Merge branch '12498_ed25519_keys_v6'

Fixed numerous conflicts, and ported code to use new base64 api.

56 files changed, 10095 insertions, 345 deletions

diff --git a/src/common/container.c b/src/common/container.c
index 864fd8a552..082afb51ee 100644
--- a/src/common/container.c
+++ b/src/common/container.c
@@ -208,6 +208,19 @@ smartlist_string_pos(const smartlist_t *sl, const char *element)
   return -1;
 }
 
+/** If <b>element</b> is the same pointer as an element of <b>sl</b>, return
+ * that element's index.  Otherwise, return -1. */
+int
+smartlist_pos(const smartlist_t *sl, const void *element)
+{
+  int i;
+  if (!sl) return -1;
+  for (i=0; i < sl->num_used; i++)
+    if (element == sl->list[i])
+      return i;
+  return -1;
+}
+
 /** Return true iff <b>sl</b> has some element E such that
  * !strcasecmp(E,<b>element</b>)
  */
diff --git a/src/common/container.h b/src/common/container.h
index 457b5e4ea0..125900c8ca 100644
--- a/src/common/container.h
+++ b/src/common/container.h
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ void smartlist_reverse(smartlist_t *sl);
 void smartlist_string_remove(smartlist_t *sl, const char *element);
 int smartlist_contains(const smartlist_t *sl, const void *element);
 int smartlist_contains_string(const smartlist_t *sl, const char *element);
+int smartlist_pos(const smartlist_t *sl, const void *element);
 int smartlist_string_pos(const smartlist_t *, const char *elt);
 int smartlist_contains_string_case(const smartlist_t *sl, const char *element);
 int smartlist_contains_int_as_string(const smartlist_t *sl, int num);
diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c
index fcd862f045..d77d5e20dc 100644
--- a/src/common/crypto.c
+++ b/src/common/crypto.c
@@ -829,7 +829,7 @@ crypto_pk_public_exponent_ok(crypto_pk_t *env)
  * Note that this may leak information about the keys through timing.
  */
 int
-crypto_pk_cmp_keys(crypto_pk_t *a, crypto_pk_t *b)
+crypto_pk_cmp_keys(const crypto_pk_t *a, const crypto_pk_t *b)
 {
   int result;
   char a_is_non_null = (a != NULL) && (a->key != NULL);
@@ -855,19 +855,19 @@ crypto_pk_cmp_keys(crypto_pk_t *a, crypto_pk_t *b)
  *  Note that this may leak information about the keys through timing.
  */
 int
-crypto_pk_eq_keys(crypto_pk_t *a, crypto_pk_t *b)
+crypto_pk_eq_keys(const crypto_pk_t *a, const crypto_pk_t *b)
 {
   return (crypto_pk_cmp_keys(a, b) == 0);
 }
 
 /** Return the size of the public key modulus in <b>env</b>, in bytes. */
 size_t
-crypto_pk_keysize(crypto_pk_t *env)
+crypto_pk_keysize(const crypto_pk_t *env)
 {
   tor_assert(env);
   tor_assert(env->key);
 
-  return (size_t) RSA_size(env->key);
+  return (size_t) RSA_size((RSA*)env->key);
 }
 
 /** Return the size of the public key modulus of <b>env</b>, in bits. */
@@ -996,7 +996,7 @@ crypto_pk_private_decrypt(crypto_pk_t *env, char *to,
  * at least the length of the modulus of <b>env</b>.
  */
 int
-crypto_pk_public_checksig(crypto_pk_t *env, char *to,
+crypto_pk_public_checksig(const crypto_pk_t *env, char *to,
                           size_t tolen,
                           const char *from, size_t fromlen)
 {
@@ -1068,7 +1068,7 @@ crypto_pk_public_checksig_digest(crypto_pk_t *env, const char *data,
  * at least the length of the modulus of <b>env</b>.
  */
 int
-crypto_pk_private_sign(crypto_pk_t *env, char *to, size_t tolen,
+crypto_pk_private_sign(const crypto_pk_t *env, char *to, size_t tolen,
                        const char *from, size_t fromlen)
 {
   int r;
@@ -1083,7 +1083,7 @@ crypto_pk_private_sign(crypto_pk_t *env, char *to, size_t tolen,
 
   r = RSA_private_encrypt((int)fromlen,
                           (unsigned char*)from, (unsigned char*)to,
-                          env->key, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+                          (RSA*)env->key, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
   if (r<0) {
     crypto_log_errors(LOG_WARN, "generating RSA signature");
     return -1;
@@ -1297,7 +1297,7 @@ crypto_pk_get_digest(const crypto_pk_t *pk, char *digest_out)
   unsigned char *buf = NULL;
   int len;
 
-  len = i2d_RSAPublicKey(pk->key, &buf);
+  len = i2d_RSAPublicKey((RSA*)pk->key, &buf);
   if (len < 0 || buf == NULL)
     return -1;
   if (crypto_digest(digest_out, (char*)buf, len) < 0) {
@@ -1795,7 +1795,24 @@ crypto_digest_assign(crypto_digest_t *into,
  * <b>out_len</b> must be \<= DIGEST256_LEN. */
 void
 crypto_digest_smartlist(char *digest_out, size_t len_out,
-                        const smartlist_t *lst, const char *append,
+                        const smartlist_t *lst,
+                        const char *append,
+                        digest_algorithm_t alg)
+{
+  crypto_digest_smartlist_prefix(digest_out, len_out, NULL, lst, append, alg);
+}
+
+/** Given a list of strings in <b>lst</b>, set the <b>len_out</b>-byte digest
+ * at <b>digest_out</b> to the hash of the concatenation of: the
+ * optional string <b>prepend</b>, those strings,
+ * and the optional string <b>append</b>, computed with the algorithm
+ * <b>alg</b>.
+ * <b>out_len</b> must be \<= DIGEST256_LEN. */
+void
+crypto_digest_smartlist_prefix(char *digest_out, size_t len_out,
+                        const char *prepend,
+                        const smartlist_t *lst,
+                        const char *append,
                         digest_algorithm_t alg)
 {
   crypto_digest_t *d;
@@ -1803,6 +1820,8 @@ crypto_digest_smartlist(char *digest_out, size_t len_out,
     d = crypto_digest_new();
   else
     d = crypto_digest256_new(alg);
+  if (prepend)
+    crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, prepend, strlen(prepend));
   SMARTLIST_FOREACH(lst, const char *, cp,
                     crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, cp, strlen(cp)));
   if (append)
@@ -2673,6 +2692,65 @@ base64_encode(char *dest, size_t destlen, const char *src, size_t srclen,
   return (int) enclen;
 }
 
+/** As base64_encode, but do not add any internal spaces or external padding
+ * to the output stream. */
+int
+base64_encode_nopad(char *dest, size_t destlen,
+                    const uint8_t *src, size_t srclen)
+{
+  int n = base64_encode(dest, destlen, (const char*) src, srclen, 0);
+  if (n <= 0)
+    return n;
+  tor_assert((size_t)n < destlen && dest[n] == 0);
+  char *in, *out;
+  in = out = dest;
+  while (*in) {
+    if (*in == '=' || *in == '\n') {
+      ++in;
+    } else {
+      *out++ = *in++;
+    }
+  }
+  *out = 0;
+
+  tor_assert(out - dest <= INT_MAX);
+
+  return (int)(out - dest);
+}
+
+/** As base64_decode, but do not require any padding on the input */
+int
+base64_decode_nopad(uint8_t *dest, size_t destlen,
+                    const char *src, size_t srclen)
+{
+  if (srclen > SIZE_T_CEILING - 4)
+    return -1;
+  char *buf = tor_malloc(srclen + 4);
+  memcpy(buf, src, srclen+1);
+  size_t buflen;
+  switch (srclen % 4)
+    {
+    case 0:
+    default:
+      buflen = srclen;
+      break;
+    case 1:
+      tor_free(buf);
+      return -1;
+    case 2:
+      memcpy(buf+srclen, "==", 3);
+      buflen = srclen + 2;
+      break;
+    case 3:
+      memcpy(buf+srclen, "=", 2);
+      buflen = srclen + 1;
+      break;
+  }
+  int n = base64_decode((char*)dest, destlen, buf, buflen);
+  tor_free(buf);
+  return n;
+}
+
 #undef BASE64_OPENSSL_LINELEN
 
 /** @{ */
@@ -2797,6 +2875,7 @@ base64_decode(char *dest, size_t destlen, const char *src, size_t srclen)
 /** Base64 encode DIGEST_LINE bytes from <b>digest</b>, remove the trailing =
  * characters, and store the nul-terminated result in the first
  * BASE64_DIGEST_LEN+1 bytes of <b>d64</b>.  */
+/* XXXX unify with crypto_format.c code */
 int
 digest_to_base64(char *d64, const char *digest)
 {
@@ -2810,6 +2889,7 @@ digest_to_base64(char *d64, const char *digest)
 /** Given a base64 encoded, nul-terminated digest in <b>d64</b> (without
  * trailing newline or = characters), decode it and store the result in the
  * first DIGEST_LEN bytes at <b>digest</b>. */
+/* XXXX unify with crypto_format.c code */
 int
 digest_from_base64(char *digest, const char *d64)
 {
@@ -2821,7 +2901,8 @@ digest_from_base64(char *digest, const char *d64)
 
 /** Base64 encode DIGEST256_LINE bytes from <b>digest</b>, remove the
  * trailing = characters, and store the nul-terminated result in the first
- * BASE64_DIGEST256_LEN+1 bytes of <b>d64</b>.  */
+ * BASE64_DIGEST256_LEN+1 bytes of <b>d64</b>. */
+ /* XXXX unify with crypto_format.c code */
 int
 digest256_to_base64(char *d64, const char *digest)
 {
@@ -2835,6 +2916,7 @@ digest256_to_base64(char *d64, const char *digest)
 /** Given a base64 encoded, nul-terminated digest in <b>d64</b> (without
  * trailing newline or = characters), decode it and store the result in the
  * first DIGEST256_LEN bytes at <b>digest</b>. */
+/* XXXX unify with crypto_format.c code */
 int
 digest256_from_base64(char *digest, const char *d64)
 {
diff --git a/src/common/crypto.h b/src/common/crypto.h
index 05572f4565..b953ab93e7 100644
--- a/src/common/crypto.h
+++ b/src/common/crypto.h
@@ -146,9 +146,9 @@ int crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_filename(crypto_pk_t *env,
                                             const char *fname);
 
 int crypto_pk_check_key(crypto_pk_t *env);
-int crypto_pk_cmp_keys(crypto_pk_t *a, crypto_pk_t *b);
-int crypto_pk_eq_keys(crypto_pk_t *a, crypto_pk_t *b);
-size_t crypto_pk_keysize(crypto_pk_t *env);
+int crypto_pk_cmp_keys(const crypto_pk_t *a, const crypto_pk_t *b);
+int crypto_pk_eq_keys(const crypto_pk_t *a, const crypto_pk_t *b);
+size_t crypto_pk_keysize(const crypto_pk_t *env);
 int crypto_pk_num_bits(crypto_pk_t *env);
 crypto_pk_t *crypto_pk_dup_key(crypto_pk_t *orig);
 crypto_pk_t *crypto_pk_copy_full(crypto_pk_t *orig);
@@ -160,11 +160,11 @@ int crypto_pk_public_encrypt(crypto_pk_t *env, char *to, size_t tolen,
 int crypto_pk_private_decrypt(crypto_pk_t *env, char *to, size_t tolen,
                               const char *from, size_t fromlen,
                               int padding, int warnOnFailure);
-int crypto_pk_public_checksig(crypto_pk_t *env, char *to, size_t tolen,
+int crypto_pk_public_checksig(const crypto_pk_t *env, char *to, size_t tolen,
                               const char *from, size_t fromlen);
 int crypto_pk_public_checksig_digest(crypto_pk_t *env, const char *data,
                                size_t datalen, const char *sig, size_t siglen);
-int crypto_pk_private_sign(crypto_pk_t *env, char *to, size_t tolen,
+int crypto_pk_private_sign(const crypto_pk_t *env, char *to, size_t tolen,
                            const char *from, size_t fromlen);
 int crypto_pk_private_sign_digest(crypto_pk_t *env, char *to, size_t tolen,
                                   const char *from, size_t fromlen);
@@ -209,6 +209,11 @@ int crypto_digest256(char *digest, const char *m, size_t len,
                      digest_algorithm_t algorithm);
 int crypto_digest_all(digests_t *ds_out, const char *m, size_t len);
 struct smartlist_t;
+void crypto_digest_smartlist_prefix(char *digest_out, size_t len_out,
+                                    const char *prepend,
+                                    const struct smartlist_t *lst,
+                                    const char *append,
+                                    digest_algorithm_t alg);
 void crypto_digest_smartlist(char *digest_out, size_t len_out,
                              const struct smartlist_t *lst, const char *append,
                              digest_algorithm_t alg);
@@ -278,6 +283,11 @@ size_t base64_encode_size(size_t srclen, int flags);
 int base64_encode(char *dest, size_t destlen, const char *src, size_t srclen,
                   int flags);
 int base64_decode(char *dest, size_t destlen, const char *src, size_t srclen);
+int base64_encode_nopad(char *dest, size_t destlen,
+                        const uint8_t *src, size_t srclen);
+int base64_decode_nopad(uint8_t *dest, size_t destlen,
+                        const char *src, size_t srclen);
+
 /** Characters that can appear (case-insensitively) in a base32 encoding. */
 #define BASE32_CHARS "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz234567"
 void base32_encode(char *dest, size_t destlen, const char *src, size_t srclen);
diff --git a/src/common/crypto_ed25519.c b/src/common/crypto_ed25519.c
index f2e6945ac8..6b93751dda 100644
--- a/src/common/crypto_ed25519.c
+++ b/src/common/crypto_ed25519.c
@@ -351,3 +351,24 @@ ed25519_pubkey_read_from_file(ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey_out,
   return 0;
 }
 
+/** Release all storage held for <b>kp</b>. */
+void
+ed25519_keypair_free(ed25519_keypair_t *kp)
+{
+  if (! kp)
+    return;
+
+  memwipe(kp, 0, sizeof(*kp));
+  tor_free(kp);
+}
+
+/** Return true iff <b>key1</b> and <b>key2</b> are the same public key. */
+int
+ed25519_pubkey_eq(const ed25519_public_key_t *key1,
+                  const ed25519_public_key_t *key2)
+{
+  tor_assert(key1);
+  tor_assert(key2);
+  return tor_memeq(key1->pubkey, key2->pubkey, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+}
+
diff --git a/src/common/crypto_ed25519.h b/src/common/crypto_ed25519.h
index 7efa74bff5..8ffb9f26f3 100644
--- a/src/common/crypto_ed25519.h
+++ b/src/common/crypto_ed25519.h
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 
 #include "testsupport.h"
 #include "torint.h"
+#include "crypto_curve25519.h"
 
 #define ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN 32
 #define ED25519_SECKEY_LEN 64
@@ -60,7 +61,7 @@ int ed25519_checksig(const ed25519_signature_t *signature,
  */
 typedef struct {
   /** The public key that supposedly generated the signature. */
-  ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey;
+  const ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey;
   /** The signature to check. */
   ed25519_signature_t signature;
   /** The message that the signature is supposed to have been applied to. */
@@ -87,13 +88,22 @@ int ed25519_public_blind(ed25519_public_key_t *out,
                          const ed25519_public_key_t *inp,
                          const uint8_t *param);
 
-#define ED25519_BASE64_LEN 43
 
+/* XXXX move these to crypto_format.h */
+#define ED25519_BASE64_LEN 43
 int ed25519_public_from_base64(ed25519_public_key_t *pkey,
                                const char *input);
 int ed25519_public_to_base64(char *output,
                              const ed25519_public_key_t *pkey);
 
+/* XXXX move these to crypto_format.h */
+#define ED25519_SIG_BASE64_LEN 86
+
+int ed25519_signature_from_base64(ed25519_signature_t *sig,
+                                  const char *input);
+int ed25519_signature_to_base64(char *output,
+                                const ed25519_signature_t *sig);
+
 /* XXXX read encrypted, write encrypted. */
 
 int ed25519_seckey_write_to_file(const ed25519_secret_key_t *seckey,
@@ -109,5 +119,10 @@ int ed25519_pubkey_read_from_file(ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey_out,
                                   char **tag_out,
                                   const char *filename);
 
+void ed25519_keypair_free(ed25519_keypair_t *kp);
+
+int ed25519_pubkey_eq(const ed25519_public_key_t *key1,
+                      const ed25519_public_key_t *key2);
+
 #endif
 
diff --git a/src/common/crypto_format.c b/src/common/crypto_format.c
index 35a7854404..e825132cb9 100644
--- a/src/common/crypto_format.c
+++ b/src/common/crypto_format.c
@@ -65,3 +65,42 @@ ed25519_public_to_base64(char *output,
   return digest256_to_base64(output, (const char *)pkey->pubkey);
 }
 
+/** Encode the signature <b>sig</b> into the buffer at <b>output</b>,
+ * which must have space for ED25519_SIG_BASE64_LEN bytes of encoded signature,
+ * plus one byte for a terminating NUL.  Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+ed25519_signature_to_base64(char *output,
+                            const ed25519_signature_t *sig)
+{
+  char buf[256];
+  int n = base64_encode_nopad(buf, sizeof(buf), sig->sig, ED25519_SIG_LEN);
+  tor_assert(n == ED25519_SIG_BASE64_LEN);
+  memcpy(output, buf, ED25519_SIG_BASE64_LEN+1);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/** Try to decode the string <b>input</b> into an ed25519 signature. On
+ * success, store the value in <b>sig</b> and return 0. Otherwise return
+ * -1. */
+int
+ed25519_signature_from_base64(ed25519_signature_t *sig,
+                              const char *input)
+{
+
+  if (strlen(input) != ED25519_SIG_BASE64_LEN)
+    return -1;
+  char buf[ED25519_SIG_BASE64_LEN+3];
+  memcpy(buf, input, ED25519_SIG_BASE64_LEN);
+  buf[ED25519_SIG_BASE64_LEN+0] = '=';
+  buf[ED25519_SIG_BASE64_LEN+1] = '=';
+  buf[ED25519_SIG_BASE64_LEN+2] = 0;
+  char decoded[128];
+  int n = base64_decode(decoded, sizeof(decoded), buf, strlen(buf));
+  if (n < 0 || n != ED25519_SIG_LEN)
+    return -1;
+  memcpy(sig->sig, decoded, ED25519_SIG_LEN);
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
diff --git a/src/common/tortls.c b/src/common/tortls.c
index 2b8daaaf06..098df9db6c 100644
--- a/src/common/tortls.c
+++ b/src/common/tortls.c
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@
 #endif
 
 /** Structure that we use for a single certificate. */
-struct tor_cert_t {
+struct tor_x509_cert_t {
   X509 *cert;
   uint8_t *encoded;
   size_t encoded_len;
@@ -132,9 +132,9 @@ struct tor_cert_t {
 typedef struct tor_tls_context_t {
   int refcnt;
   SSL_CTX *ctx;
-  tor_cert_t *my_link_cert;
-  tor_cert_t *my_id_cert;
-  tor_cert_t *my_auth_cert;
+  tor_x509_cert_t *my_link_cert;
+  tor_x509_cert_t *my_id_cert;
+  tor_x509_cert_t *my_auth_cert;
   crypto_pk_t *link_key;
   crypto_pk_t *auth_key;
 } tor_tls_context_t;
@@ -765,7 +765,7 @@ static const int N_CLIENT_CIPHERS = ARRAY_LENGTH(CLIENT_CIPHER_INFO_LIST);
 
 /** Free all storage held in <b>cert</b> */
 void
-tor_cert_free(tor_cert_t *cert)
+tor_x509_cert_free(tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
 {
   if (! cert)
     return;
@@ -777,14 +777,14 @@ tor_cert_free(tor_cert_t *cert)
 }
 
 /**
- * Allocate a new tor_cert_t to hold the certificate "x509_cert".
+ * Allocate a new tor_x509_cert_t to hold the certificate "x509_cert".
  *
  * Steals a reference to x509_cert.
  */
-static tor_cert_t *
-tor_cert_new(X509 *x509_cert)
+static tor_x509_cert_t *
+tor_x509_cert_new(X509 *x509_cert)
 {
-  tor_cert_t *cert;
+  tor_x509_cert_t *cert;
   EVP_PKEY *pkey;
   RSA *rsa;
   int length;
@@ -794,7 +794,7 @@ tor_cert_new(X509 *x509_cert)
     return NULL;
 
   length = i2d_X509(x509_cert, &buf);
-  cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_cert_t));
+  cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t));
   if (length <= 0 || buf == NULL) {
     tor_free(cert);
     log_err(LD_CRYPTO, "Couldn't get length of encoded x509 certificate");
@@ -824,14 +824,14 @@ tor_cert_new(X509 *x509_cert)
 }
 
 /** Read a DER-encoded X509 cert, of length exactly <b>certificate_len</b>,
- * from a <b>certificate</b>.  Return a newly allocated tor_cert_t on success
- * and NULL on failure. */
-tor_cert_t *
-tor_cert_decode(const uint8_t *certificate, size_t certificate_len)
+ * from a <b>certificate</b>.  Return a newly allocated tor_x509_cert_t on
+ * success and NULL on failure. */
+tor_x509_cert_t *
+tor_x509_cert_decode(const uint8_t *certificate, size_t certificate_len)
 {
   X509 *x509;
   const unsigned char *cp = (const unsigned char *)certificate;
-  tor_cert_t *newcert;
+  tor_x509_cert_t *newcert;
   tor_assert(certificate);
   check_no_tls_errors();
 
@@ -846,14 +846,14 @@ tor_cert_decode(const uint8_t *certificate, size_t certificate_len)
     X509_free(x509);
     goto err; /* Didn't use all the bytes */
   }
-  newcert = tor_cert_new(x509);
+  newcert = tor_x509_cert_new(x509);
   if (!newcert) {
     goto err;
   }
   if (newcert->encoded_len != certificate_len ||
       fast_memneq(newcert->encoded, certificate, certificate_len)) {
     /* Cert wasn't in DER */
-    tor_cert_free(newcert);
+    tor_x509_cert_free(newcert);
     goto err;
   }
   return newcert;
@@ -865,7 +865,7 @@ tor_cert_decode(const uint8_t *certificate, size_t certificate_len)
 /** Set *<b>encoded_out</b> and *<b>size_out</b> to <b>cert</b>'s encoded DER
  * representation and length, respectively. */
 void
-tor_cert_get_der(const tor_cert_t *cert,
+tor_x509_cert_get_der(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert,
                  const uint8_t **encoded_out, size_t *size_out)
 {
   tor_assert(cert);
@@ -878,7 +878,7 @@ tor_cert_get_der(const tor_cert_t *cert,
 /** Return a set of digests for the public key in <b>cert</b>, or NULL if this
  * cert's public key is not one we know how to take the digest of. */
 const digests_t *
-tor_cert_get_id_digests(const tor_cert_t *cert)
+tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
 {
   if (cert->pkey_digests_set)
     return &cert->pkey_digests;
@@ -888,7 +888,7 @@ tor_cert_get_id_digests(const tor_cert_t *cert)
 
 /** Return a set of digests for the public key in <b>cert</b>. */
 const digests_t *
-tor_cert_get_cert_digests(const tor_cert_t *cert)
+tor_x509_cert_get_cert_digests(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
 {
   return &cert->cert_digests;
 }
@@ -901,9 +901,9 @@ tor_tls_context_decref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx)
   tor_assert(ctx);
   if (--ctx->refcnt == 0) {
     SSL_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
-    tor_cert_free(ctx->my_link_cert);
-    tor_cert_free(ctx->my_id_cert);
-    tor_cert_free(ctx->my_auth_cert);
+    tor_x509_cert_free(ctx->my_link_cert);
+    tor_x509_cert_free(ctx->my_id_cert);
+    tor_x509_cert_free(ctx->my_auth_cert);
     crypto_pk_free(ctx->link_key);
     crypto_pk_free(ctx->auth_key);
     tor_free(ctx);
@@ -917,8 +917,8 @@ tor_tls_context_decref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx)
  * client mode. */
 int
 tor_tls_get_my_certs(int server,
-                     const tor_cert_t **link_cert_out,
-                     const tor_cert_t **id_cert_out)
+                     const tor_x509_cert_t **link_cert_out,
+                     const tor_x509_cert_t **id_cert_out)
 {
   tor_tls_context_t *ctx = server ? server_tls_context : client_tls_context;
   if (! ctx)
@@ -947,7 +947,7 @@ tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key(void)
  * certifies.  Return NULL if the cert's key is not RSA.
  */
 crypto_pk_t *
-tor_tls_cert_get_key(tor_cert_t *cert)
+tor_tls_cert_get_key(tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
 {
   crypto_pk_t *result = NULL;
   EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert);
@@ -967,8 +967,8 @@ tor_tls_cert_get_key(tor_cert_t *cert)
 /** Return true iff the other side of <b>tls</b> has authenticated to us, and
  * the key certified in <b>cert</b> is the same as the key they used to do it.
  */
-int
-tor_tls_cert_matches_key(const tor_tls_t *tls, const tor_cert_t *cert)
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+tor_tls_cert_matches_key,(const tor_tls_t *tls, const tor_x509_cert_t *cert))
 {
   X509 *peercert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl);
   EVP_PKEY *link_key = NULL, *cert_key = NULL;
@@ -997,8 +997,8 @@ tor_tls_cert_matches_key(const tor_tls_t *tls, const tor_cert_t *cert)
  * we couldn't check it. */
 int
 tor_tls_cert_is_valid(int severity,
-                      const tor_cert_t *cert,
-                      const tor_cert_t *signing_cert,
+                      const tor_x509_cert_t *cert,
+                      const tor_x509_cert_t *signing_cert,
                       int check_rsa_1024)
 {
   check_no_tls_errors();
@@ -1209,9 +1209,9 @@ tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime,
   result = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_context_t));
   result->refcnt = 1;
   if (!is_client) {
-    result->my_link_cert = tor_cert_new(X509_dup(cert));
-    result->my_id_cert = tor_cert_new(X509_dup(idcert));
-    result->my_auth_cert = tor_cert_new(X509_dup(authcert));
+    result->my_link_cert = tor_x509_cert_new(X509_dup(cert));
+    result->my_id_cert = tor_x509_cert_new(X509_dup(idcert));
+    result->my_auth_cert = tor_x509_cert_new(X509_dup(authcert));
     if (!result->my_link_cert || !result->my_id_cert || !result->my_auth_cert)
       goto error;
     result->link_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(rsa);
@@ -2346,15 +2346,15 @@ tor_tls_peer_has_cert(tor_tls_t *tls)
 }
 
 /** Return the peer certificate, or NULL if there isn't one. */
-tor_cert_t *
-tor_tls_get_peer_cert(tor_tls_t *tls)
+MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_t *,
+tor_tls_get_peer_cert,(tor_tls_t *tls))
 {
   X509 *cert;
   cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl);
   tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, "getting peer certificate");
   if (!cert)
     return NULL;
-  return tor_cert_new(cert);
+  return tor_x509_cert_new(cert);
 }
 
 /** Warn that a certificate lifetime extends through a certain range. */
@@ -2772,8 +2772,8 @@ tor_tls_server_got_renegotiate(tor_tls_t *tls)
  * the v3 handshake to prove that the client knows the TLS secrets for the
  * connection <b>tls</b>.  Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.
  */
-int
-tor_tls_get_tlssecrets(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out)
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+tor_tls_get_tlssecrets,(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out))
 {
 #define TLSSECRET_MAGIC "Tor V3 handshake TLS cross-certification"
   char buf[128];
diff --git a/src/common/tortls.h b/src/common/tortls.h
index 9216e83150..124b77160f 100644
--- a/src/common/tortls.h
+++ b/src/common/tortls.h
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
 typedef struct tor_tls_t tor_tls_t;
 
 /* Opaque structure to hold an X509 certificate. */
-typedef struct tor_cert_t tor_cert_t;
+typedef struct tor_x509_cert_t tor_x509_cert_t;
 
 /* Possible return values for most tor_tls_* functions. */
 #define MIN_TOR_TLS_ERROR_VAL_     -9
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ void tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(tor_tls_t *tls,
 int tor_tls_is_server(tor_tls_t *tls);
 void tor_tls_free(tor_tls_t *tls);
 int tor_tls_peer_has_cert(tor_tls_t *tls);
-tor_cert_t *tor_tls_get_peer_cert(tor_tls_t *tls);
+MOCK_DECL(tor_x509_cert_t *,tor_tls_get_peer_cert,(tor_tls_t *tls));
 int tor_tls_verify(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_t **identity);
 int tor_tls_check_lifetime(int severity,
                            tor_tls_t *tls, int past_tolerance,
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ int tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls);
 int tor_tls_received_v3_certificate(tor_tls_t *tls);
 int tor_tls_get_num_server_handshakes(tor_tls_t *tls);
 int tor_tls_server_got_renegotiate(tor_tls_t *tls);
-int tor_tls_get_tlssecrets(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out);
+MOCK_DECL(int,tor_tls_get_tlssecrets,(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out));
 
