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-rw-r--r--src/common/crypto_curve25519.c21
-rw-r--r--src/common/crypto_ed25519.c18
-rw-r--r--src/common/util.c14
-rw-r--r--src/or/routerkeys.c111
-rw-r--r--src/or/routerkeys.h1
-rw-r--r--src/or/torcert.c9
6 files changed, 142 insertions, 32 deletions
diff --git a/src/common/crypto_curve25519.c b/src/common/crypto_curve25519.c
index 80b0d88952..113ac89df7 100644
--- a/src/common/crypto_curve25519.c
+++ b/src/common/crypto_curve25519.c
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ crypto_write_tagged_contents_to_file(const char *fname,
* <b>data_out_len</b>-byte buffer in <b>data_out</b>. Check that the
* typestring matches <b>typestring</b>; store the tag into a newly allocated
* string in <b>tag_out</b>. Return -1 on failure, and the number of bytes of
- * data on success. */
+ * data on success. Preserves the errno from reading the file. */
ssize_t
crypto_read_tagged_contents_from_file(const char *fname,
const char *typestring,
@@ -214,27 +214,36 @@ crypto_read_tagged_contents_from_file(const char *fname,
struct stat st;
ssize_t r = -1;
size_t st_size = 0;
+ int saved_errno = 0;
*tag_out = NULL;
st.st_size = 0;
content = read_file_to_str(fname, RFTS_BIN|RFTS_IGNORE_MISSING, &st);
- if (! content)
+ if (! content) {
+ saved_errno = errno;
goto end;
- if (st.st_size < 32 || st.st_size > 32 + data_out_len)
+ }
+ if (st.st_size < 32 || st.st_size > 32 + data_out_len) {
+ saved_errno = EINVAL;
goto end;
+ }
st_size = (size_t)st.st_size;
memcpy(prefix, content, 32);
prefix[32] = 0;
/* Check type, extract tag. */
if (strcmpstart(prefix, "== ") || strcmpend(prefix, " ==") ||
- ! tor_mem_is_zero(prefix+strlen(prefix), 32-strlen(prefix)))
+ ! tor_mem_is_zero(prefix+strlen(prefix), 32-strlen(prefix))) {
+ saved_errno = EINVAL;
goto end;
+ }
if (strcmpstart(prefix+3, typestring) ||
3+strlen(typestring) >= 32 ||
- strcmpstart(prefix+3+strlen(typestring), ": "))
+ strcmpstart(prefix+3+strlen(typestring), ": ")) {
+ saved_errno = EINVAL;
goto end;
+ }
*tag_out = tor_strndup(prefix+5+strlen(typestring),
strlen(prefix)-8-strlen(typestring));
@@ -246,6 +255,8 @@ crypto_read_tagged_contents_from_file(const char *fname,
if (content)
memwipe(content, 0, st_size);
tor_free(content);
+ if (saved_errno)
+ errno = saved_errno;
return r;
}
diff --git a/src/common/crypto_ed25519.c b/src/common/crypto_ed25519.c
index 599a1ca9b7..1606d02c48 100644
--- a/src/common/crypto_ed25519.c
+++ b/src/common/crypto_ed25519.c
@@ -381,10 +381,13 @@ ed25519_seckey_read_from_file(ed25519_secret_key_t *seckey_out,
len = crypto_read_tagged_contents_from_file(filename, "ed25519v1-secret",
tag_out, seckey_out->seckey,
sizeof(seckey_out->seckey));
- if (len != sizeof(seckey_out->seckey))
- return -1;
+ if (len == sizeof(seckey_out->seckey)) {
+ return 0;
+ } else if (len >= 0) {
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ }
- return 0;
+ return -1;
}
/**
@@ -417,10 +420,13 @@ ed25519_pubkey_read_from_file(ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey_out,
len = crypto_read_tagged_contents_from_file(filename, "ed25519v1-public",
tag_out, pubkey_out->pubkey,
sizeof(pubkey_out->pubkey));
- if (len != sizeof(pubkey_out->pubkey))
- return -1;
+ if (len == sizeof(pubkey_out->pubkey)) {
+ return 0;
+ } else if (len >= 0) {
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ }
- return 0;
+ return -1;
}
/** Release all storage held for <b>kp</b>. */
diff --git a/src/common/util.c b/src/common/util.c
