diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | changes/reject-tap | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/router.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/test/test_dir.c | 20 |
3 files changed, 25 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/changes/reject-tap b/changes/reject-tap index 85fffc5b3e..5b79485f9f 100644 --- a/changes/reject-tap +++ b/changes/reject-tap @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ o Major bug fixes (circuit building): - - Authorites should not trust the version a relay claims (if any), - instead, they should check specifically for an ntor key. + - Tor authorities, relays, and clients no longer support + circuit-building using TAP. (The hidden service protocol + still uses TAP.) + - Relays make sure their own descriptor has an ntor key. + - Authorites no longer trust the version a relay claims (if any), + instead, they check specifically for an ntor key. Fixes bug 19163; bugfix on 0.2.4.18-rc. diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index a671591ad7..8d56f52b61 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -2753,6 +2753,10 @@ router_dump_router_to_string(routerinfo_t *router, (const char *)router->onion_curve25519_pkey->public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN, BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE); smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "ntor-onion-key %s", kbuf); + } else { + /* Authorities will start rejecting relays without ntor keys in 0.2.9 */ + log_err(LD_BUG, "A relay must have an ntor onion key"); + goto err; } /* Write the exit policy to the end of 's'. */ diff --git a/src/test/test_dir.c b/src/test/test_dir.c index 8889ccc41b..c1485ccaab 100644 --- a/src/test/test_dir.c +++ b/src/test/test_dir.c @@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ test_dir_formats(void *arg) const addr_policy_t *p; time_t now = time(NULL); port_cfg_t orport, dirport; + char cert_buf[256]; (void)arg; pk1 = pk_generate(0); @@ -135,6 +136,11 @@ test_dir_formats(void *arg) tor_addr_parse(&r1->ipv6_addr, "1:2:3:4::"); r1->ipv6_orport = 9999; r1->onion_pkey = crypto_pk_dup_key(pk1); + /* Fake just enough of an ntor key to get by */ + curve25519_keypair_t r1_onion_keypair; + curve25519_keypair_generate(&r1_onion_keypair, 0); + r1->onion_curve25519_pkey = tor_memdup(&r1_onion_keypair.pubkey, + sizeof(curve25519_public_key_t)); r1->identity_pkey = crypto_pk_dup_key(pk2); r1->bandwidthrate = 1000; r1->bandwidthburst = 5000; @@ -167,11 +173,6 @@ test_dir_formats(void *arg) &kp2.pubkey, now, 86400, CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY); - char cert_buf[256]; - base64_encode(cert_buf, sizeof(cert_buf), - (const char*)r2->cache_info.signing_key_cert->encoded, - r2->cache_info.signing_key_cert->encoded_len, - BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE); r2->platform = tor_strdup(platform); r2->cache_info.published_on = 5; r2->or_port = 9005; @@ -247,6 +248,11 @@ test_dir_formats(void *arg) strlcat(buf2, "hidden-service-dir\n", sizeof(buf2)); strlcat(buf2, "contact Magri White <magri@elsewhere.example.com>\n", sizeof(buf2)); + strlcat(buf2, "ntor-onion-key ", sizeof(buf2)); + base64_encode(cert_buf, sizeof(cert_buf), + (const char*)r1_onion_keypair.pubkey.public_key, 32, + BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE); + strlcat(buf2, cert_buf, sizeof(buf2)); strlcat(buf2, "reject *:*\n", sizeof(buf2)); strlcat(buf2, "tunnelled-dir-server\nrouter-signature\n", sizeof(buf2)); buf[strlen(buf2)] = '\0'; /* Don't compare the sig; it's never the same @@ -276,6 +282,10 @@ test_dir_formats(void *arg) "router Fred 10.3.2.1 9005 0 0\n" "identity-ed25519\n" "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n", sizeof(buf2)); + base64_encode(cert_buf, sizeof(cert_buf), + (const char*)r2->cache_info.signing_key_cert->encoded, + r2->cache_info.signing_key_cert->encoded_len, + BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE); strlcat(buf2, cert_buf, sizeof(buf2)); strlcat(buf2, "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n", sizeof(buf2)); strlcat(buf2, "master-key-ed25519 ", sizeof(buf2)); |