Merge branch 'bug26367_035_01'

19 files changed, 35 insertions, 508 deletions

diff --git a/src/app/config/config.c b/src/app/config/config.c
index 105c408614..339f8e2475 100644
--- a/src/app/config/config.c
+++ b/src/app/config/config.c
@@ -174,7 +174,6 @@ static config_abbrev_t option_abbrevs_[] = {
   PLURAL(AuthDirRejectCC),
   PLURAL(EntryNode),
   PLURAL(ExcludeNode),
-  PLURAL(Tor2webRendezvousPoint),
   PLURAL(FirewallPort),
   PLURAL(LongLivedPort),
   PLURAL(HiddenServiceNode),
@@ -598,8 +597,8 @@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = {
   OBSOLETE("Support022HiddenServices"),
   V(TestSocks,                   BOOL,     "0"),
   V(TokenBucketRefillInterval,   MSEC_INTERVAL, "100 msec"),
-  V(Tor2webMode,                 BOOL,     "0"),
-  V(Tor2webRendezvousPoints,      ROUTERSET, NULL),
+  OBSOLETE("Tor2webMode"),
+  OBSOLETE("Tor2webRendezvousPoints"),
   OBSOLETE("TLSECGroup"),
   V(TrackHostExits,              CSV,      NULL),
   V(TrackHostExitsExpire,        INTERVAL, "30 minutes"),
@@ -1698,8 +1697,7 @@ options_need_geoip_info(const or_options_t *options, const char **reason_out)
     routerset_needs_geoip(options->ExcludeExitNodes) ||
     routerset_needs_geoip(options->ExcludeNodes) ||
     routerset_needs_geoip(options->HSLayer2Nodes) ||
-    routerset_needs_geoip(options->HSLayer3Nodes) ||
-    routerset_needs_geoip(options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints);
+    routerset_needs_geoip(options->HSLayer3Nodes);
 
   if (routerset_usage && reason_out) {
     *reason_out = "We've been configured to use (or avoid) nodes in certain "
@@ -1882,27 +1880,6 @@ options_act(const or_options_t *old_options)
              "in a non-anonymous mode. It will provide NO ANONYMITY.");
   }
 
-#ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE
-/* LCOV_EXCL_START */
-  // XXXX This should move into options_validate()
-  if (!options->Tor2webMode) {
-    log_err(LD_CONFIG, "This copy of Tor was compiled to run in "
-            "'tor2web mode'. It can only be run with the Tor2webMode torrc "
-            "option enabled.");
-    return -1;
-  }
-/* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
-#else /* !(defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE)) */
-  // XXXX This should move into options_validate()
-  if (options->Tor2webMode) {
-    log_err(LD_CONFIG, "This copy of Tor was not compiled to run in "
-            "'tor2web mode'. It cannot be run with the Tor2webMode torrc "
-            "option enabled. To enable Tor2webMode recompile with the "
-            "--enable-tor2web-mode option.");
-    return -1;
-  }
-#endif /* defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) */
-
   /* If we are a bridge with a pluggable transport proxy but no
      Extended ORPort, inform the user that they are missing out. */
   if (server_mode(options) && options->ServerTransportPlugin &&
@@ -2164,8 +2141,6 @@ options_act(const or_options_t *old_options)
                          options->HSLayer2Nodes) ||
         !routerset_equal(old_options->HSLayer3Nodes,
                          options->HSLayer3Nodes) ||
-        !routerset_equal(old_options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints,
-                         options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints) ||
         options->StrictNodes != old_options->StrictNodes) {
       log_info(LD_CIRC,
                "Changed to using entry guards or bridges, or changed "
@@ -3307,23 +3282,12 @@ options_validate_single_onion(or_options_t *options, char **msg)
                                options->NATDPort_set ||
                                options->DNSPort_set ||
                                options->HTTPTunnelPort_set);
-  if (rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(options) && client_port_set &&
-      !options->Tor2webMode) {
+  if (rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(options) && client_port_set) {
     REJECT("HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode is incompatible with using Tor as "
            "an anonymous client. Please set Socks/Trans/NATD/DNSPort to 0, or "
            "revert HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode to 0.");
   }
 
-  /* If you run a hidden service in non-anonymous mode, the hidden service
-   * loses anonymity, even if SOCKSPort / Tor2web mode isn't used. */
-  if (!rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(options) &&
-      options->RendConfigLines && options->Tor2webMode) {
-    REJECT("Non-anonymous (Tor2web) mode is incompatible with using Tor as a "
-           "hidden service. Please remove all HiddenServiceDir lines, or use "
-           "a version of tor compiled without --enable-tor2web-mode, or use "
-           "HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode.");
-  }
-
   if (rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(options)
       && options->UseEntryGuards) {
     /* Single Onion services only use entry guards when uploading descriptors;
@@ -3793,26 +3757,6 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options,
     REJECT("CircuitsAvailableTimeout is too large. Max is 24 hours.");
   }
 
