aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat
-rw-r--r--changes/reject-tap15
-rw-r--r--doc/tor.1.txt10
-rw-r--r--src/or/circuitbuild.c230
-rw-r--r--src/or/circuitbuild.h5
-rw-r--r--src/or/circuitlist.c6
-rw-r--r--src/or/config.c2
-rw-r--r--src/or/dirserv.c14
-rw-r--r--src/or/networkstatus.c6
-rw-r--r--src/or/nodelist.c28
-rw-r--r--src/or/onion.c4
-rw-r--r--src/or/or.h3
-rw-r--r--src/or/rendclient.c7
-rw-r--r--src/or/rendservice.c8
-rw-r--r--src/or/rendservice.h2
-rw-r--r--src/or/router.c4
-rw-r--r--src/or/routerlist.c51
-rw-r--r--src/or/routerlist.h3
-rw-r--r--src/test/test_dir.c20
18 files changed, 325 insertions, 93 deletions
diff --git a/changes/reject-tap b/changes/reject-tap
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8e616de301
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changes/reject-tap
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+ o Major bug fixes (circuit building):
+ - Tor authorities, relays, and clients only use ntor, except for
+ rare cases in the hidden service protocol.
+ - Authorities, relays and clients specifically check that each
+ descriptor has an ntor key.
+ - Clients avoid downloading a descriptor if the relay version is
+ too old to support ntor.
+ - Client code never chooses nodes without ntor keys: they will not
+ be selected during circuit-building, or as guards, or as directory
+ mirrors, or as introduction or rendezvous points.
+ - Circuit-building code assumes that all hops can use ntor,
+ except for rare hidden service protocol cases.
+ - Hidden service client to intro point and service to rendezvous point
+ connections use the TAP key supplied by the protocol.
+ Fixes bug 19163; bugfix on 0.2.4.18-rc.
diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt
index ebf16f3397..0687991e1f 100644
--- a/doc/tor.1.txt
+++ b/doc/tor.1.txt
@@ -1452,16 +1452,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
"auto" (recommended) then it is on for all clients that do not set
FetchUselessDescriptors. (Default: auto)
-[[UseNTorHandshake]] **UseNTorHandshake** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
- The "ntor" circuit-creation handshake is faster and (we think) more
- secure than the original ("TAP") circuit handshake, but starting to use
- it too early might make your client stand out. If this option is 0, your
- Tor client won't use the ntor handshake. If it's 1, your Tor client
- will use the ntor handshake to extend circuits through servers that
- support it. If this option is "auto", then your client
- will use the ntor handshake once enough directory authorities recommend
- it. (Default: 1)
-
[[PathBiasCircThreshold]] **PathBiasCircThreshold** __NUM__ +
[[PathBiasNoticeRate]] **PathBiasNoticeRate** __NUM__ +
diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
index 14d40150db..2e7ea2f79a 100644
--- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c
+++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
@@ -58,7 +58,6 @@ static crypt_path_t *onion_next_hop_in_cpath(crypt_path_t *cpath);
static int onion_extend_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ);
static int count_acceptable_nodes(smartlist_t *routers);
static int onion_append_hop(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, extend_info_t *choice);
-static int circuits_can_use_ntor(void);
/** This function tries to get a channel to the specified endpoint,
* and then calls command_setup_channel() to give it the right
@@ -365,7 +364,7 @@ circuit_rep_hist_note_result(origin_circuit_t *circ)
} while (hop!=circ->cpath);
}
-/** Return 1 iff at least one node in circ's cpath supports ntor. */
+/** Return 1 iff every node in circ's cpath definitely supports ntor. */
static int
circuit_cpath_supports_ntor(const origin_circuit_t *circ)
{
@@ -373,16 +372,19 @@ circuit_cpath_supports_ntor(const origin_circuit_t *circ)
cpath = head = circ->cpath;
do {
- if (cpath->extend_info &&
- !tor_mem_is_zero(