index 449015054f..1849613512 100644
--- a/src/common/util.c
+++ b/src/common/util.c
@@ -1997,8 +1997,10 @@ read_all(tor_socket_t fd, char *buf, size_t count, int isSocket)
size_t numread = 0;
ssize_t result;
- if (count > SIZE_T_CEILING || count > SSIZE_MAX)
+ if (count > SIZE_T_CEILING || count > SSIZE_MAX) {
+ errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
+ }
while (numread != count) {
if (isSocket)
@@ -2558,8 +2560,10 @@ read_file_to_str_until_eof(int fd, size_t max_bytes_to_read, size_t *sz_out)
char *string = NULL;
size_t string_max = 0;
- if (max_bytes_to_read+1 >= SIZE_T_CEILING)
+ if (max_bytes_to_read+1 >= SIZE_T_CEILING) {
+ errno = EINVAL;
return NULL;
+ }
do {
/* XXXX This "add 1K" approach is a little goofy; if we care about
@@ -2571,7 +2575,9 @@ read_file_to_str_until_eof(int fd, size_t max_bytes_to_read, size_t *sz_out)
string = tor_realloc(string, string_max);
r = read(fd, string + pos, string_max - pos - 1);
if (r < 0) {
+ int save_errno = errno;
tor_free(string);
+ errno = save_errno;
return NULL;
}
@@ -2639,17 +2645,21 @@ read_file_to_str(const char *filename, int flags, struct stat *stat_out)
if (S_ISFIFO(statbuf.st_mode)) {
size_t sz = 0;
string = read_file_to_str_until_eof(fd, FIFO_READ_MAX, &sz);
+ int save_errno = errno;
if (string && stat_out) {
statbuf.st_size = sz;
memcpy(stat_out, &statbuf, sizeof(struct stat));
}
close(fd);
+ if (!string)
+ errno = save_errno;
return string;
}
#endif
if ((uint64_t)(statbuf.st_size)+1 >= SIZE_T_CEILING) {
close(fd);
+ errno = EINVAL;
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/src/or/routerkeys.c b/src/or/routerkeys.c
index d075c67e6a..955cb9ce23 100644
--- a/src/or/routerkeys.c
+++ b/src/or/routerkeys.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ read_encrypted_secret_key(ed25519_secret_key_t *out,
char pwbuf[256];
uint8_t encrypted_key[256];
char *tag = NULL;
+ int saved_errno = 0;
ssize_t encrypted_len = crypto_read_tagged_contents_from_file(fname,
ENC_KEY_HEADER,
@@ -28,24 +29,30 @@ read_encrypted_secret_key(ed25519_secret_key_t *out,
encrypted_key,
sizeof(encrypted_key));
if (encrypted_len < 0) {
+ saved_errno = errno;
log_info(LD_OR, "%s is missing", fname);
r = 0;
goto done;
}
- if (strcmp(tag, ENC_KEY_TAG))
+ if (strcmp(tag, ENC_KEY_TAG)) {
+ saved_errno = EINVAL;
goto done;
+ }
while (1) {
ssize_t pwlen =
tor_getpass("Enter pasphrase for master key:", pwbuf, sizeof(pwbuf));
- if (pwlen < 0)
+ if (pwlen < 0) {
+ saved_errno = EINVAL;
goto done;
+ }
const int r = crypto_unpwbox(&secret, &secret_len,
encrypted_key, encrypted_len,
pwbuf, pwlen);
if (r == UNPWBOX_CORRUPTED) {
log_err(LD_OR, "%s is corrupted.", fname);
+ saved_errno = EINVAL;
goto done;
} else if (r == UNPWBOX_OKAY) {
break;
@@ -57,6 +64,7 @@ read_encrypted_secret_key(ed25519_secret_key_t *out,
if (secret_len != ED25519_SECKEY_LEN) {
log_err(LD_OR, "%s is corrupted.", fname);
+ saved_errno = EINVAL;
goto done;
}
memcpy(out->seckey, secret, ED25519_SECKEY_LEN);
@@ -70,6 +78,8 @@ read_encrypted_secret_key(ed25519_secret_key_t *out,
memwipe(secret, 0, secret_len);
tor_free(secret);
}
+ if (saved_errno)
+ errno = saved_errno;
return r;
}
@@ -160,10 +170,13 @@ write_secret_key(const ed25519_secret_key_t *key, int encrypted,
* public key file but no secret key file, return successfully anyway.
*
* If INIT_ED_KEY_OMIT_SECRET is set in <b>flags</b>, do not even try to
- * load or return a secret key (but create and save on if needed).