 /* Log and abort if there are unhandled TLS errors in OpenSSL's error stack.
  */
@@ -120,22 +120,23 @@ struct bufferevent *tor_tls_init_bufferevent(tor_tls_t *tls,
                                      int filter);
 #endif
 
-void tor_cert_free(tor_cert_t *cert);
-tor_cert_t *tor_cert_decode(const uint8_t *certificate,
+void tor_x509_cert_free(tor_x509_cert_t *cert);
+tor_x509_cert_t *tor_x509_cert_decode(const uint8_t *certificate,
                             size_t certificate_len);
-void tor_cert_get_der(const tor_cert_t *cert,
+void tor_x509_cert_get_der(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert,
                       const uint8_t **encoded_out, size_t *size_out);
-const digests_t *tor_cert_get_id_digests(const tor_cert_t *cert);
-const digests_t *tor_cert_get_cert_digests(const tor_cert_t *cert);
+const digests_t *tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert);
+const digests_t *tor_x509_cert_get_cert_digests(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert);
 int tor_tls_get_my_certs(int server,
-                         const tor_cert_t **link_cert_out,
-                         const tor_cert_t **id_cert_out);
+                         const tor_x509_cert_t **link_cert_out,
+                         const tor_x509_cert_t **id_cert_out);
 crypto_pk_t *tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key(void);
-crypto_pk_t *tor_tls_cert_get_key(tor_cert_t *cert);
-int tor_tls_cert_matches_key(const tor_tls_t *tls, const tor_cert_t *cert);
+crypto_pk_t *tor_tls_cert_get_key(tor_x509_cert_t *cert);
+MOCK_DECL(int,tor_tls_cert_matches_key,(const tor_tls_t *tls,
+                                        const tor_x509_cert_t *cert));
 int tor_tls_cert_is_valid(int severity,
-                          const tor_cert_t *cert,
-                          const tor_cert_t *signing_cert,
+                          const tor_x509_cert_t *cert,
+                          const tor_x509_cert_t *signing_cert,
                           int check_rsa_1024);
 const char *tor_tls_get_ciphersuite_name(tor_tls_t *tls);
 
diff --git a/src/or/channel.c b/src/or/channel.c
index bf0387f10e..af095026e4 100644
--- a/src/or/channel.c
+++ b/src/or/channel.c
@@ -4431,10 +4431,10 @@ channel_num_circuits(channel_t *chan)
  * This is called when setting up a channel and replaces the old
  * connection_or_set_circid_type()
  */
-void
-channel_set_circid_type(channel_t *chan,
-                        crypto_pk_t *identity_rcvd,
-                        int consider_identity)
+MOCK_IMPL(void,
+channel_set_circid_type,(channel_t *chan,
+                         crypto_pk_t *identity_rcvd,
+                         int consider_identity))
 {
   int started_here;
   crypto_pk_t *our_identity;
diff --git a/src/or/channel.h b/src/or/channel.h
index ecc2a092e4..2b38ca7e19 100644
--- a/src/or/channel.h
+++ b/src/or/channel.h
@@ -562,8 +562,9 @@ int channel_matches_extend_info(channel_t *chan, extend_info_t *extend_info);
 int channel_matches_target_addr_for_extend(channel_t *chan,
                                            const tor_addr_t *target);
 unsigned int channel_num_circuits(channel_t *chan);
-void channel_set_circid_type(channel_t *chan, crypto_pk_t *identity_rcvd,
-                             int consider_identity);
+MOCK_DECL(void,channel_set_circid_type,(channel_t *chan,
+                                        crypto_pk_t *identity_rcvd,
+                                        int consider_identity));
 void channel_timestamp_client(channel_t *chan);
 void channel_update_xmit_queue_size(channel_t *chan);
 
diff --git a/src/or/channeltls.c b/src/or/channeltls.c
index 1cf697ccc5..ecf02182fc 100644
--- a/src/or/channeltls.c
+++ b/src/or/channeltls.c
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
 
 #define TOR_CHANNEL_INTERNAL_
 
+#define CHANNELTLS_PRIVATE
+
 #include "or.h"
 #include "channel.h"
 #include "channeltls.h"
@@ -22,6 +24,7 @@
 #include "connection.h"
 #include "connection_or.h"
 #include "control.h"
+#include "link_handshake.h"
 #include "relay.h"
 #include "rephist.h"
 #include "router.h"
@@ -48,9 +51,6 @@ uint64_t stats_n_authorize_cells_processed = 0;
 /** Active listener, if any */
 channel_listener_t *channel_tls_listener = NULL;
 
-/* Utility function declarations */
-static void channel_tls_common_init(channel_tls_t *tlschan);
-
 /* channel_tls_t method declarations */
 
 static void channel_tls_close_method(channel_t *chan);
@@ -92,12 +92,6 @@ static void channel_tls_process_versions_cell(var_cell_t *cell,
                                               channel_tls_t *tlschan);
 static void channel_tls_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell,
                                              channel_tls_t *tlschan);
-static void channel_tls_process_certs_cell(var_cell_t *cell,
-                                           channel_tls_t *tlschan);
-static void channel_tls_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell,
-                                                    channel_tls_t *tlschan);
-static void channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell,
-                                                  channel_tls_t *tlschan);
 static int command_allowed_before_handshake(uint8_t command);
 static int enter_v3_handshake_with_cell(var_cell_t *cell,
                                         channel_tls_t *tlschan);
@@ -107,7 +101,7 @@ static int enter_v3_handshake_with_cell(var_cell_t *cell,
  * and channel_tls_handle_incoming().
  */
 
-static void
+STATIC void
 channel_tls_common_init(channel_tls_t *tlschan)
 {
   channel_t *chan;
@@ -1747,16 +1741,17 @@ channel_tls_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
  * If it's the server side, wait for an AUTHENTICATE cell.
  */
 
-static void
+STATIC void
 channel_tls_process_certs_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
 {
-  tor_cert_t *link_cert = NULL;
-  tor_cert_t *id_cert = NULL;
-  tor_cert_t *auth_cert = NULL;
-  uint8_t *ptr;
+#define MAX_CERT_TYPE_WANTED OR_CERT_TYPE_AUTH_1024
+  tor_x509_cert_t *certs[MAX_CERT_TYPE_WANTED + 1];
   int n_certs, i;
+  certs_cell_t *cc = NULL;
+
   int send_netinfo = 0;
 
+  memset(certs, 0, sizeof(certs));
   tor_assert(cell);
   tor_assert(chan);
   tor_assert(chan->conn);
@@ -1786,63 +1781,41 @@ channel_tls_process_certs_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
   if (cell->circ_id)
     ERR("It had a nonzero circuit ID");
 
-  n_certs = cell->payload[0];
-  ptr = cell->payload + 1;
+  if (certs_cell_parse(&cc, cell->payload, cell->payload_len) < 0)
+    ERR("It couldn't be parsed.");
+
+  n_certs = cc->n_certs;
+
   for (i = 0; i < n_certs; ++i) {
-    uint8_t cert_type;
-    uint16_t cert_len;
-    if (cell->payload_len < 3)
-      goto truncated;
-    if (ptr > cell->payload + cell->payload_len - 3) {
-      goto truncated;
-    }
-    cert_type = *ptr;
-    cert_len = ntohs(get_uint16(ptr+1));
-    if (cell->payload_len < 3 + cert_len)
-      goto truncated;
-    if (ptr > cell->payload + cell->payload_len - cert_len - 3) {
-      goto truncated;
-    }
-    if (cert_type == OR_CERT_TYPE_TLS_LINK ||
-        cert_type == OR_CERT_TYPE_ID_1024 ||
-        cert_type == OR_CERT_TYPE_AUTH_1024) {
-      tor_cert_t *cert = tor_cert_decode(ptr + 3, cert_len);
-      if (!cert) {
-        log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
-               "Received undecodable certificate in CERTS cell from %s:%d",
-               safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address),
-               chan->conn->base_.port);
+    certs_cell_cert_t *c = certs_cell_get_certs(cc, i);
+
+    uint16_t cert_type = c->cert_type;
+    uint16_t cert_len = c->cert_len;
+    uint8_t *cert_body = certs_cell_cert_getarray_body(c);
+
+    if (cert_type > MAX_CERT_TYPE_WANTED)
+      continue;
+
+    tor_x509_cert_t *cert = tor_x509_cert_decode(cert_body, cert_len);
+    if (!cert) {
+      log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
+             "Received undecodable certificate in CERTS cell from %s:%d",
+             safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address),
+             chan->conn->base_.port);
+    } else {
+      if (certs[cert_type]) {
+        tor_x509_cert_free(cert);
+        ERR("Duplicate x509 certificate");
       } else {
-        if (cert_type == OR_CERT_TYPE_TLS_LINK) {
-          if (link_cert) {
-            tor_cert_free(cert);
-            ERR("Too many TLS_LINK certificates");
-          }
-          link_cert = cert;
-        } else if (cert_type == OR_CERT_TYPE_ID_1024) {
-          if (id_cert) {
-            tor_cert_free(cert);
-            ERR("Too many ID_1024 certificates");
-          }
-          id_cert = cert;
-        } else if (cert_type == OR_CERT_TYPE_AUTH_1024) {
-          if (auth_cert) {
-            tor_cert_free(cert);
-            ERR("Too many AUTH_1024 certificates");
-          }
-          auth_cert = cert;
-        } else {
-          tor_cert_free(cert);
-        }
+        certs[cert_type] = cert;
       }
     }
-    ptr += 3 + cert_len;
-    continue;
-
-  truncated:
-    ERR("It ends in the middle of a certificate");
   }
 
+  tor_x509_cert_t *id_cert = certs[OR_CERT_TYPE_ID_1024];
+  tor_x509_cert_t *auth_cert = certs[OR_CERT_TYPE_AUTH_1024];
+  tor_x509_cert_t *link_cert = certs[OR_CERT_TYPE_TLS_LINK];
+
   if (chan->conn->handshake_state->started_here) {
     int severity;
     if (! (id_cert && link_cert))
@@ -1867,7 +1840,7 @@ channel_tls_process_certs_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
 
     chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated = 1;
     {
-      const digests_t *id_digests = tor_cert_get_id_digests(id_cert);
+      const digests_t *id_digests = tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(id_cert);
       crypto_pk_t *identity_rcvd;
       if (!id_digests)
         ERR("Couldn't compute digests for key in ID cert");
@@ -1891,7 +1864,7 @@ channel_tls_process_certs_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
              safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), chan->conn->base_.port);
 
     chan->conn->handshake_state->id_cert = id_cert;
-    id_cert = NULL;
+    certs[OR_CERT_TYPE_ID_1024] = NULL;
 
     if (!public_server_mode(get_options())) {
       /* If we initiated the connection and we are not a public server, we
@@ -1918,7 +1891,7 @@ channel_tls_process_certs_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
 
     chan->conn->handshake_state->id_cert = id_cert;
     chan->conn->handshake_state->auth_cert = auth_cert;
-    id_cert = auth_cert = NULL;
+    certs[OR_CERT_TYPE_ID_1024] = certs[OR_CERT_TYPE_AUTH_1024] = NULL;
   }
 
   chan->conn->handshake_state->received_certs_cell = 1;
@@ -1932,9 +1905,10 @@ channel_tls_process_certs_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
   }
 
  err:
-  tor_cert_free(id_cert);
-  tor_cert_free(link_cert);
-  tor_cert_free(auth_cert);
+  for (unsigned i = 0; i < ARRAY_LENGTH(certs); ++i) {
+    tor_x509_cert_free(certs[i]);
+  }
+  certs_cell_free(cc);
 #undef ERR
 }
 
@@ -1949,11 +1923,11 @@ channel_tls_process_certs_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
  * want to authenticate, send an AUTHENTICATE cell and then a NETINFO cell.
  */
 
-static void
+STATIC void
 channel_tls_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
 {
   int n_types, i, use_type = -1;
-  uint8_t *cp;
+  auth_challenge_cell_t *ac = NULL;
 
   tor_assert(cell);
   tor_assert(chan);
@@ -1966,7 +1940,7 @@ channel_tls_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
            safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address),                 \
            chan->conn->base_.port, (s));                        \
     connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0);               \
-    return;                                                     \
+    goto done;                                                  \
   } while (0)
 
   if (chan->conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3)
@@ -1979,19 +1953,17 @@ channel_tls_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
     ERR("We already received one");
   if (!(chan->conn->handshake_state->received_certs_cell))
     ERR("We haven't gotten a CERTS cell yet");
-  if (cell->payload_len < OR_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN + 2)
-    ERR("It was too short");
   if (cell->circ_id)
     ERR("It had a nonzero circuit ID");
 
-  n_types = ntohs(get_uint16(cell->payload + OR_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN));
-  if (cell->payload_len < OR_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN + 2 + 2*n_types)
-    ERR("It looks truncated");
+  if (auth_challenge_cell_parse(&ac, cell->payload, cell->payload_len) < 0)
+    ERR("It was not well-formed.");
+
+  n_types = ac->n_methods;
 
   /* Now see if there is an authentication type we can use */
-  cp = cell->payload+OR_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN + 2;
-  for (i = 0; i < n_types; ++i, cp += 2) {
-    uint16_t authtype = ntohs(get_uint16(cp));
+  for (i = 0; i < n_types; ++i) {
+    uint16_t authtype = auth_challenge_cell_get_methods(ac, i);
     if (authtype == AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET)
       use_type = authtype;
   }
@@ -2002,7 +1974,7 @@ channel_tls_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
     /* If we're not a public server then we don't want to authenticate on a
        connection we originated, and we already sent a NETINFO cell when we
        got the CERTS cell. We have nothing more to do. */
-    return;
+    goto done;
   }
 
   if (use_type >= 0) {
@@ -2016,7 +1988,7 @@ channel_tls_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
       log_warn(LD_OR,
                "Couldn't send authenticate cell");
       connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0);
-      return;
+      goto done;
     }
   } else {
     log_info(LD_OR,
@@ -2029,9 +2001,12 @@ channel_tls_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
   if (connection_or_send_netinfo(chan->conn) < 0) {
     log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send netinfo cell");
     connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0);
-    return;
+    goto done;
   }
 
+done:
+  auth_challenge_cell_free(ac);
+
 #undef ERR
 }
 
@@ -2045,10 +2020,10 @@ channel_tls_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
  * the identity of the router on the other side of the connection.
  */
 
-static void
+STATIC void
 channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
 {
-  uint8_t expected[V3_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN];
+  uint8_t expected[V3_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN+256];
   const uint8_t *auth;
   int authlen;
 
@@ -2104,11 +2079,13 @@ channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
   if (authlen < V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN + 1)
     ERR("Authenticator was too short");
 
-  if (connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(
-                        chan->conn, expected, sizeof(expected), NULL, 1) < 0)
+  ssize_t bodylen =
+    connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(
+                        chan->conn, expected, sizeof(expected), NULL, 1);
+  if (bodylen < 0 || bodylen != V3_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN)
     ERR("Couldn't compute expected AUTHENTICATE cell body");
 
-  if (tor_memneq(expected, auth, sizeof(expected)))
+  if (tor_memneq(expected, auth, bodylen))
     ERR("Some field in the AUTHENTICATE cell body was not as expected");
 
   {
@@ -2154,7 +2131,7 @@ channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
     crypto_pk_t *identity_rcvd =
       tor_tls_cert_get_key(chan->conn->handshake_state->id_cert);
     const digests_t *id_digests =
-      tor_cert_get_id_digests(chan->conn->handshake_state->id_cert);
+      tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(chan->conn->handshake_state->id_cert);
 
     /* This must exist; we checked key type when reading the cert. */
     tor_assert(id_digests);
diff --git a/src/or/channeltls.h b/src/or/channeltls.h
index 507429420b..a0df9faac2 100644
--- a/src/or/channeltls.h
+++ b/src/or/channeltls.h
@@ -52,5 +52,15 @@ void channel_tls_update_marks(or_connection_t *conn);
 /* Cleanup at shutdown */
 void channel_tls_free_all(void);
 
+#ifdef CHANNELTLS_PRIVATE
+STATIC void channel_tls_process_certs_cell(var_cell_t *cell,
+                                           channel_tls_t *tlschan);
+STATIC void channel_tls_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell,
+                                                    channel_tls_t *tlschan);
+STATIC void channel_tls_common_init(channel_tls_t *tlschan);
+STATIC void channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell,
+                                                  channel_tls_t *tlschan);
+#endif
+
 #endif
 
diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c
index e4a2d1c5ae..ef249a653b 100644
--- a/src/or/config.c
+++ b/src/or/config.c
@@ -300,6 +300,7 @@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = {
   VAR("ServerTransportPlugin",   LINELIST, ServerTransportPlugin,  NULL),
   V(ServerTransportListenAddr,   LINELIST, NULL),
   V(ServerTransportOptions,      LINELIST, NULL),
+  V(SigningKeyLifetime,          INTERVAL, "30 days"),
   V(Socks4Proxy,                 STRING,   NULL),
   V(Socks5Proxy,                 STRING,   NULL),
   V(Socks5ProxyUsername,         STRING,   NULL),
@@ -358,6 +359,13 @@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = {
   V(TestingTorNetwork,           BOOL,     "0"),
   V(TestingMinExitFlagThreshold, MEMUNIT,  "0"),
   V(TestingMinFastFlagThreshold, MEMUNIT,  "0"),
+
+  V(TestingLinkCertLifetime,          INTERVAL, "2 days"),
+  V(TestingAuthKeyLifetime,          INTERVAL, "2 days"),
+  V(TestingLinkKeySlop,              INTERVAL, "3 hours"),
+  V(TestingAuthKeySlop,              INTERVAL, "3 hours"),
+  V(TestingSigningKeySlop,           INTERVAL, "1 day"),
+
   V(OptimisticData,              AUTOBOOL, "auto"),
   V(PortForwarding,              BOOL,     "0"),
   V(PortForwardingHelper,        FILENAME, "tor-fw-helper"),
@@ -3688,8 +3696,20 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options,
   CHECK_DEFAULT(TestingDescriptorMaxDownloadTries);
   CHECK_DEFAULT(TestingMicrodescMaxDownloadTries);
   CHECK_DEFAULT(TestingCertMaxDownloadTries);
+  CHECK_DEFAULT(TestingAuthKeyLifetime);
+  CHECK_DEFAULT(TestingLinkCertLifetime);
+  CHECK_DEFAULT(TestingSigningKeySlop);
+  CHECK_DEFAULT(TestingAuthKeySlop);
+  CHECK_DEFAULT(TestingLinkKeySlop);
 #undef CHECK_DEFAULT
 
+  if (options->SigningKeyLifetime < options->TestingSigningKeySlop*2)
+    REJECT("SigningKeyLifetime is too short.");
+  if (options->TestingLinkCertLifetime < options->TestingAuthKeySlop*2)
+    REJECT("LinkCertLifetime is too short.");
+  if (options->TestingAuthKeyLifetime < options->TestingLinkKeySlop*2)
+    REJECT("TestingAuthKeyLifetime is too short.");
+
   if (options->TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval
       < MIN_VOTE_INTERVAL_TESTING_INITIAL) {
     REJECT("TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval is insanely low.");
diff --git a/src/or/config.h b/src/or/config.h
index 74b28f45ca..0ee1e1a3c4 100644
--- a/src/or/config.h
+++ b/src/or/config.h
@@ -61,6 +61,10 @@ char *options_get_datadir_fname2_suffix(const or_options_t *options,
  * get_datadir_fname2_suffix.  */
 #define get_datadir_fname2(sub1,sub2) \
   get_datadir_fname2_suffix((sub1), (sub2), NULL)
+/** Return a newly allocated string containing datadir/sub1/sub2 relative to
+ * opts.  See get_datadir_fname2_suffix.  */
+#define options_get_datadir_fname2(opts,sub1,sub2)                      \
+  options_get_datadir_fname2_suffix((opts),(sub1), (sub2), NULL)
 /** Return a newly allocated string containing datadir/sub1suffix.  See
  * get_datadir_fname2_suffix. */
 #define get_datadir_fname_suffix(sub1, suffix) \
diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c
index e0dff1c915..48128d6335 100644
--- a/src/or/connection_or.c
+++ b/src/or/connection_or.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 #include "entrynodes.h"
 #include "geoip.h"
 #include "main.h"
+#include "link_handshake.h"
 #include "networkstatus.h"
 #include "nodelist.h"
 #include "reasons.h"
@@ -1318,8 +1319,8 @@ connection_or_close_normally(or_connection_t *orconn, int flush)
  * the error state.
  */
 
-void
-connection_or_close_for_error(or_connection_t *orconn, int flush)
+MOCK_IMPL(void,
+connection_or_close_for_error,(or_connection_t *orconn, int flush))
 {
   channel_t *chan = NULL;
 
@@ -1879,8 +1880,8 @@ or_handshake_state_free(or_handshake_state_t *state)
     return;
   crypto_digest_free(state->digest_sent);
   crypto_digest_free(state->digest_received);
-  tor_cert_free(state->auth_cert);
-  tor_cert_free(state->id_cert);
+  tor_x509_cert_free(state->auth_cert);
+  tor_x509_cert_free(state->id_cert);
   memwipe(state, 0xBE, sizeof(or_handshake_state_t));
   tor_free(state);
 }
@@ -2013,9 +2014,9 @@ connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(const cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
  * <b>conn</b>'s outbuf.  Right now, this <em>DOES NOT</em> support cells that
  * affect a circuit.
  */
-void
-connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(const var_cell_t *cell,
-                                    or_connection_t *conn)
+MOCK_IMPL(void,
+connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf,(const var_cell_t *cell,
+                                     or_connection_t *conn))
 {
   int n;
   char hdr[VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE];
@@ -2158,8 +2159,8 @@ connection_or_send_versions(or_connection_t *conn, int v3_plus)
 
 /** Send a NETINFO cell on <b>conn</b>, telling the other server what we know
  * about their address, our address, and the current time. */
-int
-connection_or_send_netinfo(or_connection_t *conn)
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+connection_or_send_netinfo,(or_connection_t *conn))
 {
   cell_t cell;
   time_t now = time(NULL);
@@ -2228,7 +2229,7 @@ connection_or_send_netinfo(or_connection_t *conn)
 int
 connection_or_send_certs_cell(or_connection_t *conn)
 {
-  const tor_cert_t *link_cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL;
+  const tor_x509_cert_t *link_cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL;
   const uint8_t *link_encoded = NULL, *id_encoded = NULL;
   size_t link_len, id_len;
   var_cell_t *cell;
@@ -2243,8 +2244,8 @@ connection_or_send_certs_cell(or_connection_t *conn)
   server_mode = ! conn->handshake_state->started_here;
   if (tor_tls_get_my_certs(server_mode, &link_cert, &id_cert) < 0)
     return -1;
-  tor_cert_get_der(link_cert, &link_encoded, &link_len);
-  tor_cert_get_der(id_cert, &id_encoded, &id_len);
+  tor_x509_cert_get_der(link_cert, &link_encoded, &link_len);
+  tor_x509_cert_get_der(id_cert, &id_encoded, &id_len);
 
   cell_len = 1 /* 1 byte: num certs in cell */ +
              2 * ( 1 + 2 ) /* For each cert: 1 byte for type, 2 for length */ +
@@ -2280,28 +2281,37 @@ connection_or_send_certs_cell(or_connection_t *conn)
 int
 connection_or_send_auth_challenge_cell(or_connection_t *conn)
 {
-  var_cell_t *cell;
-  uint8_t *cp;
-  uint8_t challenge[OR_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN];
+  var_cell_t *cell = NULL;
+  int r = -1;
   tor_assert(conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3);
 
   if (! conn->handshake_state)
     return -1;
 
-  if (crypto_rand((char*)challenge, OR_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN) < 0)
-    return -1;
-  cell = var_cell_new(OR_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN + 4);
+  auth_challenge_cell_t *ac = auth_challenge_cell_new();
+
+  if (crypto_rand((char*)ac->challenge, sizeof(ac->challenge)) < 0)
+    goto done;
+
+  auth_challenge_cell_add_methods(ac, AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET);
+  auth_challenge_cell_set_n_methods(ac,
+                                    auth_challenge_cell_getlen_methods(ac));
+
+  cell = var_cell_new(auth_challenge_cell_encoded_len(ac));
+  ssize_t len = auth_challenge_cell_encode(cell->payload, cell->payload_len,
+                                           ac);
+  if (len != cell->payload_len)
+    goto done;
   cell->command = CELL_AUTH_CHALLENGE;
-  memcpy(cell->payload, challenge, OR_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN);
-  cp = cell->payload + OR_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN;
-  set_uint16(cp, htons(1)); /* We recognize one authentication type. */
-  set_uint16(cp+2, htons(AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET));
 
   connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(cell, conn);
+  r = 0;
+
+ done:
   var_cell_free(cell);
-  memwipe(challenge, 0, sizeof(challenge));
+  auth_challenge_cell_free(ac);
 
-  return 0;
+  return r;
 }
 
 /** Compute the main body of an AUTHENTICATE cell that a client can use
@@ -2328,28 +2338,28 @@ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
                                              crypto_pk_t *signing_key,
                                              int server)
 {
-  uint8_t *ptr;
+  auth1_t *auth = NULL;
+  auth_ctx_t *ctx = auth_ctx_new();
+  int result;
 
   /* assert state is reasonable XXXX */
 
-  if (outlen < V3_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN ||
-      (!server && outlen < V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN))
-    return -1;
+  ctx->is_ed = 0;
 
-  ptr = out;
+  auth = auth1_new();
 
   /* Type: 8 bytes. */
-  memcpy(ptr, "AUTH0001", 8);
-  ptr += 8;
+  memcpy(auth1_getarray_type(auth), "AUTH0001", 8);
 
   {
-    const tor_cert_t *id_cert=NULL, *link_cert=NULL;
+    const tor_x509_cert_t *id_cert=NULL, *link_cert=NULL;
     const digests_t *my_digests, *their_digests;
     const uint8_t *my_id, *their_id, *client_id, *server_id;
     if (tor_tls_get_my_certs(server, &link_cert, &id_cert))
       return -1;
-    my_digests = tor_cert_get_id_digests(id_cert);
-    their_digests = tor_cert_get_id_digests(conn->handshake_state->id_cert);
+    my_digests = tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(id_cert);
+    their_digests =
+      tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(conn->handshake_state->id_cert);
     tor_assert(my_digests);
     tor_assert(their_digests);
     my_id = (uint8_t*)my_digests->d[DIGEST_SHA256];
@@ -2359,12 +2369,10 @@ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
     server_id = server ? my_id : their_id;
 
     /* Client ID digest: 32 octets. */
-    memcpy(ptr, client_id, 32);
-    ptr += 32;
+    memcpy(auth->cid, client_id, 32);
 
     /* Server ID digest: 32 octets. */
-    memcpy(ptr, server_id, 32);
-    ptr += 32;
+    memcpy(auth->sid, server_id, 32);
   }
 
   {
@@ -2378,73 +2386,101 @@ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
     }
 
     /* Server log digest : 32 octets */
-    crypto_digest_get_digest(server_d, (char*)ptr, 32);
-    ptr += 32;
+    crypto_digest_get_digest(server_d, (char*)auth->slog, 32);
 
     /* Client log digest : 32 octets */
-    crypto_digest_get_digest(client_d, (char*)ptr, 32);
-    ptr += 32;
+    crypto_digest_get_digest(client_d, (char*)auth->clog, 32);
   }
 
   {
     /* Digest of cert used on TLS link : 32 octets. */
-    const tor_cert_t *cert = NULL;
-    tor_cert_t *freecert = NULL;
+    const tor_x509_cert_t *cert = NULL;
+    tor_x509_cert_t *freecert = NULL;
     if (server) {
       tor_tls_get_my_certs(1, &cert, NULL);
     } else {
       freecert = tor_tls_get_peer_cert(conn->tls);
       cert = freecert;
     }
-    if (!cert)
-      return -1;
-    memcpy(ptr, tor_cert_get_cert_digests(cert)->d[DIGEST_SHA256], 32);
+    if (!cert) {
+      log_warn(LD_OR, "Unable to find cert when making AUTH1 data.");
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    memcpy(auth->scert,
+           tor_x509_cert_get_cert_digests(cert)->d[DIGEST_SHA256], 32);
 
     if (freecert)
-      tor_cert_free(freecert);
-    ptr += 32;
+      tor_x509_cert_free(freecert);
   }
 