- (const char*)cpath->extend_info->curve25519_onion_key.public_key,
- CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN))
- return 1;
+ /* if the extend_info is missing, we can't tell if it supports ntor */
+ if (!cpath->extend_info) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* if the key is blank, it definitely doesn't support ntor */
+ if (!extend_info_supports_ntor(cpath->extend_info)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
cpath = cpath->next;
} while (cpath != head);
- return 0;
+ return 1;
}
/** Pick all the entries in our cpath. Stop and return 0 when we're
@@ -390,41 +392,61 @@ circuit_cpath_supports_ntor(const origin_circuit_t *circ)
static int
onion_populate_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ)
{
- int n_tries = 0;
- const int using_ntor = circuits_can_use_ntor();
+ int r = 0;
-#define MAX_POPULATE_ATTEMPTS 32
+ /* onion_extend_cpath assumes these are non-NULL */
+ tor_assert(circ);
+ tor_assert(circ->build_state);
- while (1) {
- int r = onion_extend_cpath(circ);
+ while (r == 0) {
+ r = onion_extend_cpath(circ);
if (r < 0) {
log_info(LD_CIRC,"Generating cpath hop failed.");
return -1;
}
- if (r == 1) {
- /* This circuit doesn't need/shouldn't be forced to have an ntor hop */
- if (circ->build_state->desired_path_len <= 1 || ! using_ntor)
- return 0;
+ }
- /* This circuit has an ntor hop. great! */
- if (circuit_cpath_supports_ntor(circ))
- return 0;
+ /* The path is complete */
+ tor_assert(r == 1);
- /* No node in the circuit supports ntor. Have we already tried too many
- * times? */
- if (++n_tries >= MAX_POPULATE_ATTEMPTS)
- break;
+ /* Does every node in this path support ntor? */
+ int path_supports_ntor = circuit_cpath_supports_ntor(circ);
+
+ /* We would like every path to support ntor, but we have to allow for some
+ * edge cases. */
+ tor_assert(circuit_get_cpath_len(circ));
+ if (circuit_can_use_tap(circ)) {
+ /* Circuits from clients to intro points, and hidden services to
+ * rend points do not support ntor, because the hidden service protocol
+ * does not include ntor onion keys. This is also true for Tor2web clients
+ * and Single Onion Services. */
+ return 0;
+ }
- /* Clear the path and retry */
- circuit_clear_cpath(circ);
+ if (circuit_get_cpath_len(circ) == 1) {
+ /* Allow for bootstrapping: when we're fetching directly from a fallback,
+ * authority, or bridge, we have no way of knowing its ntor onion key
+ * before we connect to it. So instead, we try connecting, and end up using
+ * CREATE_FAST. */
+ tor_assert(circ->cpath);
+ tor_assert(circ->cpath->extend_info);
+ const node_t *node = node_get_by_id(
+ circ->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest);
+ /* If we don't know the node and its descriptor, we must be bootstrapping.
+ */
+ if (!node || !node_has_descriptor(node)) {
+ return 0;
}
}
- log_warn(LD_CIRC, "I tried for %d times, but I couldn't build a %d-hop "
- "circuit with at least one node that supports ntor.",
- MAX_POPULATE_ATTEMPTS,
- circ->build_state->desired_path_len);
- return -1;
+ if (BUG(!path_supports_ntor)) {
+ /* If we're building a multi-hop path, and it's not one of the HS or
+ * bootstrapping exceptions, and it doesn't support ntor, something has
+ * gone wrong. */
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
}
/** Create and return a new origin circuit. Initialize its purpose and
@@ -757,10 +779,13 @@ should_use_create_fast_for_circuit(origin_circuit_t *circ)
tor_assert(circ->cpath);
tor_assert(circ->cpath->extend_info);
- if (!circ->cpath->extend_info->onion_key)
- return 1; /* our hand is forced: only a create_fast will work. */
+ if (!circuit_has_usable_onion_key(circ)) {
+ /* We don't have ntor, and we don't have or can't use TAP,
+ * so our hand is forced: only a create_fast will work. */
+ return 1;
+ }
if (public_server_mode(options)) {
- /* We're a server, and we know an onion key. We can choose.