-#ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE
-  if (options->Tor2webMode && options->UseEntryGuards) {
-    /* tor2web mode clients do not (and should not) use entry guards
-     * in any meaningful way.  Further, tor2web mode causes the hidden
-     * service client code to do things which break the path bias
-     * detector, and it's far easier to turn off entry guards (and
-     * thus the path bias detector with it) than to figure out how to
-     * make a piece of code which cannot possibly help tor2web mode
-     * users compatible with tor2web mode.
-     */
-    log_notice(LD_CONFIG,
-               "Tor2WebMode is enabled; disabling UseEntryGuards.");
-    options->UseEntryGuards = 0;
-  }
-#endif /* defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) */
-
-  if (options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints && !options->Tor2webMode) {
-    REJECT("Tor2webRendezvousPoints cannot be set without Tor2webMode.");
-  }
-
   if (options->EntryNodes && !options->UseEntryGuards) {
     REJECT("If EntryNodes is set, UseEntryGuards must be enabled.");
   }
diff --git a/src/app/config/or_options_st.h b/src/app/config/or_options_st.h
index 627b39aea3..8ef01f80e7 100644
--- a/src/app/config/or_options_st.h
+++ b/src/app/config/or_options_st.h
@@ -262,14 +262,6 @@ struct or_options_t {
   int AllDirActionsPrivate; /**< Should every directory action be sent
                              * through a Tor circuit? */
 
-  /** Run in 'tor2web mode'? (I.e. only make client connections to hidden
-   * services, and use a single hop for all hidden-service-related
-   * circuits.) */
-  int Tor2webMode;
-
-  /** A routerset that should be used when picking RPs for HS circuits. */
-  routerset_t *Tor2webRendezvousPoints;
-
   /** A routerset that should be used when picking middle nodes for HS
    *  circuits. */
   routerset_t *HSLayer2Nodes;
@@ -543,9 +535,9 @@ struct or_options_t {
    * of fixed nodes? */
   int UseEntryGuards_option;
   /** Internal variable to remember whether we're actually acting on
-   * UseEntryGuards_option -- when we're a non-anonymous Tor2web client or
-   * Single Onion Service, it is always false, otherwise we use the value of
-   * UseEntryGuards_option. */
+   * UseEntryGuards_option -- when we're a non-anonymous Single Onion Service,
+   * it is always false, otherwise we use the value of UseEntryGuards_option.
+   * */
   int UseEntryGuards;
 
   int NumEntryGuards; /**< How many entry guards do we try to establish? */
diff --git a/src/core/or/channel.c b/src/core/or/channel.c
index 476f31d5b4..0c204ddfb6 100644
--- a/src/core/or/channel.c
+++ b/src/core/or/channel.c
@@ -1882,13 +1882,6 @@ channel_do_open_actions(channel_t *chan)
     if (!get_options()->ConnectionPadding) {
       /* Disable if torrc disabled */
       channelpadding_disable_padding_on_channel(chan);
-    } else if (get_options()->Tor2webMode &&
-            !networkstatus_get_param(NULL,
-                                     CHANNELPADDING_TOR2WEB_PARAM,
-                                     CHANNELPADDING_TOR2WEB_DEFAULT, 0, 1)) {
-      /* Disable if we're using tor2web and the consensus disabled padding
-       * for tor2web */
-      channelpadding_disable_padding_on_channel(chan);
     } else if (rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(get_options()) &&
                !networkstatus_get_param(NULL,
                                         CHANNELPADDING_SOS_PARAM,
diff --git a/src/core/or/channelpadding.c b/src/core/or/channelpadding.c
index b8cfd33d50..1a8f8209d0 100644
--- a/src/core/or/channelpadding.c
+++ b/src/core/or/channelpadding.c
@@ -52,8 +52,6 @@ static int consensus_nf_conntimeout_clients;
 static int consensus_nf_pad_before_usage;
 /** Should we pad relay-to-relay connections? */
 static int consensus_nf_pad_relays;
-/** Should we pad tor2web connections? */
-static int consensus_nf_pad_tor2web;
 /** Should we pad rosos connections? */
 static int consensus_nf_pad_single_onion;
 
@@ -141,11 +139,6 @@ channelpadding_new_consensus_params(networkstatus_t *ns)
   consensus_nf_pad_relays =
     networkstatus_get_param(ns, "nf_pad_relays", 0, 0, 1);
 
-  consensus_nf_pad_tor2web =
-    networkstatus_get_param(ns,
-                            CHANNELPADDING_TOR2WEB_PARAM,
-                            CHANNELPADDING_TOR2WEB_DEFAULT, 0, 1);
-
   consensus_nf_pad_single_onion =
     networkstatus_get_param(ns,
                             CHANNELPADDING_SOS_PARAM,
@@ -740,15 +733,6 @@ channelpadding_decide_to_pad_channel(channel_t *chan)
     return CHANNELPADDING_WONTPAD;
   }
 
-  if (options->Tor2webMode && !consensus_nf_pad_tor2web) {
-    /* If the consensus just changed values, this channel may still
-     * think padding is enabled. Negotiate it off. */
-    if (chan->padding_enabled)
-      channelpadding_disable_padding_on_channel(chan);
-
-    return CHANNELPADDING_WONTPAD;
-  }
-
   if (rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(options) &&
       !consensus_nf_pad_single_onion) {
     /* If the consensus just changed values, this channel may still
diff --git a/src/core/or/channelpadding.h b/src/core/or/channelpadding.h
index 7eddbdbe2d..7f8cfd4cc7 100644
--- a/src/core/or/channelpadding.h
+++ b/src/core/or/channelpadding.h
@@ -13,8 +13,6 @@
 
 #include "trunnel/channelpadding_negotiation.h"
 