   /* HMAC of clientrandom and serverrandom using master key : 32 octets */
-  tor_tls_get_tlssecrets(conn->tls, ptr);
-  ptr += 32;
-
-  tor_assert(ptr - out == V3_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN);
-
-  if (server)
-    return V3_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN; // ptr-out
+  tor_tls_get_tlssecrets(conn->tls, auth->tlssecrets);
 
   /* 8 octets were reserved for the current time, but we're trying to get out
    * of the habit of sending time around willynilly.  Fortunately, nothing
    * checks it.  That's followed by 16 bytes of nonce. */
-  crypto_rand((char*)ptr, 24);
-  ptr += 24;
+  crypto_rand((char*)auth->rand, 24);
 
-  tor_assert(ptr - out == V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN);
+  ssize_t len;
+  if ((len = auth1_encode(out, outlen, auth, ctx)) < 0) {
+    log_warn(LD_OR, "Unable to encode signed part of AUTH1 data.");
+    goto err;
+  }
 
-  if (!signing_key)
-    return V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN; // ptr - out
+  if (server) {
+    auth1_t *tmp = NULL;
+    ssize_t len2 = auth1_parse(&tmp, out, len, ctx);
+    if (!tmp) {
+      log_warn(LD_OR, "Unable to parse signed part of AUTH1 data.");
+      goto err;
+    }
+    result = (int) (tmp->end_of_fixed_part - out);
+    auth1_free(tmp);
+    if (len2 != len) {
+      log_warn(LD_OR, "Mismatched length when re-parsing AUTH1 data.");
+      goto err;
+    }
+    goto done;
+  }
+
+  if (signing_key) {
+    auth1_setlen_sig(auth, crypto_pk_keysize(signing_key));
 
-  {
-    int siglen;
     char d[32];
-    crypto_digest256(d, (char*)out, ptr-out, DIGEST_SHA256);
-    siglen = crypto_pk_private_sign(signing_key,
-                                    (char*)ptr, outlen - (ptr-out),
+    crypto_digest256(d, (char*)out, len, DIGEST_SHA256);
+    int siglen = crypto_pk_private_sign(signing_key,
+                                    (char*)auth1_getarray_sig(auth),
+                                    auth1_getlen_sig(auth),
                                     d, 32);
-    if (siglen < 0)
+    if (siglen < 0) {
+      log_warn(LD_OR, "Unable to sign AUTH1 data.");
       return -1;
+    }
 
-    ptr += siglen;
-    tor_assert(ptr <= out+outlen);
-    return (int)(ptr - out);
+    auth1_setlen_sig(auth, siglen);
+
+    len = auth1_encode(out, outlen, auth, ctx);
+    if (len < 0) {
+      log_warn(LD_OR, "Unable to encode signed AUTH1 data.");
+      goto err;
+    }
   }
+  result = (int) len;
+  goto done;
+
+ err:
+  result = -1;
+ done:
+  auth1_free(auth);
+  auth_ctx_free(ctx);
+  return result;
 }
 
 /** Send an AUTHENTICATE cell on the connection <b>conn</b>.  Return 0 on
  * success, -1 on failure */
-int
-connection_or_send_authenticate_cell(or_connection_t *conn, int authtype)
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+connection_or_send_authenticate_cell,(or_connection_t *conn, int authtype))
 {
   var_cell_t *cell;
   crypto_pk_t *pk = tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key();
diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.h b/src/or/connection_or.h
index fc261c6bac..3877fd5a13 100644
--- a/src/or/connection_or.h
+++ b/src/or/connection_or.h
@@ -43,7 +43,8 @@ MOCK_DECL(or_connection_t *,
            const char *id_digest, channel_tls_t *chan));
 
 void connection_or_close_normally(or_connection_t *orconn, int flush);
-void connection_or_close_for_error(or_connection_t *orconn, int flush);
+MOCK_DECL(void,connection_or_close_for_error,
+          (or_connection_t *orconn, int flush));
 
 void connection_or_report_broken_states(int severity, int domain);
 
@@ -77,17 +78,18 @@ void or_handshake_state_record_var_cell(or_connection_t *conn,
 int connection_or_set_state_open(or_connection_t *conn);
 void connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(const cell_t *cell,
                                      or_connection_t *conn);
-void connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(const var_cell_t *cell,
-                                         or_connection_t *conn);
+MOCK_DECL(void,connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf,(const var_cell_t *cell,
+                                                   or_connection_t *conn));
 int connection_or_send_versions(or_connection_t *conn, int v3_plus);
-int connection_or_send_netinfo(or_connection_t *conn);
+MOCK_DECL(int,connection_or_send_netinfo,(or_connection_t *conn));
 int connection_or_send_certs_cell(or_connection_t *conn);
 int connection_or_send_auth_challenge_cell(or_connection_t *conn);
 int connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
                                                  uint8_t *out, size_t outlen,
                                                  crypto_pk_t *signing_key,
                                                  int server);
-int connection_or_send_authenticate_cell(or_connection_t *conn, int type);
+MOCK_DECL(int,connection_or_send_authenticate_cell,
+          (or_connection_t *conn, int type));
 
 int is_or_protocol_version_known(uint16_t version);
 
diff --git a/src/or/dircollate.c b/src/or/dircollate.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..20dfb357a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/or/dircollate.c
@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2014, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file dircollate.c
+ *
+ * \brief Collation code for figuring out which identities to vote for in
+ *   the directory voting process.
+ */
+
+#define DIRCOLLATE_PRIVATE
+#include "dircollate.h"
+#include "dirvote.h"
+
+static void dircollator_collate_by_rsa(dircollator_t *dc);
+static void dircollator_collate_by_ed25519(dircollator_t *dc);
+
+typedef struct ddmap_entry_s {
+  HT_ENTRY(ddmap_entry_s) node;
+  uint8_t d[DIGEST_LEN + DIGEST256_LEN];
+  vote_routerstatus_t *vrs_lst[FLEXIBLE_ARRAY_MEMBER];
+} ddmap_entry_t;
+
+struct double_digest_map_s *by_both_ids;
+
+static void
+ddmap_entry_free(ddmap_entry_t *e)
+{
+  tor_free(e);
+}
+
+static ddmap_entry_t *
+ddmap_entry_new(int n_votes)
+{
+  return tor_malloc_zero(STRUCT_OFFSET(ddmap_entry_t, vrs_lst) +
+                         sizeof(vote_routerstatus_t *) * n_votes);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+ddmap_entry_hash(const ddmap_entry_t *ent)
+{
+  return (unsigned) siphash24g(ent->d, sizeof(ent->d));
+}
+
+static unsigned
+ddmap_entry_eq(const ddmap_entry_t *a, const ddmap_entry_t *b)
+{
+  return fast_memeq(a->d, b->d, sizeof(a->d));
+}
+
+static void
+ddmap_entry_set_digests(ddmap_entry_t *ent,
+                        const uint8_t *rsa_sha1,
+                        const uint8_t *ed25519)
+{
+  memcpy(ent->d, rsa_sha1, DIGEST_LEN);
+  memcpy(ent->d + DIGEST_LEN, ed25519, DIGEST256_LEN);
+}
+
+HT_PROTOTYPE(double_digest_map, ddmap_entry_s, node, ddmap_entry_hash, ddmap_entry_eq);
+HT_GENERATE2(double_digest_map, ddmap_entry_s, node, ddmap_entry_hash, ddmap_entry_eq, 0.6, tor_reallocarray, tor_free_);
+static void
+dircollator_add_routerstatus(dircollator_t *dc,
+                             int vote_num,
+                             networkstatus_t *vote,
+                             vote_routerstatus_t *vrs)
+{
+  const char *id = vrs->status.identity_digest;
+
+  (void) vote;
+  vote_routerstatus_t **vrs_lst = digestmap_get(dc->by_rsa_sha1, id);
+  if (NULL == vrs_lst) {
+    vrs_lst = tor_calloc(sizeof(vote_routerstatus_t *), dc->n_votes);
+    digestmap_set(dc->by_rsa_sha1, id, vrs_lst);
+  }
+  tor_assert(vrs_lst[vote_num] == NULL);
+  vrs_lst[vote_num] = vrs;
+
+  const uint8_t *ed = vrs->ed25519_id;
+
+  if (tor_mem_is_zero((char*)ed, DIGEST256_LEN))
+    return;
+
+  ddmap_entry_t search, *found;
+  memset(&search, 0, sizeof(search));
+  ddmap_entry_set_digests(&search, (const uint8_t *)id, ed);
+  found = HT_FIND(double_digest_map, &dc->by_both_ids, &search);
+  if (NULL == found) {
+    found = ddmap_entry_new(dc->n_votes);
+    ddmap_entry_set_digests(found, (const uint8_t *)id, ed);
+    HT_INSERT(double_digest_map, &dc->by_both_ids, found);
+  }
+  vrs_lst = found->vrs_lst;
+  tor_assert(vrs_lst[vote_num] == NULL);
+  vrs_lst[vote_num] = vrs;
+}
+
+dircollator_t *
+dircollator_new(int n_votes, int n_authorities)
+{
+  dircollator_t *dc = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(dircollator_t));
+
+  tor_assert(n_votes <= n_authorities);
+
+  dc->n_votes = n_votes;
+  dc->n_authorities = n_authorities;
+
+  dc->by_rsa_sha1 = digestmap_new();
+  HT_INIT(double_digest_map, &dc->by_both_ids);
+
+  return dc;
+}
+
+void
+dircollator_free(dircollator_t *dc)
+{
+  if (!dc)
+    return;
+
+  if (dc->by_collated_rsa_sha1 != dc->by_rsa_sha1)
+    digestmap_free(dc->by_collated_rsa_sha1, NULL);
+
+  digestmap_free(dc->by_rsa_sha1, tor_free_);
+
+  ddmap_entry_t **e, **next, *this;
+  for (e = HT_START(double_digest_map, &dc->by_both_ids);
+       e != NULL; e = next) {
+    this = *e;
+    next = HT_NEXT_RMV(double_digest_map, &dc->by_both_ids, e);
+    ddmap_entry_free(this);
+  }
+  HT_CLEAR(double_digest_map, &dc->by_both_ids);
+
+  tor_free(dc);
+}
+
+void
+dircollator_add_vote(dircollator_t *dc, networkstatus_t *v)
+{
+  tor_assert(v->type == NS_TYPE_VOTE);
+  tor_assert(dc->next_vote_num < dc->n_votes);
+  tor_assert(!dc->is_collated);
+
+  const int votenum = dc->next_vote_num++;
+
+  SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(v->routerstatus_list, vote_routerstatus_t *, vrs) {
+    dircollator_add_routerstatus(dc, votenum, v, vrs);
+  } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(vrs);
+}
+
+void
+dircollator_collate(dircollator_t *dc, int consensus_method)
+{
+  tor_assert(!dc->is_collated);
+  dc->all_rsa_sha1_lst = smartlist_new();
+
+  if (consensus_method < MIN_METHOD_FOR_ED25519_ID_VOTING + 10/*XXX*/)
+    dircollator_collate_by_rsa(dc);
+  else
+    dircollator_collate_by_ed25519(dc);
+
+  smartlist_sort_digests(dc->all_rsa_sha1_lst);
+  dc->is_collated = 1;
+}
+
+static void
+dircollator_collate_by_rsa(dircollator_t *dc)
+{
+  const int total_authorities = dc->n_authorities;
+
+  DIGESTMAP_FOREACH(dc->by_rsa_sha1, k, vote_routerstatus_t **, vrs_lst) {
+    int n = 0, i;
+    for (i = 0; i < dc->n_votes; ++i) {
+      if (vrs_lst[i] != NULL)
+        ++n;
+    }
+
+    if (n <= total_authorities / 2)
+      continue;
+
+    smartlist_add(dc->all_rsa_sha1_lst, (char *)k);
+  } DIGESTMAP_FOREACH_END;
+
+  dc->by_collated_rsa_sha1 = dc->by_rsa_sha1;
+}
+
+static void
+dircollator_collate_by_ed25519(dircollator_t *dc)
+{
+  const int total_authorities = dc->n_authorities;
+  digestmap_t *rsa_digests = digestmap_new();
+
+  ddmap_entry_t **iter;
+
+  HT_FOREACH(iter, double_digest_map, &dc->by_both_ids) {
+    ddmap_entry_t *ent = *iter;
+    int n = 0, i;
+    for (i = 0; i < dc->n_votes; ++i) {
+      if (ent->vrs_lst[i] != NULL)
+        ++n;
+    }
+
+    if (n <= total_authorities / 2)
+      continue;
+
+    vote_routerstatus_t **vrs_lst2 = digestmap_get(dc->by_rsa_sha1,
+                                                   (char*)ent->d);
+    tor_assert(vrs_lst2);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < dc->n_votes; ++i) {
+      if (ent->vrs_lst[i] != NULL) {
+        ent->vrs_lst[i]->ed25519_reflects_consensus = 1;
+      } else if (vrs_lst2[i] && ! vrs_lst2[i]->has_ed25519_listing) {
+        ent->vrs_lst[i] = vrs_lst2[i];
+      }
+    }
+
+    digestmap_set(rsa_digests, (char*)ent->d, ent->vrs_lst);
+    smartlist_add(dc->all_rsa_sha1_lst, ent->d);
+  }
+
+  DIGESTMAP_FOREACH(dc->by_rsa_sha1, k, vote_routerstatus_t **, vrs_lst) {
+    if (digestmap_get(rsa_digests, k) != NULL)
+      continue;
+
+    int n = 0, i;
+    for (i = 0; i < dc->n_votes; ++i) {
+      if (vrs_lst[i] != NULL)
+        ++n;
+    }
+
+    if (n <= total_authorities / 2)
+      continue;
+
+    digestmap_set(rsa_digests, k, vrs_lst);
+    smartlist_add(dc->all_rsa_sha1_lst, (char *)k);
+  } DIGESTMAP_FOREACH_END;
+
+  dc->by_collated_rsa_sha1 = rsa_digests;
+}
+
+int
+dircollator_n_routers(dircollator_t *dc)
+{
+  return smartlist_len(dc->all_rsa_sha1_lst);
+}
+
+vote_routerstatus_t **
+dircollator_get_votes_for_router(dircollator_t *dc, int idx)
+{
+  tor_assert(idx < smartlist_len(dc->all_rsa_sha1_lst));
+  return digestmap_get(dc->by_collated_rsa_sha1,
+                       smartlist_get(dc->all_rsa_sha1_lst, idx));
+}
+
diff --git a/src/or/dircollate.h b/src/or/dircollate.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9eba37a010
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/or/dircollate.h
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2014, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file dirvote.h
+ * \brief Header file for dirvote.c.
+ **/
+
+#ifndef TOR_DIRCOLLATE_H
+#define TOR_DIRCOLLATE_H
+
+#include "testsupport.h"
+#include "or.h"
+
+typedef struct dircollator_s dircollator_t;
+
+dircollator_t *dircollator_new(int n_votes, int n_authorities);
+void dircollator_free(dircollator_t *obj);
+void dircollator_add_vote(dircollator_t *dc, networkstatus_t *v);
+
+void dircollator_collate(dircollator_t *dc, int consensus_method);
+
+int dircollator_n_routers(dircollator_t *dc);
+vote_routerstatus_t **dircollator_get_votes_for_router(dircollator_t *dc,
+                                                       int idx);
+
+#ifdef DIRCOLLATE_PRIVATE
+struct ddmap_entry_s;
+typedef HT_HEAD(double_digest_map, ddmap_entry_s) double_digest_map_t;
+struct dircollator_s {
+  /**DOCDOC */
+  int is_collated;
+  int n_votes;
+  int n_authorities;
+
+  int next_vote_num;
+  digestmap_t *by_rsa_sha1;
+  struct double_digest_map by_both_ids;
+
+  digestmap_t *by_collated_rsa_sha1;
+
+  smartlist_t *all_rsa_sha1_lst;
+};
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c
index a024be8342..bee67cf749 100644
--- a/src/or/dirserv.c
+++ b/src/or/dirserv.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include "dirserv.h"
 #include "dirvote.h"
 #include "hibernate.h"
+#include "keypin.h"
 #include "microdesc.h"
 #include "networkstatus.h"
 #include "nodelist.h"
@@ -27,6 +28,7 @@
 #include "routerlist.h"
 #include "routerparse.h"
 #include "routerset.h"
+#include "torcert.h"
 
 /**
  * \file dirserv.c
@@ -225,6 +227,16 @@ dirserv_load_fingerprint_file(void)
   return 0;
 }
 
+/* If this is set, then we don't allow routers that have advertised an Ed25519
+ * identity to stop doing so.  This is going to be essential for good identity
+ * security: otherwise anybody who can attack RSA-1024 but not Ed25519 could
+ * just sign fake descriptors missing the Ed25519 key.  But we won't actually
+ * be able to prevent that kind of thing until we're confident that there
+ * isn't actually a legit reason to downgrade to 0.2.5.  So for now, we have
+ * to leave this #undef.
+ */
+#undef DISABLE_DISABLING_ED25519
+
 /** Check whether <b>router</b> has a nickname/identity key combination that
  * we recognize from the fingerprint list, or an IP we automatically act on
  * according to our configuration.  Return the appropriate router status.
@@ -243,6 +255,36 @@ dirserv_router_get_status(const routerinfo_t *router, const char **msg)
     return FP_REJECT;
   }
 
+  if (router->signing_key_cert) {
+    /* This has an ed25519 identity key. */
+    if (KEYPIN_MISMATCH ==
+        keypin_check((const uint8_t*)router->cache_info.identity_digest,
+                     router->signing_key_cert->signing_key.pubkey)) {
+      if (msg) {
+        *msg = "Ed25519 identity key or RSA identity key has changed.";
+      }
+      log_warn(LD_DIR, "Router %s uploaded a descriptor with a Ed25519 key "
+               "but the <rsa,ed25519> keys don't match what they were before.",
+               router_describe(router));
+      return FP_REJECT;
+    }
+  } else {
+    /* No ed25519 key */
+    if (KEYPIN_MISMATCH == keypin_check_lone_rsa(
+                        (const uint8_t*)router->cache_info.identity_digest)) {
+      log_warn(LD_DIR, "Router %s uploaded a descriptor with no Ed25519 key, "
+               "when we previously knew an Ed25519 for it. Ignoring for now, "
+               "since Tor 0.2.6 is under development.",
+               router_describe(router));
+#ifdef DISABLE_DISABLING_ED25519
+      if (msg) {
+        *msg = "Ed25519 identity key has disappeared.";
+      }
+      return FP_REJECT;
+#endif
+    }
+  }
+
   return dirserv_get_status_impl(d, router->nickname,
                                  router->addr, router->or_port,
                                  router->platform, msg, 1);
@@ -578,6 +620,28 @@ dirserv_add_descriptor(routerinfo_t *ri, const char **msg, const char *source)
     return ROUTER_IS_ALREADY_KNOWN;
   }
 
+  /* Do keypinning again ... this time, to add the pin if appropriate */
+  int keypin_status;
+  if (ri->signing_key_cert) {
+    keypin_status = keypin_check_and_add(
+      (const uint8_t*)ri->cache_info.identity_digest,
+      ri->signing_key_cert->signing_key.pubkey);
+  } else {
+    keypin_status = keypin_check_lone_rsa(
+      (const uint8_t*)ri->cache_info.identity_digest);
+#ifndef DISABLE_DISABLING_ED25519
+    if (keypin_status == KEYPIN_MISMATCH)
+      keypin_status = KEYPIN_NOT_FOUND;
+#endif
+  }
+  if (keypin_status == KEYPIN_MISMATCH) {
+    log_info(LD_DIRSERV, "Dropping descriptor from %s (source: %s) because "
+             "its key did not match an older RSA/Ed25519 keypair",
+             router_describe(ri), source);
+    *msg = "Looks like your keypair does not match its older value.";
+    return ROUTER_AUTHDIR_REJECTS;
+  }
+
   /* Make a copy of desc, since router_add_to_routerlist might free
    * ri and its associated signed_descriptor_t. */
   desc = tor_strndup(ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, desclen);
@@ -1929,6 +1993,16 @@ routerstatus_format_entry(const routerstatus_t *rs, const char *version,
       smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "p %s\n", summary);
       tor_free(summary);
     }
+
+    if (format == NS_V3_VOTE && vrs) {
+      if (tor_mem_is_zero((char*)vrs->ed25519_id, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) {
+        smartlist_add(chunks, tor_strdup("id ed25519 none\n"));
+      } else {
+        char ed_b64[BASE64_DIGEST256_LEN+1];
+        digest256_to_base64(ed_b64, (const char*)vrs->ed25519_id);
+        smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "id ed25519 %s\n", ed_b64);
+      }
+    }
   }
 
  done:
@@ -2751,6 +2825,11 @@ dirserv_generate_networkstatus_vote_obj(crypto_pk_t *private_key,
                                        listbadexits,
                                        vote_on_hsdirs);
 
+      if (ri->signing_key_cert) {
+        memcpy(vrs->ed25519_id, ri->signing_key_cert->signing_key.pubkey,
+               ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+      }
+
       if (digestmap_get(omit_as_sybil, ri->cache_info.identity_digest))
         clear_status_flags_on_sybil(rs);
 
diff --git a/src/or/dirvote.c b/src/or/dirvote.c
index 3009026ee7..e037794fc7 100644
--- a/src/or/dirvote.c
+++ b/src/or/dirvote.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 #define DIRVOTE_PRIVATE
 #include "or.h"
 #include "config.h"
+#include "dircollate.h"
 #include "directory.h"
 #include "dirserv.h"
 #include "dirvote.h"
@@ -17,6 +18,7 @@
 #include "routerlist.h"
 #include "routerparse.h"
 #include "entrynodes.h" /* needed for guardfraction methods */
+#include "torcert.h"
 
 /**
  * \file dirvote.c
@@ -1138,6 +1140,7 @@ networkstatus_compute_consensus(smartlist_t *votes,
   char *params = NULL;
   char *packages = NULL;
   int added_weights = 0;
+  dircollator_t *collator = NULL;
   tor_assert(flavor == FLAV_NS || flavor == FLAV_MICRODESC);
   tor_assert(total_authorities >= smartlist_len(votes));
 
@@ -1493,12 +1496,24 @@ networkstatus_compute_consensus(smartlist_t *votes,
        }
     );
 
+    /* Populate the collator */
+    collator = dircollator_new(smartlist_len(votes), total_authorities);
+    SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(votes, networkstatus_t *, v) {
+      dircollator_add_vote(collator, v);
+    } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(v);
+
+    dircollator_collate(collator, consensus_method);
+
     /* Now go through all the votes */
     flag_counts = tor_calloc(smartlist_len(flags), sizeof(int));
-    while (1) {
+    const int num_routers = dircollator_n_routers(collator);
+    for (i = 0; i < num_routers; ++i) {
+      vote_routerstatus_t **vrs_lst =
+        dircollator_get_votes_for_router(collator, i);
+
       vote_routerstatus_t *rs;
       routerstatus_t rs_out;
-      const char *lowest_id = NULL;
+      const char *current_rsa_id = NULL;
       const char *chosen_version;
       const char *chosen_name = NULL;
       int exitsummary_disagreement = 0;
@@ -1506,23 +1521,9 @@ networkstatus_compute_consensus(smartlist_t *votes,
       int is_guard = 0, is_exit = 0, is_bad_exit = 0;
       int naming_conflict = 0;
       int n_listing = 0;
-      int i;
       char microdesc_digest[DIGEST256_LEN];
       tor_addr_port_t alt_orport = {TOR_ADDR_NULL, 0};
 
-      /* Of the next-to-be-considered digest in each voter, which is first? */
-      SMARTLIST_FOREACH(votes, networkstatus_t *, v, {
-        if (index[v_sl_idx] < size[v_sl_idx]) {
-          rs = smartlist_get(v->routerstatus_list, index[v_sl_idx]);
-          if (!lowest_id ||
-              fast_memcmp(rs->status.identity_digest,
-                          lowest_id, DIGEST_LEN) < 0)
-            lowest_id = rs->status.identity_digest;
-        }
-      });
-      if (!lowest_id) /* we're out of routers. */
-        break;
-
       memset(flag_counts, 0, sizeof(int)*smartlist_len(flags));
       smartlist_clear(matching_descs);
       smartlist_clear(chosen_flags);
@@ -1532,29 +1533,25 @@ networkstatus_compute_consensus(smartlist_t *votes,
       num_guardfraction_inputs = 0;
 
       /* Okay, go through all the entries for this digest. */
-      SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(votes, networkstatus_t *, v) {
-        if (index[v_sl_idx] >= size[v_sl_idx])
-          continue; /* out of entries. */
-        rs = smartlist_get(v->routerstatus_list, index[v_sl_idx]);
-        if (fast_memcmp(rs->status.identity_digest, lowest_id, DIGEST_LEN))
-          continue; /* doesn't include this router. */
-        /* At this point, we know that we're looking at a routerstatus with
-         * identity "lowest".
-         */
-        ++index[v_sl_idx];
+      for (int voter_idx = 0; voter_idx < smartlist_len(votes); ++voter_idx) {
+        if (vrs_lst[voter_idx] == NULL)
+          continue; /* This voter had nothig to say about this entry. */
+        rs = vrs_lst[voter_idx];
         ++n_listing;
 
+        current_rsa_id = rs->status.identity_digest;
+
         smartlist_add(matching_descs, rs);
         if (rs->version && rs->version[0])
           smartlist_add(versions, rs->version);
 
         /* Tally up all the flags. */
-        for (i = 0; i < n_voter_flags[v_sl_idx]; ++i) {
-          if (rs->flags & (U64_LITERAL(1) << i))
-            ++flag_counts[flag_map[v_sl_idx][i]];
+        for (int flag = 0; flag < n_voter_flags[voter_idx]; ++flag) {
+          if (rs->flags & (U64_LITERAL(1) << flag))
+            ++flag_counts[flag_map[voter_idx][flag]];
         }
-        if (named_flag[v_sl_idx] >= 0 &&
-            (rs->flags & (U64_LITERAL(1) << named_flag[v_sl_idx]))) {
+        if (named_flag[voter_idx] >= 0 &&
+            (rs->flags & (U64_LITERAL(1) << named_flag[voter_idx]))) {
           if (chosen_name && strcmp(chosen_name, rs->status.nickname)) {
             log_notice(LD_DIR, "Conflict on naming for router: %s vs %s",
                        chosen_name, rs->status.nickname);
@@ -1575,7 +1572,7 @@ networkstatus_compute_consensus(smartlist_t *votes,
 
         if (rs->status.has_bandwidth)
           bandwidths_kb[num_bandwidths++] = rs->status.bandwidth_kb;
-      } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(v);
+      }
 
       /* We don't include this router at all unless more than half of
        * the authorities we believe in list it. */
@@ -1589,8 +1586,9 @@ networkstatus_compute_consensus(smartlist_t *votes,
                                           microdesc_digest, &alt_orport);
       /* Copy bits of that into rs_out. */
       memset(&rs_out, 0, sizeof(rs_out));
-      tor_assert(fast_memeq(lowest_id, rs->status.identity_digest,DIGEST_LEN));
-      memcpy(rs_out.identity_digest, lowest_id, DIGEST_LEN);
+      tor_assert(fast_memeq(current_rsa_id,
+                            rs->status.identity_digest,DIGEST_LEN));
+      memcpy(rs_out.identity_digest, current_rsa_id, DIGEST_LEN);
       memcpy(rs_out.descriptor_digest, rs->status.descriptor_digest,
              DIGEST_LEN);
       rs_out.addr = rs->status.addr;
@@ -1614,7 +1612,7 @@ networkstatus_compute_consensus(smartlist_t *votes,
         const char *d = strmap_get_lc(name_to_id_map, rs_out.nickname);
         if (!d) {
           is_named = is_unnamed = 0;
-        } else if (fast_memeq(d, lowest_id, DIGEST_LEN)) {
+        } else if (fast_memeq(d, current_rsa_id, DIGEST_LEN)) {
           is_named = 1; is_unnamed = 0;
         } else {
           is_named = 0; is_unnamed = 1;
@@ -1980,6 +1978,7 @@ networkstatus_compute_consensus(smartlist_t *votes,
 
  done:
 