+ /* We're a server, and we have a usable onion key. We can choose.
* Prefer to blend our circuit into the other circuits we are
* creating on behalf of others. */
return 0;
@@ -785,30 +810,20 @@ circuit_timeout_want_to_count_circ(origin_circuit_t *circ)
&& circ->build_state->desired_path_len == DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN;
}
-/** Return true if the ntor handshake is enabled in the configuration, or if
- * it's been set to "auto" in the configuration and it's enabled in the
- * consensus. */
-static int
-circuits_can_use_ntor(void)
-{
- const or_options_t *options = get_options();
- if (options->UseNTorHandshake != -1)
- return options->UseNTorHandshake;
- return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "UseNTorHandshake", 0, 0, 1);
-}
-
/** Decide whether to use a TAP or ntor handshake for connecting to <b>ei</b>
* directly, and set *<b>cell_type_out</b> and *<b>handshake_type_out</b>
- * accordingly. */
+ * accordingly.
+ * Note that TAP handshakes are only used for direct connections:
+ * - from Tor2web to intro points not in the client's consensus, and
+ * - from Single Onions to rend points not in the service's consensus.
+ * This is checked in onion_populate_cpath. */
static void
circuit_pick_create_handshake(uint8_t *cell_type_out,
uint16_t *handshake_type_out,
const extend_info_t *ei)
{
- /* XXXX029 Remove support for deciding to use TAP. */
- if (!tor_mem_is_zero((const char*)ei->curve25519_onion_key.public_key,
- CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN) &&
- circuits_can_use_ntor()) {
+ /* XXXX030 Remove support for deciding to use TAP. */
+ if (extend_info_supports_ntor(ei)) {
*cell_type_out = CELL_CREATE2;
*handshake_type_out = ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR;
return;
@@ -822,7 +837,11 @@ circuit_pick_create_handshake(uint8_t *cell_type_out,
* directly, and set *<b>handshake_type_out</b> accordingly. Decide whether,
* in extending through <b>node</b> to do so, we should use an EXTEND2 or an
* EXTEND cell to do so, and set *<b>cell_type_out</b> and
- * *<b>create_cell_type_out</b> accordingly. */
+ * *<b>create_cell_type_out</b> accordingly.
+ * Note that TAP handshakes are only used for extend handshakes:
+ * - from clients to intro points, and
+ * - from hidden services to rend points.
+ * This is checked in onion_populate_cpath. */
static void
circuit_pick_extend_handshake(uint8_t *cell_type_out,
uint8_t *create_cell_type_out,
@@ -833,17 +852,27 @@ circuit_pick_extend_handshake(uint8_t *cell_type_out,
uint8_t t;
circuit_pick_create_handshake(&t, handshake_type_out, ei);
- /* XXXX029 Remove support for deciding to use TAP. */
+ /* XXXX030 Remove support for deciding to use TAP. */
+
+ /* It is an error to extend if there is no previous node. */
+ tor_assert_nonfatal(node_prev);
+ /* It is an error for a node with a known version to be so old it does not
+ * support ntor. */
+ tor_assert_nonfatal(routerstatus_version_supports_ntor(node_prev->rs, 1));
+
+ /* Assume relays without tor versions or routerstatuses support ntor.
+ * The authorities enforce ntor support, and assuming and failing is better
+ * than allowing a malicious node to perform a protocol downgrade to TAP. */
if (node_prev &&
*handshake_type_out != ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP &&
(node_has_curve25519_onion_key(node_prev) ||
- (node_prev->rs && node_prev->rs->version_supports_extend2_cells))) {
- *cell_type_out = RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND2;
- *create_cell_type_out = CELL_CREATE2;
- } else {
- *cell_type_out = RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND;
- *create_cell_type_out = CELL_CREATE;
- }
+ (routerstatus_version_supports_ntor(node_prev->rs, 1)))) {
+ *cell_type_out = RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND2;
+ *create_cell_type_out = CELL_CREATE2;
+ } else {
+ *cell_type_out = RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND;
+ *create_cell_type_out = CELL_CREATE;
+ }
}
/** This is the backbone function for building circuits.