-#define CHANNELPADDING_TOR2WEB_PARAM  "nf_pad_tor2web"
-#define CHANNELPADDING_TOR2WEB_DEFAULT 1
 #define CHANNELPADDING_SOS_PARAM  "nf_pad_single_onion"
 #define CHANNELPADDING_SOS_DEFAULT 1
 
diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c
index e22ddabde3..5c3d209448 100644
--- a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c
+++ b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c
@@ -408,10 +408,10 @@ onion_populate_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ)
    * edge cases. */
   tor_assert(circuit_get_cpath_len(circ));
   if (circuit_can_use_tap(circ)) {
-    /* Circuits from clients to intro points, and hidden services to
-     * rend points do not support ntor, because the hidden service protocol
-     * does not include ntor onion keys. This is also true for Tor2web clients
-     * and Single Onion Services. */
+    /* Circuits from clients to intro points, and hidden services to rend
+     * points do not support ntor, because the hidden service protocol does
+     * not include ntor onion keys. This is also true for Single Onion
+     * Services. */
     return 0;
   }
 
@@ -824,7 +824,6 @@ circuit_timeout_want_to_count_circ(const origin_circuit_t *circ)
  * accordingly.
  * Note that TAP handshakes in CREATE cells are only used for direct
  * connections:
- *  - from Tor2web to intro points not in the client's consensus, and
  *  - from Single Onions to rend points not in the service's consensus.
  * This is checked in onion_populate_cpath. */
 static void
@@ -1985,98 +1984,11 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(router_crn_flags_t flags)
   return NULL;
 }
 
-#if defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) || defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS)
-/* The config option Tor2webRendezvousPoints has been set and we need
- * to pick an RP out of that set. Make sure that the RP we choose is
- * alive, and return it. Return NULL if no usable RP could be found in
- * Tor2webRendezvousPoints. */
-STATIC const node_t *
-pick_tor2web_rendezvous_node(router_crn_flags_t flags,
-                             const or_options_t *options)
-{
-  const node_t *rp_node = NULL;
-  const int need_desc = (flags & CRN_NEED_DESC) != 0;
-  const int pref_addr = (flags & CRN_PREF_ADDR) != 0;
-  const int direct_conn = (flags & CRN_DIRECT_CONN) != 0;
-
-  smartlist_t *whitelisted_live_rps = smartlist_new();
-  smartlist_t *all_live_nodes = smartlist_new();
-
-  tor_assert(options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints);
-
-  /* Add all running nodes to all_live_nodes */
-  router_add_running_nodes_to_smartlist(all_live_nodes,
-                                        0, 0, 0,
-                                        need_desc,
-                                        pref_addr,
-                                        direct_conn);
-
-  /* Filter all_live_nodes to only add live *and* whitelisted RPs to
-   * the list whitelisted_live_rps. */
-  SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(all_live_nodes, node_t *, live_node) {
-    if (routerset_contains_node(options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints, live_node)) {
-      smartlist_add(whitelisted_live_rps, live_node);
-    }
-  } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(live_node);
-
-  /* Honor ExcludeNodes */
-  if (options->ExcludeNodes) {
-    routerset_subtract_nodes(whitelisted_live_rps, options->ExcludeNodes);
-  }
-
-  /* Now pick randomly amongst the whitelisted RPs. No need to waste time
-     doing bandwidth load balancing, for most use cases
-     'whitelisted_live_rps' contains a single OR anyway. */
-  rp_node = smartlist_choose(whitelisted_live_rps);
-
-  if (!rp_node) {
-    log_warn(LD_REND, "Could not find a Rendezvous Point that suits "
-             "the purposes of Tor2webRendezvousPoints. Choosing random one.");
-  }
-
-  smartlist_free(whitelisted_live_rps);
-  smartlist_free(all_live_nodes);
-
-  return rp_node;
-}
-#endif /* defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) || defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */
-
 /* Pick a Rendezvous Point for our HS circuits according to <b>flags</b>. */
 static const node_t *
 pick_rendezvous_node(router_crn_flags_t flags)
 {
   const or_options_t *options = get_options();
-
-#ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE
-  /* We want to connect directly to the node if we can */
-  router_crn_flags_t direct_flags = flags;
-  direct_flags |= CRN_PREF_ADDR;
-  direct_flags |= CRN_DIRECT_CONN;
-
-  /* The user wants us to pick specific RPs. */
-  if (options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints) {
-    const node_t *tor2web_rp = pick_tor2web_rendezvous_node(direct_flags,
-                                                            options);
-    if (tor2web_rp) {
-      return tor2web_rp;
-    }
-  }
-
-  /* Else, if no direct, preferred tor2web RP was found, fall back to choosing
-   * a random direct node */
-  const node_t *node = router_choose_random_node(NULL, options->ExcludeNodes,
-                                                 direct_flags);
-  /* Return the direct node (if found), or log a message and fall back to an
-   * indirect connection. */
-  if (node) {
-    return node;
-  } else {
-    log_info(LD_REND,
-             "Unable to find a random rendezvous point that is reachable via "
-             "a direct connection, falling back to a 3-hop path.");
-  }
-#endif /* defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) */
-
   return router_choose_random_node(NULL, options->ExcludeNodes, flags);
 }
 
diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.h b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.h
index 9f5d99c2a5..0c6f2f6ce5 100644
--- a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.h
+++ b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.h
@@ -93,14 +93,10 @@ STATIC int
 onion_pick_cpath_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit_ei,
                       int is_hs_v3_rp_circuit);
 