+ * load or return a secret key (but create and save one if needed).
*
* If INIT_ED_KEY_TRY_ENCRYPTED is set, we look for an encrypted secret key
* and consider encrypting any new secret key.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR is set, and there is any issue loading the keys
+ * from disk _other than their absence_, we do not try to replace them.
*/
ed25519_keypair_t *
ed_key_init_from_file(const char *fname, uint32_t flags,
@@ -178,9 +191,16 @@ ed_key_init_from_file(const char *fname, uint32_t flags,
char *encrypted_secret_fname = NULL;
char *public_fname = NULL;
char *cert_fname = NULL;
+ const char *loaded_secret_fname = NULL;
int created_pk = 0, created_sk = 0, created_cert = 0;
const int try_to_load = ! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_REPLACE);
- const int encrypt_key = (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_TRY_ENCRYPTED);
+ const int encrypt_key = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_TRY_ENCRYPTED);
+ const int norepair = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR);
+ const int split = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT);
+
+ /* we don't support setting both of these flags at once. */
+ tor_assert((flags & (INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR|INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT)) !=
+ (INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR|INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT));
char tag[8];
tor_snprintf(tag, sizeof(tag), "type%d", (int)cert_type);
@@ -195,10 +215,22 @@ ed_key_init_from_file(const char *fname, uint32_t flags,
tor_asprintf(&cert_fname, "%s_cert", fname);
/* Try to read the secret key. */
- int have_secret = try_to_load &&
- !(flags & INIT_ED_KEY_OMIT_SECRET) &&
- ed25519_seckey_read_from_file(&keypair->seckey,
- &got_tag, secret_fname) == 0;
+ int have_secret = 0;
+ if (try_to_load &&
+ !(flags & INIT_ED_KEY_OMIT_SECRET)) {
+ int rv = ed25519_seckey_read_from_file(&keypair->seckey,
+ &got_tag, secret_fname);
+ if (rv == 0) {
+ have_secret = 1;
+ loaded_secret_fname = secret_fname;
+ } else {
+ if (errno != ENOENT && norepair) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Unable to read %s: %s", secret_fname,
+ strerror(errno));
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
/* Should we try for an encrypted key? */
if (!have_secret && try_to_load && encrypt_key) {
@@ -207,31 +239,58 @@ ed_key_init_from_file(const char *fname, uint32_t flags,
if (r > 0) {
have_secret = 1;
got_tag = tor_strdup(tag);
+ loaded_secret_fname = encrypted_secret_fname;
+ } else if (errno != ENOENT && norepair) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Unable to read %s: %s", encrypted_secret_fname,
+ strerror(errno));
+ goto err;
}
}
if (have_secret) {
if (strcmp(got_tag, tag)) {
- tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s has wrong tag", secret_fname);
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s has wrong tag", loaded_secret_fname);
goto err;
}
/* Derive the public key */
if (ed25519_public_key_generate(&keypair->pubkey, &keypair->seckey)<0) {
- tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s can't produce a public key", secret_fname);
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s can't produce a public key",
+ loaded_secret_fname);
goto err;
}
}
- /* If it's absent and that's okay, try to read the pubkey. */
+ /* If it's absent and that's okay, or if we do split keys here, try to re
+ * the pubkey. */
int found_public = 0;
- if (!have_secret && try_to_load) {
+ if ((!have_secret && try_to_load) || (have_secret && split)) {
+ ed25519_public_key_t pubkey_tmp;
tor_free(got_tag);
- found_public = ed25519_pubkey_read_from_file(&keypair->pubkey,
+ found_public = ed25519_pubkey_read_from_file(&pubkey_tmp,
&got_tag, public_fname) == 0;
+ if (!found_public && errno != ENOENT && norepair) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Unable to read %s: %s", public_fname,
+ strerror(errno));
+ goto err;
+ }
if (found_public && strcmp(got_tag, tag)) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s has wrong tag", public_fname);
goto err;
}
+ if (found_public) {
+ if (have_secret) {
+ /* If we have a secret key and we're reloading the public key,
+ * the key must match! */
+ if (! ed25519_pubkey_eq(&keypair->pubkey, &pubkey_tmp)) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s does not match %s!",