@@ -2058,15 +2087,18 @@ count_acceptable_nodes(smartlist_t *nodes)
if (! node->is_running)
// log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Nope, the directory says %d is not running.",i);
continue;
+ /* XXX This clause makes us count incorrectly: if AllowInvalidRouters
+ * allows this node in some places, then we're getting an inaccurate
+ * count. For now, be conservative and don't count it. But later we
+ * should try to be smarter. */
if (! node->is_valid)
// log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Nope, the directory says %d is not valid.",i);
continue;
if (! node_has_descriptor(node))
continue;
- /* XXX This clause makes us count incorrectly: if AllowInvalidRouters
- * allows this node in some places, then we're getting an inaccurate
- * count. For now, be conservative and don't count it. But later we
- * should try to be smarter. */
+ /* The node has a descriptor, so we can just check the ntor key directly */
+ if (!node_has_curve25519_onion_key(node))
+ continue;
++num;
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node);
@@ -2356,6 +2388,14 @@ extend_info_from_node(const node_t *node, int for_direct_connect)
log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Could not choose valid address for %s",
node->ri ? node->ri->nickname : node->rs->nickname);
+ /* Every node we connect or extend to must support ntor */
+ if (!node_has_curve25519_onion_key(node)) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_CIRC,
+ "Attempted to create extend_info for a node that does not support "
+ "ntor: %s", node_describe(node));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
if (valid_addr && node->ri)
return extend_info_new(node->ri->nickname,
node->identity,
@@ -2441,3 +2481,65 @@ extend_info_addr_is_allowed(const tor_addr_t *addr)
return 0;
}
+/* Does ei have a valid TAP key? */
+int
+extend_info_supports_tap(const extend_info_t* ei)
+{
+ tor_assert(ei);
+ /* Valid TAP keys are not NULL */
+ return ei->onion_key != NULL;
+}
+
+/* Does ei have a valid ntor key? */
+int
+extend_info_supports_ntor(const extend_info_t* ei)
+{
+ tor_assert(ei);
+ /* Valid ntor keys have at least one non-zero byte */
+ return !tor_mem_is_zero(
+ (const char*)ei->curve25519_onion_key.public_key,
+ CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+}
+
+/* Is circuit purpose allowed to use the deprecated TAP encryption protocol?
+ * The hidden service protocol still uses TAP for some connections, because
+ * ntor onion keys aren't included in HS descriptors or INTRODUCE cells. */
+static int
+circuit_purpose_can_use_tap_impl(uint8_t purpose)
+{
+ return (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND ||
+ purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING);
+}
+
+/* Is circ allowed to use the deprecated TAP encryption protocol?
+ * The hidden service protocol still uses TAP for some connections, because
+ * ntor onion keys aren't included in HS descriptors or INTRODUCE cells. */
+int
+circuit_can_use_tap(const origin_circuit_t *circ)
+{
+ tor_assert(circ);
+ tor_assert(circ->cpath);
+ tor_assert(circ->cpath->extend_info);
+ return (circuit_purpose_can_use_tap_impl(circ->base_.purpose) &&
+ extend_info_supports_tap(circ->cpath->extend_info));
+}
+
+/* Does circ have an onion key which it's allowed to use? */
+int
+circuit_has_usable_onion_key(const origin_circuit_t *circ)
+{
+ tor_assert(circ);
+ tor_assert(circ->cpath);
+ tor_assert(circ->cpath->extend_info);
+ return (extend_info_supports_ntor(circ->cpath->extend_info) ||
+ circuit_can_use_tap(circ));
+}
+
+/* Does ei have an onion key which it would prefer to use?