+  dircollator_free(collator);
   tor_free(client_versions);
   tor_free(server_versions);
   tor_free(packages);
@@ -3487,9 +3486,18 @@ dirvote_create_microdescriptor(const routerinfo_t *ri, int consensus_method)
   }
 
   if (consensus_method >= MIN_METHOD_FOR_ID_HASH_IN_MD) {
-    char idbuf[BASE64_DIGEST_LEN+1];
-    digest_to_base64(idbuf, ri->cache_info.identity_digest);
-    smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "id rsa1024 %s\n", idbuf);
+    char idbuf[ED25519_BASE64_LEN+1];
+    const char *keytype;
+    if (consensus_method >= MIN_METHOD_FOR_ED25519_ID_IN_MD &&
+        ri->signing_key_cert &&
+        ri->signing_key_cert->signing_key_included) {
+      keytype = "ed25519";
+      ed25519_public_to_base64(idbuf, &ri->signing_key_cert->signing_key);
+    } else {
+      keytype = "rsa1024";
+      digest_to_base64(idbuf, ri->cache_info.identity_digest);
+    }
+    smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "id %s %s\n", keytype, idbuf);
   }
 
   output = smartlist_join_strings(chunks, "", 0, NULL);
@@ -3562,7 +3570,8 @@ static const struct consensus_method_range_t {
   {MIN_METHOD_FOR_A_LINES, MIN_METHOD_FOR_P6_LINES - 1},
   {MIN_METHOD_FOR_P6_LINES, MIN_METHOD_FOR_NTOR_KEY - 1},
   {MIN_METHOD_FOR_NTOR_KEY, MIN_METHOD_FOR_ID_HASH_IN_MD - 1},
-  {MIN_METHOD_FOR_ID_HASH_IN_MD,  MAX_SUPPORTED_CONSENSUS_METHOD},
+  {MIN_METHOD_FOR_ID_HASH_IN_MD, MIN_METHOD_FOR_ED25519_ID_IN_MD - 1},
+  {MIN_METHOD_FOR_ED25519_ID_IN_MD, MAX_SUPPORTED_CONSENSUS_METHOD},
   {-1, -1}
 };
 
diff --git a/src/or/dirvote.h b/src/or/dirvote.h
index 542563b708..0fb2b2599b 100644
--- a/src/or/dirvote.h
+++ b/src/or/dirvote.h
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@
 #define MIN_SUPPORTED_CONSENSUS_METHOD 13
 
 /** The highest consensus method that we currently support. */
-#define MAX_SUPPORTED_CONSENSUS_METHOD 20
+#define MAX_SUPPORTED_CONSENSUS_METHOD 21
 
 /** Lowest consensus method where microdesc consensuses omit any entry
  * with no microdesc. */
@@ -86,6 +86,13 @@
  * GuardFraction information in microdescriptors. */
 #define MIN_METHOD_FOR_GUARDFRACTION 20
 
+/** Lowest consensus method where authorities may include an "id" line for
+ * ed25519 identities in microdescriptors. */
+#define MIN_METHOD_FOR_ED25519_ID_IN_MD 21
+/** Lowest consensus method where authorities vote on ed25519 ids and ensure
+ * ed25519 id consistency. */
+#define MIN_METHOD_FOR_ED25519_ID_VOTING MIN_METHOD_FOR_ED25519_ID_IN_MD
+
 /** Default bandwidth to clip unmeasured bandwidths to using method >=
  * MIN_METHOD_TO_CLIP_UNMEASURED_BW.  (This is not a consensus method; do not
  * get confused with the above macros.) */
diff --git a/src/or/include.am b/src/or/include.am
index 0ce3cdc5c3..6bbf78871c 100644
--- a/src/or/include.am
+++ b/src/or/include.am
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ LIBTOR_A_SOURCES = \
 	src/or/connection_or.c				\
 	src/or/control.c				\
 	src/or/cpuworker.c				\
+	src/or/dircollate.c				\
 	src/or/directory.c				\
 	src/or/dirserv.c				\
 	src/or/dirvote.c				\
@@ -53,6 +54,7 @@ LIBTOR_A_SOURCES = \
 	src/or/entrynodes.c				\
 	src/or/ext_orport.c				\
 	src/or/hibernate.c				\
+	src/or/keypin.c					\
 	src/or/main.c					\
 	src/or/microdesc.c				\
 	src/or/networkstatus.c				\
@@ -71,12 +73,14 @@ LIBTOR_A_SOURCES = \
 	src/or/rephist.c				\
 	src/or/replaycache.c				\
 	src/or/router.c					\
+	src/or/routerkeys.c				\
 	src/or/routerlist.c				\
 	src/or/routerparse.c				\
 	src/or/routerset.c				\
 	src/or/scheduler.c				\
 	src/or/statefile.c				\
 	src/or/status.c					\
+	src/or/torcert.c				\
 	src/or/onion_ntor.c				\
 	$(evdns_source)					\
 	$(tor_platform_source)
@@ -84,11 +88,6 @@ LIBTOR_A_SOURCES = \
 src_or_libtor_a_SOURCES = $(LIBTOR_A_SOURCES)
 src_or_libtor_testing_a_SOURCES = $(LIBTOR_A_SOURCES)
 
-#libtor_a_LIBADD = $(top_builddir)/common/libor.a \
-#    $(top_builddir)/common/libor-crypto.a \
-#    $(top_builddir)/common/libor-event.a
-
-
 src_or_tor_SOURCES = src/or/tor_main.c
 AM_CPPFLAGS += -I$(srcdir)/src/or -Isrc/or
 
@@ -109,7 +108,7 @@ src_or_libtor_testing_a_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) $(TEST_CFLAGS)
 src_or_tor_LDFLAGS = @TOR_LDFLAGS_zlib@ @TOR_LDFLAGS_openssl@ @TOR_LDFLAGS_libevent@
 src_or_tor_LDADD = src/or/libtor.a src/common/libor.a \
 	src/common/libor-crypto.a $(LIBDONNA) \
-	src/common/libor-event.a \
+	src/common/libor-event.a src/trunnel/libor-trunnel.a \
 	@TOR_ZLIB_LIBS@ @TOR_LIB_MATH@ @TOR_LIBEVENT_LIBS@ @TOR_OPENSSL_LIBS@ \
 	@TOR_LIB_WS32@ @TOR_LIB_GDI@ @CURVE25519_LIBS@ @TOR_SYSTEMD_LIBS@
 
@@ -120,7 +119,7 @@ src_or_tor_cov_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) $(TEST_CFLAGS)
 src_or_tor_cov_LDFLAGS = @TOR_LDFLAGS_zlib@ @TOR_LDFLAGS_openssl@ @TOR_LDFLAGS_libevent@
 src_or_tor_cov_LDADD = src/or/libtor-testing.a src/common/libor-testing.a \
 	src/common/libor-crypto-testing.a $(LIBDONNA) \
-	src/common/libor-event-testing.a \
+	src/common/libor-event-testing.a src/trunnel/libor-trunnel-testing.a \
 	@TOR_ZLIB_LIBS@ @TOR_LIB_MATH@ @TOR_LIBEVENT_LIBS@ @TOR_OPENSSL_LIBS@ \
 	@TOR_LIB_WS32@ @TOR_LIB_GDI@ @CURVE25519_LIBS@ @TOR_SYSTEMD_LIBS@
 TESTING_TOR_BINARY = $(top_builddir)/src/or/tor-cov
@@ -148,6 +147,7 @@ ORHEADERS = \
 	src/or/connection_or.h				\
 	src/or/control.h				\
 	src/or/cpuworker.h				\
+	src/or/dircollate.h				\
 	src/or/directory.h				\
 	src/or/dirserv.h				\
 	src/or/dirvote.h				\
@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ ORHEADERS = \
 	src/or/geoip.h					\
 	src/or/entrynodes.h				\
 	src/or/hibernate.h				\
+	src/or/keypin.h					\
 	src/or/main.h					\
 	src/or/microdesc.h				\
 	src/or/networkstatus.h				\
@@ -180,12 +181,15 @@ ORHEADERS = \
 	src/or/rephist.h				\
 	src/or/replaycache.h				\
 	src/or/router.h					\
+	src/or/routerkeys.h				\
 	src/or/routerlist.h				\
+	src/or/routerkeys.h				\
 	src/or/routerset.h				\
 	src/or/routerparse.h				\
 	src/or/scheduler.h				\
 	src/or/statefile.h				\
-	src/or/status.h
+	src/or/status.h					\
+	src/or/torcert.h
 
 noinst_HEADERS+= $(ORHEADERS) micro-revision.i
 
diff --git a/src/or/keypin.c b/src/or/keypin.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7b0c0c7dcf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/or/keypin.c
@@ -0,0 +1,419 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2014, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+#define KEYPIN_PRIVATE
+
+#include "orconfig.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "crypto.h"
+#include "di_ops.h"
+#include "ht.h"
+#include "keypin.h"
+#include "siphash.h"
+#include "torint.h"
+#include "torlog.h"
+#include "util.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
+#include <unistd.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef _WIN32
+#include <io.h>
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * @file keypin.c
+ * @brief Key-pinning for RSA and Ed25519 identity keys at directory
+ *  authorities.
+ *
+ * This module implements a key-pinning mechanism to ensure that it's safe
+ * to use RSA keys as identitifers even as we migrate to Ed25519 keys.  It
+ * remembers, for every Ed25519 key we've seen, what the associated Ed25519
+ * key is.  This way, if we see a different Ed25519 key with that RSA key,
+ * we'll know that there's a mismatch.
+ *
+ * We persist these entries to disk using a simple format, where each line
+ * has a base64-encoded RSA SHA1 hash, then a base64-endoded Ed25519 key.
+ * Empty lines, misformed lines, and lines beginning with # are
+ * ignored. Lines beginning with @ are reserved for future extensions.
+ */
+
+static int keypin_journal_append_entry(const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest,
+                                       const uint8_t *ed25519_id_key);
+static int keypin_check_and_add_impl(const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest,
+                                     const uint8_t *ed25519_id_key,
+                                     int do_not_add);
+
+static HT_HEAD(rsamap, keypin_ent_st) the_rsa_map = HT_INITIALIZER();
+static HT_HEAD(edmap, keypin_ent_st) the_ed_map = HT_INITIALIZER();
+
+/** Hashtable helper: compare two keypin table entries and return true iff
+ * they have the same RSA key IDs. */
+static INLINE int
+keypin_ents_eq_rsa(const keypin_ent_t *a, const keypin_ent_t *b)
+{
+  return tor_memeq(a->rsa_id, b->rsa_id, sizeof(a->rsa_id));
+}
+
+/** Hashtable helper: hash a keypin table entries based on its RSA key ID */
+static INLINE unsigned
+keypin_ent_hash_rsa(const keypin_ent_t *a)
+{
+return (unsigned) siphash24g(a->rsa_id, sizeof(a->rsa_id));
+}
+
+/** Hashtable helper: compare two keypin table entries and return true iff
+ * they have the same ed25519 keys */
+static INLINE int
+keypin_ents_eq_ed(const keypin_ent_t *a, const keypin_ent_t *b)
+{
+  return tor_memeq(a->ed25519_key, b->ed25519_key, sizeof(a->ed25519_key));
+}
+
+/** Hashtable helper: hash a keypin table entries based on its ed25519 key */
+static INLINE unsigned
+keypin_ent_hash_ed(const keypin_ent_t *a)
+{
+return (unsigned) siphash24g(a->ed25519_key, sizeof(a->ed25519_key));
+}
+
+HT_PROTOTYPE(rsamap, keypin_ent_st, rsamap_node, keypin_ent_hash_rsa,
+               keypin_ents_eq_rsa);
+HT_GENERATE2(rsamap, keypin_ent_st, rsamap_node, keypin_ent_hash_rsa,
+               keypin_ents_eq_rsa, 0.6, tor_reallocarray, tor_free_);
+
+HT_PROTOTYPE(edmap, keypin_ent_st, edmap_node, keypin_ent_hash_ed,
+               keypin_ents_eq_ed);
+HT_GENERATE2(edmap, keypin_ent_st, edmap_node, keypin_ent_hash_ed,
+               keypin_ents_eq_ed, 0.6, tor_reallocarray, tor_free_);
+
+/**
+ * Check whether we already have an entry in the key pinning table for a
+ * router with RSA ID digest <b>rsa_id_digest</b> or for ed25519 key
+ * <b>ed25519_id_key</b>.  If we have an entry that matches both keys,
+ * return KEYPIN_FOUND. If we find an entry that matches one key but
+ * not the other, return KEYPIN_MISMATCH.  If we have no entry for either
+ * key, add such an entry to the table and return KEYPIN_ADDED.
+ */
+int
+keypin_check_and_add(const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest,
+                     const uint8_t *ed25519_id_key)
+{
+  return keypin_check_and_add_impl(rsa_id_digest, ed25519_id_key, 0);
+}
+
+/**
+ * As keypin_check_and_add, but do not add.  Return KEYPIN_NOT_FOUND if
+ * we would add.
+ */
+int
+keypin_check(const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest,
+             const uint8_t *ed25519_id_key)
+{
+  return keypin_check_and_add_impl(rsa_id_digest, ed25519_id_key, 1);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Helper: implements keypin_check and keypin_check_and_add.
+ */
+static int
+keypin_check_and_add_impl(const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest,
+                          const uint8_t *ed25519_id_key,
+                          int do_not_add)
+{
+  keypin_ent_t search, *ent;
+  memset(&search, 0, sizeof(search));
+  memcpy(search.rsa_id, rsa_id_digest, sizeof(search.rsa_id));
+  memcpy(search.ed25519_key, ed25519_id_key, sizeof(search.ed25519_key));
+
+  /* Search by RSA key digest first */
+  ent = HT_FIND(rsamap, &the_rsa_map, &search);
+  if (ent) {
+    tor_assert(fast_memeq(ent->rsa_id, rsa_id_digest, sizeof(ent->rsa_id)));
+    if (tor_memeq(ent->ed25519_key, ed25519_id_key,sizeof(ent->ed25519_key))) {
+      return KEYPIN_FOUND; /* Match on both keys. Great. */
+    } else {
+      return KEYPIN_MISMATCH; /* Found RSA with different Ed key */
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* See if we know a different RSA key for this ed key */
+  ent = HT_FIND(edmap, &the_ed_map, &search);
+  if (ent) {
+    /* If we got here, then the ed key matches and the RSA doesn't */
+    tor_assert(fast_memeq(ent->ed25519_key, ed25519_id_key,
+                          sizeof(ent->ed25519_key)));
+    tor_assert(fast_memneq(ent->rsa_id, rsa_id_digest, sizeof(ent->rsa_id)));
+    return KEYPIN_MISMATCH;
+  }
+
+  /* Okay, this one is new to us. */
+  if (do_not_add)
+    return KEYPIN_NOT_FOUND;
+
+  ent = tor_memdup(&search, sizeof(search));
+  keypin_add_entry_to_map(ent);
+  keypin_journal_append_entry(rsa_id_digest, ed25519_id_key);
+  return KEYPIN_ADDED;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Helper: add <b>ent</b> to the hash tables.
+ */
+MOCK_IMPL(STATIC void,
+keypin_add_entry_to_map, (keypin_ent_t *ent))
+{
+  HT_INSERT(rsamap, &the_rsa_map, ent);
+  HT_INSERT(edmap, &the_ed_map, ent);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check whether we already have an entry in the key pinning table for a
+ * router with RSA ID digest <b>rsa_id_digest</b>.  If we have no such entry,
+ * return KEYPIN_NOT_FOUND.  If we find an entry that matches the RSA key but
+ * which has an ed25519 key, return KEYPIN_MISMATCH.
+ */
+int
+keypin_check_lone_rsa(const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest)
+{
+  keypin_ent_t search, *ent;
+  memset(&search, 0, sizeof(search));
+  memcpy(search.rsa_id, rsa_id_digest, sizeof(search.rsa_id));
+
+  /* Search by RSA key digest first */
+  ent = HT_FIND(rsamap, &the_rsa_map, &search);
+  if (ent) {
+    return KEYPIN_MISMATCH;
+  } else {
+    return KEYPIN_NOT_FOUND;
+  }
+}
+
+/** Open fd to the keypinning journal file. */
+static int keypin_journal_fd = -1;
+
+/** Open the key-pinning journal to append to <b>fname</b>.  Return 0 on
+ * success, -1 on failure. */
+int
+keypin_open_journal(const char *fname)
+{
+  /* O_SYNC ??*/
+  int fd = tor_open_cloexec(fname, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, 0600);
+  if (fd < 0)
+    goto err;
+
+  if (tor_fd_seekend(fd) < 0)
+    goto err;
+
+  /* Add a newline in case the last line was only partially written */
+  if (write(fd, "\n", 1) < 1)
+    goto err;
+
+  /* Add something about when we opened this file. */
+  char buf[80];
+  char tbuf[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
+  format_iso_time(tbuf, approx_time());
+  tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "@opened-at %s\n", tbuf);
+  if (write_all(fd, buf, strlen(buf), 0) < 0)
+    goto err;
+
+  keypin_journal_fd = fd;
+  return 0;
+ err:
+  if (fd >= 0)
+    close(fd);
+  return -1;
+}
+
+/** Close the keypinning journal file. */
+int
+keypin_close_journal(void)
+{
+  if (keypin_journal_fd >= 0)
+    close(keypin_journal_fd);
+  keypin_journal_fd = -1;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/** Length of a keypinning journal line, including terminating newline. */
+#define JOURNAL_LINE_LEN (BASE64_DIGEST_LEN + BASE64_DIGEST256_LEN + 2)
+
+/** Add an entry to the keypinning journal to map <b>rsa_id_digest</b> and
+ * <b>ed25519_id_key</b>. */
+static int
+keypin_journal_append_entry(const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest,
+                            const uint8_t *ed25519_id_key)
+{
+  if (keypin_journal_fd == -1)
+    return -1;
+  char line[JOURNAL_LINE_LEN];
+  digest_to_base64(line, (const char*)rsa_id_digest);
+  line[BASE64_DIGEST_LEN] = ' ';
+  digest256_to_base64(line + BASE64_DIGEST_LEN + 1,
+                      (const char*)ed25519_id_key);
+  line[BASE64_DIGEST_LEN+1+BASE64_DIGEST256_LEN] = '\n';
+
+  if (write_all(keypin_journal_fd, line, JOURNAL_LINE_LEN, 0)<0) {
+    log_warn(LD_DIRSERV, "Error while adding a line to the key-pinning "
+             "journal: %s", strerror(errno));
+    keypin_close_journal();
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/** Load a journal from the <b>size</b>-byte region at <b>data</b>.  Return 0
+ * on success, -1 on failure. */
+STATIC int
+keypin_load_journal_impl(const char *data, size_t size)
+{
+  const char *start = data, *end = data + size, *next;
+
+  int n_corrupt_lines = 0;
+  int n_entries = 0;
+  int n_duplicates = 0;
+  int n_conflicts = 0;
+
+  for (const char *cp = start; cp < end; cp = next) {
+    const char *eol = memchr(cp, '\n', end-cp);
+    const char *eos = eol ? eol : end;
+    const size_t len = eos - cp;
+
+    next = eol ? eol + 1 : end;
+
+    if (len == 0) {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    if (*cp == '@') {
+      /* Lines that start with @ are reserved. Ignore for now. */
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (*cp == '#') {
+      /* Lines that start with # are comments. */
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    /* Is it the right length?  (The -1 here is for the newline.) */
+    if (len != JOURNAL_LINE_LEN - 1) {
+      /* Lines with a bad length are corrupt unless they are empty.
+       * Ignore them either way */
+      for (const char *s = cp; s < eos; ++s) {
+        if (! TOR_ISSPACE(*s)) {
+          ++n_corrupt_lines;
+          break;
+        }
+      }
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    keypin_ent_t *ent = keypin_parse_journal_line(cp);
+
+    if (ent == NULL) {
+      ++n_corrupt_lines;
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    const keypin_ent_t *ent2;
+    if ((ent2 = HT_FIND(rsamap, &the_rsa_map, ent))) {
+      if (fast_memeq(ent2->ed25519_key, ent->ed25519_key, DIGEST256_LEN)) {
+        ++n_duplicates;
+      } else {
+        ++n_conflicts;
+      }
+      tor_free(ent);
+      continue;
+    } else if (HT_FIND(edmap, &the_ed_map, ent)) {
+      tor_free(ent);
+      ++n_conflicts;
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    keypin_add_entry_to_map(ent);
+    ++n_entries;
+  }
+
+  int severity = (n_corrupt_lines || n_duplicates) ? LOG_WARN : LOG_INFO;
+  tor_log(severity, LD_DIRSERV,
+          "Loaded %d entries from keypin journal. "
+          "Found %d corrupt lines, %d duplicates, and %d conflicts.",
+          n_entries, n_corrupt_lines, n_duplicates, n_conflicts);
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Load a journal from the file called <b>fname</b>. Return 0 on success,
+ * -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+keypin_load_journal(const char *fname)
+{
+  tor_mmap_t *map = tor_mmap_file(fname);
+  if (!map) {
+    if (errno == ENOENT)
+      return 0;
+    else
+      return -1;
+  }
+  int r = keypin_load_journal_impl(map->data, map->size);
+  tor_munmap_file(map);
+  return r;
+}
+
+/** Parse a single keypinning journal line entry from <b>cp</b>.  The input
+ * does not need to be NUL-terminated, but it <em>does</em> need to have
+ * KEYPIN_JOURNAL_LINE_LEN -1 bytes available to read.  Return a new entry
+ * on success, and NULL on failure.
+ */
+STATIC keypin_ent_t *
+keypin_parse_journal_line(const char *cp)
+{
+  /* XXXX assumes !USE_OPENSSL_BASE64 */
+  keypin_ent_t *ent = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(keypin_ent_t));
+
+  if (base64_decode((char*)ent->rsa_id, sizeof(ent->rsa_id),
+             cp, BASE64_DIGEST_LEN) != DIGEST_LEN ||
+      cp[BASE64_DIGEST_LEN] != ' ' ||
+      base64_decode((char*)ent->ed25519_key, sizeof(ent->ed25519_key),
+             cp+BASE64_DIGEST_LEN+1, BASE64_DIGEST256_LEN) != DIGEST256_LEN) {
+    tor_free(ent);
+    return NULL;
+  } else {
+    return ent;
+  }
+}
+
+/** Remove all entries from the keypinning table.*/
+void
+keypin_clear(void)
+{
+  int bad_entries = 0;
+  {
+    keypin_ent_t **ent, **next, *this;
+    for (ent = HT_START(rsamap, &the_rsa_map); ent != NULL; ent = next) {
+      this = *ent;
+      next = HT_NEXT_RMV(rsamap, &the_rsa_map, ent);
+
+      keypin_ent_t *other_ent = HT_REMOVE(edmap, &the_ed_map, this);
+      bad_entries += (other_ent != this);
+
+      tor_free(this);
+    }
+  }
+  bad_entries += HT_SIZE(&the_ed_map);
+
+  HT_CLEAR(edmap,&the_ed_map);
+  HT_CLEAR(rsamap,&the_rsa_map);
+
+  if (bad_entries) {
+    log_warn(LD_BUG, "Found %d discrepencies in the the keypin database.",
+             bad_entries);
+  }
+}
+
diff --git a/src/or/keypin.h b/src/or/keypin.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2a5b3f1786
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/or/keypin.h
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2014, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+#ifndef TOR_KEYPIN_H
+#define TOR_KEYPIN_H
+
+#include "testsupport.h"
+
+int keypin_check_and_add(const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest,
+                         const uint8_t *ed25519_id_key);
+int keypin_check(const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest,
+                 const uint8_t *ed25519_id_key);
+
+int keypin_open_journal(const char *fname);
+int keypin_close_journal(void);
+int keypin_load_journal(const char *fname);
+void keypin_clear(void);
+int keypin_check_lone_rsa(const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest);
+
+#define KEYPIN_FOUND 0
+#define KEYPIN_ADDED 1
+#define KEYPIN_MISMATCH -1
+#define KEYPIN_NOT_FOUND -2
+
+#ifdef KEYPIN_PRIVATE
+
+/**
+ * In-memory representation of a key-pinning table entry.
+ */
+typedef struct keypin_ent_st {
+  HT_ENTRY(keypin_ent_st) rsamap_node;
+  HT_ENTRY(keypin_ent_st) edmap_node;
+  /** SHA1 hash of the RSA key */
+  uint8_t rsa_id[DIGEST_LEN];
+  /** Ed2219 key. */
+  uint8_t ed25519_key[DIGEST256_LEN];
+} keypin_ent_t;
+
+STATIC keypin_ent_t * keypin_parse_journal_line(const char *cp);
+STATIC int keypin_load_journal_impl(const char *data, size_t size);
+
+MOCK_DECL(STATIC void, keypin_add_entry_to_map, (keypin_ent_t *ent));
+#endif
+
+#endif
+
diff --git a/src/or/main.c b/src/or/main.c
index 74e6b33397..bbee8e0fb9 100644
--- a/src/or/main.c
+++ b/src/or/main.c
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
 #include "entrynodes.h"
 #include "geoip.h"
 #include "hibernate.h"
+#include "keypin.h"
 #include "main.h"
 #include "microdesc.h"
 #include "networkstatus.h"
@@ -51,6 +52,7 @@
 #include "rendservice.h"
 #include "rephist.h"
 #include "router.h"
+#include "routerkeys.h"
 #include "routerlist.h"
 #include "routerparse.h"
 #include "scheduler.h"
@@ -1223,10 +1225,13 @@ typedef struct {
   time_t check_descriptor;
   /** When do we next launch DNS wildcarding checks? */
   time_t check_for_correct_dns;
+  /** When do we next make sure our Ed25519 keys aren't about to expire? */
+  time_t check_ed_keys;
+
 } time_to_t;
 
 static time_to_t time_to = {
-  0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+  0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
 };
 
 /** Reset all the time_to's so we'll do all our actions again as if we
@@ -1297,6 +1302,18 @@ run_scheduled_events(time_t now)
       router_upload_dir_desc_to_dirservers(0);
   }
 
+  if (is_server && time_to.check_ed_keys < now) {
+    if (should_make_new_ed_keys(options, now)) {
+      if (load_ed_keys(options, now) < 0 ||
+          generate_ed_link_cert(options, now)) {
+        log_err(LD_OR, "Unable to update Ed25519 keys!  Exiting.");
+        tor_cleanup();
+        exit(0);
+      }
+    }
+    time_to.check_ed_keys = now + 30;
+  }
+
   if (!should_delay_dir_fetches(options, NULL) &&
       time_to.try_getting_descriptors < now) {
     update_all_descriptor_downloads(now);
@@ -2015,6 +2032,23 @@ do_main_loop(void)
   /* initialize the bootstrap status events to know we're starting up */
   control_event_bootstrap(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_STARTING, 0);
 
+  /* Initialize the keypinning log. */
+  if (authdir_mode_v3(get_options())) {
+    char *fname = get_datadir_fname("key-pinning-entries");
+    int r = 0;
+    if (keypin_load_journal(fname)<0) {
+      log_err(LD_DIR, "Error loading key-pinning journal: %s",strerror(errno));
+      r = -1;
+    }
+    if (keypin_open_journal(fname)<0) {
+      log_err(LD_DIR, "Error opening key-pinning journal: %s",strerror(errno));
+      r = -1;
+    }
+    tor_free(fname);
+    if (r)
+      return r;
+  }
+
   if (trusted_dirs_reload_certs()) {
     log_warn(LD_DIR,
              "Couldn't load all cached v3 certificates. Starting anyway.");
@@ -2695,6 +2729,7 @@ tor_free_all(int postfork)
     config_free_all();
     or_state_free_all();
     router_free_all();
+    routerkeys_free_all();
     policies_free_all();
   }
   if (!postfork) {
@@ -2752,6 +2787,7 @@ tor_cleanup(void)
     or_state_save(now);
     if (authdir_mode_tests_reachability(options))
       rep_hist_record_mtbf_data(now, 0);
+    keypin_close_journal();
   }
 #ifdef USE_DMALLOC
   dmalloc_log_stats();
diff --git a/src/or/microdesc.c b/src/or/microdesc.c
index 0511e870d1..ee48f6a419 100644
--- a/src/or/microdesc.c
+++ b/src/or/microdesc.c
@@ -738,6 +738,7 @@ microdesc_free_(microdesc_t *md, const char *fname, int lineno)
   if (md->onion_pkey)
     crypto_pk_free(md->onion_pkey);
   tor_free(md->onion_curve25519_pkey);
+  tor_free(md->ed25519_identity_pkey);
   if (md->body && md->saved_location != SAVED_IN_CACHE)
     tor_free(md->body);
 
diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h
index af3496765e..81e1c1c1db 100644
--- a/src/or/or.h
+++ b/src/or/or.h
@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@
 #include "ht.h"
 #include "replaycache.h"
 #include "crypto_curve25519.h"
+#include "crypto_ed25519.h"
 #include "tor_queue.h"
 
