_startswith(buf, "PUT " )) + return 1; + return 0; +} + +/** Return 1 iff <b>buf</b> starts with <b>cmd</b>. <b>cmd</b> must be a null + * terminated string, of no more than PEEK_BUF_STARTSWITH_MAX bytes. */ +int +peek_buf_startswith(const buf_t *buf, const char *cmd) +{ + char tmp[PEEK_BUF_STARTSWITH_MAX]; + size_t clen = strlen(cmd); + if (BUG(clen > sizeof(tmp))) + return 0; + if (buf->datalen < clen) + return 0; + peek_from_buf(tmp, clen, buf); + return fast_memeq(tmp, cmd, clen); +} + /** Return 1 iff buf looks more like it has an (obsolete) v0 controller * command on it than any valid v1 controller command. */ int diff --git a/src/or/buffers.h b/src/or/buffers.h index 23b58a571a..d884084385 100644 --- a/src/or/buffers.h +++ b/src/or/buffers.h @@ -53,6 +53,9 @@ int fetch_from_buf_socks_client(buf_t *buf, int state, char **reason); int fetch_from_buf_line(buf_t *buf, char *data_out, size_t *data_len); int peek_buf_has_control0_command(buf_t *buf); +#define PEEK_BUF_STARTSWITH_MAX 16 +int peek_buf_startswith(const buf_t *buf, const char *cmd); +int peek_buf_has_http_command(const buf_t *buf); int fetch_ext_or_command_from_buf(buf_t *buf, ext_or_cmd_t **out); diff --git a/src/or/channel.c b/src/or/channel.c index df6d7d3423..9f8a03683f 100644 --- a/src/or/channel.c +++ b/src/or/channel.c @@ -2086,8 +2086,8 @@ channel_write_var_cell(channel_t *chan, var_cell_t *var_cell) * are appropriate to the state transition in question. */ -void -channel_change_state(channel_t *chan, channel_state_t to_state) +static void +channel_change_state_(channel_t *chan, channel_state_t to_state) { channel_state_t from_state; unsigned char was_active, is_active; @@ -2206,18 +2206,8 @@ channel_change_state(channel_t *chan, channel_state_t to_state) estimated_total_queue_size += chan->bytes_in_queue; } - /* Tell circuits if we opened and stuff */ - if (to_state == CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN) { - channel_do_open_actions(chan); - chan->has_been_open = 1; - - /* Check for queued cells to process */ - if (! TOR_SIMPLEQ_EMPTY(&chan->incoming_queue)) - channel_process_cells(chan); - if (! TOR_SIMPLEQ_EMPTY(&chan->outgoing_queue)) - channel_flush_cells(chan); - } else if (to_state == CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSED || - to_state == CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR) { + if (to_state == CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSED || + to_state == CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR) { /* Assert that all queues are empty */ tor_assert(TOR_SIMPLEQ_EMPTY(&chan->incoming_queue)); tor_assert(TOR_SIMPLEQ_EMPTY(&chan->outgoing_queue)); @@ -2225,6 +2215,35 @@ channel_change_state(channel_t *chan, channel_state_t to_state) } /** + * As channel_change_state_, but change the state to any state but open. + */ +void +channel_change_state(channel_t *chan, channel_state_t to_state) +{ + tor_assert(to_state != CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN); + channel_change_state_(chan, to_state); +} + +/** + * As channel_change_state, but change the state to open. + */ +void +channel_change_state_open(channel_t *chan) +{ + channel_change_state_(chan, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN); + + /* Tell circuits if we opened and stuff */ + channel_do_open_actions(chan); + chan->has_been_open = 1; + + /* Check for queued cells to process */ + if (! TOR_SIMPLEQ_EMPTY(&chan->incoming_queue)) + channel_process_cells(chan); + if (! TOR_SIMPLEQ_EMPTY(&chan->outgoing_queue)) + channel_flush_cells(chan); +} + +/** * Change channel listener state * * This internal and subclass use only function is used to change channel diff --git a/src/or/channel.h b/src/or/channel.h index ea280f2fd2..2d0ec39924 100644 --- a/src/or/channel.h +++ b/src/or/channel.h @@ -522,6 +522,7 @@ void channel_listener_free(channel_listener_t *chan_l); /* State/metadata setters */ void channel_change_state(channel_t *chan, channel_state_t to_state); +void channel_change_state_open(channel_t *chan); void channel_clear_identity_digest(channel_t *chan); void channel_clear_remote_end(channel_t *chan); void channel_mark_local(channel_t *chan); diff --git a/src/or/channeltls.c b/src/or/channeltls.c index f44e4fc8ea..6547451181 100644 --- a/src/or/channeltls.c +++ b/src/or/channeltls.c @@ -993,7 +993,7 @@ channel_tls_handle_state_change_on_orconn(channel_tls_t *chan, * We can go to CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN from CHANNEL_STATE_OPENING or * CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT on this. */ - channel_change_state(base_chan, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN); + channel_change_state_open(base_chan); /* We might have just become writeable; check and tell the scheduler */ if (connection_or_num_cells_writeable(conn) > 0) { scheduler_channel_wants_writes(base_chan); @@ -1915,7 +1915,6 @@ certs_cell_typenum_to_cert_type(int typenum) * of the connection, we then authenticate the server or mark the connection. * If it's the server side, wait for an AUTHENTICATE cell. */ - STATIC void channel_tls_process_certs_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan) { diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 16cef0e56b..8bb7c94d74 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -74,6 +74,10 @@ static int onion_pick_cpath_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit); static crypt_path_t *onion_next_hop_in_cpath(crypt_path_t *cpath); static int onion_extend_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ); static int onion_append_hop(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, extend_info_t *choice); +static int circuit_send_first_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ); +static int circuit_build_no_more_hops(origin_circuit_t *circ); +static int circuit_send_intermediate_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ, + crypt_path_t *hop); /** This function tries to get a channel to the specified endpoint, * and then calls command_setup_channel() to give it the right @@ -912,234 +916,275 @@ circuit_purpose_may_omit_guard(int purpose) * If circ's first hop is closed, then we need to build a create * cell and send it forward. * - * Otherwise, we need to build a relay extend cell and send it - * forward. + * Otherwise, if circ's cpath still has any non-open hops, we need to + * build a relay extend cell and send it forward to the next non-open hop. + * + * If all hops on the cpath are open, we're done building the circuit + * and we should do housekeeping for the newly opened circuit. * * Return -reason if we want to tear down circ, else return 0. */ int circuit_send_next_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ) { - crypt_path_t *hop; - const node_t *node; - tor_assert(circ); if (circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_CLOSED) { - /* This is the first hop. */ - create_cell_t cc; - int fast; - int len; - log_debug(LD_CIRC,"First skin; sending create cell."); - memset(&cc, 0, sizeof(cc)); - if (circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel) - control_event_bootstrap(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_ONEHOP_CREATE, 0); - else { - control_event_bootstrap(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_CIRCUIT_CREATE, 0); - - /* If this is not a one-hop tunnel, the channel is being used - * for traffic that wants anonymity and protection from traffic - * analysis (such as netflow record retention). That means we want - * to pad it. - */ - if (circ->base_.n_chan->channel_usage < CHANNEL_USED_FOR_FULL_CIRCS) - circ->base_.n_chan->channel_usage = CHANNEL_USED_FOR_FULL_CIRCS; - } + /* Case one: we're on the first hop. */ + return circuit_send_first_onion_skin(circ); + } - node = node_get_by_id(circ->base_.n_chan->identity_digest); - fast = should_use_create_fast_for_circuit(circ); - if (!fast) { - /* We are an OR and we know the right onion key: we should - * send a create cell. - */ - circuit_pick_create_handshake(&cc.cell_type, &cc.handshake_type, - circ->cpath->extend_info); - } else { - /* We are not an OR, and we're building the first hop of a circuit to a - * new OR: we can be speedy and use CREATE_FAST to save an RSA operation - * and a DH operation. */ - cc.cell_type = CELL_CREATE_FAST; - cc.handshake_type = ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_FAST; - } + tor_assert(circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN); + tor_assert(circ->base_.state == CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING); + crypt_path_t *hop = onion_next_hop_in_cpath(circ->cpath); - len = onion_skin_create(cc.handshake_type, - circ->cpath->extend_info, - &circ->cpath->handshake_state, - cc.onionskin); - if (len < 0) { - log_warn(LD_CIRC,"onion_skin_create (first hop) failed."); - return - END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL; - } - cc.handshake_len = len; + if (hop) { + /* Case two: we're on a hop after the first. */ + return circuit_send_intermediate_onion_skin(circ, hop); + } + + /* Case three: the circuit is finished. Do housekeeping tasks on it. */ + return circuit_build_no_more_hops(circ); +} + +/** + * Called from circuit_send_next_onion_skin() when we find ourselves connected + * to the first hop in <b>circ</b>: Send a CREATE or CREATE2 or CREATE_FAST + * cell to that hop. Return 0 on success; -reason on failure (if the circuit + * should be torn down). + */ +static int +circuit_send_first_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ) +{ + int fast; + int len; + const node_t *node; + create_cell_t cc; + memset(&cc, 0, sizeof(cc)); - if (circuit_deliver_create_cell(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), &cc, 0) < 0) - return - END_CIRC_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT; + log_debug(LD_CIRC,"First skin; sending create cell."); - circ->cpath->state = CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS; - circuit_set_state(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING); - log_info(LD_CIRC,"First hop: finished sending %s cell to '%s'", - fast ? "CREATE_FAST" : "CREATE", - node ? node_describe(node) : "<unnamed>"); + if (circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel) { + control_event_bootstrap(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_ONEHOP_CREATE, 0); } else { - extend_cell_t ec; - int len; - tor_assert(circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN); - tor_assert(circ->base_.state == CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING); - log_debug(LD_CIRC,"starting to send subsequent skin."); - hop = onion_next_hop_in_cpath(circ->cpath); - memset(&ec, 0, sizeof(ec)); - if (!hop) { - /* done building the circuit. whew. */ - guard_usable_t r; - if (! circ->guard_state) { - if (circuit_get_cpath_len(circ) != 1 && - ! circuit_purpose_may_omit_guard(circ->base_.purpose) && - get_options()->UseEntryGuards) { - log_warn(LD_BUG, "%d-hop circuit %p with purpose %d has no " - "guard state", - circuit_get_cpath_len(circ), circ, circ->base_.purpose); - } - r = GUARD_USABLE_NOW; - } else { - r = entry_guard_succeeded(&circ->guard_state); - } - const int is_usable_for_streams = (r == GUARD_USABLE_NOW); - if (r == GUARD_USABLE_NOW) { - circuit_set_state(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN); - } else if (r == GUARD_MAYBE_USABLE_LATER) { - // Wait till either a better guard succeeds, or till - // all better guards fail. - circuit_set_state(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_STATE_GUARD_WAIT); - } else { - tor_assert_nonfatal(r == GUARD_USABLE_NEVER); - return - END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL; - } + control_event_bootstrap(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_CIRCUIT_CREATE, 0); - /* XXXX #21422 -- the rest of this branch needs careful thought! - * Some of the things here need to happen when a circuit becomes - * mechanically open; some need to happen when it is actually usable. - * I think I got them right, but more checking would be wise. -NM - */ + /* If this is not a one-hop tunnel, the channel is being used + * for traffic that wants anonymity and protection from traffic + * analysis (such as netflow record retention). That means we want + * to pad it. + */ + if (circ->base_.n_chan->channel_usage < CHANNEL_USED_FOR_FULL_CIRCS) + circ->base_.n_chan->channel_usage = CHANNEL_USED_FOR_FULL_CIRCS; + } - if (circuit_timeout_want_to_count_circ(circ)) { - struct timeval end; - long timediff; - tor_gettimeofday(&end); - timediff = tv_mdiff(&circ->base_.timestamp_began, &end); + node = node_get_by_id(circ->base_.n_chan->identity_digest); + fast = should_use_create_fast_for_circuit(circ); + if (!fast) { + /* We know the right onion key: we should send a create cell. */ + circuit_pick_create_handshake(&cc.cell_type, &cc.handshake_type, + circ->cpath->extend_info); + } else { + /* We don't know an onion key, so we need to fall back to CREATE_FAST. */ + cc.cell_type = CELL_CREATE_FAST; + cc.handshake_type = ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_FAST; + } - /* - * If the circuit build time is much greater than we would have cut - * it off at, we probably had a suspend event along this codepath, - * and we should discard the value. - */ - if (timediff < 0 || - timediff > 2*get_circuit_build_close_time_ms()+1000) { - log_notice(LD_CIRC, "Strange value for circuit build time: %ldmsec. " - "Assuming clock jump. Purpose %d (%s)", timediff, - circ->base_.purpose, - circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose)); - } else if (!circuit_build_times_disabled(get_options())) { - /* Only count circuit times if the network is live */ - if (circuit_build_times_network_check_live( - get_circuit_build_times())) { - circuit_build_times_add_time(get_circuit_build_times_mutable(), - (build_time_t)timediff); - circuit_build_times_set_timeout(get_circuit_build_times_mutable()); - } - - if (circ->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT) { - circuit_build_times_network_circ_success( - get_circuit_build_times_mutable()); - } - } - } - log_info(LD_CIRC,"circuit built!"); - circuit_reset_failure_count(0); + len = onion_skin_create(cc.handshake_type, + circ->cpath->extend_info, + &circ->cpath->handshake_state, + cc.onionskin); + if (len < 0) { + log_warn(LD_CIRC,"onion_skin_create (first hop) failed."); + return - END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL; + } + cc.handshake_len = len; - if (circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel || circ->has_opened) { - control_event_bootstrap(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_REQUESTING_STATUS, 0); - } + if (circuit_deliver_create_cell(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), &cc, 0) < 0) + return - END_CIRC_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT; - pathbias_count_build_success(circ); - circuit_rep_hist_note_result(circ); - if (is_usable_for_streams) - circuit_has_opened(circ); /* do other actions as necessary */ - - if (!have_completed_a_circuit() && !circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel) { - const or_options_t *options = get_options(); - note_that_we_completed_a_circuit(); - /* FFFF Log a count of known routers here */ - log_notice(LD_GENERAL, - "Tor has successfully opened a circuit. " - "Looks like client functionality is working."); - if (control_event_bootstrap(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_DONE, 0) == 0) { - log_notice(LD_GENERAL, - "Tor has successfully opened a circuit. " - "Looks like client functionality is working."); - } - control_event_client_status(LOG_NOTICE, "CIRCUIT_ESTABLISHED"); - clear_broken_connection_map(1); - if (server_mode(options) && !check_whether_orport_reachable(options)) { - inform_testing_reachability(); - consider_testing_reachability(1, 1); - } + circ->cpath->state = CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS; + circuit_set_state(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING); + log_info(LD_CIRC,"First hop: finished sending %s cell to '%s'", + fast ? "CREATE_FAST" : "CREATE", + node ? node_describe(node) : "<unnamed>"); + return 0; +} + +/** + * Called from circuit_send_next_onion_skin() when we find that we have no + * more hops: mark the circuit as finished, and perform the necessary + * bookkeeping. Return 0 on success; -reason on failure (if the circuit + * should be torn down). + */ +static int +circuit_build_no_more_hops(origin_circuit_t *circ) +{ + guard_usable_t r; + if (! circ->guard_state) { + if (circuit_get_cpath_len(circ) != 1 && + ! circuit_purpose_may_omit_guard(circ->base_.purpose) && + get_options()->UseEntryGuards) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "%d-hop circuit %p with purpose %d has no " + "guard state", + circuit_get_cpath_len(circ), circ, circ->base_.purpose); + } + r = GUARD_USABLE_NOW; + } else { + r = entry_guard_succeeded(&circ->guard_state); + } + const int is_usable_for_streams = (r == GUARD_USABLE_NOW); + if (r == GUARD_USABLE_NOW) { + circuit_set_state(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN); + } else if (r == GUARD_MAYBE_USABLE_LATER) { + // Wait till either a better guard succeeds, or till + // all better guards fail. + circuit_set_state(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_STATE_GUARD_WAIT); + } else { + tor_assert_nonfatal(r == GUARD_USABLE_NEVER); + return - END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL; + } + + /* XXXX #21422 -- the rest of this branch needs careful thought! + * Some of the things here need to happen when a circuit becomes + * mechanically open; some need to happen when it is actually usable. + * I think I got them right, but more checking would be wise. -NM + */ + + if (circuit_timeout_want_to_count_circ(circ)) { + struct timeval end; + long timediff; + tor_gettimeofday(&end); + timediff = tv_mdiff(&circ->base_.timestamp_began, &end); + + /* + * If the circuit build time is much greater than we would have cut + * it off at, we probably had a suspend event along this codepath, + * and we should discard the value. + */ + if (timediff < 0 || + timediff > 2*get_circuit_build_close_time_ms()+1000) { + log_notice(LD_CIRC, "Strange value for circuit build time: %ldmsec. " + "Assuming clock jump. Purpose %d (%s)", timediff, + circ->base_.purpose, + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose)); + } else if (!circuit_build_times_disabled(get_options())) { + /* Only count circuit times if the network is live */ + if (circuit_build_times_network_check_live( + get_circuit_build_times())) { + circuit_build_times_add_time(get_circuit_build_times_mutable(), + (build_time_t)timediff); + circuit_build_times_set_timeout(get_circuit_build_times_mutable()); } - /* We're done with measurement circuits here. Just close them */ - if (circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT) { - circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED); + if (circ->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT) { + circuit_build_times_network_circ_success( + get_circuit_build_times_mutable()); } - return 0; } - - if (tor_addr_family(&hop->extend_info->addr) != AF_INET) { - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Trying to extend to a non-IPv4 address."); - return - END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL; + } + log_info(LD_CIRC,"circuit built!"); + circuit_reset_failure_count(0); + + if (circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel || circ->has_opened) { + control_event_bootstrap(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_REQUESTING_STATUS, 0); + } + + pathbias_count_build_success(circ); + circuit_rep_hist_note_result(circ); + if (is_usable_for_streams) + circuit_has_opened(circ); /* do other actions as necessary */ + + if (!have_completed_a_circuit() && !circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel) { + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + note_that_we_completed_a_circuit(); + /* FFFF Log a count of known routers here */ + log_notice(LD_GENERAL, + "Tor has successfully opened a circuit. " + "Looks like client functionality is working."); + if (control_event_bootstrap(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_DONE, 0) == 0) { + log_notice(LD_GENERAL, + "Tor has successfully opened a circuit. " + "Looks like client functionality is working."); } - - circuit_pick_extend_handshake(&ec.cell_type, - &ec.create_cell.cell_type, - &ec.create_cell.handshake_type, - hop->extend_info); - - tor_addr_copy(&ec.orport_ipv4.addr, &hop->extend_info->addr); - ec.orport_ipv4.port = hop->extend_info->port; - tor_addr_make_unspec(&ec.orport_ipv6.addr); - memcpy(ec.node_id, hop->extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN); - /* Set the ED25519 identity too -- it will only get included - * in the extend2 cell if we're configured to use it, though. */ - ed25519_pubkey_copy(&ec.ed_pubkey, &hop->extend_info->ed_identity); - - len = onion_skin_create(ec.create_cell.handshake_type, - hop->extend_info, - &hop->handshake_state, - ec.create_cell.onionskin); - if (len < 0) { - log_warn(LD_CIRC,"onion_skin_create failed."); - return - END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL; + control_event_client_status(LOG_NOTICE, "CIRCUIT_ESTABLISHED"); + clear_broken_connection_map(1); + if (server_mode(options) && !check_whether_orport_reachable(options)) { + inform_testing_reachability(); + consider_testing_reachability(1, 1); } - ec.create_cell.handshake_len = len; + } - log_info(LD_CIRC,"Sending extend relay cell."); - { - uint8_t command = 0; - uint16_t payload_len=0; - uint8_t payload[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE]; - if (extend_cell_format(&command, &payload_len, payload, &ec)<0) { - log_warn(LD_CIRC,"Couldn't format extend cell"); - return -END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL; - } + /* We're done with measurement circuits here. Just close them */ + if (circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT) { + circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED); + } + return 0; +} + +/** + * Called from circuit_send_next_onion_skin() when we find that we have a hop + * other than the first that we need to extend to: use <b>hop</b>'s + * information to extend the circuit another step. Return 0 on success; + * -reason on failure (if the circuit should be torn down). + */ +static int +circuit_send_intermediate_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ, + crypt_path_t *hop) +{ + int len; + extend_cell_t ec; + memset(&ec, 0, sizeof(ec)); + + log_debug(LD_CIRC,"starting to send subsequent skin."); + + if (tor_addr_family(&hop->extend_info->addr) != AF_INET) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Trying to extend to a non-IPv4 address."); + return - END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL; + } + + circuit_pick_extend_handshake(&ec.cell_type, + &ec.create_cell.cell_type, + &ec.create_cell.handshake_type, + hop->extend_info); - /* send it to hop->prev, because it will transfer - * it to a create cell and then send to hop */ - if (relay_send_command_from_edge(0, TO_CIRCUIT(circ), - command, - (char*)payload, payload_len, - hop->prev) < 0) - return 0; /* circuit is closed */ + tor_addr_copy(&ec.orport_ipv4.addr, &hop->extend_info->addr); + ec.orport_ipv4.port = hop->extend_info->port; + tor_addr_make_unspec(&ec.orport_ipv6.addr); + memcpy(ec.node_id, hop->extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN); + /* Set the ED25519 identity too -- it will only get included + * in the extend2 cell if we're configured to use it, though. */ + ed25519_pubkey_copy(&ec.ed_pubkey, &hop->extend_info->ed_identity); + + len = onion_skin_create(ec.create_cell.handshake_type, + hop->extend_info, + &hop->handshake_state, + ec.create_cell.onionskin); + if (len < 0) { + log_warn(LD_CIRC,"onion_skin_create failed."); + return - END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL; + } + ec.create_cell.handshake_len = len; + + log_info(LD_CIRC,"Sending extend relay cell."); + { + uint8_t command = 0; + uint16_t payload_len=0; + uint8_t payload[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE]; + if (extend_cell_format(&command, &payload_len, payload, &ec)<0) { + log_warn(LD_CIRC,"Couldn't format extend cell"); + return -END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL; } - hop->state = CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS; + + /* send it to hop->prev, because that relay will transfer + * it to a create cell and then send to hop */ + if (relay_send_command_from_edge(0, TO_CIRCUIT(circ), + command, + (char*)payload, payload_len, + hop->prev) < 0) + return 0; /* circuit is closed */ } + hop->state = CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS; return 0; } @@ -1956,9 +2001,10 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(int need_uptime, int need_capacity) } if (options->ExitNodes) { log_warn(LD_CIRC, - "No specified %sexit routers seem to be running: " + "No exits in ExitNodes%s seem to be running: " "can't choose an exit.", - options->ExcludeExitNodesUnion_ ? "non-excluded " : ""); + options->ExcludeExitNodesUnion_ ? + ", except possibly those excluded by your configuration, " : ""); } return NULL; } @@ -2580,7 +2626,7 @@ extend_info_from_node(const node_t *node, int for_direct_connect) ed_pubkey = node_get_ed25519_id(node); } else if (node_get_ed25519_id(node)) { log_info(LD_CIRC, "Not including the ed25519 ID for %s, since it won't " - " be able to authenticate it.", + "be able to authenticate it.", node_describe(node)); } diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 7d2ebbdd03..5b5bb9049b 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -673,6 +673,13 @@ static const config_deprecation_t option_deprecation_notes_[] = { "easier to fingerprint, and may open you to esoteric attacks." }, /* End of options deprecated since 0.2.9.2-alpha. */ + /* Deprecated since 0.3.2.0-alpha. */ + { "HTTPProxy", "It only applies to direct unencrypted HTTP connections " + "to your directory server, which your Tor probably wasn't using." }, + { "HTTPProxyAuthenticator", "HTTPProxy is deprecated in favor of HTTPSProxy " + "which should be used with HTTPSProxyAuthenticator." }, + /* End of options deprecated since 0.3.2.0-alpha. */ + { NULL, NULL } }; @@ -3154,7 +3161,7 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, "UseEntryGuards. Disabling."); options->UseEntryGuards = 0; } - if (!options->DownloadExtraInfo && authdir_mode_any_main(options)) { + if (!options->DownloadExtraInfo && authdir_mode_v3(options)) { log_info(LD_CONFIG, "Authoritative directories always try to download " "extra-info documents. Setting DownloadExtraInfo."); options->DownloadExtraInfo = 1; @@ -6251,8 +6258,9 @@ port_cfg_free(port_cfg_t *port) /** Warn for every port in <b>ports</b> of type <b>listener_type</b> that is * on a publicly routable address. */ static void -warn_nonlocal_client_ports(const smartlist_t *ports, const char *portname, - int listener_type) +warn_nonlocal_client_ports(const smartlist_t *ports, + const char *portname, + const int listener_type) { SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(ports, const port_cfg_t *, port) { if (port->type != listener_type) @@ -6936,7 +6944,8 @@ parse_ports(or_options_t *options, int validate_only, options->SocksPort_lines, "Socks", CONN_TYPE_AP_LISTENER, "127.0.0.1", 9050, - CL_PORT_WARN_NONLOCAL|CL_PORT_TAKES_HOSTNAMES|gw_flag) < 0) { + ((validate_only ? 0 : CL_PORT_WARN_NONLOCAL) + | CL_PORT_TAKES_HOSTNAMES | gw_flag)) < 0) { *msg = tor_strdup("Invalid SocksPort configuration"); goto err; } diff --git a/src/or/control.c b/src/or/control.c index 9bcf1ee364..724d4b35c0 100644 --- a/src/or/control.c +++ b/src/or/control.c @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ #include "hibernate.h" #include "hs_common.h" #include "main.h" +#include "microdesc.h" #include "networkstatus.h" #include "nodelist.h" #include "policies.h" @@ -802,7 +803,7 @@ queued_events_flush_all(int force) } /** Libevent callback: Flushes pending events to controllers that are - * interested in them */ + * interested in them. */ static void flush_queued_events_cb(evutil_socket_t fd, short what, void *arg) { @@ -1892,6 +1893,12 @@ getinfo_helper_dir(control_connection_t *control_conn, const char *body = signed_descriptor_get_body(&ri->cache_info); if (body) *answer = tor_strndup(body, ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len); + } else if (! we_fetch_router_descriptors(get_options())) { + /* Descriptors won't be available, provide proper error */ + *errmsg = "We fetch microdescriptors, not router " + "descriptors. You'll need to use md/id/* " + "instead of desc/id/*."; + return 0; } } else if (!strcmpstart(question, "desc/name/")) { const routerinfo_t *ri = NULL; @@ -1905,7 +1912,16 @@ getinfo_helper_dir(control_connection_t *control_conn, const char *body = signed_descriptor_get_body(&ri->cache_info); if (body) *answer = tor_strndup(body, ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len); + } else if (! we_fetch_router_descriptors(get_options())) { + /* Descriptors won't be available, provide proper error */ + *errmsg = "We fetch microdescriptors, not router " + "descriptors. You'll need to use md/name/* " + "instead of desc/name/*."; + return 0; } + } else if (!strcmp(question, "desc/download-enabled")) { + int r = we_fetch_router_descriptors(get_options()); + tor_asprintf(answer, "%d", !!r); } else if (!strcmp(question, "desc/all-recent")) { routerlist_t *routerlist = router_get_routerlist(); smartlist_t *sl = smartlist_new(); @@ -1991,6 +2007,9 @@ getinfo_helper_dir(control_connection_t *control_conn, if (md && md->body) { *answer = tor_strndup(md->body, md->bodylen); } + } else if (!strcmp(question, "md/download-enabled")) { + int r = we_fetch_microdescriptors(get_options()); + tor_asprintf(answer, "%d", !!r); } else if (!strcmpstart(question, "desc-annotations/id/")) { const routerinfo_t *ri = NULL; const node_t *node = @@ -2907,7 +2926,8 @@ getinfo_helper_sr(control_connection_t *control_conn, * *<b>a</b>. If an internal error occurs, return -1 and optionally set * *<b>error_out</b> to point to an error message to be delivered to the * controller. On success, _or if the key is not recognized_, return 0. Do not - * set <b>a</b> if the key is not recognized. + * set <b>a</b> if the key is not recognized but you may set <b>error_out</b> + * to improve the error message. */ typedef int (*getinfo_helper_t)(control_connection_t *, const char *q, char **a, @@ -3012,9 +3032,13 @@ static const getinfo_item_t getinfo_items[] = { PREFIX("desc/name/", dir, "Router descriptors by nickname."), ITEM("desc/all-recent", dir, "All non-expired, non-superseded router descriptors."), + ITEM("desc/download-enabled", dir, + "Do we try to download router descriptors?"), ITEM("desc/all-recent-extrainfo-hack", dir, NULL), /* Hack. */ PREFIX("md/id/", dir, "Microdescriptors by ID"), PREFIX("md/name/", dir, "Microdescriptors by name"), + ITEM("md/download-enabled", dir, + "Do we try to download microdescriptors?"), PREFIX("extra-info/digest/", dir, "Extra-info documents by digest."), PREFIX("hs/client/desc/id", dir, "Hidden Service descriptor in client's cache by onion."), @@ -3162,7 +3186,7 @@ handle_control_getinfo(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len, smartlist_t *questions = smartlist_new(); smartlist_t *answers = smartlist_new(); smartlist_t *unrecognized = smartlist_new(); - char *msg = NULL, *ans = NULL; + char *ans = NULL; int i; (void) len; /* body is NUL-terminated, so it's safe to ignore the length. */ @@ -3177,20 +3201,26 @@ handle_control_getinfo(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len, goto done; } if (!ans) { - smartlist_add(unrecognized, (char*)q); + if (errmsg) /* use provided error message */ + smartlist_add_strdup(unrecognized, errmsg); + else /* use default error message */ + smartlist_add_asprintf(unrecognized, "Unrecognized key \"%s\"", q); } else { smartlist_add_strdup(answers, q); smartlist_add(answers, ans); } } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(q); + if (smartlist_len(unrecognized)) { + /* control-spec section 2.3, mid-reply '-' or end of reply ' ' */ for (i=0; i < smartlist_len(unrecognized)-1; ++i) connection_printf_to_buf(conn, - "552-Unrecognized key \"%s\"\r\n", - (char*)smartlist_get(unrecognized, i)); + "552-%s\r\n", + (char *)smartlist_get(unrecognized, i)); + connection_printf_to_buf(conn, - "552 Unrecognized key \"%s\"\r\n", - (char*)smartlist_get(unrecognized, i)); + "552 %s\r\n", + (char *)smartlist_get(unrecognized, i)); goto done; } @@ -3217,8 +3247,8 @@ handle_control_getinfo(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len, smartlist_free(answers); SMARTLIST_FOREACH(questions, char *, cp, tor_free(cp)); smartlist_free(questions); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(unrecognized, char *, cp, tor_free(cp)); smartlist_free(unrecognized); - tor_free(msg); return 0; } @@ -4882,6 +4912,38 @@ peek_connection_has_control0_command(connection_t *conn) return peek_buf_has_control0_command(conn->inbuf); } +static int +peek_connection_has_http_command(connection_t *conn) +{ + return peek_buf_has_http_command(conn->inbuf); +} + +static const char CONTROLPORT_IS_NOT_AN_HTTP_PROXY_MSG[] = + "HTTP/1.0 501 Tor ControlPort is not an HTTP proxy" + "\r\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1\r\n\r\n" + "<html>\n" + "<head>\n" + "<title>Tor's ControlPort is not an HTTP proxy</title>\n" + "</head>\n" + "<body>\n" + "<h1>Tor's ControlPort is not an HTTP proxy</h1>\n" + "<p>\n" + "It appears you have configured your web browser to use Tor's control port" + " as an HTTP proxy.\n" + "This is not correct: Tor's default SOCKS proxy port is 9050.\n" + "Please configure your client accordingly.\n" + "</p>\n" + "<p>\n" + "See <a href=\"https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html\">" + "https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html</a> for more " + "information.\n" + "<!-- Plus this comment, to make the body response more than 512 bytes, so " + " IE will be willing to display it. Comment comment comment comment " + " comment comment comment comment comment comment comment comment.-->\n" + "</p>\n" + "</body>\n" + "</html>\n"; + /** Called when data has arrived on a v1 control connection: Try to fetch * commands from conn->inbuf, and execute them. */ @@ -4921,6 +4983,15 @@ connection_control_process_inbuf(control_connection_t *conn) return 0; } + /* If the user has the HTTP proxy port and the control port confused. */ + if (conn->base_.state == CONTROL_CONN_STATE_NEEDAUTH && + peek_connection_has_http_command(TO_CONN(conn))) { + connection_write_str_to_buf(CONTROLPORT_IS_NOT_AN_HTTP_PROXY_MSG, conn); + log_notice(LD_CONTROL, "Received HTTP request on ControlPort"); + connection_mark_and_flush(TO_CONN(conn)); + return 0; + } + again: while (1) { size_t last_idx; diff --git a/src/or/cpuworker.c b/src/or/cpuworker.c index 1013fa555e..06d45f9960 100644 --- a/src/or/cpuworker.c +++ b/src/or/cpuworker.c @@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ queue_pending_tasks(void) if (!circ) return; - if (assign_onionskin_to_cpuworker(circ, onionskin)) + if (assign_onionskin_to_cpuworker(circ, onionskin) < 0) log_info(LD_OR,"assign_to_cpuworker failed. Ignoring."); } } diff --git a/src/or/directory.c b/src/or/directory.c index 45fbd1dd33..69479ad745 100644 --- a/src/or/directory.c +++ b/src/or/directory.c @@ -4918,7 +4918,7 @@ directory_handle_command_post,(dir_connection_t *conn, const char *headers, goto done; } - if (authdir_mode_handles_descs(options, -1) && + if (authdir_mode(options) && !strcmp(url,"/tor/")) { /* server descriptor post */ const char *msg = "[None]"; uint8_t purpose = authdir_mode_bridge(options) ? diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c index 4954471c6a..75a245e07a 100644 --- a/src/or/dirserv.c +++ b/src/or/dirserv.c @@ -704,10 +704,22 @@ dirserv_add_descriptor(routerinfo_t *ri, const char **msg, const char *source) /* Do keypinning again ... this time, to add the pin if appropriate */ int keypin_status; if (ri->cache_info.signing_key_cert) { + ed25519_public_key_t *pkey = &ri->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key; + /* First let's validate this pubkey before pinning it */ + if (ed25519_validate_pubkey(pkey) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_DIRSERV, "Received bad key from %s (source %s)", + router_describe(ri), source); + control_event_or_authdir_new_descriptor("REJECTED", + ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, + desclen, *msg); + routerinfo_free(ri); + return ROUTER_AUTHDIR_REJECTS; + } + + /* Now pin it! */ keypin_status = keypin_check_and_add( (const uint8_t*)ri->cache_info.identity_digest, - ri->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key.pubkey, - ! key_pinning); + pkey->pubkey, ! key_pinning); } else { keypin_status = keypin_check_lone_rsa( (const uint8_t*)ri->cache_info.identity_digest); diff --git a/src/or/dns.c b/src/or/dns.c index 98b684c904..cc062e30ef 100644 --- a/src/or/dns.c +++ b/src/or/dns.c @@ -182,6 +182,18 @@ evdns_log_cb(int warn, const char *msg) } else if (!strcmp(msg, "All nameservers have failed")) { control_event_server_status(LOG_WARN, "NAMESERVER_ALL_DOWN"); all_down = 1; + } else if (!strcmpstart(msg, "Address mismatch on received DNS")) { + static ratelim_t mismatch_limit = RATELIM_INIT(3600); + const char *src = strstr(msg, " Apparent source"); + if (!src || get_options()->SafeLogging) { + src = ""; + } + log_fn_ratelim(&mismatch_limit, severity, LD_EXIT, + "eventdns: Received a DNS packet from " + "an IP address to which we did not send a request. This " + "could be a DNS spoofing attempt, or some kind of " + "misconfiguration.%s", src); + return; } tor_log(severity, LD_EXIT, "eventdns: %s", msg); } @@ -1928,7 +1940,7 @@ dns_launch_wildcard_checks(void) launch_wildcard_check(8, 16, ipv6, ".com"); launch_wildcard_check(8, 16, ipv6, ".org"); launch_wildcard_check(8, 16, ipv6, ".net"); - } + } } } diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c index fa768fc4a6..739ec82484 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@ -813,7 +813,7 @@ STATIC entry_guard_t * entry_guard_add_to_sample(guard_selection_t *gs, const node_t *node) { - log_info(LD_GUARD, "Adding %s as to the entry guard sample set.", + log_info(LD_GUARD, "Adding %s to the entry guard sample set.", node_describe(node)); /* make sure that the guard is not already sampled. */ diff --git a/src/or/hs_descriptor.c b/src/or/hs_descriptor.c index 2a000f5002..b55f9663bc 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_descriptor.c +++ b/src/or/hs_descriptor.c @@ -1747,18 +1747,13 @@ decode_introduction_point(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, const char *start) /* Given a descriptor string at <b>data</b>, decode all possible introduction * points that we can find. Add the introduction point object to desc_enc as we - * find them. Return 0 on success. - * - * On error, a negative value is returned. It is possible that some intro - * point object have been added to the desc_enc, they should be considered - * invalid. One single bad encoded introduction point will make this function - * return an error. */ -STATIC int + * find them. This function can't fail and it is possible that zero + * introduction points can be decoded. */ +static void decode_intro_points(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *desc_enc, const char *data) { - int retval = -1; smartlist_t *chunked_desc = smartlist_new(); smartlist_t *intro_points = smartlist_new(); @@ -1799,22 +1794,19 @@ decode_intro_points(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(intro_points, const char *, intro_point) { hs_desc_intro_point_t *ip = decode_introduction_point(desc, intro_point); if (!ip) { - /* Malformed introduction point section. Stop right away, this - * descriptor shouldn't be used. */ - goto err; + /* Malformed introduction point section. We'll ignore this introduction + * point and continue parsing. New or unknown fields are possible for + * forward compatibility. */ + continue; } smartlist_add(desc_enc->intro_points, ip); } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(intro_point); done: - retval = 0; - - err: SMARTLIST_FOREACH(chunked_desc, char *, a, tor_free(a)); smartlist_free(chunked_desc); SMARTLIST_FOREACH(intro_points, char *, a, tor_free(a)); smartlist_free(intro_points); - return retval; } /* Return 1 iff the given base64 encoded signature in b64_sig from the encoded * descriptor in encoded_desc validates the descriptor content. */ @@ -2040,9 +2032,8 @@ desc_decode_encrypted_v3(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, /* Initialize the descriptor's introduction point list before we start * decoding. Having 0 intro point is valid. Then decode them all. */ desc_encrypted_out->intro_points = smartlist_new(); - if (decode_intro_points(desc, desc_encrypted_out, message) < 0) { - goto err; - } + decode_intro_points(desc, desc_encrypted_out, message); + /* Validation of maximum introduction points allowed. */ if (smartlist_len(desc_encrypted_out->intro_points) > MAX_INTRO_POINTS) { log_warn(LD_REND, "Service descriptor contains too many introduction " diff --git a/src/or/hs_descriptor.h b/src/or/hs_descriptor.h index b8b94792de..58c4089795 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_descriptor.h +++ b/src/or/hs_descriptor.h @@ -223,9 +223,6 @@ STATIC smartlist_t *decode_link_specifiers(const char *encoded); STATIC hs_desc_intro_point_t *decode_introduction_point( const hs_descriptor_t *desc, const char *text); -STATIC int decode_intro_points(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, - hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *desc_enc, - const char *data); STATIC int encrypted_data_length_is_valid(size_t len); STATIC int cert_is_valid(tor_cert_t *cert, uint8_t type, const char *log_obj_type); diff --git a/src/or/main.c b/src/or/main.c index cb24fd18c8..5fa3869ff8 100644 --- a/src/or/main.c +++ b/src/or/main.c @@ -2355,7 +2355,7 @@ do_hup(void) tor_free(msg); } } - if (authdir_mode_handles_descs(options, -1)) { + if (authdir_mode(options)) { /* reload the approved-routers file */ if (dirserv_load_fingerprint_file() < 0) { /* warnings are logged from dirserv_load_fingerprint_file() directly */ @@ -3478,7 +3478,7 @@ sandbox_init_filter(void) if (options->BridgeAuthoritativeDir) OPEN_DATADIR_SUFFIX("networkstatus-bridges", ".tmp"); - if (authdir_mode_handles_descs(options, -1)) + if (authdir_mode(options)) OPEN_DATADIR("approved-routers"); if (options->ServerDNSResolvConfFile) diff --git a/src/or/microdesc.c b/src/or/microdesc.c index a4e6b409c4..18a6fbded7 100644 --- a/src/or/microdesc.c +++ b/src/or/microdesc.c @@ -876,7 +876,7 @@ update_microdesc_downloads(time_t now) smartlist_free(missing); } -/** For every microdescriptor listed in the current microdecriptor consensus, +/** For every microdescriptor listed in the current microdescriptor consensus, * update its last_listed field to be at least as recent as the publication * time of the current microdescriptor consensus. */ diff --git a/src/or/networkstatus.c b/src/or/networkstatus.c index fffd1078be..a9a6227cd6 100644 --- a/src/or/networkstatus.c +++ b/src/or/networkstatus.c @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ static strmap_t *unnamed_server_map = NULL; * status. */ STATIC networkstatus_t *current_ns_consensus = NULL; -/** Most recently received and validated v3 "microdec"-flavored consensus +/** Most recently received and validated v3 "microdesc"-flavored consensus * network status. */ STATIC networkstatus_t *current_md_consensus = NULL; @@ -1783,7 +1783,7 @@ networkstatus_set_current_consensus(const char *consensus, if (from_cache && !was_waiting_for_certs) { /* We previously stored this; check _now_ to make sure that version-kills - * really work. This happens even before we check signatures: we did so + * really work. This happens even before we check signatures: we did so * before when we stored this to disk. This does mean an attacker who can * write to the datadir can make us not start: such an attacker could * already harm us by replacing our guards, which would be worse. */ diff --git a/src/or/nodelist.c b/src/or/nodelist.c index 3ac5c3e302..6ec7da798f 100644 --- a/src/or/nodelist.c +++ b/src/or/nodelist.c @@ -707,6 +707,48 @@ node_supports_ed25519_link_authentication(const node_t *node) return 0; } +/** Return true iff <b>node</b> supports the hidden service directory version + * 3 protocol (proposal 224). */ +int +node_supports_v3_hsdir(const node_t *node) +{ + tor_assert(node); + + if (node->rs) { + return node->rs->supports_v3_hsdir; + } + if (node->ri) { + if (node->ri->protocol_list == NULL) { + return 0; + } + return protocol_list_supports_protocol(node->ri->protocol_list, + PRT_HSDIR, PROTOVER_HSDIR_V3); + } + tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached_once(); + return 0; +} + +/** Return true iff <b>node</b> supports ed25519 authentication as an hidden + * service introduction point.*/ +int +node_supports_ed25519_hs_intro(const node_t *node) +{ + tor_assert(node); + + if (node->rs) { + return node->rs->supports_ed25519_hs_intro; + } + if (node->ri) { + if (node->ri->protocol_list == NULL) { + return 0; + } + return protocol_list_supports_protocol(node->ri->protocol_list, + PRT_HSINTRO, PROTOVER_HS_INTRO_V3); + } + tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached_once(); + return 0; +} + /** Return the RSA ID key's SHA1 digest for the provided node. */ const uint8_t * node_get_rsa_id_digest(const node_t *node) diff --git a/src/or/nodelist.h b/src/or/nodelist.h index 95ae778a5b..405b79d820 100644 --- a/src/or/nodelist.h +++ b/src/or/nodelist.h @@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ const ed25519_public_key_t *node_get_ed25519_id(const node_t *node); int node_ed25519_id_matches(const node_t *node, const ed25519_public_key_t *id); int node_supports_ed25519_link_authentication(const node_t *node); +int node_supports_v3_hsdir(const node_t *node); +int node_supports_ed25519_hs_intro(const node_t *node); const uint8_t *node_get_rsa_id_digest(const node_t *node); int node_has_ipv6_addr(const node_t *node); diff --git a/src/or/protover.h b/src/or/protover.h index 22667bed79..2066aeec72 100644 --- a/src/or/protover.h +++ b/src/or/protover.h @@ -17,6 +17,11 @@ /* This is a guess. */ #define FIRST_TOR_VERSION_TO_ADVERTISE_PROTOCOLS "0.2.9.3-alpha" +/** The protover version number that signifies HSDir support for HSv3 */ +#define PROTOVER_HSDIR_V3 2 +/** The protover version number that signifies HSv3 intro point support */ +#define PROTOVER_HS_INTRO_V3 4 + /** List of recognized subprotocols. */ typedef enum protocol_type_t { PRT_LINK, diff --git a/src/or/relay.c b/src/or/relay.c index 0ff53ed5e9..18ccc65b80 100644 --- a/src/or/relay.c +++ b/src/or/relay.c @@ -184,18 +184,12 @@ relay_digest_matches(crypto_digest_t *digest, cell_t *cell) /** Apply <b>cipher</b> to CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE bytes of <b>in</b> * (in place). * - * If <b>encrypt_mode</b> is 1 then encrypt, else decrypt. - * - * Returns 0. + * Note that we use the same operation for encrypting and for decrypting. */ -static int -relay_crypt_one_payload(crypto_cipher_t *cipher, uint8_t *in, - int encrypt_mode) +static void +relay_crypt_one_payload(crypto_cipher_t *cipher, uint8_t *in) { - (void)encrypt_mode; crypto_cipher_crypt_inplace(cipher, (char*) in, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE); - - return 0; } /** @@ -449,8 +443,8 @@ relay_crypt(circuit_t *circ, cell_t *cell, cell_direction_t cell_direction, do { /* Remember: cpath is in forward order, that is, first hop first. */ tor_assert(thishop); - if (relay_crypt_one_payload(thishop->b_crypto, cell->payload, 0) < 0) - return -1; + /* decrypt one layer */ + relay_crypt_one_payload(thishop->b_crypto, cell->payload); relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload); if (rh.recognized == 0) { @@ -467,19 +461,14 @@ relay_crypt(circuit_t *circ, cell_t *cell, cell_direction_t cell_direction, log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, "Incoming cell at client not recognized. Closing."); return -1; - } else { /* we're in the middle. Just one crypt. */ - if (relay_crypt_one_payload(TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_crypto, - cell->payload, 1) < 0) - return -1; -// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Skipping recognized check, because we're not " -// "the client."); + } else { + /* We're in the middle. Encrypt one layer. */ + relay_crypt_one_payload(TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_crypto, cell->payload); } } else /* cell_direction == CELL_DIRECTION_OUT */ { - /* we're in the middle. Just one crypt. */ + /* We're in the middle. Decrypt one layer. */ - if (relay_crypt_one_payload(TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_crypto, - cell->payload, 0) < 0) - return -1; + relay_crypt_one_payload(TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_crypto, cell->payload); relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload); if (rh.recognized == 0) { @@ -525,11 +514,8 @@ circuit_package_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, /* moving from farthest to nearest hop */ do { tor_assert(thishop); - /* XXXX RD This is a bug, right? */ - log_debug(LD_OR,"crypting