+ * Currently, we prefer ntor keys*/
+int
+extend_info_has_preferred_onion_key(const extend_info_t* ei)
+{
+ tor_assert(ei);
+ return extend_info_supports_ntor(ei);
+}
diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.h b/src/or/circuitbuild.h
index 7f5fd511a9..1244601f71 100644
--- a/src/or/circuitbuild.h
+++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.h
@@ -54,6 +54,11 @@ extend_info_t *extend_info_from_node(const node_t *r, int for_direct_connect);
extend_info_t *extend_info_dup(extend_info_t *info);
void extend_info_free(extend_info_t *info);
int extend_info_addr_is_allowed(const tor_addr_t *addr);
+int extend_info_supports_tap(const extend_info_t* ei);
+int extend_info_supports_ntor(const extend_info_t* ei);
+int circuit_can_use_tap(const origin_circuit_t *circ);
+int circuit_has_usable_onion_key(const origin_circuit_t *circ);
+int extend_info_has_preferred_onion_key(const extend_info_t* ei);
const node_t *build_state_get_exit_node(cpath_build_state_t *state);
const char *build_state_get_exit_nickname(cpath_build_state_t *state);
diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.c b/src/or/circuitlist.c
index 5c691644a4..3c92baa274 100644
--- a/src/or/circuitlist.c
+++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c
@@ -1613,7 +1613,8 @@ circuit_find_to_cannibalize(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *info,
return best;
}
-/** Return the number of hops in circuit's path. */
+/** Return the number of hops in circuit's path. If circ has no entries,
+ * or is NULL, returns 0. */
int
circuit_get_cpath_len(origin_circuit_t *circ)
{
@@ -1629,7 +1630,8 @@ circuit_get_cpath_len(origin_circuit_t *circ)
}
/** Return the <b>hopnum</b>th hop in <b>circ</b>->cpath, or NULL if there
- * aren't that many hops in the list. */
+ * aren't that many hops in the list. <b>hopnum</b> starts at 1.
+ * Returns NULL if <b>hopnum</b> is 0 or negative. */
crypt_path_t *
circuit_get_cpath_hop(origin_circuit_t *circ, int hopnum)
{
diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c
index 31bf81877d..6ab2fd8116 100644
--- a/src/or/config.c
+++ b/src/or/config.c
@@ -438,7 +438,7 @@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = {
V(UseEntryGuardsAsDirGuards, BOOL, "1"),
V(UseGuardFraction, AUTOBOOL, "auto"),
V(UseMicrodescriptors, AUTOBOOL, "auto"),
- V(UseNTorHandshake, AUTOBOOL, "1"),
+ OBSOLETE("UseNTorHandshake"),
V(User, STRING, NULL),
OBSOLETE("UserspaceIOCPBuffers"),
V(AuthDirSharedRandomness, BOOL, "1"),
diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c
index 64ebde6fdd..ff50ca4417 100644
--- a/src/or/dirserv.c
+++ b/src/or/dirserv.c
@@ -255,6 +255,20 @@ dirserv_router_get_status(const routerinfo_t *router, const char **msg,
return FP_REJECT;
}
+ /* dirserv_get_status_impl already rejects versions older than 0.2.4.18-rc,
+ * and onion_curve25519_pkey was introduced in 0.2.4.8-alpha.