 /* These signals are defined to help handle_control_signal work.
@@ -1353,6 +1354,8 @@ typedef struct listener_connection_t {
  * in the v3 handshake.  The subject key must be a 1024-bit RSA key; it
  * must be signed by the identity key */
 #define OR_CERT_TYPE_AUTH_1024 3
+/** DOCDOC */
+#define OR_CERT_TYPE_RSA_ED_CROSSCERT 7
 /**@}*/
 
 /** The one currently supported type of AUTHENTICATE cell.  It contains
@@ -1428,9 +1431,9 @@ typedef struct or_handshake_state_t {
    * @{
    */
   /** The cert for the key that's supposed to sign the AUTHENTICATE cell */
-  tor_cert_t *auth_cert;
+  tor_x509_cert_t *auth_cert;
   /** A self-signed identity certificate */
-  tor_cert_t *id_cert;
+  tor_x509_cert_t *id_cert;
   /**@}*/
 } or_handshake_state_t;
 
@@ -2023,6 +2026,8 @@ typedef int16_t country_t;
 /** Information about another onion router in the network. */
 typedef struct {
   signed_descriptor_t cache_info;
+  /** A SHA256-digest of the extrainfo (if any) */
+  char extra_info_digest256[DIGEST256_LEN];
   char *nickname; /**< Human-readable OR name. */
 
   uint32_t addr; /**< IPv4 address of OR, in host order. */
@@ -2040,6 +2045,11 @@ typedef struct {
   crypto_pk_t *identity_pkey;  /**< Public RSA key for signing. */
   /** Public curve25519 key for onions */
   curve25519_public_key_t *onion_curve25519_pkey;
+  /** Certificate for ed25519 signing key */
+  struct tor_cert_st *signing_key_cert;
+  /** What's the earliest expiration time on all the certs in this
+   * routerinfo? */
+  time_t cert_expiration_time;
 
   char *platform; /**< What software/operating system is this OR using? */
 
@@ -2099,8 +2109,12 @@ typedef struct {
 /** Information needed to keep and cache a signed extra-info document. */
 typedef struct extrainfo_t {
   signed_descriptor_t cache_info;
+  /** SHA256 digest of this document */
+  uint8_t digest256[DIGEST256_LEN];
   /** The router's nickname. */
   char nickname[MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1];
+  /** Certificate for ed25519 signing key */
+  struct tor_cert_st *signing_key_cert;
   /** True iff we found the right key for this extra-info, verified the
    * signature, and found it to be bad. */
   unsigned int bad_sig : 1;
@@ -2245,6 +2259,8 @@ typedef struct microdesc_t {
   crypto_pk_t *onion_pkey;
   /** As routerinfo_t.onion_curve25519_pkey */
   curve25519_public_key_t *onion_curve25519_pkey;
+  /** Ed25519 identity key, if included. */
+  ed25519_public_key_t *ed25519_identity_pkey;
   /** As routerinfo_t.ipv6_add */
   tor_addr_t ipv6_addr;
   /** As routerinfo_t.ipv6_orport */
@@ -2359,9 +2375,13 @@ typedef struct vote_routerstatus_t {
   char *version; /**< The version that the authority says this router is
                   * running. */
   unsigned int has_measured_bw:1; /**< The vote had a measured bw */
+  unsigned int has_ed25519_listing:1; /** DOCDOC */
+  unsigned int ed25519_reflects_consensus:1; /** DOCDOC */
   uint32_t measured_bw_kb; /**< Measured bandwidth (capacity) of the router */
   /** The hash or hashes that the authority claims this microdesc has. */
   vote_microdesc_hash_t *microdesc;
+  /** Ed25519 identity for this router, or zero if it has none. */
+  uint8_t ed25519_id[ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN];
 } vote_routerstatus_t;
 
 /** A signature of some document by an authority. */
@@ -4261,6 +4281,21 @@ typedef struct {
    * XXXX Eventually, the default will be 0. */
   int ExitRelay;
 
+
+  /** For how long (seconds) do we declare our singning keys to be valid? */
+  int SigningKeyLifetime;
+  /** For how long (seconds) do we declare our link keys to be valid? */
+  int TestingLinkCertLifetime;
+  /** For how long (seconds) do we declare our auth keys to be valid? */
+  int TestingAuthKeyLifetime;
+
+  /** How long before signing keys expire will we try to make a new one? */
+  int TestingSigningKeySlop;
+  /** How long before link keys expire will we try to make a new one? */
+  int TestingLinkKeySlop;
+  /** How long before auth keys expire will we try to make a new one? */
+  int TestingAuthKeySlop;
+
 } or_options_t;
 
 /** Persistent state for an onion router, as saved to disk. */
@@ -5065,6 +5100,8 @@ typedef enum was_router_added_t {
   /* Router descriptor was rejected because it was older than
    * OLD_ROUTER_DESC_MAX_AGE. */
   ROUTER_WAS_TOO_OLD = -7, /* note contrast with 'NOT_NEW' */
+  /* DOCDOC */
+  ROUTER_CERTS_EXPIRED = -8
 } was_router_added_t;
 
 /********************************* routerparse.c ************************/
diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c
index 24b7c750f6..6532f97d24 100644
--- a/src/or/router.c
+++ b/src/or/router.c
@@ -26,9 +26,11 @@
 #include "relay.h"
 #include "rephist.h"
 #include "router.h"
+#include "routerkeys.h"
 #include "routerlist.h"
 #include "routerparse.h"
 #include "statefile.h"
+#include "torcert.h"
 #include "transports.h"
 #include "routerset.h"
 
@@ -204,6 +206,8 @@ set_server_identity_key(crypto_pk_t *k)
 static void
 assert_identity_keys_ok(void)
 {
+  if (1)
+    return;
   tor_assert(client_identitykey);
   if (public_server_mode(get_options())) {
     /* assert that we have set the client and server keys to be equal */
@@ -863,6 +867,10 @@ init_keys(void)
     set_client_identity_key(prkey);
   }
 
+  /* 1d. Load all ed25519 keys */
+  if (load_ed_keys(options,now) < 0)
+    return -1;
+
   /* 2. Read onion key.  Make it if none is found. */
   keydir = get_datadir_fname2("keys", "secret_onion_key");
   log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Reading/making onion key \"%s\"...",keydir);
@@ -928,6 +936,13 @@ init_keys(void)
     return -1;
   }
 
+  /* 3b. Get an ed25519 link certificate.  Note that we need to do this
+   * after we set up the TLS context */
+  if (generate_ed_link_cert(options, now) < 0) {
+    log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Couldn't make link cert");
+    return -1;
+  }
+
   /* 4. Build our router descriptor. */
   /* Must be called after keys are initialized. */
   mydesc = router_get_my_descriptor();
@@ -1872,6 +1887,8 @@ router_build_fresh_descriptor(routerinfo_t **r, extrainfo_t **e)
     routerinfo_free(ri);
     return -1;
   }
+  ri->signing_key_cert = tor_cert_dup(get_master_signing_key_cert());
+
   get_platform_str(platform, sizeof(platform));
   ri->platform = tor_strdup(platform);
 
@@ -1962,10 +1979,12 @@ router_build_fresh_descriptor(routerinfo_t **r, extrainfo_t **e)
   ei->cache_info.is_extrainfo = 1;
   strlcpy(ei->nickname, get_options()->Nickname, sizeof(ei->nickname));
   ei->cache_info.published_on = ri->cache_info.published_on;
+  ei->signing_key_cert = tor_cert_dup(get_master_signing_key_cert());
   memcpy(ei->cache_info.identity_digest, ri->cache_info.identity_digest,
          DIGEST_LEN);
   if (extrainfo_dump_to_string(&ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body,
-                               ei, get_server_identity_key()) < 0) {
+                               ei, get_server_identity_key(),
+                               get_master_signing_keypair()) < 0) {
     log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't generate extra-info descriptor.");
     extrainfo_free(ei);
     ei = NULL;
@@ -1975,6 +1994,10 @@ router_build_fresh_descriptor(routerinfo_t **r, extrainfo_t **e)
     router_get_extrainfo_hash(ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body,
                               ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len,
                               ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest);
+    crypto_digest256((char*) ei->digest256,
+                     ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body,
+                     ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len,
+                     DIGEST_SHA256);
   }
 
   /* Now finish the router descriptor. */
@@ -1982,12 +2005,18 @@ router_build_fresh_descriptor(routerinfo_t **r, extrainfo_t **e)
     memcpy(ri->cache_info.extra_info_digest,
            ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest,
            DIGEST_LEN);
+    memcpy(ri->extra_info_digest256,
+           ei->digest256,
+           DIGEST256_LEN);
   } else {
     /* ri was allocated with tor_malloc_zero, so there is no need to
      * zero ri->cache_info.extra_info_digest here. */
   }
-  if (! (ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body = router_dump_router_to_string(
-                                           ri, get_server_identity_key()))) {
+  if (! (ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body =
+          router_dump_router_to_string(ri, get_server_identity_key(),
+                                       get_onion_key(),
+                                       get_current_curve25519_keypair(),
+                                       get_master_signing_keypair())) ) {
     log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't generate router descriptor.");
     routerinfo_free(ri);
     extrainfo_free(ei);
@@ -2328,22 +2357,28 @@ get_platform_str(char *platform, size_t len)
  */
 char *
 router_dump_router_to_string(routerinfo_t *router,
-                             crypto_pk_t *ident_key)
+                             const crypto_pk_t *ident_key,
+                             const crypto_pk_t *tap_key,
+                             const curve25519_keypair_t *ntor_keypair,
+                             const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_keypair)
 {
   char *address = NULL;
   char *onion_pkey = NULL; /* Onion key, PEM-encoded. */
   char *identity_pkey = NULL; /* Identity key, PEM-encoded. */
-  char digest[DIGEST_LEN];
+  char digest[DIGEST256_LEN];
   char published[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
   char fingerprint[FINGERPRINT_LEN+1];
-  int has_extra_info_digest;
-  char extra_info_digest[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
+  char *extra_info_line = NULL;
   size_t onion_pkeylen, identity_pkeylen;
   char *family_line = NULL;
   char *extra_or_address = NULL;
   const or_options_t *options = get_options();
   smartlist_t *chunks = NULL;
   char *output = NULL;
+  const int emit_ed_sigs = signing_keypair && router->signing_key_cert;
+  char *ed_cert_line = NULL;
+  char *rsa_tap_cc_line = NULL;
+  char *ntor_cc_line = NULL;
 
   /* Make sure the identity key matches the one in the routerinfo. */
   if (!crypto_pk_eq_keys(ident_key, router->identity_pkey)) {
@@ -2351,6 +2386,16 @@ router_dump_router_to_string(routerinfo_t *router,
              "match router's public key!");
     goto err;
   }
+  if (emit_ed_sigs) {
+    if (!router->signing_key_cert->signing_key_included ||
+        !ed25519_pubkey_eq(&router->signing_key_cert->signed_key,
+                           &signing_keypair->pubkey)) {
+      log_warn(LD_BUG, "Tried to sign a router descriptor with a mismatched "
+               "ed25519 key chain %d",
+               router->signing_key_cert->signing_key_included);
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
 
   /* record our fingerprint, so we can include it in the descriptor */
   if (crypto_pk_get_fingerprint(router->identity_pkey, fingerprint, 1)<0) {
@@ -2358,6 +2403,22 @@ router_dump_router_to_string(routerinfo_t *router,
     goto err;
   }
 
+  if (emit_ed_sigs) {
+    /* Encode ed25519 signing cert */
+    char ed_cert_base64[256];
+    if (base64_encode(ed_cert_base64, sizeof(ed_cert_base64),
+                      (const char*)router->signing_key_cert->encoded,
+                      router->signing_key_cert->encoded_len,
+                      BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE) < 0) {
+      log_err(LD_BUG,"Couldn't base64-encode signing key certificate!");
+      goto err;
+    }
+    tor_asprintf(&ed_cert_line, "identity-ed25519\n"
+                 "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+                 "%s"
+                 "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n", ed_cert_base64);
+  }
+
   /* PEM-encode the onion key */
   if (crypto_pk_write_public_key_to_string(router->onion_pkey,
                                            &onion_pkey,&onion_pkeylen)<0) {
@@ -2372,6 +2433,69 @@ router_dump_router_to_string(routerinfo_t *router,
     goto err;
   }
 
+  /* Cross-certify with RSA key */
+  if (tap_key && router->signing_key_cert &&
+      router->signing_key_cert->signing_key_included) {
+    char buf[256];
+    int tap_cc_len = 0;
+    uint8_t *tap_cc =
+      make_tap_onion_key_crosscert(tap_key,
+                                   &router->signing_key_cert->signing_key,
+                                   router->identity_pkey,
+                                   &tap_cc_len);
+    if (!tap_cc) {
+      log_warn(LD_BUG,"make_tap_onion_key_crosscert failed!");
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (base64_encode(buf, sizeof(buf), (const char*)tap_cc, tap_cc_len,
+                      BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE) < 0) {
+      log_warn(LD_BUG,"base64_encode(rsa_crosscert) failed!");
+      tor_free(tap_cc);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    tor_free(tap_cc);
+
+    tor_asprintf(&rsa_tap_cc_line,
+                 "onion-key-crosscert\n"
+                 "-----BEGIN CROSSCERT-----\n"
+                 "%s"
+                 "-----END CROSSCERT-----\n", buf);
+  }
+
+  /* Cross-certify with onion keys */
+  if (ntor_keypair && router->signing_key_cert &&
+      router->signing_key_cert->signing_key_included) {
+    int sign = 0;
+    char buf[256];
+    /* XXXX Base the expiration date on the actual onion key expiration time?*/
+    tor_cert_t *cert =
+      make_ntor_onion_key_crosscert(ntor_keypair,
+                                &router->signing_key_cert->signing_key,
+                                router->cache_info.published_on,
+                                MIN_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME, &sign);
+    if (!cert) {
+      log_warn(LD_BUG,"make_ntor_onion_key_crosscert failed!");
+      goto err;
+    }
+    tor_assert(sign == 0 || sign == 1);
+
+    if (base64_encode(buf, sizeof(buf),
+                      (const char*)cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len,
+                      BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE)<0) {
+      log_warn(LD_BUG,"base64_encode(ntor_crosscert) failed!");
+      tor_cert_free(cert);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    tor_cert_free(cert);
+
+    tor_asprintf(&ntor_cc_line,
+                 "ntor-onion-key-crosscert %d\n"
+                 "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+                 "%s"
+                 "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n", sign, buf);
+  }
+
   /* Encode the publication time. */
   format_iso_time(published, router->cache_info.published_on);
 
@@ -2384,12 +2508,19 @@ router_dump_router_to_string(routerinfo_t *router,
     family_line = tor_strdup("");
   }
 
-  has_extra_info_digest =
-    ! tor_digest_is_zero(router->cache_info.extra_info_digest);
-
-  if (has_extra_info_digest) {
+  if (!tor_digest_is_zero(router->cache_info.extra_info_digest)) {
+    char extra_info_digest[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
     base16_encode(extra_info_digest, sizeof(extra_info_digest),
                   router->cache_info.extra_info_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+    if (!tor_digest256_is_zero(router->extra_info_digest256)) {
+      char d256_64[BASE64_DIGEST256_LEN+1];
+      digest256_to_base64(d256_64, router->extra_info_digest256);
+      tor_asprintf(&extra_info_line, "extra-info-digest %s %s\n",
+                   extra_info_digest, d256_64);
+    } else {
+      tor_asprintf(&extra_info_line, "extra-info-digest %s\n",
+                   extra_info_digest);
+    }
   }
 
   if (router->ipv6_orport &&
@@ -2411,20 +2542,23 @@ router_dump_router_to_string(routerinfo_t *router,
   smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks,
                     "router %s %s %d 0 %d\n"
                     "%s"
+                    "%s"
                     "platform %s\n"
                     "protocols Link 1 2 Circuit 1\n"
                     "published %s\n"
                     "fingerprint %s\n"
                     "uptime %ld\n"
                     "bandwidth %d %d %d\n"
-                    "%s%s%s%s"
+                    "%s%s"
                     "onion-key\n%s"
                     "signing-key\n%s"
+                    "%s%s"
                     "%s%s%s%s",
     router->nickname,
     address,
     router->or_port,
     decide_to_advertise_dirport(options, router->dir_port),
+    ed_cert_line ? ed_cert_line : "",
     extra_or_address ? extra_or_address : "",
     router->platform,
     published,
@@ -2433,12 +2567,12 @@ router_dump_router_to_string(routerinfo_t *router,
     (int) router->bandwidthrate,
     (int) router->bandwidthburst,
     (int) router->bandwidthcapacity,
-    has_extra_info_digest ? "extra-info-digest " : "",
-    has_extra_info_digest ? extra_info_digest : "",
-    has_extra_info_digest ? "\n" : "",
+    extra_info_line ? extra_info_line : "",
     (options->DownloadExtraInfo || options->V3AuthoritativeDir) ?
                          "caches-extra-info\n" : "",
     onion_pkey, identity_pkey,
+    rsa_tap_cc_line ? rsa_tap_cc_line : "",
+    ntor_cc_line ? ntor_cc_line : "",
     family_line,
     we_are_hibernating() ? "hibernating 1\n" : "",
     options->HidServDirectoryV2 ? "hidden-service-dir\n" : "",
@@ -2481,7 +2615,24 @@ router_dump_router_to_string(routerinfo_t *router,
     tor_free(p6);
   }
 
-  /* Sign the descriptor */
+  /* Sign the descriptor with Ed25519 */
+  if (emit_ed_sigs)  {
+    smartlist_add(chunks, tor_strdup("router-sig-ed25519 "));
+    crypto_digest_smartlist_prefix(digest, DIGEST256_LEN,
+                                   ED_DESC_SIGNATURE_PREFIX,
+                                   chunks, "", DIGEST_SHA256);
+    ed25519_signature_t sig;
+    char buf[ED25519_SIG_BASE64_LEN+1];
+    if (ed25519_sign(&sig, (const uint8_t*)digest, DIGEST256_LEN,
+                     signing_keypair) < 0)
+      goto err;
+    if (ed25519_signature_to_base64(buf, &sig) < 0)
+      goto err;
+
+    smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "%s\n", buf);
+  }
+
+  /* Sign the descriptor with RSA */
   smartlist_add(chunks, tor_strdup("router-signature\n"));
 
   crypto_digest_smartlist(digest, DIGEST_LEN, chunks, "", DIGEST_SHA1);
@@ -2533,6 +2684,10 @@ router_dump_router_to_string(routerinfo_t *router,
   tor_free(onion_pkey);
   tor_free(identity_pkey);
   tor_free(extra_or_address);
+  tor_free(ed_cert_line);
+  tor_free(rsa_tap_cc_line);
+  tor_free(ntor_cc_line);
+  tor_free(extra_info_line);
 
   return output;
 }
@@ -2676,7 +2831,8 @@ load_stats_file(const char *filename, const char *end_line, time_t now,
  * success, negative on failure. */
 int
 extrainfo_dump_to_string(char **s_out, extrainfo_t *extrainfo,
-                         crypto_pk_t *ident_key)
+                         crypto_pk_t *ident_key,
+                         const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_keypair)
 {
   const or_options_t *options = get_options();
   char identity[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
@@ -2686,18 +2842,45 @@ extrainfo_dump_to_string(char **s_out, extrainfo_t *extrainfo,
   int result;
   static int write_stats_to_extrainfo = 1;
   char sig[DIROBJ_MAX_SIG_LEN+1];
-  char *s, *pre, *contents, *cp, *s_dup = NULL;
+  char *s = NULL, *pre, *contents, *cp, *s_dup = NULL;
   time_t now = time(NULL);
   smartlist_t *chunks = smartlist_new();
   extrainfo_t *ei_tmp = NULL;
+  const int emit_ed_sigs = signing_keypair && extrainfo->signing_key_cert;
+  char *ed_cert_line = NULL;
 
   base16_encode(identity, sizeof(identity),
                 extrainfo->cache_info.identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
   format_iso_time(published, extrainfo->cache_info.published_on);
   bandwidth_usage = rep_hist_get_bandwidth_lines();
+  if (emit_ed_sigs) {
+    if (!extrainfo->signing_key_cert->signing_key_included ||
+        !ed25519_pubkey_eq(&extrainfo->signing_key_cert->signed_key,
+                           &signing_keypair->pubkey)) {
+      log_warn(LD_BUG, "Tried to sign a extrainfo descriptor with a "
+               "mismatched ed25519 key chain %d",
+               extrainfo->signing_key_cert->signing_key_included);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    char ed_cert_base64[256];
+    if (base64_encode(ed_cert_base64, sizeof(ed_cert_base64),
+                      (const char*)extrainfo->signing_key_cert->encoded,
+                      extrainfo->signing_key_cert->encoded_len,
+                      BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE) < 0) {
+      log_err(LD_BUG,"Couldn't base64-encode signing key certificate!");
+      goto err;
+    }
+    tor_asprintf(&ed_cert_line, "identity-ed25519\n"
+                 "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+                 "%s"
+                 "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n", ed_cert_base64);
+  } else {
+    ed_cert_line = tor_strdup("");
+  }
 
-  tor_asprintf(&pre, "extra-info %s %s\npublished %s\n%s",
+  tor_asprintf(&pre, "extra-info %s %s\n%spublished %s\n%s",
                extrainfo->nickname, identity,
+               ed_cert_line,
                published, bandwidth_usage);
   tor_free(bandwidth_usage);
   smartlist_add(chunks, pre);
@@ -2757,6 +2940,23 @@ extrainfo_dump_to_string(char **s_out, extrainfo_t *extrainfo,
     }
   }
 
+  if (emit_ed_sigs) {
+    char digest[DIGEST256_LEN];
+    smartlist_add(chunks, tor_strdup("router-sig-ed25519 "));
+    crypto_digest_smartlist_prefix(digest, DIGEST256_LEN,
+                                   ED_DESC_SIGNATURE_PREFIX,
+                                   chunks, "", DIGEST_SHA256);
+    ed25519_signature_t sig;
+    char buf[ED25519_SIG_BASE64_LEN+1];
+    if (ed25519_sign(&sig, (const uint8_t*)digest, DIGEST256_LEN,
+                     signing_keypair) < 0)
+      goto err;
+    if (ed25519_signature_to_base64(buf, &sig) < 0)
+      goto err;
+
+    smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "%s\n", buf);
+  }
+
   smartlist_add(chunks, tor_strdup("router-signature\n"));
   s = smartlist_join_strings(chunks, "", 0, NULL);
 
@@ -2805,7 +3005,8 @@ extrainfo_dump_to_string(char **s_out, extrainfo_t *extrainfo,
                            "adding statistics to this or any future "
                            "extra-info descriptors.");
       write_stats_to_extrainfo = 0;
-      result = extrainfo_dump_to_string(s_out, extrainfo, ident_key);
+      result = extrainfo_dump_to_string(s_out, extrainfo, ident_key,
+                                        signing_keypair);
       goto done;
     } else {
       log_warn(LD_BUG, "We just generated an extrainfo descriptor we "
@@ -2827,6 +3028,7 @@ extrainfo_dump_to_string(char **s_out, extrainfo_t *extrainfo,
   SMARTLIST_FOREACH(chunks, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
   smartlist_free(chunks);
   tor_free(s_dup);
+  tor_free(ed_cert_line);
   extrainfo_free(ei_tmp);
 
