diff options
-rw-r--r-- | changes/bug24313 | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | changes/bug24480 | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | changes/trove-2017-009 | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | changes/trove-2017-010 | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | changes/trove-2017-011 | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | changes/trove-2017-012-part1 | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | changes/trove-2017-012-part2 | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | configure.ac | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/common/crypto.c | 16 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/or/entrynodes.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/or/protover.c | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/or/rendservice.c | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/or/routerlist.c | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/win32/orconfig.h | 2 |
15 files changed, 77 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/changes/bug24313 b/changes/bug24313 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b927ec3ba6 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug24313 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Major bugfixes (security, hidden service v2): + - Fix a use-after-free error that could crash v2 Tor hidden services + when it failed to open circuits while expiring introductions + points. Fixes bug 24313; bugfix on 0.2.7.2-alpha. This + issue is also tracked as TROVE-2017-013 and CVE-2017-8823. diff --git a/changes/bug24480 b/changes/bug24480 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..94e5b91a0c --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug24480 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (compilation): + - Fix a signed/unsigned comparison warning introduced by our + fix to TROVE-2017-009. Fixes bug 24480; bugfix on 0.2.5.16. diff --git a/changes/trove-2017-009 b/changes/trove-2017-009 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..166a5faec6 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/trove-2017-009 @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ + o Major bugfixes (security): + - When checking for replays in the INTRODUCE1 cell data for a (legacy) + hiddden service, correctly detect replays in the RSA-encrypted part of + the cell. We were previously checking for replays on the entire cell, + but those can be circumvented due to the malleability of Tor's legacy + hybrid encryption. This fix helps prevent a traffic confirmation + attack. Fixes bug 24244; bugfix on 0.2.4.1-alpha. This issue is also + tracked as TROVE-2017-009 and CVE-2017-8819. + + diff --git a/changes/trove-2017-010 b/changes/trove-2017-010 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d5bf9333da --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/trove-2017-010 @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + o Major bugfixes (security): + - Fix a denial-of-service issue where an attacker could crash + a directory authority using a malformed router descriptor. + Fixes bug 24245; bugfix on 0.2.9.4-alpha. Also tracked + as TROVE-2017-010 and CVE-2017-8820. + diff --git a/changes/trove-2017-011 b/changes/trove-2017-011 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..82d20d9e78 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/trove-2017-011 @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ + o Major bugfixes (security): + - Fix a denial of service bug where an attacker could use a malformed + directory object to cause a Tor instance to pause while OpenSSL would + try to read a passphrase from the terminal. (If the terminal was not + available, tor would continue running.) Fixes bug 24246; bugfix on + every version of Tor. Also tracked as TROVE-2017-011 and + CVE-2017-8821. Found by OSS-Fuzz as testcase 6360145429790720. + diff --git a/changes/trove-2017-012-part1 b/changes/trove-2017-012-part1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9fccc2cf65 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/trove-2017-012-part1 @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + o Major bugfixes (security, relay): + - When running as a relay, make sure that we never build a path through + ourselves, even in the case where we have somehow lost the version of + our descriptor appearing in the consensus. Fixes part of bug 21534; + bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha. This issue is also tracked as TROVE-2017-012 + and CVE-2017-8822. diff --git a/changes/trove-2017-012-part2 b/changes/trove-2017-012-part2 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ed994c5b02 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/trove-2017-012-part2 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Major bugfixes (security, relay): + - When running as a relay, make sure that we never ever choose ourselves + as a guard. Previously, this was possible. Fixes part of bug 21534; + bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. This issue is also tracked as TROVE-2017-012 + and CVE-2017-8822. diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac index 315bd2df35..88bc968848 100644 --- a/configure.ac +++ b/configure.ac @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ dnl Copyright (c) 2007-2015, The Tor Project, Inc. dnl See LICENSE for licensing