+ * But just in case a relay doesn't provide or lies about its version, or
+ * doesn't include an ntor key in its descriptor, check that it exists,
+ * and is non-zero (clients check that it's non-zero before using it). */
+ if (!routerinfo_has_curve25519_onion_key(router)) {
+ log_fn(severity, LD_DIR,
+ "Descriptor from router %s is missing an ntor curve25519 onion "
+ "key.", router_describe(router));
+ if (msg)
+ *msg = "Missing ntor curve25519 onion key. Please upgrade!";
+ return FP_REJECT;
+ }
+
if (router->cache_info.signing_key_cert) {
/* This has an ed25519 identity key. */
if (KEYPIN_MISMATCH ==
diff --git a/src/or/networkstatus.c b/src/or/networkstatus.c
index fe4b4562ff..72af505d19 100644
--- a/src/or/networkstatus.c
+++ b/src/or/networkstatus.c
@@ -2275,6 +2275,12 @@ client_would_use_router(const routerstatus_t *rs, time_t now,
/* We'd drop it immediately for being too old. */
return 0;
}
+ if (!routerstatus_version_supports_ntor(rs, 1)) {
+ /* We'd ignore it because it doesn't support ntor.
+ * If we don't know the version, download the descriptor so we can
+ * check if it supports ntor. */
+ return 0;
+ }
return 1;
}
diff --git a/src/or/nodelist.c b/src/or/nodelist.c
index 7b64cafd79..070e2e9e0d 100644
--- a/src/or/nodelist.c
+++ b/src/or/nodelist.c
@@ -1173,14 +1173,38 @@ node_get_pref_ipv6_dirport(const node_t *node, tor_addr_port_t *ap_out)
}
}
+/** Return true iff <b>md</b> has a curve25519 onion key.
+ * Use node_has_curve25519_onion_key() instead of calling this directly. */
+static int
+microdesc_has_curve25519_onion_key(const microdesc_t *md)
+{
+ if (!md) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!md->onion_curve25519_pkey) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (tor_mem_is_zero((const char*)md->onion_curve25519_pkey->public_key,
+ CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
/** Return true iff <b>node</b> has a curve25519 onion key. */
int
node_has_curve25519_onion_key(const node_t *node)
{
+ if (!node)
+ return 0;
+
if (node->ri)
- return node->ri->onion_curve25519_pkey != NULL;
+ return routerinfo_has_curve25519_onion_key(node->ri);
else if (node->md)
- return node->md->onion_curve25519_pkey != NULL;
+ return microdesc_has_curve25519_onion_key(node->md);
else
return 0;
}
diff --git a/src/or/onion.c b/src/or/onion.c
index 5495074a83..8a566af766 100644
--- a/src/or/onion.c
+++ b/src/or/onion.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
**/
#include "or.h"
+#include "circuitbuild.h"
#include "circuitlist.h"
#include "config.h"
#include "cpuworker.h"
@@ -438,8 +439,7 @@ onion_skin_create(int type,
r = CREATE_FAST_LEN;
break;
case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR:
- if (tor_mem_is_zero((const char*)node->curve25519_onion_key.public_key,
- CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN))
+ if (!extend_info_supports_ntor(node))
return -1;
if (onion_skin_ntor_create((const uint8_t*)node->identity_digest,
&node->curve25519_onion_key,
diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h
index be58fa0d0a..34089ad994 100644
--- a/src/or/or.h
+++ b/src/or/or.h
@@ -4384,9 +4384,6 @@ typedef struct {
char *TLSECGroup; /**< One of "P256", "P224", or nil for auto */
- /** Autobool: should we use the ntor handshake if we can? */
- int UseNTorHandshake;
-
/** Fraction: */
double PathsNeededToBuildCircuits;
diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c
index 3468b07561..3a742fec0a 100644
--- a/src/or/rendclient.c
+++ b/src/or/rendclient.c
@@ -1368,8 +1368,13 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(const rend_cache_entry_t *entry,
i = crypto_rand_int(smartlist_len(usable_nodes));