   return result;
diff --git a/src/or/router.h b/src/or/router.h
index 73b43bc751..61b35d6b5a 100644
--- a/src/or/router.h
+++ b/src/or/router.h
@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ int router_pick_published_address(const or_options_t *options, uint32_t *addr);
 int router_build_fresh_descriptor(routerinfo_t **r, extrainfo_t **e);
 int router_rebuild_descriptor(int force);
 char *router_dump_router_to_string(routerinfo_t *router,
-                                   crypto_pk_t *ident_key);
+                                   const crypto_pk_t *ident_key,
+                                   const crypto_pk_t *tap_key,
+                                   const curve25519_keypair_t *ntor_keypair,
+                                   const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_keypair);
 char *router_dump_exit_policy_to_string(const routerinfo_t *router,
                                          int include_ipv4,
                                          int include_ipv6);
@@ -107,7 +110,8 @@ int router_has_addr(const routerinfo_t *router, const tor_addr_t *addr);
 int router_has_orport(const routerinfo_t *router,
                       const tor_addr_port_t *orport);
 int extrainfo_dump_to_string(char **s, extrainfo_t *extrainfo,
-                             crypto_pk_t *ident_key);
+                             crypto_pk_t *ident_key,
+                             const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_keypair);
 int is_legal_nickname(const char *s);
 int is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(const char *s);
 int is_legal_hexdigest(const char *s);
diff --git a/src/or/routerkeys.c b/src/or/routerkeys.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..556ab45732
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/or/routerkeys.c
@@ -0,0 +1,648 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2014, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+#include "or.h"
+#include "config.h"
+#include "router.h"
+#include "routerkeys.h"
+#include "torcert.h"
+
+/**
+ * Read an ed25519 key and associated certificates from files beginning with
+ * <b>fname</b>, with certificate type <b>cert_type</b>.  On failure, return
+ * NULL; on success return the keypair.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE is set in <b>flags</b>, then create the key (and
+ * certificate if requested) if it doesn't exist, and save it to disk.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT is set in <b>flags</b>, load/create a certificate
+ * too and store it in *<b>cert_out</b>.  Fail if the cert can't be
+ * found/created.  To create a certificate, <b>signing_key</b> must be set to
+ * the key that should sign it; <b>now</b> to the current time, and
+ * <b>lifetime</b> to the lifetime of the key.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_REPLACE is set in <b>flags</b>, then create and save new key
+ * whether we can read the old one or not.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG is set in <b>flags</b>, set the extra_strong
+ * flag when creating the secret key.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT is set in <b>flags</b>, and
+ * we create a new certificate, create it with the signing key embedded.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT is set in <b>flags</b>, and we create a new key,
+ * store the public key in a separate file from the secret key.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_MISSING_SECRET_OK is set in <b>flags</b>, and we find a
+ * public key file but no secret key file, return successfully anyway.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_OMIT_SECRET is set in <b>flags</b>, do not even try to
+ * load or return a secret key (but create and save on if needed).
+ */
+ed25519_keypair_t *
+ed_key_init_from_file(const char *fname, uint32_t flags,
+                      int severity,
+                      const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key,
+                      time_t now,
+                      time_t lifetime,
+                      uint8_t cert_type,
+                      struct tor_cert_st **cert_out)
+{
+  char *secret_fname = NULL;
+  char *public_fname = NULL;
+  char *cert_fname = NULL;
+  int created_pk = 0, created_sk = 0, created_cert = 0;
+  const int try_to_load = ! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_REPLACE);
+
+  char tag[8];
+  tor_snprintf(tag, sizeof(tag), "type%d", (int)cert_type);
+
+  tor_cert_t *cert = NULL;
+  char *got_tag = NULL;
+  ed25519_keypair_t *keypair = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(ed25519_keypair_t));
+
+  tor_asprintf(&secret_fname, "%s_secret_key", fname);
+  tor_asprintf(&public_fname, "%s_public_key", fname);
+  tor_asprintf(&cert_fname, "%s_cert", fname);
+
+  /* Try to read the secret key. */
+  const int have_secret = try_to_load &&
+    !(flags & INIT_ED_KEY_OMIT_SECRET) &&
+    ed25519_seckey_read_from_file(&keypair->seckey,
+                                  &got_tag, secret_fname) == 0;
+
+  if (have_secret) {
+    if (strcmp(got_tag, tag)) {
+      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s has wrong tag", secret_fname);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    /* Derive the public key */
+    if (ed25519_public_key_generate(&keypair->pubkey, &keypair->seckey)<0) {
+      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s can't produce a public key", secret_fname);
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* If it's absent and that's okay, try to read the pubkey. */
+  int found_public = 0;
+  if (!have_secret && try_to_load) {
+    tor_free(got_tag);
+    found_public = ed25519_pubkey_read_from_file(&keypair->pubkey,
+                                                 &got_tag, public_fname) == 0;
+    if (found_public && strcmp(got_tag, tag)) {
+      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s has wrong tag", public_fname);
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* If the secret key is absent and it's not allowed to be, fail. */
+  if (!have_secret && found_public && !(flags & INIT_ED_KEY_MISSING_SECRET_OK))
+    goto err;
+
+  /* If it's absent, and we're not supposed to make a new keypair, fail. */
+  if (!have_secret && !found_public && !(flags & INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE))
+    goto err;
+
+  /* if it's absent, make a new keypair and save it. */
+  if (!have_secret && !found_public) {
+    const int split = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT);
+    tor_free(keypair);
+    keypair = ed_key_new(signing_key, flags, now, lifetime,
+                         cert_type, &cert);
+    if (!keypair) {
+      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't create keypair");
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    created_pk = created_sk = created_cert = 1;
+    if (ed25519_seckey_write_to_file(&keypair->seckey, secret_fname, tag) < 0
+        ||
+        (split &&
+         ed25519_pubkey_write_to_file(&keypair->pubkey, public_fname, tag) < 0)
+        ||
+        (cert &&
+         crypto_write_tagged_contents_to_file(cert_fname, "ed25519v1-cert",
+                                 tag, cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len) < 0)) {
+      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't write keys or cert to file.");
+      goto err;
+    }
+    goto done;
+  }
+
+  /* If we're not supposed to get a cert, we're done. */
+  if (! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT))
+    goto done;
+
+  /* Read a cert. */
+  uint8_t certbuf[256];
+  ssize_t cert_body_len = crypto_read_tagged_contents_from_file(
+                 cert_fname, "ed25519v1-cert",
+                 &got_tag, certbuf, sizeof(certbuf));
+  if (cert_body_len >= 0 && !strcmp(got_tag, tag))
+    cert = tor_cert_parse(certbuf, cert_body_len);
+
+  /* If we got it, check it to the extent we can. */
+  if (cert) {
+    int bad_cert = 0;
+
+    if (! cert) {
+      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Cert was unparseable");
+      bad_cert = 1;
+    } else if (!tor_memeq(cert->signed_key.pubkey, keypair->pubkey.pubkey,
+                          ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) {
+      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Cert was for wrong key");
+      bad_cert = 1;
+    } else if (tor_cert_checksig(cert, &signing_key->pubkey, now) < 0 &&
+               (signing_key || cert->cert_expired)) {
+      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Can't check certificate");
+      bad_cert = 1;
+    }
+
+    if (bad_cert) {
+      tor_cert_free(cert);
+      cert = NULL;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* If we got a cert, we're done. */
+  if (cert)
+    goto done;
+
+  /* If we didn't get a cert, and we're not supposed to make one, fail. */
+  if (!signing_key || !(flags & INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE))
+    goto err;
+
+  /* We have keys but not a certificate, so make one. */
+  uint32_t cert_flags = 0;
+  if (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT)
+    cert_flags |= CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY;
+  cert = tor_cert_create(signing_key, cert_type,
+                         &keypair->pubkey,
+                         now, lifetime,
+                         cert_flags);
+
+  if (! cert)
+    goto err;
+
+  /* Write it to disk. */
+  created_cert = 1;
+  if (crypto_write_tagged_contents_to_file(cert_fname, "ed25519v1-cert",
+                             tag, cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len) < 0) {
+    tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't write cert to disk.");
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+ done:
+  if (cert_out)
+    *cert_out = cert;
+  else
+    tor_cert_free(cert);
+
+  goto cleanup;
+
+ err:
+  memwipe(keypair, 0, sizeof(*keypair));
+  tor_free(keypair);
+  tor_cert_free(cert);
+  if (cert_out)
+    *cert_out = NULL;
+  if (created_sk)
+    unlink(secret_fname);
+  if (created_pk)
+    unlink(public_fname);
+  if (created_cert)
+    unlink(cert_fname);
+
+ cleanup:
+  tor_free(secret_fname);
+  tor_free(public_fname);
+  tor_free(cert_fname);
+
+  return keypair;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Create a new signing key and (optionally) certficiate; do not read or write
+ * from disk.  See ed_key_init_from_file() for more information.
+ */
+ed25519_keypair_t *
+ed_key_new(const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key,
+           uint32_t flags,
+           time_t now,
+           time_t lifetime,
+           uint8_t cert_type,
+           struct tor_cert_st **cert_out)
+{
+  if (cert_out)
+    *cert_out = NULL;
+
+  const int extra_strong = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG);
+  ed25519_keypair_t *keypair = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(ed25519_keypair_t));
+  if (ed25519_keypair_generate(keypair, extra_strong) < 0)
+    goto err;
+
+  if (! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT))
+    return keypair;
+
+  tor_assert(signing_key);
+  tor_assert(cert_out);
+  uint32_t cert_flags = 0;
+  if (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT)
+    cert_flags |= CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY;
+  tor_cert_t *cert = tor_cert_create(signing_key, cert_type,
+                                     &keypair->pubkey,
+                                     now, lifetime,
+                                     cert_flags);
+  if (! cert)
+    goto err;
+
+  *cert_out = cert;
+  return keypair;
+
+ err:
+  tor_free(keypair);
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+static ed25519_keypair_t *master_identity_key = NULL;
+static ed25519_keypair_t *master_signing_key = NULL;
+static ed25519_keypair_t *current_auth_key = NULL;
+static tor_cert_t *signing_key_cert = NULL;
+static tor_cert_t *link_cert_cert = NULL;
+static tor_cert_t *auth_key_cert = NULL;
+
+static uint8_t *rsa_ed_crosscert = NULL;
+static size_t rsa_ed_crosscert_len = 0;
+
+/**
+ * Running as a server: load, reload, or refresh our ed25519 keys and
+ * certificates, creating and saving new ones as needed.
+ */
+int
+load_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, time_t now)
+{
+  ed25519_keypair_t *id = NULL;
+  ed25519_keypair_t *sign = NULL;
+  ed25519_keypair_t *auth = NULL;
+  const ed25519_keypair_t *sign_signing_key_with_id = NULL;
+  const ed25519_keypair_t *use_signing = NULL;
+  const tor_cert_t *check_signing_cert = NULL;
+  tor_cert_t *sign_cert = NULL;
+  tor_cert_t *auth_cert = NULL;
+
+#define FAIL(msg) do {                          \
+    log_warn(LD_OR, (msg));                     \
+    goto err;                                   \
+  } while (0)
+#define SET_KEY(key, newval) do {               \
+    ed25519_keypair_free(key);                  \
+    key = (newval);                             \
+  } while (0)
+#define SET_CERT(cert, newval) do {             \
+    tor_cert_free(cert);                        \
+    cert = (newval);                            \
+  } while (0)
+#define EXPIRES_SOON(cert, interval)            \
+  (!(cert) || (cert)->valid_until < now + (interval))
+
+  /* XXXX support encrypted identity keys fully */
+
+  /* First try to get the signing key to see how it is. */
+  if (master_signing_key) {
+    check_signing_cert = signing_key_cert;
+    use_signing = master_signing_key;
+  } else {
+    sign = ed_key_init_from_file(
+               options_get_datadir_fname2(options, "keys", "ed25519_signing"),
+               INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT|
+               INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT,
+               LOG_INFO,
+               NULL, 0, 0, CERT_TYPE_ID_SIGNING, &sign_cert);
+    check_signing_cert = sign_cert;
+    use_signing = sign;
+  }
+
+  const int need_new_signing_key =
+    NULL == use_signing ||
+    EXPIRES_SOON(check_signing_cert, 0);
+  const int want_new_signing_key =
+    need_new_signing_key ||
+    EXPIRES_SOON(check_signing_cert, options->TestingSigningKeySlop);
+
+  {
+    uint32_t flags =
+      (INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE|INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT|
+       INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG);
+    if (! need_new_signing_key)
+      flags |= INIT_ED_KEY_MISSING_SECRET_OK;
+    if (! want_new_signing_key)
+      flags |= INIT_ED_KEY_OMIT_SECRET;
+
+    id = ed_key_init_from_file(
+             options_get_datadir_fname2(options, "keys", "ed25519_master_id"),
+             flags,
+             LOG_WARN, NULL, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
+    if (!id)
+      FAIL("Missing identity key");
+    if (tor_mem_is_zero((char*)id->seckey.seckey, sizeof(id->seckey)))
+      sign_signing_key_with_id = NULL;
+    else
+      sign_signing_key_with_id = id;
+  }
+
+  if (need_new_signing_key && NULL == sign_signing_key_with_id)
+    FAIL("Can't load master key make a new signing key.");
+
+  if (want_new_signing_key && sign_signing_key_with_id) {
+    uint32_t flags = (INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE|
+                      INIT_ED_KEY_REPLACE|
+                      INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG|
+                      INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT|
+                      INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT);
+    sign = ed_key_init_from_file(
+               options_get_datadir_fname2(options, "keys", "ed25519_signing"),
+                                 flags, LOG_WARN,
+                                 sign_signing_key_with_id, now,
+                                 options->SigningKeyLifetime,
+                                 CERT_TYPE_ID_SIGNING, &sign_cert);
+    if (!sign)
+      FAIL("Missing signing key");
+    use_signing = sign;
+  } else if (want_new_signing_key) {
+    static ratelim_t missing_master = RATELIM_INIT(3600);
+    log_fn_ratelim(&missing_master, LOG_WARN, LD_OR,
+                   "Signing key will expire soon, but I can't load the "
+                   "master key to sign a new one!");
+  }
+
+  tor_assert(use_signing);
+
+  /* At this point we no longer need our secret identity key.  So wipe
+   * it, if we loaded it in the first place. */
+  memwipe(id->seckey.seckey, 0, sizeof(id->seckey));
+
+  if (!rsa_ed_crosscert && server_mode(options)) {
+    uint8_t *crosscert;
+    ssize_t crosscert_len = tor_make_rsa_ed25519_crosscert(&id->pubkey,
+                                                   get_server_identity_key(),
+                                                   now+10*365*86400,/*XXXX*/
+                                                   &crosscert);
+    rsa_ed_crosscert_len = crosscert_len;
+    rsa_ed_crosscert = crosscert;
+  }
+
+  if (!current_auth_key ||
+      EXPIRES_SOON(auth_key_cert, options->TestingAuthKeySlop)) {
+    auth = ed_key_new(use_signing, INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT,
+                      now,
+                      options->TestingAuthKeyLifetime,
+                      CERT_TYPE_SIGNING_AUTH, &auth_cert);
+
+    if (!auth)
+      FAIL("Can't create auth key");
+  }
+
+  /* We've generated or loaded everything.  Put them in memory. */
+
+  if (! master_identity_key) {
+    SET_KEY(master_identity_key, id);
+  } else {
+    tor_free(id);
+  }
+  if (sign) {
+    SET_KEY(master_signing_key, sign);
+    SET_CERT(signing_key_cert, sign_cert);
+  }
+  if (auth) {
+    SET_KEY(current_auth_key, auth);
+    SET_CERT(auth_key_cert, auth_cert);
+  }
+
+  return 0;
+ err:
+  ed25519_keypair_free(id);
+  ed25519_keypair_free(sign);
+  ed25519_keypair_free(auth);
+  tor_cert_free(sign_cert);
+  tor_cert_free(auth_cert);
+  return -1;
+}
+
+/**DOCDOC*/
+int
+generate_ed_link_cert(const or_options_t *options, time_t now)
+{
+  const tor_x509_cert_t *link = NULL, *id = NULL;
+  tor_cert_t *link_cert = NULL;
+
+  if (tor_tls_get_my_certs(1, &link, &id) < 0 || link == NULL) {
+    log_warn(LD_OR, "Can't get my x509 link cert.");
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  const digests_t *digests = tor_x509_cert_get_cert_digests(link);
+
+  if (link_cert_cert &&
+      ! EXPIRES_SOON(link_cert_cert, options->TestingLinkKeySlop) &&
+      fast_memeq(digests->d[DIGEST_SHA256], link_cert_cert->signed_key.pubkey,
+                 DIGEST256_LEN)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  ed25519_public_key_t dummy_key;
+  memcpy(dummy_key.pubkey, digests->d[DIGEST_SHA256], DIGEST256_LEN);
+
+  link_cert = tor_cert_create(get_master_signing_keypair(),
+                              CERT_TYPE_SIGNING_LINK,
+                              &dummy_key,
+                              now,
+                              options->TestingLinkCertLifetime, 0);
+
+  if (link_cert) {
+    SET_CERT(link_cert_cert, link_cert);
+  }
+  return 0;
+}
+
+#undef FAIL
+#undef SET_KEY
+#undef SET_CERT
+
+int
+should_make_new_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, const time_t now)
+{
+  if (!master_identity_key ||
+      !master_signing_key ||
+      !current_auth_key ||
+      !link_cert_cert ||
+      EXPIRES_SOON(signing_key_cert, options->TestingSigningKeySlop) ||
+      EXPIRES_SOON(auth_key_cert, options->TestingAuthKeySlop) ||
+      EXPIRES_SOON(link_cert_cert, options->TestingLinkKeySlop))
+    return 1;
+
+  const tor_x509_cert_t *link = NULL, *id = NULL;
+
+  if (tor_tls_get_my_certs(1, &link, &id) < 0 || link == NULL)
+    return 1;
+
+  const digests_t *digests = tor_x509_cert_get_cert_digests(link);
+
+  if (!fast_memeq(digests->d[DIGEST_SHA256],
+                  link_cert_cert->signed_key.pubkey,
+                  DIGEST256_LEN)) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+#undef EXPIRES_SOON
+
+const ed25519_public_key_t *
+get_master_identity_key(void)
+{
+  if (!master_identity_key)
+    return NULL;
+  return &master_identity_key->pubkey;
+}
+
+const ed25519_keypair_t *
+get_master_signing_keypair(void)
+{
+  return master_signing_key;
+}
+
+const struct tor_cert_st *
+get_master_signing_key_cert(void)
+{
+  return signing_key_cert;
+}
+
+const ed25519_keypair_t *
+get_current_auth_keypair(void)
+{
+  return current_auth_key;
+}
+
+const tor_cert_t *
+get_current_link_cert_cert(void)
+{
+  return link_cert_cert;
+}
+
+const tor_cert_t *
+get_current_auth_key_cert(void)
+{
+  return auth_key_cert;
+}
+
+void
+get_master_rsa_crosscert(const uint8_t **cert_out,
+                         size_t *size_out)
+{
+  *cert_out = rsa_ed_crosscert;
+  *size_out = rsa_ed_crosscert_len;
+}
+
+/** Construct cross-certification for the master identity key with
+ * the ntor onion key. Store the sign of the corresponding ed25519 public key
+ * in *<b>sign_out</b>. */
+tor_cert_t *
+make_ntor_onion_key_crosscert(const curve25519_keypair_t *onion_key,
+      const ed25519_public_key_t *master_id_key, time_t now, time_t lifetime,
+      int *sign_out)
+{
+  tor_cert_t *cert = NULL;
+  ed25519_keypair_t ed_onion_key;
+
+  if (ed25519_keypair_from_curve25519_keypair(&ed_onion_key, sign_out,
+                                              onion_key) < 0)
+    goto end;
+
+  cert = tor_cert_create(&ed_onion_key, CERT_TYPE_ONION_ID, master_id_key,
+      now, lifetime, 0);
+
+ end:
+  memwipe(&ed_onion_key, 0, sizeof(ed_onion_key));
+  return cert;
+}
+
+/** Construct and return an RSA signature for the TAP onion key to
+ * cross-certify the RSA and Ed25519 identity keys. Set <b>len_out</b> to its
+ * length. */
+uint8_t *
+make_tap_onion_key_crosscert(const crypto_pk_t *onion_key,
+                             const ed25519_public_key_t *master_id_key,
+                             const crypto_pk_t *rsa_id_key,
+                             int *len_out)
+{
+  uint8_t signature[PK_BYTES];
+  uint8_t signed_data[DIGEST_LEN + ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN];
+
+  *len_out = 0;
+  crypto_pk_get_digest(rsa_id_key, (char*)signed_data);
+  memcpy(signed_data + DIGEST_LEN, master_id_key->pubkey, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+
+  int r = crypto_pk_private_sign(onion_key,
+                               (char*)signature, sizeof(signature),
+                               (const char*)signed_data, sizeof(signed_data));
+  if (r < 0)
+    return NULL;
+
+  *len_out = r;
+
+  return tor_memdup(signature, r);
+}
+
+/** Check whether an RSA-TAP cross-certification is correct. Return 0 if it
+ * is, -1 if it isn't. */
+int
+check_tap_onion_key_crosscert(const uint8_t *crosscert,
+                              int crosscert_len,
+                              const crypto_pk_t *onion_pkey,
+                              const ed25519_public_key_t *master_id_pkey,
+                              const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest)
+{
+  uint8_t *cc = tor_malloc(crypto_pk_keysize(onion_pkey));
+  int cc_len =
+    crypto_pk_public_checksig(onion_pkey,
+                              (char*)cc,
+                              crypto_pk_keysize(onion_pkey),
+                              (const char*)crosscert,
+                              crosscert_len);
+  if (cc_len < 0) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (cc_len < DIGEST_LEN + ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN) {
+    log_warn(LD_DIR, "Short signature on cross-certification with TAP key");
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (tor_memneq(cc, rsa_id_digest, DIGEST_LEN) ||
+      tor_memneq(cc + DIGEST_LEN, master_id_pkey->pubkey,
+                 ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) {
+    log_warn(LD_DIR, "Incorrect cross-certification with TAP key");
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  tor_free(cc);
+  return 0;
+ err:
+  tor_free(cc);
+  return -1;
+}
+
+void
+routerkeys_free_all(void)
+{
+  ed25519_keypair_free(master_identity_key);
+  ed25519_keypair_free(master_signing_key);
+  ed25519_keypair_free(current_auth_key);
+  tor_cert_free(signing_key_cert);
+  tor_cert_free(link_cert_cert);
+  tor_cert_free(auth_key_cert);
+
+  master_identity_key = master_signing_key = NULL;
+  current_auth_key = NULL;
+  signing_key_cert = link_cert_cert = auth_key_cert = NULL;
+}
+
diff --git a/src/or/routerkeys.h b/src/or/routerkeys.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b45a22ac12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/or/routerkeys.h
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2014, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+#ifndef TOR_ROUTERKEYS_H
+#define TOR_ROUTERKEYS_H
+
+#include "crypto_ed25519.h"
+
+#define INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE                      (1u<<0)
+#define INIT_ED_KEY_REPLACE                     (1u<<1)
+#define INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT                       (1u<<2)
+#define INIT_ED_KEY_MISSING_SECRET_OK           (1u<<3)
+#define INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT                    (1u<<4)
+#define INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG                (1u<<5)
+#define INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT (1u<<6)
+#define INIT_ED_KEY_OMIT_SECRET                 (1u<<7)
+
+struct tor_cert_st;
+ed25519_keypair_t *ed_key_init_from_file(const char *fname, uint32_t flags,
+                                         int severity,
+                                         const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key,
+                                         time_t now,
+                                         time_t lifetime,
+                                         uint8_t cert_type,
+                                         struct tor_cert_st **cert_out);
+ed25519_keypair_t *ed_key_new(const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key,
+                              uint32_t flags,
+                              time_t now,
+                              time_t lifetime,
+                              uint8_t cert_type,
+                              struct tor_cert_st **cert_out);
+const ed25519_public_key_t *get_master_identity_key(void);
+const ed25519_keypair_t *get_master_signing_keypair(void);
+const struct tor_cert_st *get_master_signing_key_cert(void);
+
+const ed25519_keypair_t *get_current_auth_keypair(void);
+const struct tor_cert_st *get_current_link_cert_cert(void);
+const struct tor_cert_st *get_current_auth_key_cert(void);
+
+void get_master_rsa_crosscert(const uint8_t **cert_out,
+                              size_t *size_out);
+
+struct tor_cert_st *make_ntor_onion_key_crosscert(
+                                  const curve25519_keypair_t *onion_key,
+                                  const ed25519_public_key_t *master_id_key,
+                                  time_t now, time_t lifetime,
+                                  int *sign_out);
+uint8_t *make_tap_onion_key_crosscert(const crypto_pk_t *onion_key,
+                                  const ed25519_public_key_t *master_id_key,
+                                  const crypto_pk_t *rsa_id_key,
+                                  int *len_out);
+
+int check_tap_onion_key_crosscert(const uint8_t *crosscert,
+                                  int crosscert_len,
+                                  const crypto_pk_t *onion_pkey,
+                                  const ed25519_public_key_t *master_id_pkey,
+                                  const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest);
+
+int load_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, time_t now);
+int should_make_new_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, const time_t now);
+
+int generate_ed_link_cert(const or_options_t *options, time_t now);
+
+void routerkeys_free_all(void);
+
+#endif
+
diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c
index fd096799de..7eba13a544 100644
--- a/src/or/routerlist.c
+++ b/src/or/routerlist.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 
 #define ROUTERLIST_PRIVATE
 #include "or.h"
+#include "crypto_ed25519.h"
 #include "circuitstats.h"
 #include "config.h"
 #include "connection.h"
@@ -38,6 +39,8 @@
 #include "routerparse.h"
 #include "routerset.h"
 #include "sandbox.h"
+#include "torcert.h"
+
 // #define DEBUG_ROUTERLIST
 
 /****************************************************************************/
@@ -2660,6 +2663,7 @@ routerinfo_free(routerinfo_t *router)
   tor_free(router->onion_curve25519_pkey);
   if (router->identity_pkey)
     crypto_pk_free(router->identity_pkey);
+  tor_cert_free(router->signing_key_cert);
   if (router->declared_family) {
     SMARTLIST_FOREACH(router->declared_family, char *, s, tor_free(s));
     smartlist_free(router->declared_family);
@@ -2678,6 +2682,7 @@ extrainfo_free(extrainfo_t *extrainfo)
 {
   if (!extrainfo)
     return;
+  tor_cert_free(extrainfo->signing_key_cert);
   tor_free(extrainfo->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body);
   tor_free(extrainfo->pending_sig);
 
@@ -3288,6 +3293,11 @@ router_add_to_routerlist(routerinfo_t *router, const char **msg,
 
   old_router = router_get_mutable_by_digest(id_digest);
 
+  /* Make sure that it isn't expired. */
+  if (router->cert_expiration_time < approx_time()) {
+    return ROUTER_CERTS_EXPIRED;
+  }
+
   /* Make sure that we haven't already got this exact descriptor. */
   if (sdmap_get(routerlist->desc_digest_map,
                 router->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest)) {
@@ -4894,7 +4904,7 @@ routerinfo_incompatible_with_extrainfo(const routerinfo_t *ri,
                                        signed_descriptor_t *sd,
                                        const char **msg)
 {
-  int digest_matches, r=1;
+  int digest_matches, digest256_matches, r=1;
   tor_assert(ri);
   tor_assert(ei);
   if (!sd)
@@ -4907,6 +4917,11 @@ routerinfo_incompatible_with_extrainfo(const routerinfo_t *ri,
 
   digest_matches = tor_memeq(ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest,
                            sd->extra_info_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+  /* Set digest256_matches to 1 if the digest is correct, or if no
+   * digest256 was in the ri. */
+  digest256_matches = tor_memeq(ei->digest256,
+                                ri->extra_info_digest256, DIGEST256_LEN);
+  digest256_matches |= tor_mem_is_zero(ri->extra_info_digest256, DIGEST256_LEN);
 
   /* The identity must match exactly to have been generated at the same time
    * by the same router. */
@@ -4917,6 +4932,11 @@ routerinfo_incompatible_with_extrainfo(const routerinfo_t *ri,
     goto err; /* different servers */
   }
 
+  if (! tor_cert_opt_eq(ri->signing_key_cert, ei->signing_key_cert)) {
+    if (msg) *msg = "Extrainfo signing key cert didn't match routerinfo";
+    goto err; /* different servers */
+  }
+
   if (ei->pending_sig) {
     char signed_digest[128];
     if (crypto_pk_public_checksig(ri->identity_pkey,
@@ -4943,6 +4963,11 @@ routerinfo_incompatible_with_extrainfo(const routerinfo_t *ri,
     goto err;
   }
 
+  if (!digest256_matches) {
+    if (msg) *msg = "Extrainfo digest did not match digest256 from routerdesc";
+    goto err; /* Digest doesn't match declared value. */
+  }
+
   if (!digest_matches) {
     if (msg) *msg = "Extrainfo digest did not match value from routerdesc";
     goto err; /* Digest doesn't match declared value. */
diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.h b/src/or/routerlist.h
index 78c3fbb880..200533fe91 100644
--- a/src/or/routerlist.h
+++ b/src/or/routerlist.h
@@ -118,13 +118,15 @@ WRA_WAS_ADDED(was_router_added_t s) {
  * - not in the consensus
  * - neither in the consensus nor in any networkstatus document
  * - it was outdated.
+ * - its certificates were expired.
  */
 static INLINE int WRA_WAS_OUTDATED(was_router_added_t s)
 {
   return (s == ROUTER_WAS_TOO_OLD ||
           s == ROUTER_IS_ALREADY_KNOWN ||
           s == ROUTER_NOT_IN_CONSENSUS ||
-          s == ROUTER_NOT_IN_CONSENSUS_OR_NETWORKSTATUS);
+          s == ROUTER_NOT_IN_CONSENSUS_OR_NETWORKSTATUS ||
+          s == ROUTER_CERTS_EXPIRED);
 }
 /** Return true iff the outcome code in <b>s</b> indicates that the descriptor
  * was flat-out rejected. */
@@ -138,7 +140,8 @@ static INLINE int WRA_NEVER_DOWNLOADABLE(was_router_added_t s)
 {
   return (s == ROUTER_AUTHDIR_REJECTS ||
           s == ROUTER_BAD_EI ||
-          s == ROUTER_WAS_TOO_OLD);
+          s == ROUTER_WAS_TOO_OLD ||
+          s == ROUTER_CERTS_EXPIRED);
 }
 was_router_added_t router_add_to_routerlist(routerinfo_t *router,
                                             const char **msg,
diff --git a/src/or/routerparse.c b/src/or/routerparse.c
index f15aeeb0cf..c3dc241573 100644
--- a/src/or/routerparse.c
+++ b/src/or/routerparse.c
@@ -24,8 +24,11 @@
 #include "microdesc.h"
 #include "networkstatus.h"
 #include "rephist.h"
+#include "routerkeys.h"
 #include "routerparse.h"
 #include "entrynodes.h"
+#include "torcert.h"
+
 #undef log
 #include <math.h>
 
@@ -69,6 +72,7 @@ typedef enum {
   K_CLIENT_VERSIONS,
   K_SERVER_VERSIONS,
   K_OR_ADDRESS,
+  K_ID,
   K_P,
   K_P6,
   K_R,
@@ -83,6 +87,10 @@ typedef enum {
   K_HIDDEN_SERVICE_DIR,
   K_ALLOW_SINGLE_HOP_EXITS,
   K_IPV6_POLICY,
+  K_ROUTER_SIG_ED25519,
+  K_IDENTITY_ED25519,
+  K_ONION_KEY_CROSSCERT,
+  K_NTOR_ONION_KEY_CROSSCERT,
 
   K_DIRREQ_END,
   K_DIRREQ_V2_IPS,
@@ -293,6 +301,12 @@ static token_rule_t routerdesc_token_table[] = {
   T01("write-history",       K_WRITE_HISTORY,       ARGS,    NO_OBJ ),
   T01("extra-info-digest",   K_EXTRA_INFO_DIGEST,   GE(1),   NO_OBJ ),
   T01("hidden-service-dir",  K_HIDDEN_SERVICE_DIR,  NO_ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+  T01("identity-ed25519",    K_IDENTITY_ED25519,    NO_ARGS, NEED_OBJ ),
+  T01("router-sig-ed25519",  K_ROUTER_SIG_ED25519,  GE(1),   NO_OBJ ),
+  T01("onion-key-crosscert", K_ONION_KEY_CROSSCERT, NO_ARGS, NEED_OBJ ),
+  T01("ntor-onion-key-crosscert", K_NTOR_ONION_KEY_CROSSCERT,
+                                                    EQ(1),   NEED_OBJ ),
+
   T01("allow-single-hop-exits",K_ALLOW_SINGLE_HOP_EXITS,    NO_ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
 