-#if defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) || defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS)
-enum router_crn_flags_t;
-STATIC const node_t *pick_tor2web_rendezvous_node(
-                                     enum router_crn_flags_t flags,
-                                     const or_options_t *options);
+#if defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS)
 unsigned int cpath_get_n_hops(crypt_path_t **head_ptr);
 
-#endif /* defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) || defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */
+#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */
 
 #endif /* defined(CIRCUITBUILD_PRIVATE) */
 
diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitstats.c b/src/core/or/circuitstats.c
index 63cd21540d..9ebf618b45 100644
--- a/src/core/or/circuitstats.c
+++ b/src/core/or/circuitstats.c
@@ -113,8 +113,7 @@ get_circuit_build_timeout_ms(void)
  *  2. If the torrc option LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is false.
  *  3. If we are a directory authority
  *  4. If we fail to write circuit build time history to our state file.
- *  5. If we are compiled or configured in Tor2web mode
- *  6. If we are configured in Single Onion mode
+ *  5. If we are configured in Single Onion mode
  */
 int
 circuit_build_times_disabled(const or_options_t *options)
@@ -136,7 +135,7 @@ circuit_build_times_disabled_(const or_options_t *options,
     int config_disabled = !options->LearnCircuitBuildTimeout;
     int dirauth_disabled = authdir_mode(options);
     int state_disabled = did_last_state_file_write_fail() ? 1 : 0;
-    /* LearnCircuitBuildTimeout and Tor2web/Single Onion Services are
+    /* LearnCircuitBuildTimeout and Single Onion Services are
      * incompatible in two ways:
      *
      * - LearnCircuitBuildTimeout results in a low CBT, which
@@ -148,12 +147,11 @@ circuit_build_times_disabled_(const or_options_t *options,
      *
      * If we fix both of these issues someday, we should test
      * these modes with LearnCircuitBuildTimeout on again. */
-    int tor2web_disabled = rend_client_allow_non_anonymous_connection(options);
     int single_onion_disabled = rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(
                                                                       options);
 
     if (consensus_disabled || config_disabled || dirauth_disabled ||
-        state_disabled || tor2web_disabled || single_onion_disabled) {
+        state_disabled || single_onion_disabled) {
 #if 0
       log_debug(LD_CIRC,
                "CircuitBuildTime learning is disabled. "
diff --git a/src/core/or/circuituse.c b/src/core/or/circuituse.c
index a3b9eb1713..0f2b1ede32 100644
--- a/src/core/or/circuituse.c
+++ b/src/core/or/circuituse.c
@@ -863,8 +863,7 @@ static time_t last_expired_clientside_circuits = 0;
 /**
  * As a diagnostic for bug 8387, log information about how many one-hop
  * circuits we have around that have been there for at least <b>age</b>
- * seconds. Log a few of them.
- * Ignores Single Onion Service intro and Tor2web redezvous circuits, they are
+ * seconds. Log a few of them. Ignores Single Onion Service intro, it is
  * expected to be long-term one-hop circuits.
  */
 void
@@ -889,13 +888,6 @@ circuit_log_ancient_one_hop_circuits(int age)
         (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO ||
          circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED))
       continue;
-    /* Tor2web deliberately makes long term one-hop rend connections,
-     * particularly when Tor2webRendezvousPoints is used. We only ignore
-     * active rend point connections, if we take a long time to rendezvous,
-     * that's worth logging. */
-    if (rend_client_allow_non_anonymous_connection(options) &&
-        circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED)
-      continue;
     ocirc = CONST_TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
 
     if (ocirc->build_state && ocirc->build_state->onehop_tunnel) {
@@ -1999,18 +1991,16 @@ circuit_should_use_vanguards(uint8_t purpose)
  * Return true for the set of conditions for which it is OK to use
  * a cannibalized circuit.
  *
- * Don't cannibalize for onehops, or tor2web, or certain purposes.
+ * Don't cannibalize for onehops, or certain purposes.
  */
 static int
 circuit_should_cannibalize_to_build(uint8_t purpose_to_build,
                                     int has_extend_info,
-                                    int onehop_tunnel,
-                                    int need_specific_rp)
+                                    int onehop_tunnel)
 {
 
-  /* Do not try to cannibalize if this is a one hop circuit, or
-   * is a tor2web/special rp. */
-  if (onehop_tunnel || need_specific_rp) {
+  /* Do not try to cannibalize if this is a one hop circuit. */
+  if (onehop_tunnel) {
     return 0;
   }
 
@@ -2059,7 +2049,6 @@ circuit_launch_by_extend_info(uint8_t purpose,
   origin_circuit_t *circ;
   int onehop_tunnel = (flags & CIRCLAUNCH_ONEHOP_TUNNEL) != 0;
   int have_path = have_enough_path_info(! (flags & CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL) );
-  int need_specific_rp = 0;
 
   /* Keep some stats about our attempts to launch HS rendezvous circuits */
   if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND) {
@@ -2075,20 +2064,11 @@ circuit_launch_by_extend_info(uint8_t purpose,
     return NULL;
   }
 