intro = smartlist_get(usable_nodes, i);
+ if (BUG(!intro->extend_info)) {
+ /* This should never happen, but it isn't fatal, just try another */
+ smartlist_del(usable_nodes, i);
+ goto again;
+ }
/* Do we need to look up the router or is the extend info complete? */
- if (!intro->extend_info->onion_key) {
+ if (!extend_info_supports_tap(intro->extend_info)) {
const node_t *node;
extend_info_t *new_extend_info;
if (tor_digest_is_zero(intro->extend_info->identity_digest))
diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c
index 4c88f1fa5f..4ad35059f1 100644
--- a/src/or/rendservice.c
+++ b/src/or/rendservice.c
@@ -3896,3 +3896,11 @@ rend_service_set_connection_addr_port(edge_connection_t *conn,
return -2;
}
+/* Stub that should be replaced with the #17178 version of the function
+ * when merging. */
+int
+rend_service_allow_direct_connection(const or_options_t *options)
+{
+ (void)options;
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.h b/src/or/rendservice.h
index 4966cb0302..1622086a99 100644
--- a/src/or/rendservice.h
+++ b/src/or/rendservice.h
@@ -131,5 +131,7 @@ void directory_post_to_hs_dir(rend_service_descriptor_t *renddesc,
const char *service_id, int seconds_valid);
void rend_service_desc_has_uploaded(const rend_data_t *rend_data);
+int rend_service_allow_direct_connection(const or_options_t *options);
+
#endif
diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c
index e9961d4594..b664a88760 100644
--- a/src/or/router.c
+++ b/src/or/router.c
@@ -2836,6 +2836,10 @@ router_dump_router_to_string(routerinfo_t *router,
(const char *)router->onion_curve25519_pkey->public_key,
CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN, BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE);
smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "ntor-onion-key %s", kbuf);
+ } else {
+ /* Authorities will start rejecting relays without ntor keys in 0.2.9 */
+ log_err(LD_BUG, "A relay must have an ntor onion key");
+ goto err;
}
/* Write the exit policy to the end of 's'. */
diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c
index 1773f1d05c..74b8d1b1d3 100644
--- a/src/or/routerlist.c
+++ b/src/or/routerlist.c
@@ -2260,10 +2260,16 @@ router_add_running_nodes_to_smartlist(smartlist_t *sl, int allow_invalid,
continue;
if (node_is_unreliable(node, need_uptime, need_capacity, need_guard))
continue;
- /* Choose a node with an OR address that matches the firewall rules,
- * if we are making a direct connection */
+ /* Don't choose nodes if we are certain they can't do ntor */
+ if (node->rs && !routerstatus_version_supports_ntor(node->rs, 1))
+ continue;
+ if ((node->ri || node->md) && !node_has_curve25519_onion_key(node))
+ continue;
+ /* Choose a node with an OR address that matches the firewall rules */
if (direct_conn && check_reach &&
- !fascist_firewall_allows_node(node, FIREWALL_OR_CONNECTION, pref_addr))
+ !fascist_firewall_allows_node(node,
+ FIREWALL_OR_CONNECTION,
+ pref_addr))
continue;
smartlist_add(sl, (void *)node);
@@ -5497,6 +5503,45 @@ routerinfo_incompatible_with_extrainfo(const crypto_pk_t *identity_pkey,
return r;
}
+/* Does ri have a valid ntor onion key?
+ * Valid ntor onion keys exist and have at least one non-zero byte. */
+int
+routerinfo_has_curve25519_onion_key(const routerinfo_t *ri)
+{
+ if (!ri) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!ri->onion_curve25519_pkey) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (tor_mem_is_zero((const char*)ri->onion_curve25519_pkey->public_key,
+ CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Is rs running a tor version known to support ntor?
+ * If allow_unknown_versions is true, return true if the version is unknown.