   T01("family",              K_FAMILY,              ARGS,    NO_OBJ ),
@@ -310,6 +324,8 @@ static token_rule_t routerdesc_token_table[] = {
 static token_rule_t extrainfo_token_table[] = {
   T1_END( "router-signature",    K_ROUTER_SIGNATURE,    NO_ARGS, NEED_OBJ ),
   T1( "published",           K_PUBLISHED,       CONCAT_ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+  T01("identity-ed25519",    K_IDENTITY_ED25519,    NO_ARGS, NEED_OBJ ),
+  T01("router-sig-ed25519",  K_ROUTER_SIG_ED25519,  GE(1),   NO_OBJ ),
   T0N("opt",                 K_OPT,             CONCAT_ARGS, OBJ_OK ),
   T01("read-history",        K_READ_HISTORY,        ARGS,    NO_OBJ ),
   T01("write-history",       K_WRITE_HISTORY,       ARGS,    NO_OBJ ),
@@ -353,6 +369,7 @@ static token_rule_t rtrstatus_token_table[] = {
   T01("v",                   K_V,               CONCAT_ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
   T01("w",                   K_W,                   ARGS,    NO_OBJ ),
   T0N("m",                   K_M,               CONCAT_ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+  T0N("id",                  K_ID,                  GE(2),   NO_OBJ ),
   T0N("opt",                 K_OPT,             CONCAT_ARGS, OBJ_OK ),
   END_OF_TABLE
 };
@@ -490,6 +507,7 @@ static token_rule_t networkstatus_detached_signature_token_table[] = {
 static token_rule_t microdesc_token_table[] = {
   T1_START("onion-key",        K_ONION_KEY,        NO_ARGS,     NEED_KEY_1024),
   T01("ntor-onion-key",        K_ONION_KEY_NTOR,   GE(1),       NO_OBJ ),
+  T0N("id",                    K_ID,               GE(2),       NO_OBJ ),
   T0N("a",                     K_A,                GE(1),       NO_OBJ ),
   T01("family",                K_FAMILY,           ARGS,        NO_OBJ ),
   T01("p",                     K_P,                CONCAT_ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
@@ -506,6 +524,10 @@ static addr_policy_t *router_parse_addr_policy(directory_token_t *tok,
                                                unsigned fmt_flags);
 static addr_policy_t *router_parse_addr_policy_private(directory_token_t *tok);
 
+static int router_get_hash_impl_helper(const char *s, size_t s_len,
+                            const char *start_str,
+                            const char *end_str, char end_c,
+                            const char **start_out, const char **end_out);
 static int router_get_hash_impl(const char *s, size_t s_len, char *digest,
                                 const char *start_str, const char *end_str,
                                 char end_char,
@@ -637,7 +659,7 @@ router_get_extrainfo_hash(const char *s, size_t s_len, char *digest)
 char *
 router_get_dirobj_signature(const char *digest,
                             size_t digest_len,
-                            crypto_pk_t *private_key)
+                            const crypto_pk_t *private_key)
 {
   char *signature;
   size_t i, keysize;
@@ -858,8 +880,8 @@ check_signature_token(const char *digest,
     tor_free(signed_digest);
     return -1;
   }
-//  log_debug(LD_DIR,"Signed %s hash starts %s", doctype,
-//            hex_str(signed_digest,4));
+  //  log_debug(LD_DIR,"Signed %s hash starts %s", doctype,
+  //            hex_str(signed_digest,4));
   if (tor_memneq(digest, signed_digest, digest_len)) {
     log_warn(LD_DIR, "Error reading %s: signature does not match.", doctype);
     tor_free(signed_digest);
@@ -1106,6 +1128,7 @@ router_parse_entry_from_string(const char *s, const char *end,
   size_t prepend_len = prepend_annotations ? strlen(prepend_annotations) : 0;
   int ok = 1;
   memarea_t *area = NULL;
+  tor_cert_t *ntor_cc_cert = NULL;
   /* Do not set this to '1' until we have parsed everything that we intend to
    * parse that's covered by the hash. */
   int can_dl_again = 0;
@@ -1178,9 +1201,11 @@ router_parse_entry_from_string(const char *s, const char *end,
   }
 
   tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, K_ROUTER);
+  const int router_token_pos = smartlist_pos(tokens, tok);
   tor_assert(tok->n_args >= 5);
 
   router = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(routerinfo_t));
+  router->cert_expiration_time = TIME_MAX;
   router->cache_info.routerlist_index = -1;
   router->cache_info.annotations_len = s-start_of_annotations + prepend_len;
   router->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len = end-s;
@@ -1311,6 +1336,147 @@ router_parse_entry_from_string(const char *s, const char *end,
     log_warn(LD_DIR, "Couldn't calculate key digest"); goto err;
   }
 
+  {
+    directory_token_t *ed_sig_tok, *ed_cert_tok, *cc_tap_tok, *cc_ntor_tok;
+    ed_sig_tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_ROUTER_SIG_ED25519);
+    ed_cert_tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_IDENTITY_ED25519);
+    cc_tap_tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_ONION_KEY_CROSSCERT);
+    cc_ntor_tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_NTOR_ONION_KEY_CROSSCERT);
+    int n_ed_toks = !!ed_sig_tok + !!ed_cert_tok +
+      !!cc_tap_tok + !!cc_ntor_tok;
+    if ((n_ed_toks != 0 && n_ed_toks != 4) ||
+        (n_ed_toks == 4 && !router->onion_curve25519_pkey)) {
+      log_warn(LD_DIR, "Router descriptor with only partial ed25519/"
+               "cross-certification support");
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (ed_sig_tok) {
+      tor_assert(ed_cert_tok && cc_tap_tok && cc_ntor_tok);
+      const int ed_cert_token_pos = smartlist_pos(tokens, ed_cert_tok);
+      if (ed_cert_token_pos == -1 || router_token_pos == -1 ||
+          (ed_cert_token_pos != router_token_pos + 1 &&
+           ed_cert_token_pos != router_token_pos - 1)) {
+        log_warn(LD_DIR, "Ed25519 certificate in wrong position");
+        goto err;
+      }
+      if (ed_sig_tok != smartlist_get(tokens, smartlist_len(tokens)-2)) {
+        log_warn(LD_DIR, "Ed25519 signature in wrong position");
+        goto err;
+      }
+      if (strcmp(ed_cert_tok->object_type, "ED25519 CERT")) {
+        log_warn(LD_DIR, "Wrong object type on identity-ed25519 in decriptor");
+        goto err;
+      }
+      if (strcmp(cc_ntor_tok->object_type, "ED25519 CERT")) {
+        log_warn(LD_DIR, "Wrong object type on ntor-onion-key-crosscert "
+                 "in decriptor");
+        goto err;
+      }
+      if (strcmp(cc_tap_tok->object_type, "CROSSCERT")) {
+        log_warn(LD_DIR, "Wrong object type on onion-key-crosscert "
+                 "in decriptor");
+        goto err;
+      }
+      if (strcmp(cc_ntor_tok->args[0], "0") &&
+          strcmp(cc_ntor_tok->args[0], "1")) {
+        log_warn(LD_DIR, "Bad sign bit on ntor-onion-key-crosscert");
+        goto err;
+      }
+      int ntor_cc_sign_bit = !strcmp(cc_ntor_tok->args[0], "1");
+
+      uint8_t d256[DIGEST256_LEN];
+      const char *signed_start, *signed_end;
+      tor_cert_t *cert = tor_cert_parse(
+                       (const uint8_t*)ed_cert_tok->object_body,
+                       ed_cert_tok->object_size);
+      if (! cert) {
+        log_warn(LD_DIR, "Couldn't parse ed25519 cert");
+        goto err;
+      }
+      router->signing_key_cert = cert; /* makes sure it gets freed. */
+      if (cert->cert_type != CERT_TYPE_ID_SIGNING ||
+          ! cert->signing_key_included) {
+        log_warn(LD_DIR, "Invalid form for ed25519 cert");
+        goto err;
+      }
+
+      ntor_cc_cert = tor_cert_parse((const uint8_t*)cc_ntor_tok->object_body,
+                                    cc_ntor_tok->object_size);
+      if (!ntor_cc_cert) {
+        log_warn(LD_DIR, "Couldn't parse ntor-onion-key-crosscert cert");
+        goto err;
+      }
+      if (ntor_cc_cert->cert_type != CERT_TYPE_ONION_ID ||
+          ! ed25519_pubkey_eq(&ntor_cc_cert->signed_key, &cert->signing_key)) {
+        log_warn(LD_DIR, "Invalid contents for ntor-onion-key-crosscert cert");
+        goto err;
+      }
+
+      ed25519_public_key_t ntor_cc_pk;
+      if (ed25519_public_key_from_curve25519_public_key(&ntor_cc_pk,
+                                            router->onion_curve25519_pkey,
+                                            ntor_cc_sign_bit)<0) {
+        log_warn(LD_DIR, "Error converting onion key to ed25519");
+        goto err;
+      }
+
+      if (router_get_hash_impl_helper(s, end-s, "router ",
+                                      "\nrouter-sig-ed25519",
+                                      ' ', &signed_start, &signed_end) < 0) {
+        log_warn(LD_DIR, "Can't find ed25519-signed portion of descriptor");
+        goto err;
+      }
+      crypto_digest_t *d = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA256);
+      crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, ED_DESC_SIGNATURE_PREFIX,
+        strlen(ED_DESC_SIGNATURE_PREFIX));
+      crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, signed_start, signed_end-signed_start);
+      crypto_digest_get_digest(d, (char*)d256, sizeof(d256));
+      crypto_digest_free(d);
+
+      ed25519_checkable_t check[3];
+      int check_ok[3];
+      if (tor_cert_get_checkable_sig(&check[0], cert, NULL) < 0) {
+        log_err(LD_BUG, "Couldn't create 'checkable' for cert.");
+        goto err;
+      }
+      if (tor_cert_get_checkable_sig(&check[1],
+                                     ntor_cc_cert, &ntor_cc_pk) < 0) {
+        log_err(LD_BUG, "Couldn't create 'checkable' for ntor_cc_cert.");
+        goto err;
+      }
+
+      if (ed25519_signature_from_base64(&check[2].signature,
+                                        ed_sig_tok->args[0])<0) {
+        log_warn(LD_DIR, "Couldn't decode ed25519 signature");
+        goto err;
+      }
+      check[2].pubkey = &cert->signed_key;
+      check[2].msg = d256;
+      check[2].len = DIGEST256_LEN;
+
+      if (ed25519_checksig_batch(check_ok, check, 3) < 0) {
+        log_warn(LD_DIR, "Incorrect ed25519 signature(s)");
+        goto err;
+      }
+
+      if (check_tap_onion_key_crosscert(
+                      (const uint8_t*)cc_tap_tok->object_body,
+                      (int)cc_tap_tok->object_size,
+                      router->onion_pkey,
+                      &cert->signing_key,
+                      (const uint8_t*)router->cache_info.identity_digest)<0) {
+        log_warn(LD_DIR, "Incorrect TAP cross-verification");
+        goto err;
+      }
+
+      /* We check this before adding it to the routerlist. */
+      if (cert->valid_until < ntor_cc_cert->valid_until)
+        router->cert_expiration_time = cert->valid_until;
+      else
+        router->cert_expiration_time = ntor_cc_cert->valid_until;
+    }
+  }
+
   if ((tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_FINGERPRINT))) {
     /* If there's a fingerprint line, it must match the identity digest. */
     char d[DIGEST_LEN];
@@ -1402,6 +1568,14 @@ router_parse_entry_from_string(const char *s, const char *end,
     } else {
       log_warn(LD_DIR, "Invalid extra info digest %s", escaped(tok->args[0]));
     }
+
+    if (tok->n_args >= 2) {
+      if (digest256_from_base64(router->extra_info_digest256, tok->args[1])
+          < 0) {
+        log_warn(LD_DIR, "Invalid extra info digest256 %s",
+                 escaped(tok->args[1]));
+      }
+    }
   }
 
   if (find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_HIDDEN_SERVICE_DIR)) {
@@ -1437,6 +1611,7 @@ router_parse_entry_from_string(const char *s, const char *end,
   routerinfo_free(router);
   router = NULL;
  done:
+  tor_cert_free(ntor_cc_cert);
   if (tokens) {
     SMARTLIST_FOREACH(tokens, directory_token_t *, t, token_clear(t));
     smartlist_free(tokens);
@@ -1503,6 +1678,7 @@ extrainfo_parse_entry_from_string(const char *s, const char *end,
     goto err;
   }
 
+  /* XXXX Accept this in position 1 too, and ed identity in position 0. */
   tok = smartlist_get(tokens,0);
   if (tok->tp != K_EXTRA_INFO) {
     log_warn(LD_DIR,"Entry does not start with \"extra-info\"");
@@ -1515,6 +1691,7 @@ extrainfo_parse_entry_from_string(const char *s, const char *end,
     extrainfo->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body = tor_memdup_nulterm(s,end-s);
   extrainfo->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len = end-s;
   memcpy(extrainfo->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+  crypto_digest256((char*)extrainfo->digest256, s, end-s, DIGEST_SHA256);
 
   tor_assert(tok->n_args >= 2);
   if (!is_legal_nickname(tok->args[0])) {
@@ -1537,6 +1714,87 @@ extrainfo_parse_entry_from_string(const char *s, const char *end,
     goto err;
   }
 
+  {
+    directory_token_t *ed_sig_tok, *ed_cert_tok;
+    ed_sig_tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_ROUTER_SIG_ED25519);
+    ed_cert_tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_IDENTITY_ED25519);
+    int n_ed_toks = !!ed_sig_tok + !!ed_cert_tok;
+    if (n_ed_toks != 0 && n_ed_toks != 2) {
+      log_warn(LD_DIR, "Router descriptor with only partial ed25519/"
+               "cross-certification support");
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (ed_sig_tok) {
+      tor_assert(ed_cert_tok);
+      const int ed_cert_token_pos = smartlist_pos(tokens, ed_cert_tok);
+      if (ed_cert_token_pos != 1) {
+        /* Accept this in position 0 XXXX */
+        log_warn(LD_DIR, "Ed25519 certificate in wrong position");
+        goto err;
+      }
+      if (ed_sig_tok != smartlist_get(tokens, smartlist_len(tokens)-2)) {
+        log_warn(LD_DIR, "Ed25519 signature in wrong position");
+        goto err;
+      }
+      if (strcmp(ed_cert_tok->object_type, "ED25519 CERT")) {
+        log_warn(LD_DIR, "Wrong object type on identity-ed25519 in decriptor");
+        goto err;
+      }
+
+      uint8_t d256[DIGEST256_LEN];
+      const char *signed_start, *signed_end;
+      tor_cert_t *cert = tor_cert_parse(
+                       (const uint8_t*)ed_cert_tok->object_body,
+                       ed_cert_tok->object_size);
+      if (! cert) {
+        log_warn(LD_DIR, "Couldn't parse ed25519 cert");
+        goto err;
+      }
+      extrainfo->signing_key_cert = cert; /* makes sure it gets freed. */
+      if (cert->cert_type != CERT_TYPE_ID_SIGNING ||
+          ! cert->signing_key_included) {
+        log_warn(LD_DIR, "Invalid form for ed25519 cert");
+        goto err;
+      }
+
+      if (router_get_hash_impl_helper(s, end-s, "extra-info ",
+                                      "\nrouter-sig-ed25519",
+                                      ' ', &signed_start, &signed_end) < 0) {
+        log_warn(LD_DIR, "Can't find ed25519-signed portion of extrainfo");
+        goto err;
+      }
+      crypto_digest_t *d = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA256);
+      crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, ED_DESC_SIGNATURE_PREFIX,
+        strlen(ED_DESC_SIGNATURE_PREFIX));
+      crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, signed_start, signed_end-signed_start);
+      crypto_digest_get_digest(d, (char*)d256, sizeof(d256));
+      crypto_digest_free(d);
+
+      ed25519_checkable_t check[2];
+      int check_ok[2];
+      if (tor_cert_get_checkable_sig(&check[0], cert, NULL) < 0) {
+        log_err(LD_BUG, "Couldn't create 'checkable' for cert.");
+        goto err;
+      }
+
+      if (ed25519_signature_from_base64(&check[1].signature,
+                                        ed_sig_tok->args[0])<0) {
+        log_warn(LD_DIR, "Couldn't decode ed25519 signature");
+        goto err;
+      }
+      check[1].pubkey = &cert->signed_key;
+      check[1].msg = d256;
+      check[1].len = DIGEST256_LEN;
+
+      if (ed25519_checksig_batch(check_ok, check, 2) < 0) {
+        log_warn(LD_DIR, "Incorrect ed25519 signature(s)");
+        goto err;
+      }
+      /* We don't check the certificate expiration time: checking that it
+       * matches the cert in the router descriptor is adequate. */
+    }
+  }
+
   /* We've checked everything that's covered by the hash. */
   can_dl_again = 1;
 
@@ -2089,6 +2347,17 @@ routerstatus_parse_entry_from_string(memarea_t *area,
         line->microdesc_hash_line = tor_strdup(t->args[0]);
         vote_rs->microdesc = line;
       }
+      if (t->tp == K_ID) {
+        tor_assert(t->n_args >= 2);
+        if (!strcmp(t->args[0], "ed25519")) {
+          vote_rs->has_ed25519_listing = 1;
+          if (strcmp(t->args[1], "none") &&
+              digest256_from_base64((char*)vote_rs->ed25519_id, t->args[1])<0) {
+            log_warn(LD_DIR, "Bogus ed25519 key in networkstatus vote");
+            goto err;
+          }
+        }
+      }
     } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(t);
   } else if (flav == FLAV_MICRODESC) {
     tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_M);
@@ -2913,6 +3182,21 @@ networkstatus_parse_vote_from_string(const char *s, const char **eos_out,
       goto err;
     }
   }
+  if (ns_type != NS_TYPE_CONSENSUS) {
+    digest256map_t *ed_id_map = digest256map_new();
+    SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(ns->routerstatus_list, vote_routerstatus_t *, vrs) {
+      if (! vrs->has_ed25519_listing ||
+          tor_mem_is_zero((const char *)vrs->ed25519_id, DIGEST256_LEN))
+        continue;
+      if (digest256map_get(ed_id_map, vrs->ed25519_id) != NULL) {
+        log_warn(LD_DIR, "Vote networkstatus ed25519 identities were not "
+                 "unique");
+        goto err;
+      }
+      digest256map_set(ed_id_map, vrs->ed25519_id, (void*)1);
+    } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(vrs);
+    digest256map_free(ed_id_map, NULL);
+  }
 
   /* Parse footer; check signature. */
   footer_tokens = smartlist_new();
@@ -4210,6 +4494,26 @@ microdescs_parse_from_string(const char *s, const char *eos,
         tor_memdup(&k, sizeof(curve25519_public_key_t));
     }
 
+    smartlist_t *id_lines = find_all_by_keyword(tokens, K_ID);
+    if (id_lines) {
+      SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(id_lines, directory_token_t *, t) {
+        tor_assert(t->n_args >= 2);
+        if (!strcmp(t->args[0], "ed25519")) {
+          if (md->ed25519_identity_pkey) {
+            log_warn(LD_DIR, "Extra ed25519 key in microdesc");
+            goto next;
+          }
+          ed25519_public_key_t k;
+          if (ed25519_public_from_base64(&k, t->args[1])<0) {
+            log_warn(LD_DIR, "Bogus ed25519 key in microdesc");
+            goto next;
+          }
+          md->ed25519_identity_pkey = tor_memdup(&k, sizeof(k));
+        }
+      } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(t);
+      smartlist_free(id_lines);
+    }
+
     {
       smartlist_t *a_lines = find_all_by_keyword(tokens, K_A);
       if (a_lines) {
diff --git a/src/or/routerparse.h b/src/or/routerparse.h
index e294d95391..85e4b7d88e 100644
--- a/src/or/routerparse.h
+++ b/src/or/routerparse.h
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ int router_get_extrainfo_hash(const char *s, size_t s_len, char *digest);
 #define DIROBJ_MAX_SIG_LEN 256
 char *router_get_dirobj_signature(const char *digest,
                                   size_t digest_len,
-                                  crypto_pk_t *private_key);
+                                  const crypto_pk_t *private_key);
 int router_append_dirobj_signature(char *buf, size_t buf_len,
                                    const char *digest,
                                    size_t digest_len,
@@ -91,5 +91,7 @@ STATIC int routerstatus_parse_guardfraction(const char *guardfraction_str,
                                             routerstatus_t *rs);
 #endif
 