-  /* If Tor2webRendezvousPoints is enabled and we are dealing with an
-     RP circuit, we want a specific RP node so we shouldn't canibalize
-     an already existing circuit. */
-  if (get_options()->Tor2webRendezvousPoints &&
-      purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND) {
-    need_specific_rp = 1;
-  }
-
   /* If we can/should cannibalize another circuit to build this one,
    * then do so. */
   if (circuit_should_cannibalize_to_build(purpose,
                                           extend_info != NULL,
-                                          onehop_tunnel,
-                                          need_specific_rp)) {
+                                          onehop_tunnel)) {
     /* see if there are appropriate circs available to cannibalize. */
     /* XXX if we're planning to add a hop, perhaps we want to look for
      * internal circs rather than exit circs? -RD */
@@ -2485,16 +2465,6 @@ circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(entry_connection_t *conn,
     else
       new_circ_purpose = desired_circuit_purpose;
 
-#ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE
-    /* If tor2Web is on, then hidden service requests should be one-hop.
-     */
-    if (options->Tor2webMode &&
-        (new_circ_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND ||
-         new_circ_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING)) {
-      want_onehop = 1;
-    }
-#endif /* defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) */
-
     /* Determine what kind of a circuit to launch, and actually launch it. */
     {
       int flags = CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY;
diff --git a/src/core/or/connection_edge.c b/src/core/or/connection_edge.c
index c51e428000..ab3c14d2c3 100644
--- a/src/core/or/connection_edge.c
+++ b/src/core/or/connection_edge.c
@@ -1842,18 +1842,6 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(entry_connection_t *conn,
       return -1;
     }
 
-#ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE
-    /* If we're running in Tor2webMode, we don't allow anything BUT .onion
-     * addresses. */
-    if (options->Tor2webMode) {
-      log_warn(LD_APP, "Refusing to connect to non-hidden-service hostname "
-               "or IP address %s because tor2web mode is enabled.",
-               safe_str_client(socks->address));
-      connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_ENTRYPOLICY);
-      return -1;
-    }
-#endif /* defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) */
-
     /* socks->address is a non-onion hostname or IP address.
      * If we can't do any non-onion requests, refuse the connection.
      * If we have a hostname but can't do DNS, refuse the connection.
diff --git a/src/core/or/or.h b/src/core/or/or.h
index 9aca030c74..f0cef06011 100644
--- a/src/core/or/or.h
+++ b/src/core/or/or.h
@@ -101,10 +101,6 @@ struct curve25519_public_key_t;
 #define cell_t tor_cell_t
 #endif
 
-#ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE
-#define NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED 1
-#endif
-
 /** Helper macro: Given a pointer to to.base_, of type from*, return &to. */
 #define DOWNCAST(to, ptr) ((to*)SUBTYPE_P(ptr, to, base_))
 
diff --git a/src/feature/dircache/directory.c b/src/feature/dircache/directory.c
index 888a7c1939..de0bcdbfa7 100644
--- a/src/feature/dircache/directory.c
+++ b/src/feature/dircache/directory.c
@@ -803,10 +803,8 @@ directory_choose_address_routerstatus(const routerstatus_t *status,
    * allowed by the firewall.
    *
    * (When Tor uploads and downloads a hidden service descriptor, it uses
-   * DIRIND_ANONYMOUS, except for Tor2Web, which uses DIRIND_ONEHOP.
-   * So this code will only modify the address for Tor2Web's HS descriptor
-   * fetches. Even Single Onion Servers (NYI) use DIRIND_ANONYMOUS, to avoid
-   * HSDirs denying service by rejecting descriptors.)
+   * DIRIND_ANONYMOUS. Even Single Onion Servers (NYI) use DIRIND_ANONYMOUS,
+   * to avoid HSDirs denying service by rejecting descriptors.)
    */
 
   /* Initialise the OR / Dir addresses */
diff --git a/src/feature/rend/rendclient.c b/src/feature/rend/rendclient.c
index 9f62156eb9..2c4cec65b1 100644
--- a/src/feature/rend/rendclient.c
+++ b/src/feature/rend/rendclient.c
@@ -449,12 +449,7 @@ directory_get_from_hs_dir(const char *desc_id,
   char desc_id_base32[REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32 + 1];
   char descriptor_cookie_base64[3*REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN_BASE64];
   const rend_data_v2_t *rend_data;
-#ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE
-  const int tor2web_mode = get_options()->Tor2webMode;
-  const int how_to_fetch = tor2web_mode ? DIRIND_ONEHOP : DIRIND_ANONYMOUS;
-#else
   const int how_to_fetch = DIRIND_ANONYMOUS;
-#endif /* defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) */
 
   tor_assert(desc_id);
   tor_assert(rend_query);
@@ -1223,35 +1218,3 @@ rend_parse_service_authorization(const or_options_t *options,
   }
   return res;
 }
-
-/* Can Tor client code make direct (non-anonymous) connections to introduction
- * or rendezvous points?
- * Returns true if tor was compiled with NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED, and is
- * configured in Tor2web mode. */
-int
-rend_client_allow_non_anonymous_connection(const or_options_t *options)
-{
-  /* Tor2web support needs to be compiled in to a tor binary. */
-#ifdef NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED
-  /* Tor2web */
-  return options->Tor2webMode ? 1 : 0;
-#else
-  (void)options;
-  return 0;
-#endif /* defined(NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED) */
-}
-
-/* At compile-time, was non-anonymous mode enabled via
- * NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED ? */
-int
-rend_client_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(const or_options_t *options)
-{
-  (void)options;
-  /* Tor2web support needs to be compiled in to a tor binary. */
-#ifdef NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED
-  /* Tor2web */
-  return 1;
-#else
-  return 0;
-#endif /* defined(NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED) */
-}
diff --git a/src/feature/rend/rendclient.h b/src/feature/rend/rendclient.h
index e41faa4932..0d27d63e65 100644
--- a/src/feature/rend/rendclient.h
+++ b/src/feature/rend/rendclient.h
@@ -47,8 +47,5 @@ rend_service_authorization_t *rend_client_lookup_service_authorization(
                                                 const char *onion_address);
 void rend_service_authorization_free_all(void);
 