+ * Otherwise, return false if the version is unknown. */
+int
+routerstatus_version_supports_ntor(const routerstatus_t *rs,
+ int allow_unknown_versions)
+{
+ if (!rs) {
+ return allow_unknown_versions;
+ }
+
+ if (!rs->version_known) {
+ return allow_unknown_versions;
+ }
+
+ return rs->version_supports_extend2_cells;
+}
+
/** Assert that the internal representation of <b>rl</b> is
* self-consistent. */
void
diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.h b/src/or/routerlist.h
index 72ab6d9bf3..47e5445e57 100644
--- a/src/or/routerlist.h
+++ b/src/or/routerlist.h
@@ -206,6 +206,9 @@ int routerinfo_incompatible_with_extrainfo(const crypto_pk_t *ri,
extrainfo_t *ei,
signed_descriptor_t *sd,
const char **msg);
+int routerinfo_has_curve25519_onion_key(const routerinfo_t *ri);
+int routerstatus_version_supports_ntor(const routerstatus_t *rs,
+ int allow_unknown_versions);
void routerlist_assert_ok(const routerlist_t *rl);
const char *esc_router_info(const routerinfo_t *router);
diff --git a/src/test/test_dir.c b/src/test/test_dir.c
index 51a5ecad76..5d9ae3c8a1 100644
--- a/src/test/test_dir.c
+++ b/src/test/test_dir.c
@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ test_dir_formats(void *arg)
const addr_policy_t *p;
time_t now = time(NULL);
port_cfg_t orport, dirport;
+ char cert_buf[256];
(void)arg;
pk1 = pk_generate(0);
@@ -135,6 +136,11 @@ test_dir_formats(void *arg)
tor_addr_parse(&r1->ipv6_addr, "1:2:3:4::");
r1->ipv6_orport = 9999;
r1->onion_pkey = crypto_pk_dup_key(pk1);
+ /* Fake just enough of an ntor key to get by */
+ curve25519_keypair_t r1_onion_keypair;
+ curve25519_keypair_generate(&r1_onion_keypair, 0);
+ r1->onion_curve25519_pkey = tor_memdup(&r1_onion_keypair.pubkey,
+ sizeof(curve25519_public_key_t));
r1->identity_pkey = crypto_pk_dup_key(pk2);
r1->bandwidthrate = 1000;
r1->bandwidthburst = 5000;
@@ -167,11 +173,6 @@ test_dir_formats(void *arg)
&kp2.pubkey,
now, 86400,
CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY);
- char cert_buf[256];
- base64_encode(cert_buf, sizeof(cert_buf),
- (const char*)r2->cache_info.signing_key_cert->encoded,
- r2->cache_info.signing_key_cert->encoded_len,
- BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE);
r2->platform = tor_strdup(platform);
r2->cache_info.published_on = 5;
r2->or_port = 9005;
@@ -247,6 +248,11 @@ test_dir_formats(void *arg)
strlcat(buf2, "hidden-service-dir\n", sizeof(buf2));
strlcat(buf2, "contact Magri White <magri@elsewhere.example.com>\n",
sizeof(buf2));
+ strlcat(buf2, "ntor-onion-key ", sizeof(buf2));
+ base64_encode(cert_buf, sizeof(cert_buf),
+ (const char*)r1_onion_keypair.pubkey.public_key, 32,
+ BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE);
+ strlcat(buf2, cert_buf, sizeof(buf2));
strlcat(buf2, "reject *:*\n", sizeof(buf2));
strlcat(buf2, "tunnelled-dir-server\nrouter-signature\n", sizeof(buf2));
buf[strlen(buf2)] = '\0'; /* Don't compare the sig; it's never the same
@@ -276,6 +282,10 @@ test_dir_formats(void *arg)
"router Fred 10.3.2.1 9005 0 0\n"
"identity-ed25519\n"
"-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n", sizeof(buf2));
+ base64_encode(cert_buf, sizeof(cert_buf),
+ (const char*)r2->cache_info.signing_key_cert->encoded,
+ r2->cache_info.signing_key_cert->encoded_len,
+ BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE);
strlcat(buf2, cert_buf, sizeof(buf2));
strlcat(buf2, "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n", sizeof(buf2));
strlcat(buf2, "master-key-ed25519 ", sizeof(buf2));
7apu2bq3rhoylwmucxizk54afw5jyda7pho4j5zdcqpwkufke7zdzwad.onion