information AC_PREREQ([2.63]) -AC_INIT([tor],[0.3.0.12-dev]) +AC_INIT([tor],[0.3.0.13-dev]) AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([src/or/main.c]) AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIR([m4]) diff --git a/contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in b/contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in index 160ef26750..8cb6fb1d35 100644 --- a/contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in +++ b/contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ !include "LogicLib.nsh" !include "FileFunc.nsh" !insertmacro GetParameters -!define VERSION "0.3.0.12-dev" +!define VERSION "0.3.0.13-dev" !define INSTALLER "tor-${VERSION}-win32.exe" !define WEBSITE "https://www.torproject.org/" !define LICENSE "LICENSE" diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index 7cb3330bde..d1357182d2 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -645,11 +645,21 @@ MOCK_IMPL(int, return 0; } +/** A PEM callback that always reports a failure to get a password */ +static int +pem_no_password_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *u) +{ + (void)buf; + (void)size; + (void)rwflag; + (void)u; + return 0; +} + /** Read a PEM-encoded private key from the <b>len</b>-byte string <b>s</b> * into <b>env</b>. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. If len is -1, * the string is nul-terminated. */ -/* Used here, and used for testing. */ int crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(crypto_pk_t *env, const char *s, ssize_t len) @@ -668,7 +678,7 @@ crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(crypto_pk_t *env, if (env->key) RSA_free(env->key); - env->key = PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey(b,NULL,NULL,NULL); + env->key = PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey(b,NULL,pem_no_password_cb,NULL); BIO_free(b); @@ -800,7 +810,7 @@ crypto_pk_read_public_key_from_string(crypto_pk_t *env, const char *src, if (env->key) RSA_free(env->key); - env->key = PEM_read_bio_RSAPublicKey(b, NULL, NULL, NULL); + env->key = PEM_read_bio_RSAPublicKey(b, NULL, pem_no_password_cb, NULL); BIO_free(b); if (!env->key) { crypto_log_errors(LOG_WARN, "reading public key from string"); diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c index d762afdcfe..0109da8e01 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@ -740,7 +740,8 @@ node_is_possible_guard(const node_t *node) node->is_stable && node->is_fast && node->is_valid && - node_is_dir(node)); + node_is_dir(node) && + !router_digest_is_me(node->identity)); } /** diff --git a/src/or/protover.c b/src/or/protover.c index 88d549ab35..c76f028699 100644 --- a/src/or/protover.c +++ b/src/or/protover.c @@ -694,6 +694,11 @@ protocol_list_contains(const smartlist_t *protos, const char * protover_compute_for_old_tor(const char *version) { + if (version == NULL) { + /* No known version; guess the oldest series that is still supported. */ + version = "0.2.5.15"; + } + if (tor_version_as_new_as(version, FIRST_TOR_VERSION_TO_ADVERTISE_PROTOCOLS)) { return ""; diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index 8087e88499..ec39e3b80e 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -1879,6 +1879,7 @@ rend_service_receive_introduction(origin_circuit_t *circuit, time_t now = time(NULL); time_t elapsed; int replay; + ssize_t keylen; /* Do some initial validation and logging before we parse the cell */ if (circuit->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO) { @@ -1953,9 +1954,10 @@ rend_service_receive_introduction(origin_circuit_t *circuit, } /* check for replay of PK-encrypted portion. */ + keylen = crypto_pk_keysize(intro_key); replay = replaycache_add_test_and_elapsed( intro_point->accepted_intro_rsa_parts, - parsed_req->ciphertext, parsed_req->ciphertext_len, + parsed_req->ciphertext, MIN(parsed_req->ciphertext_len, keylen), &elapsed); if (replay) { @@ -3974,6 +3976,10 @@ remove_invalid_intro_points(rend_service_t *service, log_info(LD_REND, "Expiring %s as intro point for %s.", safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(intro->extend_info)), safe_str_client(service->service_id)); + /* We might have put it in the retry list if so, undo. */ + if (retry_nodes) { + smartlist_remove(retry_nodes, intro); + } smartlist_add(service->expiring_nodes, intro); SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(service->intro_nodes, intro); /* Intro point is expired, we need a new one thus don't consider it diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index b68db750c3..83e513448d 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -2820,7 +2820,10 @@ router_choose_random_node(smartlist_t *excludedsmartlist, }); } - if ((r = routerlist_find_my_routerinfo())) + /* If the node_t is not found we won't be to exclude ourself but we + * won't be able to pick ourself in router_choose_random_node() so + * this is fine to at least try with our routerinfo_t object. */ + if ((r = router_get_my_routerinfo())) routerlist_add_node_and_family(excludednodes, r); router_add_running_nodes_to_smartlist(sl, allow_invalid, diff --git a/src/win32/orconfig.h b/src/win32/orconfig.h index f5a7451a53..0b09a5ca50 100644 --- a/src/win32/orconfig.h +++ b/src/win32/orconfig.h @@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ #define USING_TWOS_COMPLEMENT /* Version number of package */ -#define VERSION "0.3.0.12-dev" +#define VERSION "0.3.0.13-dev" |