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-rw-r--r--src/common/crypto.c18
-rw-r--r--src/common/crypto.h2
-rw-r--r--src/or/onion.c10
-rw-r--r--src/or/rendclient.c5
-rw-r--r--src/or/rendservice.c3
-rw-r--r--src/test/test_crypto.c4
6 files changed, 23 insertions, 19 deletions
diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c
index 4ea4492898..5a39a1ab0c 100644
--- a/src/common/crypto.c
+++ b/src/common/crypto.c
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ struct crypto_dh_env_t {
};
static int setup_openssl_threading(void);
-static int tor_check_dh_key(BIGNUM *bn);
+static int tor_check_dh_key(int severity, BIGNUM *bn);
/** Return the number of bytes added by padding method <b>padding</b>.
*/
@@ -1723,7 +1723,7 @@ crypto_dh_generate_public(crypto_dh_env_t *dh)
crypto_log_errors(LOG_WARN, "generating DH key");
return -1;
}
- if (tor_check_dh_key(dh->dh->pub_key)<0) {
+ if (tor_check_dh_key(LOG_WARN, dh->dh->pub_key)<0) {
log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Weird! Our own DH key was invalid. I guess once-in-"
"the-universe chances really do happen. Trying again.");
/* Free and clear the keys, so OpenSSL will actually try again. */
@@ -1770,7 +1770,7 @@ crypto_dh_get_public(crypto_dh_env_t *dh, char *pubkey, size_t pubkey_len)
* See http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/ftp/users/rja14/psandqs.ps.gz for some tips.
*/
static int
-tor_check_dh_key(BIGNUM *bn)
+tor_check_dh_key(int severity, BIGNUM *bn)
{
BIGNUM *x;
char *s;
@@ -1781,13 +1781,13 @@ tor_check_dh_key(BIGNUM *bn)
init_dh_param();
BN_set_word(x, 1);
if (BN_cmp(bn,x)<=0) {
- log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "DH key must be at least 2.");
+ log_fn(severity, LD_CRYPTO, "DH key must be at least 2.");
goto err;
}
BN_copy(x,dh_param_p);
BN_sub_word(x, 1);
if (BN_cmp(bn,x)>=0) {
- log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "DH key must be at most p-2.");
+ log_fn(severity, LD_CRYPTO, "DH key must be at most p-2.");
goto err;
}
BN_free(x);
@@ -1795,7 +1795,7 @@ tor_check_dh_key(BIGNUM *bn)
err:
BN_free(x);
s = BN_bn2hex(bn);
- log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Rejecting insecure DH key [%s]", s);
+ log_fn(severity, LD_CRYPTO, "Rejecting insecure DH key [%s]", s);
OPENSSL_free(s);
return -1;
}
@@ -1813,7 +1813,7 @@ tor_check_dh_key(BIGNUM *bn)
* where || is concatenation.)