-int rend_client_allow_non_anonymous_connection(const or_options_t *options);
-int rend_client_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(const or_options_t *options);
-
 #endif /* !defined(TOR_RENDCLIENT_H) */
 
diff --git a/src/feature/rend/rendcommon.c b/src/feature/rend/rendcommon.c
index 5bf9477446..8cb5fd91e6 100644
--- a/src/feature/rend/rendcommon.c
+++ b/src/feature/rend/rendcommon.c
@@ -979,37 +979,27 @@ rend_auth_decode_cookie(const char *cookie_in, uint8_t *cookie_out,
 
 /* Is this a rend client or server that allows direct (non-anonymous)
  * connections?
- * Clients must be specifically compiled and configured in this mode.
- * Onion services can be configured to start in this mode.
- * Prefer rend_client_allow_non_anonymous_connection() or
- * rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection() whenever possible, so that
- * checks are specific to Single Onion Services or Tor2web. */
+ * Onion services can be configured to start in this mode for single onion. */
 int
 rend_allow_non_anonymous_connection(const or_options_t* options)
 {
-  return (rend_client_allow_non_anonymous_connection(options)
-          || rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(options));
+  return rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(options);
 }
 
 /* Is this a rend client or server in non-anonymous mode?
- * Clients must be specifically compiled in this mode.
- * Onion services can be configured to start in this mode.
- * Prefer rend_client_non_anonymous_mode_enabled() or
- * rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled() whenever possible, so that checks
- * are specific to Single Onion Services or Tor2web. */
+ * Onion services can be configured to start in this mode for single onion. */
 int
 rend_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(const or_options_t *options)
 {
-  return (rend_client_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(options)
-          || rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(options));
+  return rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(options);
 }
 
 /* Make sure that tor only builds one-hop circuits when they would not
  * compromise user anonymity.
  *
- * One-hop circuits are permitted in Tor2web or Single Onion modes.
+ * One-hop circuits are permitted in Single Onion modes.
  *
- * Tor2web or Single Onion modes are also allowed to make multi-hop circuits.
+ * Single Onion modes are also allowed to make multi-hop circuits.
  * For example, single onion HSDir circuits are 3-hop to prevent denial of
  * service.
  */
diff --git a/src/feature/rend/rendmid.c b/src/feature/rend/rendmid.c
index 22cd6c3435..0fd6516eaa 100644
--- a/src/feature/rend/rendmid.c
+++ b/src/feature/rend/rendmid.c
@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ rend_mid_establish_rendezvous(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
   }
 
   /* Check if we are configured to accept established rendezvous cells from
-   * client or in other words tor2web clients. */
+   * client or in other words Tor2Web clients. */
   if (channel_is_client(circ->p_chan) &&
       dos_should_refuse_single_hop_client()) {
     /* Note it down for the heartbeat log purposes. */
diff --git a/src/test/test_channelpadding.c b/src/test/test_channelpadding.c
index 5d696b8b80..de673de543 100644
--- a/src/test/test_channelpadding.c
+++ b/src/test/test_channelpadding.c
@@ -406,81 +406,12 @@ test_channelpadding_killonehop(void *arg)
   setup_mock_consensus();
   setup_mock_network();
 
-  /* Do we disable padding if tor2webmode or rsos are enabled, and
-   * the consensus says don't pad?  */
-
-  /* Ensure we can kill tor2web and rsos padding if we want. */
-  // First, test that padding works if either is enabled
-  smartlist_clear(current_md_consensus->net_params);
-  channelpadding_new_consensus_params(current_md_consensus);
+  /* Do we disable padding if rsos is enabled, and the consensus says don't
+   * pad?  */
 
   monotime_coarse_t now;
   monotime_coarse_get(&now);
 