a layer of the relay cell."); - if (relay_crypt_one_payload(thishop->f_crypto, cell->payload, 1) < 0) { - return -1; - } + log_debug(LD_OR,"encrypting a layer of the relay cell."); + relay_crypt_one_payload(thishop->f_crypto, cell->payload); thishop = thishop->prev; } while (thishop != TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->cpath->prev); @@ -546,8 +532,8 @@ circuit_package_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, or_circ = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ); chan = or_circ->p_chan; relay_set_digest(or_circ->p_digest, cell); - if (relay_crypt_one_payload(or_circ->p_crypto, cell->payload, 1) < 0) - return -1; + /* encrypt one layer */ + relay_crypt_one_payload(or_circ->p_crypto, cell->payload); } ++stats_n_relay_cells_relayed; diff --git a/src/or/rendcommon.c b/src/or/rendcommon.c index e1236bdd0f..986bfde75f 100644 --- a/src/or/rendcommon.c +++ b/src/or/rendcommon.c @@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ * introducers, services, clients, and rendezvous points. **/ +#define RENDCOMMON_PRIVATE + #include "or.h" #include "circuitbuild.h" #include "config.h" @@ -395,7 +397,7 @@ rend_encrypt_v2_intro_points_stealth(char **encrypted_out, /** Attempt to parse the given <b>desc_str</b> and return true if this * succeeds, false otherwise. */ -static int +STATIC int rend_desc_v2_is_parsable(rend_encoded_v2_service_descriptor_t *desc) { rend_service_descriptor_t *test_parsed = NULL; diff --git a/src/or/rendcommon.h b/src/or/rendcommon.h index 94c2480d86..292f9277e8 100644 --- a/src/or/rendcommon.h +++ b/src/or/rendcommon.h @@ -63,5 +63,12 @@ int rend_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(const or_options_t *options); void assert_circ_anonymity_ok(origin_circuit_t *circ, const or_options_t *options); +#ifdef RENDCOMMON_PRIVATE + +STATIC int +rend_desc_v2_is_parsable(rend_encoded_v2_service_descriptor_t *desc); + +#endif + #endif diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index 2187a76b48..100c4cc949 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -1065,7 +1065,7 @@ init_keys(void) /* 4. Build our router descriptor. */ /* Must be called after keys are initialized. */ mydesc = router_get_my_descriptor(); - if (authdir_mode_handles_descs(options, ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL)) { + if (authdir_mode_v3(options)) { const char *m = NULL; routerinfo_t *ri; /* We need to add our own fingerprint so it gets recognized. */ @@ -1596,32 +1596,19 @@ authdir_mode_v3(const or_options_t *options) { return authdir_mode(options) && options->V3AuthoritativeDir != 0; } -/** Return true iff we are a v3 directory authority. */ -int -authdir_mode_any_main(const or_options_t *options) -{ - return options->V3AuthoritativeDir; -} -/** Return true if we believe ourselves to be any kind of - * authoritative directory beyond just a hidserv authority. */ -int -authdir_mode_any_nonhidserv(const or_options_t *options) -{ - return options->BridgeAuthoritativeDir || - authdir_mode_any_main(options); -} /** Return true iff we are an authoritative directory server that is * authoritative about receiving and serving descriptors of type - * <b>purpose</b> on its dirport. Use -1 for "any purpose". */ + * <b>purpose</b> on its dirport. + */ int authdir_mode_handles_descs(const or_options_t *options, int purpose) { - if (purpose < 0) - return authdir_mode_any_nonhidserv(options); + if (BUG(purpose < 0)) /* Deprecated. */ + return authdir_mode(options); else if (purpose == ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL) - return authdir_mode_any_main(options); + return authdir_mode_v3(options); else if (purpose == ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE) - return (options->BridgeAuthoritativeDir); + return authdir_mode_bridge(options); else return 0; } @@ -1633,7 +1620,7 @@ authdir_mode_publishes_statuses(const or_options_t *options) { if (authdir_mode_bridge(options)) return 0; - return authdir_mode_any_nonhidserv(options); + return authdir_mode(options); } /** Return true iff we are an authoritative directory server that * tests reachability of the descriptors it learns about. @@ -1641,7 +1628,7 @@ authdir_mode_publishes_statuses(const or_options_t *options) int authdir_mode_tests_reachability(const or_options_t *options) { - return authdir_mode_handles_descs(options, -1); + return authdir_mode(options); } /** Return true iff we believe ourselves to be a bridge authoritative * directory server. diff --git a/src/or/router.h b/src/or/router.h index 9c5def5218..97f331713a 100644 --- a/src/or/router.h +++ b/src/or/router.h @@ -54,8 +54,6 @@ int net_is_disabled(void); int authdir_mode(const or_options_t *options); int authdir_mode_v3(const or_options_t *options); -int authdir_mode_any_main(const or_options_t *options); -int authdir_mode_any_nonhidserv(const or_options_t *options); int authdir_mode_handles_descs(const or_options_t *options, int purpose); int authdir_mode_publishes_statuses(const or_options_t *options); int authdir_mode_tests_reachability(const or_options_t *options); diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index 0e45f63f70..8adaaf6c05 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -5033,7 +5033,7 @@ launch_descriptor_downloads(int purpose, } } - if (!authdir_mode_any_nonhidserv(options)) { + if (!authdir_mode(options)) { /* If we wind up going to the authorities, we want to only open one * connection to each authority at a time, so that we don't overload * them. We do this by setting PDS_NO_EXISTING_SERVERDESC_FETCH @@ -5164,7 +5164,7 @@ update_consensus_router_descriptor_downloads(time_t now, int is_vote, smartlist_add(downloadable, rs->descriptor_digest); } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(rsp); - if (!authdir_mode_handles_descs(options, ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL) + if (!authdir_mode_v3(options) && smartlist_len(no_longer_old)) { routerlist_t *rl = router_get_routerlist(); log_info(LD_DIR, "%d router descriptors listed in consensus are " diff --git a/src/or/routerparse.c b/src/or/routerparse.c index 0f6113ccfc..6a03194472 100644 --- a/src/or/routerparse.c +++ b/src/or/routerparse.c @@ -3360,8 +3360,8 @@ extract_shared_random_srvs(networkstatus_t *ns, smartlist_t *tokens) voter_identity = "consensus"; } - /* We extract both and on error, everything is stopped because it means - * the votes is malformed for the shared random value(s). */ + /* We extract both, and on error everything is stopped because it means + * the vote is malformed for the shared random value(s). */ if (extract_one_srv(tokens, K_PREVIOUS_SRV, &ns->sr_info.previous_srv) < 0) { log_warn(LD_DIR, "SR: Unable to parse previous SRV from %s", voter_identity); diff --git a/src/test/ed25519_exts_ref.py b/src/test/ed25519_exts_ref.py index af5010415e..1898256540 100644 --- a/src/test/ed25519_exts_ref.py +++ b/src/test/ed25519_exts_ref.py @@ -69,6 +69,11 @@ def signatureWithESK(m,h,pk): def newSK(): return os.urandom(32) +def random_scalar(entropy_f): # 0..L-1 inclusive + # reduce the bias to a safe level by generating 256 extra bits + oversized = int(binascii.hexlify(entropy_f(32+32)), 16) + return oversized % ell + # ------------------------------------------------------------ MSG = "This is extremely silly. But it is also incredibly serious business!" @@ -126,6 +131,31 @@ class SelfTest(unittest.TestCase): self._testSignatures(besk, bpk) + def testIdentity(self): + # Base point: + # B is the unique point (x, 4/5) \in E for which x is positive + By = 4 * inv(5) + Bx = xrecover(By) + B = [Bx % q,By % q] + + # Get identity E by doing: E = l*B, where l is the group order + identity = scalarmult(B, ell) + + # Get identity E by doing: E = l*A, where A is a random point + sk = newSK() + pk = decodepoint(publickey(sk)) + identity2 = scalarmult(pk, ell) + + # Check that identities match + assert(identity == identity2) + # Check that identity is the point (0,1) + assert(identity == [0L,1L]) + + # Check identity element: a*E = E, where a is a random scalar + scalar = random_scalar(os.urandom) + result = scalarmult(identity, scalar) + assert(result == identity == identity2) + # ------------------------------------------------------------ # From pprint.pprint([ binascii.b2a_hex(os.urandom(32)) for _ in xrange(8) ]) diff --git a/src/test/test_buffers.c b/src/test/test_buffers.c index 07114a8571..3989a45480 100644 --- a/src/test/test_buffers.c +++ b/src/test/test_buffers.c @@ -838,10 +838,37 @@ test_buffers_find_contentlen(void *arg) ; } +static void +test_buffer_peek_startswith(void *arg) +{ + (void)arg; + buf_t *buf; + buf = buf_new(); + tt_ptr_op(buf, OP_NE, NULL); + + tt_assert(peek_buf_startswith(buf, "")); + tt_assert(! peek_buf_startswith(buf, "X")); + + write_to_buf("Tor", 3, buf); + + tt_assert(peek_buf_startswith(buf, "")); + tt_assert(peek_buf_startswith(buf, "T")); + tt_assert(peek_buf_startswith(buf, "To")); + tt_assert(peek_buf_startswith(buf, "Tor")); + tt_assert(! peek_buf_startswith(buf, "Top")); + tt_assert(! peek_buf_startswith(buf, "For")); + tt_assert(! peek_buf_startswith(buf, "Tork")); + tt_assert(! peek_buf_startswith(buf, "Torpor")); + + done: + buf_free(buf); +} + struct testcase_t buffer_tests[] = { { "basic", test_buffers_basic, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, { "copy", test_buffer_copy, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, { "pullup", test_buffer_pullup, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, + { "startswith", test_buffer_peek_startswith, 0, NULL, NULL }, { "ext_or_cmd", test_buffer_ext_or_cmd, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, { "allocation_tracking", test_buffer_allocation_tracking, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, diff --git a/src/test/test_channel.c b/src/test/test_channel.c index f5999b8e67..347aca7ecb 100644 --- a/src/test/test_channel.c +++ b/src/test/test_channel.c @@ -811,7 +811,7 @@ test_channel_incoming(void *arg) tt_assert(ch->registered); /* Open it */ - channel_change_state(ch, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN); + channel_change_state_open(ch); tt_int_op(ch->state, ==, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN); /* Receive a fixed cell */ @@ -899,7 +899,7 @@ test_channel_lifecycle(void *arg) tt_int_op(old_count, ==, test_cells_written); /* Move it to OPEN and flush */ - channel_change_state(ch1, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN); + channel_change_state_open(ch1); /* Queue should drain */ tt_int_op(old_count + 1, ==, test_cells_written); @@ -925,13 +925,13 @@ test_channel_lifecycle(void *arg) tt_int_op(test_releases_count, ==, init_releases_count); /* Move ch2 to OPEN */ - channel_change_state(ch2, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN); + channel_change_state_open(ch2); tt_int_op(test_doesnt_want_writes_count, ==, init_doesnt_want_writes_count + 1); tt_int_op(test_releases_count, ==, init_releases_count); /* Move ch1 back to OPEN */ - channel_change_state(ch1, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN); + channel_change_state_open(ch1); tt_int_op(test_doesnt_want_writes_count, ==, init_doesnt_want_writes_count + 1); tt_int_op(test_releases_count, ==, init_releases_count); @@ -1018,7 +1018,7 @@ test_channel_lifecycle_2(void *arg) tt_assert(ch->registered); /* Finish opening it */ - channel_change_state(ch, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN); + channel_change_state_open(ch); /* Error exit from lower layer */ chan_test_error(ch); @@ -1037,7 +1037,7 @@ test_channel_lifecycle_2(void *arg) tt_assert(ch->registered); /* Finish opening it */ - channel_change_state(ch, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN); + channel_change_state_open(ch); tt_int_op(ch->state, ==, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN); /* Go to maintenance state */ @@ -1066,7 +1066,7 @@ test_channel_lifecycle_2(void *arg) tt_assert(ch->registered); /* Finish opening it */ - channel_change_state(ch, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN); + channel_change_state_open(ch); tt_int_op(ch->state, ==, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN); /* Go to maintenance state */ @@ -1092,7 +1092,7 @@ test_channel_lifecycle_2(void *arg) tt_assert(ch->registered); /* Finish opening it */ - channel_change_state(ch, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN); + channel_change_state_open(ch); tt_int_op(ch->state, ==, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN); /* Go to maintenance state */ @@ -1322,7 +1322,7 @@ test_channel_queue_impossible(void *arg) * gets thrown away properly. */ test_chan_accept_cells = 1; - channel_change_state(ch, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN); + channel_change_state_open(ch); tt_assert(test_cells_written == old_count); tt_int_op(chan_cell_queue_len(&(ch->outgoing_queue)), ==, 0); @@ -1350,7 +1350,7 @@ test_channel_queue_impossible(void *arg) /* Let it drain and check that the bad entry is discarded */ test_chan_accept_cells = 1; - channel_change_state(ch, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN); + channel_change_state_open(ch); tt_assert(test_cells_written == old_count); tt_int_op(chan_cell_queue_len(&(ch->outgoing_queue)), ==, 0); @@ -1378,7 +1378,7 @@ test_channel_queue_impossible(void *arg) /* Let it drain and check that the bad entry is discarded */ test_chan_accept_cells = 1; - channel_change_state(ch, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN); + channel_change_state_open(ch); tt_assert(test_cells_written == old_count); tt_int_op(chan_cell_queue_len(&(ch->outgoing_queue)), ==, 0); @@ -1406,7 +1406,7 @@ test_channel_queue_impossible(void *arg) /* Let it drain and check that the bad entry is discarded */ test_chan_accept_cells = 1; tor_capture_bugs_(1); - channel_change_state(ch, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN); + channel_change_state_open(ch); tt_assert(test_cells_written == old_count); tt_int_op(chan_cell_queue_len(&(ch->outgoing_queue)), ==, 0); @@ -1463,7 +1463,7 @@ test_channel_queue_incoming(void *arg) tt_assert(ch->registered); /* Open it */ - channel_change_state(ch, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN); + channel_change_state_open(ch); tt_int_op(ch->state, ==, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN); /* Assert that the incoming queue is empty */ @@ -1603,7 +1603,7 @@ test_channel_queue_size(void *arg) /* Go to open */ old_count = test_cells_written; - channel_change_state(ch, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN); + channel_change_state_open(ch); /* * It should try to write, but we aren't accepting cells right now, so @@ -1706,7 +1706,7 @@ test_channel_write(void *arg) * gets drained from the queue. */ test_chan_accept_cells = 1; - channel_change_state(ch, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN); + channel_change_state_open(ch); tt_assert(test_cells_written == old_count + 1); /* diff --git a/src/test/test_crypto.c b/src/test/test_crypto.c index ec9d4e2709..4d9651db9c 100644 --- a/src/test/test_crypto.c +++ b/src/test/test_crypto.c @@ -2170,6 +2170,9 @@ test_crypto_ed25519_simple(void *arg) tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, ed25519_public_key_generate(&pub1, &sec1)); tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, ed25519_public_key_generate(&pub2, &sec1)); + tt_int_op(ed25519_validate_pubkey(&pub1), OP_EQ, 0); + tt_int_op(ed25519_validate_pubkey(&pub2), OP_EQ, 0); + tt_mem_op(pub1.pubkey, OP_EQ, pub2.pubkey, sizeof(pub1.pubkey)); tt_assert(ed25519_pubkey_eq(&pub1, &pub2)); tt_assert(ed25519_pubkey_eq(&pub1, &pub1)); @@ -2541,6 +2544,39 @@ test_crypto_ed25519_blinding(void *arg) ; } +/** Test that our blinding functions will fail if we pass them bad pubkeys */ +static void +test_crypto_ed25519_blinding_fail(void *arg) +{ + int retval; + uint8_t param[32] = {2}; + ed25519_public_key_t pub; + ed25519_public_key_t pub_blinded; + + (void)arg; + + /* This point is not on the curve: the blind routines should fail */ + const char badkey[] = + "e19c65de75c68cf3b7643ea732ba9eb1a3d20d6d57ba223c2ece1df66feb5af0"; + retval = base16_decode((char*)pub.pubkey, sizeof(pub.pubkey), + badkey, strlen(badkey)); + tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, sizeof(pub.pubkey)); + retval = ed25519_public_blind(&pub_blinded, &pub, param); + tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, -1); + + /* This point is legit: blind routines should be happy */ + const char goodkey[] = + "4ba2e44760dff4c559ef3c38768c1c14a8a54740c782c8d70803e9d6e3ad8794"; + retval = base16_decode((char*)pub.pubkey, sizeof(pub.pubkey), + goodkey, strlen(goodkey)); + tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, sizeof(pub.pubkey)); + retval = ed25519_public_blind(&pub_blinded, &pub, param); + tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0); + + done: + ; +} + static void test_crypto_ed25519_testvectors(void *arg) { @@ -2832,6 +2868,67 @@ crypto_rand_check_failure_mode_predict(void) #undef FAILURE_MODE_BUFFER_SIZE +/** Test that our ed25519 validation function rejects evil public keys and + * accepts good ones. */ +static void +test_crypto_ed25519_validation(void *arg) +{ + (void) arg; + + int retval; + ed25519_public_key_t pub1; + + /* See https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2017-April/012230.html + for a list of points with torsion components in ed25519. */ + + { /* Point with torsion component (order 8l) */ + const char badkey[] = + "300ef2e64e588e1df55b48e4da0416ffb64cc85d5b00af6463d5cc6c2b1c185e"; + retval = base16_decode((char*)pub1.pubkey, sizeof(pub1.pubkey), + badkey, strlen(badkey)); + tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, sizeof(pub1.pubkey)); + tt_int_op(ed25519_validate_pubkey(&pub1), OP_EQ, -1); + } + + { /* Point with torsion component (order 4l) */ + const char badkey[] = + "f43e3a046db8749164c6e69b193f1e942c7452e7d888736f40b98093d814d5e7"; + retval = base16_decode((char*)pub1.pubkey, sizeof(pub1.pubkey), + badkey, strlen(badkey)); + tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, sizeof(pub1.pubkey)); + tt_int_op(ed25519_validate_pubkey(&pub1), OP_EQ, -1); + } + + { /* Point with torsion component (order 2l) */ + const char badkey[] = + "c9fff3af0471c28e33e98c2043e44f779d0427b1e37c521a6bddc011ed1869af"; + retval = base16_decode((char*)pub1.pubkey, sizeof(pub1.pubkey), + badkey, strlen(badkey)); + tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, sizeof(pub1.pubkey)); + tt_int_op(ed25519_validate_pubkey(&pub1), OP_EQ, -1); + } + + { /* This point is not even on the curve */ + const char badkey[] = + "e19c65de75c68cf3b7643ea732ba9eb1a3d20d6d57ba223c2ece1df66feb5af0"; + retval = base16_decode((char*)pub1.pubkey, sizeof(pub1.pubkey), + badkey, strlen(badkey)); + tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, sizeof(pub1.pubkey)); + tt_int_op(ed25519_validate_pubkey(&pub1), OP_EQ, -1); + } + + { /* This one is a good key */ + const char goodkey[] = + "4ba2e44760dff4c559ef3c38768c1c14a8a54740c782c8d70803e9d6e3ad8794"; + retval = base16_decode((char*)pub1.pubkey, sizeof(pub1.pubkey), + goodkey, strlen(goodkey)); + tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, sizeof(pub1.pubkey)); + tt_int_op(ed25519_validate_pubkey(&pub1), OP_EQ, 0); + } + + done: ; +} + static void test_crypto_failure_modes(void *arg) { @@ -2917,7 +3014,9 @@ struct testcase_t crypto_tests[] = { ED25519_TEST(encode, 0), ED25519_TEST(convert, 0), ED25519_TEST(blinding, 0), + ED25519_TEST(blinding_fail, 0), ED25519_TEST(testvectors, 0), + ED25519_TEST(validation, 0), { "ed25519_storage", test_crypto_ed25519_storage, 0, NULL, NULL }, { "siphash", test_crypto_siphash, 0, NULL, NULL }, { "failure_modes", test_crypto_failure_modes, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, diff --git a/src/test/test_hs.c b/src/test/test_hs.c index b4817a21ea..178f94d273 100644 --- a/src/test/test_hs.c +++ b/src/test/test_hs.c @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #define CONTROL_PRIVATE #define CIRCUITBUILD_PRIVATE +#define RENDCOMMON_PRIVATE #define RENDSERVICE_PRIVATE #include "or.h" @@ -32,8 +33,9 @@ #define STR_HSDIR_NONE_EXIST_LONGNAME \ "$BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB" -/* DuckDuckGo descriptor as an example. */ -static const char *hs_desc_content = "\ +/* DuckDuckGo descriptor as an example. This one has extra "\r" at the end so + * the control port is happy. */ +static const char *hs_desc_content_control = "\ rendezvous-service-descriptor g5ojobzupf275beh5ra72uyhb3dkpxwg\r\n\ version 2\r\n\ permanent-key\r\n\ @@ -94,6 +96,68 @@ PcftsZf2ztN0sbNCtPgDL3d0PqvxY3iHTQAI8EbaGq/IAJUZ8U4y963dD5+Bn6JQ\r\n\ myE3ctmh0vy5+QxSiRjmQBkuEpCyks7LvWvHYrhnmcg=\r\n\ -----END SIGNATURE-----"; +/* DuckDuckGo descriptor as an example. */ +static const char *hs_desc_content = "\ +rendezvous-service-descriptor g5ojobzupf275beh5ra72uyhb3dkpxwg\n\ +version 2\n\ +permanent-key\n\ +-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n\ +MIGJAoGBAJ/SzzgrXPxTlFrKVhXh3buCWv2QfcNgncUpDpKouLn3AtPH5Ocys0jE\n\ +aZSKdvaiQ62md2gOwj4x61cFNdi05tdQjS+2thHKEm/KsB9BGLSLBNJYY356bupg\n\ +I5gQozM65ENelfxYlysBjJ52xSDBd8C4f/p9umdzaaaCmzXG/nhzAgMBAAE=\n\ +-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n\ +secret-id-part anmjoxxwiupreyajjt5yasimfmwcnxlf\n\ +publication-time 2015-03-11 19:00:00\n\ +protocol-versions 2,3\n\ +introduction-points\n\ +-----BEGIN MESSAGE-----\n\ +aW50cm9kdWN0aW9uLXBvaW50IDd1bnd4cmg2dG5kNGh6eWt1Z3EzaGZzdHduc2ll\n\ +cmhyCmlwLWFkZHJlc3MgMTg4LjEzOC4xMjEuMTE4Cm9uaW9uLXBvcnQgOTAwMQpv\n\ +bmlvbi1rZXkKLS0tLS1CRUdJTiBSU0EgUFVCTElDIEtFWS0tLS0tCk1JR0pBb0dC\n\ +QUxGRVVyeVpDbk9ROEhURmV5cDVjMTRObWVqL1BhekFLTTBxRENTNElKUWh0Y3g1\n\ +NXpRSFdOVWIKQ2hHZ0JqR1RjV3ZGRnA0N3FkdGF6WUZhVXE2c0lQKzVqeWZ5b0Q4\n\ +UmJ1bzBwQmFWclJjMmNhYUptWWM0RDh6Vgpuby9sZnhzOVVaQnZ1cWY4eHIrMDB2\n\ +S0JJNmFSMlA2OE1WeDhrMExqcUpUU2RKOE9idm9yQWdNQkFBRT0KLS0tLS1FTkQg\n\ +UlNBIFBVQkxJQyBLRVktLS0tLQpzZXJ2aWNlLWtleQotLS0tLUJFR0lOIFJTQSBQ\n\ +VUJMSUMgS0VZLS0tLS0KTUlHSkFvR0JBTnJHb0ozeTlHNXQzN2F2ekI1cTlwN1hG\n\ +VUplRUVYMUNOaExnWmJXWGJhVk5OcXpoZFhyL0xTUQppM1Z6dW5OaUs3cndUVnE2\n\ +K2QyZ1lRckhMMmIvMXBBY3ZKWjJiNSs0bTRRc0NibFpjRENXTktRbHJnRWN5WXRJ\n\ +CkdscXJTbFFEaXA0ZnNrUFMvNDVkWTI0QmJsQ3NGU1k3RzVLVkxJck4zZFpGbmJr\n\ +NEZIS1hBZ01CQUFFPQotLS0tLUVORCBSU0EgUFVCTElDIEtFWS0tLS0tCmludHJv\n\ +ZHVjdGlvbi1wb2ludCBiNGM3enlxNXNheGZzN2prNXFibG1wN3I1b3pwdHRvagpp\n\ +cC1hZGRyZXNzIDEwOS4xNjkuNDUuMjI2Cm9uaW9uLXBvcnQgOTAwMQpvbmlvbi1r\n\ +ZXkKLS0tLS1CRUdJTiBSU0EgUFVCTElDIEtFWS0tLS0tCk1JR0pBb0dCQU8xSXpw\n\ +WFFUTUY3RXZUb1NEUXpzVnZiRVFRQUQrcGZ6NzczMVRXZzVaUEJZY1EyUkRaeVp4\n\ +OEQKNUVQSU1FeUE1RE83cGd0ak5LaXJvYXJGMC8yempjMkRXTUlSaXZyU29YUWVZ\n\ +ZXlMM1pzKzFIajJhMDlCdkYxZAp6MEswblRFdVhoNVR5V3lyMHdsbGI1SFBnTlI0\n\ +MS9oYkprZzkwZitPVCtIeGhKL1duUml2QWdNQkFBRT0KLS0tLS1FTkQgUlNBIFBV\n\ +QkxJQyBLRVktLS0tLQpzZXJ2aWNlLWtleQotLS0tLUJFR0lOIFJTQSBQVUJMSUMg\n\ +S0VZLS0tLS0KTUlHSkFvR0JBSzNWZEJ2ajFtQllLL3JrcHNwcm9Ub0llNUtHVmth\n\ +QkxvMW1tK1I2YUVJek1VZFE1SjkwNGtyRwpCd3k5NC8rV0lGNFpGYXh5Z2phejl1\n\ +N2pKY1k3ZGJhd1pFeG1hYXFCRlRwL2h2ZG9rcHQ4a1ByRVk4OTJPRHJ1CmJORUox\n\ +N1FPSmVMTVZZZk5Kcjl4TWZCQ3JQai8zOGh2RUdrbWVRNmRVWElvbVFNaUJGOVRB\n\ +Z01CQUFFPQotLS0tLUVORCBSU0EgUFVCTElDIEtFWS0tLS0tCmludHJvZHVjdGlv\n\ +bi1wb2ludCBhdjVtcWl0Y2Q3cjJkandsYmN0c2Jlc2R3eGt0ZWtvegppcC1hZGRy\n\ +ZXNzIDE0NC43Ni44LjczCm9uaW9uLXBvcnQgNDQzCm9uaW9uLWtleQotLS0tLUJF\n\ +R0lOIFJTQSBQVUJMSUMgS0VZLS0tLS0KTUlHSkFvR0JBTzVweVZzQmpZQmNmMXBE\n\ +dklHUlpmWXUzQ05nNldka0ZLMGlvdTBXTGZtejZRVDN0NWhzd3cyVwpjejlHMXhx\n\ +MmN0Nkd6VWkrNnVkTDlITTRVOUdHTi9BbW8wRG9GV1hKWHpBQkFXd2YyMVdsd1lW\n\ +eFJQMHRydi9WCkN6UDkzcHc5OG5vSmdGUGRUZ05iMjdKYmVUZENLVFBrTEtscXFt\n\ +b3NveUN2RitRa25vUS9BZ01CQUFFPQotLS0tLUVORCBSU0EgUFVCTElDIEtFWS0t\n\ +LS0tCnNlcnZpY2Uta2V5Ci0tLS0tQkVHSU4gUlNBIFBVQkxJQyBLRVktLS0tLQpN\n\ +SUdKQW9HQkFMVjNKSmtWN3lTNU9jc1lHMHNFYzFQOTVRclFRR3ZzbGJ6Wi9zRGxl\n\ +RlpKYXFSOUYvYjRUVERNClNGcFMxcU1GbldkZDgxVmRGMEdYRmN2WVpLamRJdHU2\n\ +SndBaTRJeEhxeXZtdTRKdUxrcXNaTEFLaXRLVkx4eGsKeERlMjlDNzRWMmJrOTRJ\n\ +MEgybTNKS2tzTHVwc3VxWWRVUmhOVXN0SElKZmgyZmNIalF0bEFnTUJBQUU9Ci0t\n\ +LS0tRU5EIFJTQSBQVUJMSUMgS0VZLS0tLS0KCg==\n\ +-----END MESSAGE-----\n\ +signature\n\ +-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----\n\ +d4OuCE5OLAOnRB6cQN6WyMEmg/BHem144Vec+eYgeWoKwx3MxXFplUjFxgnMlmwN\n\ +PcftsZf2ztN0sbNCtPgDL3d0PqvxY3iHTQAI8EbaGq/IAJUZ8U4y963dD5+Bn6JQ\n\ +myE3ctmh0vy5+QxSiRjmQBkuEpCyks7LvWvHYrhnmcg=\n\ +-----END SIGNATURE-----"; + /* Helper global variable for hidden service descriptor event test. * It's used as a pointer to dynamically created message buffer in * send_control_event_string_replacement function, which mocks @@ -125,6 +189,30 @@ node_describe_longname_by_id_replacement(const char *id_digest) } } +/** Test that we can parse a hardcoded v2 HS desc. */ +static void +test_hs_parse_static_v2_desc(void *arg) +{ + int ret; + rend_encoded_v2_service_descriptor_t desc; + + (void) arg; + + /* Test an obviously not parseable string */ + desc.desc_str = tor_strdup("ceci n'est pas un HS descriptor"); + ret = rend_desc_v2_is_parsable(&desc); + tor_free(desc.desc_str); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + + /* Test an actual descriptor */ + desc.desc_str = tor_strdup(hs_desc_content); + ret = rend_desc_v2_is_parsable(&desc); + tor_free(desc.desc_str); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); + + done: ; +} + /** Make sure each hidden service descriptor async event generation * * function generates the message in expected format. @@ -235,10 +323,10 @@ test_hs_desc_event(void *arg) /* test valid content. */ control_event_hs_descriptor_content(rend_query.onion_address, STR_HS_CONTENT_DESC_ID, HSDIR_EXIST_ID, - hs_desc_content); + hs_desc_content_control); tor_asprintf(&exp_msg, "650+HS_DESC_CONTENT " STR_HS_ADDR " "\ STR_HS_CONTENT_DESC_ID " " STR_HSDIR_EXIST_LONGNAME\ - "\r\n%s\r\n.\r\n650 OK\r\n", hs_desc_content); + "\r\n%s\r\n.\r\n650 OK\r\n", hs_desc_content_control); tt_assert(received_msg); tt_str_op(received_msg, OP_EQ, exp_msg); @@ -941,6 +1029,8 @@ test_prune_services_on_reload(void *arg) struct testcase_t hs_tests[] = { { "hs_rend_data", test_hs_rend_data, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, + { "hs_parse_static_v2_desc", test_hs_parse_static_v2_desc, TT_FORK, + NULL, NULL }, { "hs_desc_event", test_hs_desc_event, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, { "pick_tor2web_rendezvous_node", test_pick_tor2web_rendezvous_node, TT_FORK, diff --git a/src/test/test_scheduler.c b/src/test/test_scheduler.c index 4c536b0905..a2e77a45d4 100644 --- a/src/test/test_scheduler.c +++ b/src/test/test_scheduler.c @@ -567,7 +567,7 @@ test_scheduler_loop(void *arg) channel_register(ch1); tt_assert(ch1->registered); /* Finish opening it */ - channel_change_state(ch1, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN); + channel_change_state_open(ch1); /* It should start off in SCHED_CHAN_IDLE */ tt_int_op(ch1->scheduler_state, ==, SCHED_CHAN_IDLE); @@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ test_scheduler_loop(void *arg) tt_int_op(smartlist_len(channels_pending), ==, 0); /* Now, finish opening ch2, and get both back to pending */ - channel_change_state(ch2, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN); + channel_change_state_open(ch2); scheduler_channel_wants_writes(ch1); scheduler_channel_wants_writes(ch2); scheduler_channel_has_waiting_cells(ch1); diff --git a/src/test/test_socks.c b/src/test/test_socks.c index bb1be11f2b..94b94640cc 100644 --- a/src/test/test_socks.c +++ b/src/test/test_socks.c @@ -229,25 +229,24 @@ test_socks_5_supported_commands(void *ptr) tt_int_op(0,OP_EQ, buf_datalen(buf)); socks_request_clear(socks); - /* SOCKS 5 Should reject RESOLVE [F0] request for IPv4 address + /* SOCKS 5 Should NOT reject RESOLVE [F0] request for IPv4 address * string if SafeSocks is enabled. */ ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\x01\x00"); ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\xF0\x00\x03\x07"); ADD_DATA(buf, "8.8.8.8"); - ADD_DATA(buf, "\x01\x02"); + ADD_DATA(buf, "\x11\x11"); tt_assert(fetch_from_buf_socks(buf,socks,get_options()->TestSocks,1) - == -1); + == 1); - tt_int_op(5,OP_EQ,socks->socks_version); - tt_int_op(10,OP_EQ,socks->replylen); - tt_int_op(5,OP_EQ,socks->reply[0]); - tt_int_op(SOCKS5_NOT_ALLOWED,OP_EQ,socks->reply[1]); - tt_int_op(1,OP_EQ,socks->reply[3]); + tt_str_op("8.8.8.8", OP_EQ, socks->address); + tt_int_op(4369, OP_EQ, socks->port); + + tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, buf_datalen(buf)); socks_request_clear(socks); - /* SOCKS 5 should reject RESOLVE [F0] reject for IPv6 address + /* SOCKS 5 should NOT reject RESOLVE [F0] reject for IPv6 address * string if SafeSocks is enabled. */ ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\x01\x00"); @@ -257,11 +256,10 @@ test_socks_5_supported_commands(void *ptr) tt_assert(fetch_from_buf_socks(buf,socks,get_options()->TestSocks,1) == -1); - tt_int_op(5,OP_EQ,socks->socks_version); - tt_int_op(10,OP_EQ,socks->replylen); - tt_int_op(5,OP_EQ,socks->reply[0]); - tt_int_op(SOCKS5_NOT_ALLOWED,OP_EQ,socks->reply[1]); - tt_int_op(1,OP_EQ,socks->reply[3]); + tt_str_op("2001:0db8:85a3:0000:0000:8a2e:0370:7334", OP_EQ, socks->address); + tt_int_op(258, OP_EQ, socks->port); + + tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, buf_datalen(buf)); socks_request_clear(socks); diff --git a/src/win32/orconfig.h b/src/win32/orconfig.h index caaf481731..9b16c64752 100644 --- a/src/win32/orconfig.h +++ b/src/win32/orconfig.h @@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ #define USING_TWOS_COMPLEMENT /* Version number of package */ -#define VERSION "0.3.1.4-alpha-dev" +#define VERSION "0.3.2.0-alpha-dev" |