*/
ssize_t
-crypto_dh_compute_secret(crypto_dh_env_t *dh,
+crypto_dh_compute_secret(int severity, crypto_dh_env_t *dh,
const char *pubkey, size_t pubkey_len,
char *secret_out, size_t secret_bytes_out)
{
@@ -1828,9 +1828,9 @@ crypto_dh_compute_secret(crypto_dh_env_t *dh,
if (!(pubkey_bn = BN_bin2bn((const unsigned char*)pubkey,
(int)pubkey_len, NULL)))
goto error;
- if (tor_check_dh_key(pubkey_bn)<0) {
+ if (tor_check_dh_key(severity, pubkey_bn)<0) {
/* Check for invalid public keys. */
- log_warn(LD_CRYPTO,"Rejected invalid g^x");
+ log_fn(severity, LD_CRYPTO,"Rejected invalid g^x");
goto error;
}
secret_tmp = tor_malloc(crypto_dh_get_bytes(dh));
diff --git a/src/common/crypto.h b/src/common/crypto.h
index c0a4526255..d9adb16f80 100644
--- a/src/common/crypto.h
+++ b/src/common/crypto.h
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ int crypto_dh_get_bytes(crypto_dh_env_t *dh);
int crypto_dh_generate_public(crypto_dh_env_t *dh);
int crypto_dh_get_public(crypto_dh_env_t *dh, char *pubkey_out,
size_t pubkey_out_len);
-ssize_t crypto_dh_compute_secret(crypto_dh_env_t *dh,
+ssize_t crypto_dh_compute_secret(int severity, crypto_dh_env_t *dh,
const char *pubkey, size_t pubkey_len,
char *secret_out, size_t secret_out_len);
void crypto_dh_free(crypto_dh_env_t *dh);
diff --git a/src/or/onion.c b/src/or/onion.c
index b49a86aba3..58a51aedfe 100644
--- a/src/or/onion.c
+++ b/src/or/onion.c
@@ -253,8 +253,9 @@ onion_skin_server_handshake(const char *onion_skin, /*ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN*/
key_material_len = DIGEST_LEN+key_out_len;
key_material = tor_malloc(key_material_len);
- len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(dh, challenge, DH_KEY_LEN,
- key_material, key_material_len);
+ len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, dh, challenge,
+ DH_KEY_LEN, key_material,
+ key_material_len);
if (len < 0) {
log_info(LD_GENERAL, "crypto_dh_compute_secret failed.");
goto err;
@@ -304,8 +305,9 @@ onion_skin_client_handshake(crypto_dh_env_t *handshake_state,
key_material_len = DIGEST_LEN + key_out_len;
key_material = tor_malloc(key_material_len);
- len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(handshake_state, handshake_reply, DH_KEY_LEN,
- key_material, key_material_len);
+ len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, handshake_state,
+ handshake_reply, DH_KEY_LEN, key_material,
+ key_material_len);
if (len < 0)
goto err;
diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c
index 0ade46807c..b7ea40eed7 100644
--- a/src/or/rendclient.c
+++ b/src/or/rendclient.c
@@ -621,8 +621,9 @@ rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ, const char *request,
tor_assert(circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath);
hop = circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath;
tor_assert(hop->dh_handshake_state);
- if (crypto_dh_compute_secret(hop->dh_handshake_state, request, DH_KEY_LEN,
- keys, DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN)<0) {
+ if (crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, hop->dh_handshake_state,
+ request, DH_KEY_LEN, keys,
+ DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN)<0) {
log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't complete DH handshake.");
goto err;
}
diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c
index daf8247e55..f00cfd44d8 100644
--- a/src/or/rendservice.c
+++ b/src/or/rendservice.c
@@ -1090,7 +1090,8 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const char *request,
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL;
goto err;
}
- if (crypto_dh_compute_secret(dh, ptr+REND_COOKIE_LEN, DH_KEY_LEN, keys,
+ if (crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, dh, ptr+REND_COOKIE_LEN,
+ DH_KEY_LEN, keys,
DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN)<0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't complete DH handshake");
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL;
diff --git a/src/test/test_crypto.c b/src/test/test_crypto.c
index 2edb8035bb..670fd0048f 100644
--- a/src/test/test_crypto.c
+++ b/src/test/test_crypto.c
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ test_crypto_dh(void)
memset(s1, 0, DH_BYTES);
memset(s2, 0xFF, DH_BYTES);
- s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(dh1, p2, DH_BYTES, s1, 50);
- s2len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(dh2, p1, DH_BYTES, s2, 50);
+ s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p2, DH_BYTES, s1, 50);
+ s2len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh2, p1, DH_BYTES, s2, 50);
test_assert(s1len > 0);
test_eq(s1len, s2len);
test_memeq(s1, s2, s1len);
7apu2bq3rhoylwmucxizk54afw5jyda7pho4j5zdcqpwkufke7zdzwad.onion