diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | changes/bug6252 | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/relay.c | 14 |
2 files changed, 22 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/changes/bug6252 b/changes/bug6252 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0d29203fab --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug6252 @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ + o Security fixes: + - Tear down the circuit if we get an unexpected SENDME cell. Clients + could use this trick to make their circuits receive cells faster + than our flow control would have allowed, or to gum up the network, + or possibly to do targeted memory denial-of-service attacks on + entry nodes. Fixes bug 6252. Bugfix on the 54th commit on Tor -- + from July 2002, before the release of Tor 0.0.0. + diff --git a/src/or/relay.c b/src/or/relay.c index 3e418ea13f..3d261c2650 100644 --- a/src/or/relay.c +++ b/src/or/relay.c @@ -1265,11 +1265,25 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, case RELAY_COMMAND_SENDME: if (!rh.stream_id) { if (layer_hint) { + if (layer_hint->package_window + CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT > + CIRCWINDOW_START_MAX) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Bug/attack: unexpected sendme cell from exit relay. " + "Closing circ."); + return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; + } layer_hint->package_window += CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT; log_debug(LD_APP,"circ-level sendme at origin, packagewindow %d.", layer_hint->package_window); circuit_resume_edge_reading(circ, layer_hint); } else { + if (circ->package_window + CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT > + CIRCWINDOW_START_MAX) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Bug/attack: unexpected sendme cell from client. " + "Closing circ."); + return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; + } circ->package_window += CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT; log_debug(LD_APP, "circ-level sendme at non-origin, packagewindow %d.", |