-  tried_to_write_cell = 0;
-  get_options_mutable()->Tor2webMode = 1;
-  monotime_coarse_add_msec(&client_relay3->next_padding_time, &now, 100);
-  decision = channelpadding_decide_to_pad_channel(client_relay3);
-  tt_int_op(decision, OP_EQ, CHANNELPADDING_PADDING_SCHEDULED);
-  tt_assert(client_relay3->pending_padding_callback);
-  tt_int_op(tried_to_write_cell, OP_EQ, 0);
-
-  decision = channelpadding_decide_to_pad_channel(client_relay3);
-  tt_int_op(decision, OP_EQ, CHANNELPADDING_PADDING_ALREADY_SCHEDULED);
-
-  // Wait for the timer
-  new_time += 101*NSEC_PER_MSEC;
-  monotime_coarse_set_mock_time_nsec(new_time);
-  monotime_set_mock_time_nsec(new_time);
-  monotime_coarse_get(&now);
-  timers_run_pending();
-  tt_int_op(tried_to_write_cell, OP_EQ, 1);
-  tt_assert(!client_relay3->pending_padding_callback);
-
-  // Then test disabling each via consensus param
-  smartlist_add(current_md_consensus->net_params,
-                (void*)"nf_pad_tor2web=0");
-  channelpadding_new_consensus_params(current_md_consensus);
-
-  // Before the client tries to pad, the relay will still pad:
-  tried_to_write_cell = 0;
-  monotime_coarse_add_msec(&relay3_client->next_padding_time, &now, 100);
-  get_options_mutable()->ORPort_set = 1;
-  get_options_mutable()->Tor2webMode = 0;
-  decision = channelpadding_decide_to_pad_channel(relay3_client);
-  tt_int_op(decision, OP_EQ, CHANNELPADDING_PADDING_SCHEDULED);
-  tt_assert(relay3_client->pending_padding_callback);
-
-  // Wait for the timer
-  new_time += 101*NSEC_PER_MSEC;
-  monotime_coarse_set_mock_time_nsec(new_time);
-  monotime_set_mock_time_nsec(new_time);
-  monotime_coarse_get(&now);
-  timers_run_pending();
-  tt_int_op(tried_to_write_cell, OP_EQ, 1);
-  tt_assert(!client_relay3->pending_padding_callback);
-
-  // Test client side (it should stop immediately, but send a negotiate)
-  tried_to_write_cell = 0;
-  tt_assert(relay3_client->padding_enabled);
-  tt_assert(client_relay3->padding_enabled);
-  get_options_mutable()->Tor2webMode = 1;
-  /* For the relay to receive the negotiate: */
-  get_options_mutable()->ORPort_set = 1;
-  decision = channelpadding_decide_to_pad_channel(client_relay3);
-  tt_int_op(decision, OP_EQ, CHANNELPADDING_WONTPAD);
-  tt_int_op(tried_to_write_cell, OP_EQ, 1);
-  tt_assert(!client_relay3->pending_padding_callback);
-  tt_assert(!relay3_client->padding_enabled);
-
-  // Test relay side (it should have gotten the negotiation to disable)
-  get_options_mutable()->ORPort_set = 1;
-  get_options_mutable()->Tor2webMode = 0;
-  tt_int_op(channelpadding_decide_to_pad_channel(relay3_client), OP_EQ,
-      CHANNELPADDING_WONTPAD);
-  tt_assert(!relay3_client->padding_enabled);
-
-  /* Repeat for SOS */
   // First, test that padding works if either is enabled
   smartlist_clear(current_md_consensus->net_params);
   channelpadding_new_consensus_params(current_md_consensus);
diff --git a/src/test/test_hs.c b/src/test/test_hs.c
index 135df8e9f3..e3599d5720 100644
--- a/src/test/test_hs.c
+++ b/src/test/test_hs.c
@@ -354,76 +354,6 @@ test_hs_desc_event(void *arg)
   tor_free(received_msg);
 }
 
-/* Make sure we always pick the right RP, given a well formatted
- * Tor2webRendezvousPoints value. */
-static void
-test_pick_tor2web_rendezvous_node(void *arg)
-{
-  or_options_t *options = get_options_mutable();
-  const node_t *chosen_rp = NULL;
-  router_crn_flags_t flags = CRN_NEED_DESC;
-  int retval, i;
-  const char *tor2web_rendezvous_str = "test003r";
-
-  (void) arg;
-
-  /* Setup fake routerlist. */
-  helper_setup_fake_routerlist();
-
-  /* Parse Tor2webRendezvousPoints as a routerset. */
-  options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints = routerset_new();
-  options->UseMicrodescriptors = 0;
-  retval = routerset_parse(options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints,
-                           tor2web_rendezvous_str,
-                           "test_tor2web_rp");
-  tt_int_op(retval, OP_GE, 0);
-
-  /* Pick rendezvous point. Make sure the correct one is
-     picked. Repeat many times to make sure it works properly. */
-  for (i = 0; i < 50 ; i++) {
-    chosen_rp = pick_tor2web_rendezvous_node(flags, options);
-    tt_assert(chosen_rp);
-    tt_str_op(chosen_rp->ri->nickname, OP_EQ, tor2web_rendezvous_str);
-  }
-
- done:
-  routerset_free(options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints);
-}
-
-/* Make sure we never pick an RP if Tor2webRendezvousPoints doesn't
- * correspond to an actual node. */
-static void
-test_pick_bad_tor2web_rendezvous_node(void *arg)
-{
-  or_options_t *options = get_options_mutable();
-  const node_t *chosen_rp = NULL;
-  router_crn_flags_t flags = CRN_NEED_DESC;
-  int retval, i;
-  const char *tor2web_rendezvous_str = "dummy";
-
-  (void) arg;
-
-  /* Setup fake routerlist. */
-  helper_setup_fake_routerlist();
-
-  /* Parse Tor2webRendezvousPoints as a routerset. */
-  options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints = routerset_new();
-  retval = routerset_parse(options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints,
-                           tor2web_rendezvous_str,
-                           "test_tor2web_rp");
-  tt_int_op(retval, OP_GE, 0);
-
-  /* Pick rendezvous point. Since Tor2webRendezvousPoints was set to a
-     dummy value, we shouldn't find any eligible RPs. */
-  for (i = 0; i < 50 ; i++) {
-    chosen_rp = pick_tor2web_rendezvous_node(flags, options);
-    tt_ptr_op(chosen_rp, OP_EQ, NULL);
-  }
-
- done:
-  routerset_free(options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints);
-}
-
 /* Make sure rend_data_t is valid at creation, destruction and when
  * duplicated. */
 static void
@@ -1046,11 +976,6 @@ struct testcase_t hs_tests[] = {
     NULL, NULL },
   { "hs_desc_event", test_hs_desc_event, TT_FORK,
     NULL, NULL },
-  { "pick_tor2web_rendezvous_node", test_pick_tor2web_rendezvous_node, TT_FORK,
-    NULL, NULL },
-  { "pick_bad_tor2web_rendezvous_node",
-    test_pick_bad_tor2web_rendezvous_node, TT_FORK,
-    NULL, NULL },
   { "hs_auth_cookies", test_hs_auth_cookies, TT_FORK,
     NULL, NULL },
   { "single_onion_poisoning_create_dir_none", test_single_onion_poisoning,
diff --git a/src/test/test_options.c b/src/test/test_options.c
index 71d2193d1f..56b7f3cf0f 100644
--- a/src/test/test_options.c
+++ b/src/test/test_options.c
@@ -2459,36 +2459,6 @@ test_options_validate__circuits(void *ignored)
 }
 