+ public_fname, loaded_secret_fname);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ tor_assert(split);
+ memcpy(&keypair->pubkey, &pubkey_tmp, sizeof(pubkey_tmp));
+ }
+ }
}
/* If the secret key is absent and it's not allowed to be, fail. */
@@ -244,7 +303,6 @@ ed_key_init_from_file(const char *fname, uint32_t flags,
/* if it's absent, make a new keypair and save it. */
if (!have_secret && !found_public) {
- const int split = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT);
tor_free(keypair);
keypair = ed_key_new(signing_key, flags, now, lifetime,
cert_type, &cert);
@@ -298,6 +356,10 @@ ed_key_init_from_file(const char *fname, uint32_t flags,
(signing_key || cert->cert_expired)) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Can't check certificate");
bad_cert = 1;
+ } else if (signing_key && cert->signing_key_included &&
+ ! ed25519_pubkey_eq(&signing_key->pubkey, &cert->signing_key)) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Certificate signed by unexpectd key!");
+ bad_cert = 1;
}
if (bad_cert) {
@@ -480,7 +542,7 @@ load_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, time_t now)
{
uint32_t flags =
(INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE|INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT|
- INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG);
+ INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG|INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR);
if (! need_new_signing_key)
flags |= INIT_ED_KEY_MISSING_SECRET_OK;
if (! want_new_signing_key)
@@ -515,9 +577,24 @@ load_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, time_t now)
sign_signing_key_with_id = id;
}
+ if (master_identity_key &&
+ !ed25519_pubkey_eq(&id->pubkey, &master_identity_key->pubkey)) {
+ FAIL("Identity key on disk does not match key we loaded earlier!");
+ }
+
if (need_new_signing_key && NULL == sign_signing_key_with_id)
FAIL("Can't load master key make a new signing key.");
+ if (sign_cert) {
+ if (! sign_cert->signing_key_included)
+ FAIL("Loaded a signing cert with no key included!");
+ if (! ed25519_pubkey_eq(&sign_cert->signing_key, &id->pubkey))
+ FAIL("The signing cert we have was not signed with the master key "
+ "we loaded!");
+ if (tor_cert_checksig(sign_cert, &id->pubkey, 0) < 0)
+ FAIL("The signing cert we loaded was not signed correctly!");
+ }
+
if (want_new_signing_key && sign_signing_key_with_id) {
uint32_t flags = (INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE|
INIT_ED_KEY_REPLACE|
@@ -535,6 +612,10 @@ load_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, time_t now)
if (!sign)
FAIL("Missing signing key");
use_signing = sign;
+
+ tor_assert(sign_cert->signing_key_included);
+ tor_assert(ed25519_pubkey_eq(&sign_cert->signing_key, &id->pubkey));
+ tor_assert(ed25519_pubkey_eq(&sign_cert->signed_key, &sign->pubkey));
} else if (want_new_signing_key) {
static ratelim_t missing_master = RATELIM_INIT(3600);
log_fn_ratelim(&missing_master, LOG_WARN, LD_OR,
diff --git a/src/or/routerkeys.h b/src/or/routerkeys.h
index 1e0199e5e6..9b93358ae3 100644
--- a/src/or/routerkeys.h
+++ b/src/or/routerkeys.h
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#define INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT (1u<<6)
#define INIT_ED_KEY_OMIT_SECRET (1u<<7)
#define INIT_ED_KEY_TRY_ENCRYPTED (1u<<8)
+#define INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR (1u<<9)
struct tor_cert_st;
ed25519_keypair_t *ed_key_init_from_file(const char *fname, uint32_t flags,
diff --git a/src/or/torcert.c b/src/or/torcert.c
index f028910a70..596cd2be31 100644
--- a/src/or/torcert.c
+++ b/src/or/torcert.c
@@ -181,9 +181,10 @@ tor_cert_get_checkable_sig(ed25519_checkable_t *checkable_out,
return 0;
}
-/** Validates the signature on <b>cert</b> with <b>pubkey</b> relative to
- * the current time <b>now</b>. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.
- * Sets flags in <b>cert</b> as appropriate.
+/** Validates the signature on <b>cert</b> with <b>pubkey</b> relative to the
+ * current time <b>now</b>. (If <b>now</b> is 0, do not check the expiration
+ * time.) Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. Sets flags in <b>cert</b> as
+ * appropriate.
*/
int
tor_cert_checksig(tor_cert_t *cert,
@@ -192,7 +193,7 @@ tor_cert_checksig(tor_cert_t *cert,
ed25519_checkable_t checkable;
int okay;
- if (now > cert->valid_until) {
+ if (now && now > cert->valid_until) {
cert->cert_expired = 1;
return -1;
}
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