 static void
-test_options_validate__tor2web(void *ignored)
-{
-  (void)ignored;
-  int ret;
-  char *msg;
-  options_test_data_t *tdata = NULL;
-
-  free_options_test_data(tdata);
-  tdata = get_options_test_data(TEST_OPTIONS_DEFAULT_VALUES
-                                "Tor2webRendezvousPoints 1\n");
-  ret = options_validate(tdata->old_opt, tdata->opt, tdata->def_opt, 0, &msg);
-  tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
-  tt_str_op(msg, OP_EQ,
-            "Tor2webRendezvousPoints cannot be set without Tor2webMode.");
-  tor_free(msg);
-
-  free_options_test_data(tdata);
-  tdata = get_options_test_data(TEST_OPTIONS_DEFAULT_VALUES
-                                "Tor2webRendezvousPoints 1\nTor2webMode 1\n");
-  ret = options_validate(tdata->old_opt, tdata->opt, tdata->def_opt, 0, &msg);
-  tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
-  tor_free(msg);
-
- done:
-  policies_free_all();
-  free_options_test_data(tdata);
-  tor_free(msg);
-}
-
-static void
 test_options_validate__rend(void *ignored)
 {
   (void)ignored;
@@ -2601,13 +2571,11 @@ test_options_validate__single_onion(void *ignored)
   tt_ptr_op(msg, OP_EQ, NULL);
   free_options_test_data(tdata);
 
-  /* Test that SOCKSPort must come with Tor2webMode if
-   * HiddenServiceSingleHopMode is 1 */
+  /* Test that SOCKSPort if HiddenServiceSingleHopMode is 1 */
   tdata = get_options_test_data(TEST_OPTIONS_DEFAULT_VALUES
                                 "SOCKSPort 5000\n"
                                 "HiddenServiceSingleHopMode 1\n"
                                 "HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode 1\n"
-                                "Tor2webMode 0\n"
                                 );
   ret = options_validate(tdata->old_opt, tdata->opt, tdata->def_opt, 0, &msg);
   tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
@@ -2622,7 +2590,6 @@ test_options_validate__single_onion(void *ignored)
                                 "SOCKSPort 0\n"
                                 "HiddenServiceSingleHopMode 1\n"
                                 "HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode 1\n"
-                                "Tor2webMode 0\n"
                                 );
   ret = options_validate(tdata->old_opt, tdata->opt, tdata->def_opt, 0, &msg);
   tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
@@ -2632,27 +2599,13 @@ test_options_validate__single_onion(void *ignored)
   tdata = get_options_test_data(TEST_OPTIONS_DEFAULT_VALUES
                                 "SOCKSPort 5000\n"
                                 "HiddenServiceSingleHopMode 0\n"
-                                "Tor2webMode 0\n"
-                                );
-  ret = options_validate(tdata->old_opt, tdata->opt, tdata->def_opt, 0, &msg);
-  tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
-  tt_ptr_op(msg, OP_EQ, NULL);
-  free_options_test_data(tdata);
-
-  tdata = get_options_test_data(TEST_OPTIONS_DEFAULT_VALUES
-                                "SOCKSPort 5000\n"
-                                "HiddenServiceSingleHopMode 1\n"
-                                "HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode 1\n"
-                                "Tor2webMode 1\n"
                                 );
   ret = options_validate(tdata->old_opt, tdata->opt, tdata->def_opt, 0, &msg);
   tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
   tt_ptr_op(msg, OP_EQ, NULL);
   free_options_test_data(tdata);
 
-  /* Test that a hidden service can't be run with Tor2web
-   * Use HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode instead of Tor2webMode, because
-   * Tor2webMode requires a compilation #define */
+  /* Test that a hidden service can't be run in non anonymous mode. */
   tdata = get_options_test_data(TEST_OPTIONS_DEFAULT_VALUES
                   "HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode 1\n"
                   "HiddenServiceDir /Library/Tor/var/lib/tor/hidden_service/\n"
@@ -4257,7 +4210,6 @@ struct testcase_t options_tests[] = {
   LOCAL_VALIDATE_TEST(path_bias),
   LOCAL_VALIDATE_TEST(bandwidth),
   LOCAL_VALIDATE_TEST(circuits),
-  LOCAL_VALIDATE_TEST(tor2web),
   LOCAL_VALIDATE_TEST(rend),
   LOCAL_VALIDATE_TEST(single_onion),
   LOCAL_VALIDATE_TEST(accounting),