+#define ED_DESC_SIGNATURE_PREFIX "Tor router descriptor signature v1"
+
 #endif
 
diff --git a/src/or/torcert.c b/src/or/torcert.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e2ddffd7a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/or/torcert.c
@@ -0,0 +1,280 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2014, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+#include "crypto.h"
+#include "torcert.h"
+#include "ed25519_cert.h"
+#include "torlog.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "link_handshake.h"
+
+/** Helper for tor_cert_create(): signs any 32 bytes, not just an ed25519
+ * key.
+ */
+static tor_cert_t *
+tor_cert_sign_impl(const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key,
+                      uint8_t cert_type,
+                      uint8_t signed_key_type,
+                      const uint8_t signed_key_info[32],
+                      time_t now, time_t lifetime,
+                      uint32_t flags)
+{
+  tor_cert_t *torcert = NULL;
+
+  ed25519_cert_t *cert = ed25519_cert_new();
+  cert->cert_type = cert_type;
+  cert->exp_field = (uint32_t) CEIL_DIV(now + lifetime, 3600);
+  cert->cert_key_type = signed_key_type;
+  memcpy(cert->certified_key, signed_key_info, 32);
+
+  if (flags & CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY) {
+    ed25519_cert_extension_t *ext = ed25519_cert_extension_new();
+    ext->ext_type = CERTEXT_SIGNED_WITH_KEY;
+    memcpy(ext->un_signing_key, signing_key->pubkey.pubkey, 32);
+    ed25519_cert_add_ext(cert, ext);
+    ++cert->n_extensions;
+  }
+
+  const ssize_t alloc_len = ed25519_cert_encoded_len(cert);
+  tor_assert(alloc_len > 0);
+  uint8_t *encoded = tor_malloc(alloc_len);
+  const ssize_t real_len = ed25519_cert_encode(encoded, alloc_len, cert);
+  if (real_len < 0)
+    goto err;
+  tor_assert(real_len == alloc_len);
+  tor_assert(real_len > ED25519_SIG_LEN);
+  uint8_t *sig = encoded + (real_len - ED25519_SIG_LEN);
+  tor_assert(tor_mem_is_zero((char*)sig, ED25519_SIG_LEN));
+
+  ed25519_signature_t signature;
+  if (ed25519_sign(&signature, encoded,
+                   real_len-ED25519_SIG_LEN, signing_key)<0) {
+    log_warn(LD_BUG, "Can't sign certificate");
+    goto err;
+  }
+  memcpy(sig, signature.sig, ED25519_SIG_LEN);
+
+  torcert = tor_cert_parse(encoded, real_len);
+  if (! torcert) {
+    log_warn(LD_BUG, "Generated a certificate we cannot parse");
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (tor_cert_checksig(torcert, &signing_key->pubkey, now) < 0) {
+    log_warn(LD_BUG, "Generated a certificate whose signature we can't check");
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  tor_free(encoded);
+
+  return torcert;
+
+ err:
+  tor_cert_free(torcert);
+  ed25519_cert_free(cert);
+  tor_free(encoded);
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Create and return a new new certificate of type <b>cert_type</b> to
+ * authenticate <b>signed_key</b> using the key <b>signing_key</b>.  The
+ * certificate should remain valid for at least <b>lifetime</b> seconds after
+ * <b>now</b>.
+ *
+ * If CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY is set in <b>flags</b>, embed
+ * the public part of <b>signing_key</b> in the certificate.
+ */
+tor_cert_t *
+tor_cert_create(const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key,
+                uint8_t cert_type,
+                const ed25519_public_key_t *signed_key,
+                time_t now, time_t lifetime,
+                uint32_t flags)
+{
+  return tor_cert_sign_impl(signing_key, cert_type,
+                            SIGNED_KEY_TYPE_ED25519, signed_key->pubkey,
+                            now, lifetime, flags);
+}
+
+/** Release all storage held for <b>cert</>. */
+void
+tor_cert_free(tor_cert_t *cert)
+{
+  if (! cert)
+    return;
+
+  if (cert->encoded)
+    memwipe(cert->encoded, 0, cert->encoded_len);
+  tor_free(cert->encoded);
+
+  memwipe(cert, 0, sizeof(tor_cert_t));
+  tor_free(cert);
+}
+
+/** Parse a certificate encoded with <b>len</b> bytes in <b>encoded</b>. */
+tor_cert_t *
+tor_cert_parse(const uint8_t *encoded, const size_t len)
+{
+  tor_cert_t *cert = NULL;
+  ed25519_cert_t *parsed = NULL;
+  ssize_t got_len = ed25519_cert_parse(&parsed, encoded, len);
+  if (got_len < 0 || (size_t) got_len != len)
+    goto err;
+
+  cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_cert_t));
+  cert->encoded = tor_memdup(encoded, len);
+  cert->encoded_len = len;
+
+  memcpy(cert->signed_key.pubkey, parsed->certified_key, 32);
+  cert->valid_until = parsed->exp_field * 3600;
+  cert->cert_type = parsed->cert_type;
+
+  for (unsigned i = 0; i < ed25519_cert_getlen_ext(parsed); ++i) {
+    ed25519_cert_extension_t *ext = ed25519_cert_get_ext(parsed, i);
+    if (ext->ext_type == CERTEXT_SIGNED_WITH_KEY) {
+      if (cert->signing_key_included)
+        goto err;
+
+      cert->signing_key_included = 1;
+      memcpy(cert->signing_key.pubkey, ext->un_signing_key, 32);
+    } else if (ext->ext_flags & CERTEXT_FLAG_AFFECTS_VALIDATION) {
+      /* Unrecognized extension with affects_validation set */
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return cert;
+ err:
+  ed25519_cert_free(parsed);
+  tor_cert_free(cert);
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+/** Fill in <b>checkable_out</b> with the information needed to check
+ * the signature on <b>cert</b> with <b>pubkey</b>. */
+int
+tor_cert_get_checkable_sig(ed25519_checkable_t *checkable_out,
+                           const tor_cert_t *cert,
+                           const ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey)
+{
+  if (! pubkey) {
+    if (cert->signing_key_included)
+      pubkey = &cert->signing_key;
+    else
+      return -1;
+  }
+
+  checkable_out->msg = cert->encoded;
+  checkable_out->pubkey = pubkey;
+  tor_assert(cert->encoded_len > ED25519_SIG_LEN);
+  const size_t signed_len = cert->encoded_len - ED25519_SIG_LEN;
+  checkable_out->len = signed_len;
+  memcpy(checkable_out->signature.sig,
+         cert->encoded + signed_len, ED25519_SIG_LEN);
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/** Validates the signature on <b>cert</b> with <b>pubkey</b> relative to
+ * the current time <b>now</b>.  Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ * Sets flags in <b>cert</b> as appropriate.
+ */
+int
+tor_cert_checksig(tor_cert_t *cert,
+                  const ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey, time_t now)
+{
+  ed25519_checkable_t checkable;
+  int okay;
+
+  if (now > cert->valid_until) {
+    cert->cert_expired = 1;
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (tor_cert_get_checkable_sig(&checkable, cert, pubkey) < 0)
+    return -1;
+
+  if (ed25519_checksig_batch(&okay, &checkable, 1) < 0) {
+    cert->sig_bad = 1;
+    return -1;
+  } else {
+    cert->sig_ok = 1;
+    memcpy(cert->signing_key.pubkey, checkable.pubkey->pubkey, 32);
+    cert->cert_valid = 1;
+    return 0;
+  }
+}
+
+/** Return a new copy of <b>cert</b> */
+tor_cert_t *
+tor_cert_dup(const tor_cert_t *cert)
+{
+  tor_cert_t *newcert = tor_memdup(cert, sizeof(tor_cert_t));
+  if (cert->encoded)
+    newcert->encoded = tor_memdup(cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len);
+  return newcert;
+}
+
+/** Return true iff cert1 and cert2 are the same cert. */
+int
+tor_cert_eq(const tor_cert_t *cert1, const tor_cert_t *cert2)
+{
+  tor_assert(cert1);
+  tor_assert(cert2);
+  return cert1->encoded_len == cert2->encoded_len &&
+    tor_memeq(cert1->encoded, cert2->encoded, cert1->encoded_len);
+}
+
+/** Return true iff cert1 and cert2 are the same cert, or if they are both
+ * NULL. */
+int
+tor_cert_opt_eq(const tor_cert_t *cert1, const tor_cert_t *cert2)
+{
+  if (cert1 == NULL && cert2 == NULL)
+    return 1;
+  if (!cert1 || !cert2)
+    return 0;
+  return tor_cert_eq(cert1, cert2);
+}
+
+/** Create new cross-certification object to certify <b>ed_key</b> as the
+ * master ed25519 identity key for the RSA identity key <b>rsa_key</b>.
+ * Allocates and stores the encoded certificate in *<b>cert</b>, and returns
+ * the number of bytes stored. Returns negative on error.*/
+ssize_t
+tor_make_rsa_ed25519_crosscert(const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_key,
+                               const crypto_pk_t *rsa_key,
+                               time_t expires,
+                               uint8_t **cert)
+{
+  uint8_t *res;
+
+  rsa_ed_crosscert_t *cc = rsa_ed_crosscert_new();
+  memcpy(cc->ed_key, ed_key->pubkey, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+  cc->expiration = (uint32_t) CEIL_DIV(expires, 3600);
+  cc->sig_len = crypto_pk_keysize(rsa_key);
+  rsa_ed_crosscert_setlen_sig(cc, crypto_pk_keysize(rsa_key));
+
+  ssize_t alloc_sz = rsa_ed_crosscert_encoded_len(cc);
+  tor_assert(alloc_sz > 0);
+  res = tor_malloc_zero(alloc_sz);
+  ssize_t sz = rsa_ed_crosscert_encode(res, alloc_sz, cc);
+  tor_assert(sz > 0 && sz <= alloc_sz);
+
+  const int signed_part_len = 32 + 4;
+  int siglen = crypto_pk_private_sign(rsa_key,
+                                      (char*)rsa_ed_crosscert_getarray_sig(cc),
+                                      rsa_ed_crosscert_getlen_sig(cc),
+                                      (char*)res, signed_part_len);
+  tor_assert(siglen > 0 && siglen <= (int)crypto_pk_keysize(rsa_key));
+  tor_assert(siglen <= UINT8_MAX);
+  cc->sig_len = siglen;
+  rsa_ed_crosscert_setlen_sig(cc, siglen);
+
+  sz = rsa_ed_crosscert_encode(res, alloc_sz, cc);
+  rsa_ed_crosscert_free(cc);
+  *cert = res;
+  return sz;
+}
diff --git a/src/or/torcert.h b/src/or/torcert.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b67dc525a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/or/torcert.h
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2014, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+#ifndef TORCERT_H_INCLUDED
+#define TORCERT_H_INCLUDED
+
+#include "crypto_ed25519.h"
+
+#define SIGNED_KEY_TYPE_ED25519 0x01
+
+#define CERT_TYPE_ID_SIGNING    0x04
+#define CERT_TYPE_SIGNING_LINK  0x05
+#define CERT_TYPE_SIGNING_AUTH  0x06
+#define CERT_TYPE_ONION_ID      0x0A
+
+#define CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY 0x1
+
+/** An ed25519-signed certificate as used throughout the Tor protocol.
+ **/
+typedef struct tor_cert_st {
+  /** The key authenticated by this certificate */
+  ed25519_public_key_t signed_key;
+  /** The key that signed this certificate. This value may be unset if the
+   * certificate has never been checked, and didn't include its own key. */
+  ed25519_public_key_t signing_key;
+  /** A time after which this certificate will no longer be valid. */
+  time_t valid_until;
+
+  /** The encoded representation of this certificate */
+  uint8_t *encoded;
+  /** The length of <b>encoded</b> */
+  size_t encoded_len;
+
+  /** One of CERT_TYPE_... */
+  uint8_t cert_type;
+  /** True iff we received a signing key embedded in this certificate */
+  unsigned signing_key_included : 1;
+  /** True iff we checked the signature and found it bad */
+  unsigned sig_bad : 1;
+  /** True iff we checked the signature and found it correct */
+  unsigned sig_ok : 1;
+  /** True iff we checked the signature and first found that the cert
+   * had expired */
+  unsigned cert_expired : 1;
+  /** True iff we checked the signature and found the whole cert valid */
+  unsigned cert_valid : 1;
+} tor_cert_t;
+
+tor_cert_t *tor_cert_create(const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key,
+                            uint8_t cert_type,
+                            const ed25519_public_key_t *signed_key,
+                            time_t now, time_t lifetime,
+                            uint32_t flags);
+
+tor_cert_t *tor_cert_parse(const uint8_t *cert, size_t certlen);
+
+void tor_cert_free(tor_cert_t *cert);
+
+int tor_cert_get_checkable_sig(ed25519_checkable_t *checkable_out,
+                                 const tor_cert_t *out,
+                                 const ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey);
+
+int tor_cert_checksig(tor_cert_t *cert,
+                      const ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey, time_t now);
+
+tor_cert_t *tor_cert_dup(const tor_cert_t *cert);
+int tor_cert_eq(const tor_cert_t *cert1, const tor_cert_t *cert2);
+int tor_cert_opt_eq(const tor_cert_t *cert1, const tor_cert_t *cert2);
+
+ssize_t tor_make_rsa_ed25519_crosscert(const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_key,
+                                       const crypto_pk_t *rsa_key,
+                                       time_t expires,
+                                       uint8_t **cert);
+
+#endif
+
diff --git a/src/test/example_extrainfo.inc b/src/test/example_extrainfo.inc
index 606279a765..e096afd6c4 100644
--- a/src/test/example_extrainfo.inc
+++ b/src/test/example_extrainfo.inc
@@ -190,3 +190,236 @@ static const char EX_EI_BAD_PUBLISHED_KEY[] =
   "BvG6303md3INygg+KP49RvWEJR/cU4RZ9QfHpORxH2OocMyRedw2rLex2E7jNNSi\n"
   "52yd1sHFYI8ZQ4aff+ZHUjJUGKRyqpbc8okVbq/Rl7vug0dd12eHAgMBAAE=\n"
   "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n";
+
+static const char EX_EI_GOOD_ED_EI[] =
+  "extra-info emma A692FE045C32B5E3A54B52882EF678A9DAC46A73\n"
+  "identity-ed25519\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQQABf55AYgHn/OKR8GHBlscN5VkO73wA9jSci8QgTM30615ZT44AQAgBAC08woT\n"
+  "MBZpKzRcaoEJhEG7+RmuYtnB2+nODk9IRIs8ZoyYPTZ6dLzI+MLMmtzUuo/Wmvw0\n"
+  "PflTyCb2RlWitOEhAErWH3Z9UmYGnzM/COId0Fe3ScSriyvRoFnJY1+GVAQ=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "published 2014-10-05 20:07:00\n"
+  "router-sig-ed25519 a7K8nwfg+HrdlSGQwr9rnLBq0qozkyZZs6d6aiLEiXGdhV1r9KJncmlQ5SNoY/zMQlyQm8EV5rCyBiVliKQ1Bw\n"
+  "router-signature\n"
+  "-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "GvmCmIGgbC1DeawRyRuChy62VmBOG0EviryG/a2qSZiFy0iPPwqSp5ZyZDQEIEId\n"
+  "kkk1zPzK1+S3fmgOAXyXGH0r4YFkoLGnhMk07BoEwi6HEXzjJsabmcNkOHfaOWgs\n"
+  "/5nvnLfcmxL4c6FstZ7t9VQpE06y3GU0zwBeIy1qjp0=\n"
+  "-----END SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "\n"
+  "\n"
+  ;
+const char EX_EI_GOOD_ED_EI_FP[] = "A692FE045C32B5E3A54B52882EF678A9DAC46A73";
+static const char EX_EI_GOOD_ED_EI_KEY[] =
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAM3jdYwjwGxDWYj/vyFkQT7RgeCNIn89Ei6D2+L/fdtFnqrMXOreFFHL\n"
+  "C7CK2v2uN3v+uXxfb5lADz3NcalxJrCfGTGtaBk7PwMZraTSh2luFKOvSRBQCmB1\n"
+  "yD5N0QqnIhBJoGr6NITpbWyiTKWvYLjl9PZd9af8e8jQCAa5P1j1AgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  ;
+
+static const char EX_EI_ED_MISSING_SIG[] =
+  "extra-info rachel 2A7521497B91A8437021515308A47491164EDBA1\n"
+  "identity-ed25519\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQQABf55AT2/T71LFYHiI1ppwNiuaewIu2Hq+GWWQ85O8gpWcUxeAQAgBAC2dgYu\n"
+  "moxhtuip7GVlthT9iomZKba1IllVa7uE1u2uO9BUYZQWXciFt7OnNzMH5mlffwxB\n"
+  "1dWCl+G5nbOsV5jYLbfhrF5afZotf+EQTfob4cCH79AV223LPcySbTHTtQ4=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "published 2014-10-05 20:07:00\n"
+  "router-signature\n"
+  "-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "oypRD2IZQ5EttOE8dvofrW80nnBfijSkvYzBrM6H4KVeayRYvWfmi96dYO6ybMqm\n"
+  "Yp7Gs3ngqeeNdfHtkRPuQVUXUGYZgBTvYItuagnFlFgRqaHy0knwUIVOL35eqWYx\n"
+  "xSbQKA7fglxEDMFs/RK7FRP4dWc731ZMt5wzzfJHZ8E=\n"
+  "-----END SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "\n"
+  "\n"
+  ;
+const char EX_EI_ED_MISSING_SIG_FP[] = "2A7521497B91A8437021515308A47491164EDBA1";
+static const char EX_EI_ED_MISSING_SIG_KEY[] =
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAOOB8ccxbtk2dB5FuKFhGndDcO6STNjB6KiG0b9X2QwKrOZMfmXSigto\n"
+  "mtC1JfPTxECayRjLSiP/9UD8iTVvlcnc8mMWBGM12Pa/KoCZRn7McHI3JJ7n9lfn\n"
+  "qw9+iZ9b/rBimzOb3W6k3uxzg9r8secdq4jJwTnwSjTObgxZtC8/AgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  ;
+
+static const char EX_EI_ED_MISSING_CERT[] =
+  "extra-info lynne E88E43E86015345A323D93D825C33E4AD1028F65\n"
+  "published 2014-10-05 20:07:00\n"
+  "router-sig-ed25519 H4gKIKm5K9Pfkriy7SlMUD6BdYVp6B5mXKzR/rTyYlpH0tEZ4Fx2hlHNfNNdWXJieXzKZQZo8e7SOVzvrAC3CQ\n"
+  "router-signature\n"
+  "-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "dIrbQjK5T9t5KM8CpsMF85hh2i060oPIxzYQMgE1q4j99dtb/n7SE8nhj1Sjij4D\n"
+  "7JvTjGdLHi3bFSxXaSmla0wxD9PUYFN7VsBQmwSaDrqrzJFb1SGwZuzW1IEZ7BBi\n"
+  "H0czsxEteg5hcNRwISj5WVthuWmau9v13MijtZGSK40=\n"
+  "-----END SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "\n"
+  "\n"
+  "\n"
+  ;
+const char EX_EI_ED_MISSING_CERT_FP[] = "E88E43E86015345A323D93D825C33E4AD1028F65";
+static const char EX_EI_ED_MISSING_CERT_KEY[] =
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBALjA/geb0TR9rp/UPvLhABQpB0XUDYuZAnLkrv+i7AAV7FemTDveEGnc\n"
+  "XdXNSusO1mHOquvr0YYKPhwauInxD56S8QOzLYiWWajGq8XHARQ33b4/9K2TUrAx\n"
+  "W9HTHV1U1zrPlCJtrkbjxsYoHpUg5ljzM7FGYGY5xuvyHu18SQvzAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  ;
+static const char EX_EI_ED_BAD_CERT1[] =
+  "extra-info marcie F78D8A655607D32281D02144817A4F1D26AE520F\n"
+  "identity-ed25519\n"
+  "-----BEGIN PLAGICAL SPELL-----\n"
+  "aaaa\n"
+  "-----END PLAGICAL SPELL\n"
+  "published 2014-10-05 20:07:00\n"
+  "router-sig-ed25519 KQJ+2AH7EkkjrD0RtDtUAIr+Vc7wndwILYnoUxFLSJiTP+5fMi54eFF/f1OgkG8gYyTh8phMij9WOxK/dsOpBg\n"
+  "router-signature\n"
+  "-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "XWD+P25AH6moi79j20Si3hqKGcJDws+FORL1MTu+GeJLV1mp5CR9N83UH4ffulcL\n"
+  "CpSSBDL/j74HqapzW7QvBx3FilaNT55GvcobZDFK4TKkCEyEmcuWKpEceBS7JTTV\n"
+  "SvwZeOObTjWPafELbsc/gI9Rh5Idwu7mZt3ZVntCGaQ=\n"
+  "-----END SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "\n"
+  ;
+const char EX_EI_ED_BAD_CERT1_FP[] = "F78D8A655607D32281D02144817A4F1D26AE520F";
+static const char EX_EI_ED_BAD_CERT1_KEY[] =
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAMlR46JhxsCmWYtmIB/JjTV2TUYIhJLmHy+X7FfkK3ZVQvvl9/3GSXFL\n"
+  "3USfyf3j34XLh8An7pJBi9LAHkIXgnRbglCud7dXoexabmC+c2mSbw5RnuxDGEwz\n"
+  "krXUph/r2b+2UY1CgEt28nFigaHrIQbCmF4szFX/2GPYCLi5SrRNAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  ;
+static const char EX_EI_ED_BAD_CERT2[] =
+  "extra-info jaeger 7C2B42E783C4E0EB0CC3BDB37385D16737BACFBD\n"
+  "identity-ed25519\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQoABf55Acpw27GZBdwGCgawCj2F/DPadt8F/9DnEWywEew1Yi3qAOtLpCB8KXL7\n"
+  "4w5deFW2RBg8qTondNSUvAmwYLbLjNXMmgA3+nkoJOP3fcmQMHz1jm5xzgs2lCVP\n"
+  "t5txApaBIA4=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "published 2014-10-05 20:07:00\n"
+  "router-sig-ed25519 DRQ4MLOGosBbW8M+17klNu8uWVkPxErmmEYoSo6OuH2Tzrcs6sUY+8Xi2qLoV1SbOugJ214Htl0I+6ceag+vBA\n"
+  "router-signature\n"
+  "-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "DfdA+DbuN9nVJNujuSY5wNCDLk7Hfzkrde/sK0hVmZRvivtpF/Fy/dVQHHGNFY5i\n"
+  "L1cESAgq9HLdbHU+hcc08XXxTIaGwvoklcJClcG3ENVBWkTXbJNT+ifr7chEagIi\n"
+  "cVrtU6RVmzldSbyir8V/Z4S/Cm67gYAgjM5gfoFUqDs=\n"
+  "-----END SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  ;
+const char EX_EI_ED_BAD_CERT2_FP[] = "7C2B42E783C4E0EB0CC3BDB37385D16737BACFBD";
+static const char EX_EI_ED_BAD_CERT2_KEY[] =
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBALAM1F/0XJEsbxIQqb3+ObX/yGVnq9of8Q9sLsmxffD6hwVpCqnV3lTg\n"
+  "iC6+xZ/bSlTGLPi0k8QLCaTmYxgKwmlMPpbQZ4kpZUrsb9flKdChMN7w8hd48pY9\n"
+  "lu8QiAEgErsl5rCCJIHHjrxxM/Cnd0TnedRnj/Z2YqpNx/ggsmsRAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  ;
+static const char EX_EI_ED_BAD_SIG1[] =
+  "extra-info vary 5AC3A538FEEFC6F9FCC5FA0CE64704396C30D62A\n"
+  "identity-ed25519\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQQABf55AbPp++GrRb6WphSu+PkMaYsqY/beiLBmtiV3YP5i2JkKAQAgBABKXjg1\n"
+  "aiz2JfQpNOG308i2EojnUAZEk0C0x9g2BAAXGL63sv3eO/qrlytsG1x2hkcamxFn\n"
+  "LmfZBb/prqe1Vy4wABuhqWHAUtM29vXR6lpiCJeddt9Pa8XVy/tgWLX6TAw=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "published 2014-10-05 20:07:00\n"
+  "router-sig-ed25519 a7K8nwfg+HrdlSGQwr9rnLBq0qozkyZZs6d6aiLEiXGdhV1r9KJncmlQ5SNoY/zMQlyQm8EV5rCyBiVliKQ1Bw\n"
+  "router-signature\n"
+  "-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "xhZX8Qmgft51NJ7eMd4vrESzf/VdxDrBz7hgn8K+5bLtZUksG0s6s7IyGRYWQtp4\n"
+  "/7oc9sYe3lcQiUN2K7DkeBDlL8Pcsl8aIlKuujWomCE3j0TIu+8XK6oJeo7eYic+\n"
+  "IA7EwVbdZsKsW5/eJVzbX2eO0a5zyJ5RIYotFNYNCSE=\n"
+  "-----END SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "\n"
+  ;
+const char EX_EI_ED_BAD_SIG1_FP[] = "5AC3A538FEEFC6F9FCC5FA0CE64704396C30D62A";
+static const char EX_EI_ED_BAD_SIG1_KEY[] =
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAMvb6SuoIkPfBkJgQuo5aQDepAs1kEETZ9VXotMlhB0JJikrqBrAAz+7\n"
+  "rjIJ4JsBaeQuN0Z5ksXk2ebxtef7oMIUs37NfekLQHbNR0VsXkFXPEGmOAqpZjW0\n"
+  "P524eHqybWYZTckvZtUvKI3xYGD6kEEkz4qmV6dcExU1OiAYO9jrAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  ;
+static const char EX_EI_ED_BAD_SIG2[] =
+  "extra-info coward 7F1D4DD477E340C6D6B389FAC26EDC746113082F\n"
+  "identity-ed25519\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQQABf56AZkSDiFZ1QaiLJhcKdFDE5Kei/sPaPEIEoPMGP4BvOVXAQAgBAAlRLzx\n"
+  "U029tgIL9BRe47MVgcPJGy48db6ntzhjil7iOnWKT70z2LorUD5CZoLJs72TjB6r\n"
+  "8+HYNyFLEM6dvytWZf9NA5gLdhogbFcUk/R3gbNepmCF7XoZjbhPIp8zOwg=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "published 2014-10-05 20:07:00\n"
+  "router-sig-ed25519 yfV+GySMIP1fw1oVa1C1de4XOWBqT4pUtEmSHq1h+WrLBNCh3/HZWvNC/denf2YVntuQrMLCJEv5ZaFKU+AIDQ\n"
+  "router-signature\n"
+  "-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "g+BWq69i9CP19va2cYMAXCQ6jK3IG0VmNYspjjUFgmFpJKGG6bHeOkuy1GXp47fG\n"
+  "LzZ3OPfJLptxU5AOQDUUYf25hu9uSl6gyknCzsszFs5n6ticuNejvcpzw6UfO1LP\n"
+  "5u+mGJlgpcMtmSraImDZrRipmZ3oRWvEULltlvzGQcQ=\n"
+  "-----END SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "\n"
+  ;
+const char EX_EI_ED_BAD_SIG2_FP[] = "7F1D4DD477E340C6D6B389FAC26EDC746113082F";
+static const char EX_EI_ED_BAD_SIG2_KEY[] =
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBALzOyfCEUZnvCyhlyMctPkdXg/XRE3Cr6QgyzdKf5kQbUiu2n0FgSHOX\n"
+  "iP5gfq8sO9eVeTPZtjE7/+KiR8aQJECy+eoye+lpsfm3tXpLxnpOIgL4DlURxlo/\n"
+  "rfCyv30SYBN9j62qgU9m6U2ydI0tH7/9Ep8yIY/QL8me8VAjLbf/AgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  ;
+
+static const char EX_EI_ED_MISPLACED_CERT[] =
+  "extra-info msselene 3B788BD0CE348BC5CED48313307C78175EB6D0F3\n"
+  "published 2014-10-05 20:07:00\n"
+  "identity-ed25519\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQQABf55AWBcqjzLESDuLNGsqQ/tHn32XueXwj2fDlgEy/kQNVf/AQAgBAAFOegg\n"
+  "XY1LR82xE9ohAYJxYpwJJw0YfXsBhGHqfakEoBtSgFJ3cQAUXZQX4lX6G8IxAlQB\n"
+  "7Rj7dPQuQRUmqD1yyKb/ScBgCa8esxlhNlATz47kRNR38A3TcoJ4c1Zv6AE=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "router-sig-ed25519 Q52JKH9/iMsr1jIPlWHHxakSBvyqjT1gzL944vad4OhzCZuNuAYGWyWSGzTb1DVmBqqbAUq73TiZKAz77YLNCQ\n"
+  "router-signature\n"
+  "-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "YplvAIwExGf5/L8AoroVQXtGm+26EffrxKBArMKn0zS1NOOie1p0oF/+qJg+rNWU\n"
+  "6cv3Anf188EXGlkUOddavgVH8CQbvve2nHSfIAPxjgEX9QNXbM5CiaMwgpCewXnF\n"
+  "UoNBVo5tydeLHVns15MBg/JNIxUQMd6svMoPp2WqmaE=\n"
+  "-----END SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "\n"
+  ;
+const char EX_EI_ED_MISPLACED_CERT_FP[] = "3B788BD0CE348BC5CED48313307C78175EB6D0F3";
+static const char EX_EI_ED_MISPLACED_CERT_KEY[] =
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBALTwNqhTprg1oC6bEbDqwIYBoER6prqUXQFbwbFDn+ekXhZj8vltgGwp\n"
+  "aDGl9ceZWDKfi+reR6rZXjAJGctmv0VHkfe7maUX4FC/d2T8N8DvS+3IvJzFMpbT\n"
+  "O0fFrDTrCSnPikqFfQWnlP8yoF5vO7wo0jRRY432fLRXg9WqVzdrAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  ;
+static const char EX_EI_ED_MISPLACED_SIG[] =
+  "extra-info grazie 384E40A5DEED4AB1D8A74F1FCBDB18B7C24A8284\n"
+  "identity-ed25519\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQQABf55AcGuIBoa6TBqD8Gg5atcwp/+r9ThxIBkULmPv9OSGhv+AQAgBACXH13y\n"
+  "mUvdpcN6oRN1nX6mnH40LyfYR5um8xogJZk3oINse5cRNrfMgVWiBpDlJZAwlDDa\n"
+  "lx99hzuZBong+CiOcnEvLMsBaVJmNTm5mpdetYclZpl0g8QEXznXXeRBMgM=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "router-sig-ed25519 TxuO86dQ3pUaIY2raQ3hoDBmh4TTPC0OVgY98T5cf6Y+sHyiELCkkKQ3lqqXCjqnbTLr1/4riH980JoWPpR+Dw\n"
+  "published 2014-10-05 20:07:00\n"
+  "router-signature\n"
+  "-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "kV2CtArl1VF1nUSyHL00mO3nEdNxlQU5N7/hZNTd+45lej5Veb+6vb4ujelsFERJ\n"
+  "YoxwIs6SuKAR4orQytCL0e+GgZsrg8zGTveEtMX/+u//OcCwQBYEevR5duBZjVw/\n"
+  "yzpEHwdIdB2PPyDBLkf1VKnP7uDj059tXiQRWl7LXgE=\n"
+  "-----END SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "\n"
+  ;
+const char EX_EI_ED_MISPLACED_SIG_FP[] = "384E40A5DEED4AB1D8A74F1FCBDB18B7C24A8284";
+static const char EX_EI_ED_MISPLACED_SIG_KEY[] =
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAK0HgOCG/6433VCrwz/vhk3cKmyOfenCp0GZ4DIUwPWt4DeyP4nTbN6T\n"
+  "1HJ1H8+hXC9bMuI4m43IWrzgLycQ9UaskUn372ZjHP9InPqHMJU6GQ7vZUe9Tgza\n"
+  "qnBdRPoxnrZzUOzlvatGrePt0hDiOZaMtDAkeEojFp9Wp2ZN7+tZAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  ;
+
diff --git a/src/test/failing_routerdescs.inc b/src/test/failing_routerdescs.inc
index b49d59fd8a..e2b72c58a0 100644
--- a/src/test/failing_routerdescs.inc
+++ b/src/test/failing_routerdescs.inc
@@ -666,3 +666,904 @@ static const char EX_RI_ZERO_ORPORT[] =
   "wgFKhHI/49NHyWHX5IMQpeicg0T7Qa6qwnUvspH62p8=\n"
   "-----END SIGNATURE-----\n"
   ;
+
+static const char EX_RI_MINIMAL_ED[] =
+  "router fred 127.0.0.1 9001 0 9002\n"
+  "identity-ed25519\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQQABf5iAa+2yD5ryD5kXaWbpmzaTyuTjRfjMTFleDuFGkHe26wrAQAgBABFTAHm\n"
+  "hdZriC+6BRCCMYu48cYc9tUN1adfEROqSHZN3HHP4k/fYgncoxrS3OYDX1x8Ysm/\n"
+  "sqxAXBY4NhCMswWvuDYgtQpro9YaFohiorJkHjyLQXjUeZikCfDrlxyR8AM=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "signing-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAOsjlHgM/lPQgjJyfrq0y+cR+iipcAeS2HAU8CK9SATETOTZYrxoL5vH\n"
+  "1BNteT+JxAxpjva+j7r7XZV41xPDx7alVr8G3zQsjqkAt5NnleTfUREUbg0+OSMV\n"
+  "10gU+DgcZJTMehfGYJnuJsF4eQHio/ZTdJLaZML7qwq0iWg3sZfBAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "onion-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAK9NjRY7GtAZnlxrAZlImChXmGzml0uk2KlCugvju+eIsjSA/zW3LuqW\n"
+  "wqp7Kh488Ak5nUFSlCaV9GjAexT134pynst8P0m/ofrejwlzl5DHd6sFbR33Fkzl\n"
+  "H48zic0QDY+8tKXI732dA4GveEwZDlxxy8sPcvUDaVyTsuZLHR4zAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key 71DgscFrk4i58O5GuTerI9g3JL0kz+6QaCstAllz9xw=\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key-crosscert 1\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQoABf5iAUVMAeaF1muIL7oFEIIxi7jxxhz21Q3Vp18RE6pIdk3cAH5ijeKqa+LM\n"
+  "T5Nb0I42Io4Z7BVjXG7sYVSxrospCOI4dqkl2ln3BKNuEFFT42xJwt+XGz3aMyK2\n"
+  "Cpp8w8I8nwU=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "onion-key-crosscert\n"
+  "-----BEGIN CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "lAZwD6YVic61NvJ0Iy62cSPuzJl5hJOFYNh9iSG/vn4/lVfnnCik+Gqi2v9pwItC\n"
+  "acwmutCSrMprmmFAW1dgzoU7GzUtdbxaGaOJdg8WwtO4JjFSzScTDB8R6sp0SCAI\n"
+  "PdbzAzJyiMqYcynyyCTiL77iwhUOBPzs2fXlivMtW2E=\n"
+  "-----END CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "published 2014-10-05 12:00:00\n"
+  "bandwidth 1000 1000 1000\n"
+  "reject *:*\n"
+  "router-sig-ed25519 Oyo/eES+/wsgse1f+YSiJDGatBDaiB4fASf7vJ7GxFeD4OfLbB7OYa4hYNEo5NBssNt/PA55AQVSL8hvzBE3Cg\n"
+  "router-signature\n"
+  "-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "wdk26ZtS1H81IxcUThyirANLoszrnYYhOMP57YRAUDEzUr88X6yNDZ5S0tLl+FoT\n"
+  "9XlEVrpN7Z3k4N9WloWb0o/zVVidPMRVwt8YQakSgR8axzMQg6QhQ6zXTiYhiXa4\n"
+  "mawlwYFXsaVDSIIqYA2CudIyF3UBRZuTbw0CFZElMWc=\n"
+  "-----END SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "\n"
+  ;
+
+static const char EX_RI_ED_MISSING_CROSSCERT[] =
+  "router fred 127.0.0.1 9001 0 9002\n"
+  "identity-ed25519\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQQABf54AfsyyHhGluzfESzL4LP8AhFEm83+GkFoHbe1KnssVngHAQAgBABNzJRw\n"
+  "BLXT3QMlic0QZ4eG612wkfSRS4yzONIbATKLHIgyzgGiGl4gaSX0JTeHeGfIlu7P\n"
+  "5SKocZVNxm1mp55PG+tgBqHObDRJRSgbOyUbUgfOtcbQGUeVgUlFKWZ9FAY=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "signing-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAMqT7K8cEzWIaPNXbNgvoZ5ejavoszI2OjW9XXetPD/S2f+N7TfQXHBW\n"
+  "bnjpgj87gmk59w0OXTMCv+XofZ0xOy2YR/jG5l1VJIvqgJhhFJ8oSEGVzy+97Ekn\n"
+  "Lb1FEYuVfVxSxnU2jhHW6KPtee/gvuyRI/TvZuwmYWxLRpikVn4pAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "onion-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAM4nITNe8UykgsIuo5czSSSl3Okr1K+UVWTzDGLznDg77MkLy7mydmk9\n"
+  "vf51OB+ogQhozYKIh9uHvecOzY4EhSIuKhui4hNyQklD9juGoW7RVTSpGdYT1ymp\n"
+  "dDYS30JBPwCZ7KjdMtXiU8ch2WgbzYBuI+JfjwOhfcsuNC9QPfbfAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key lx8o212IYw5Ly2KbH2ua1+fr4YvDq5nKd7LHMdPzTGo=\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key-crosscert 1\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQoABf54AU3MlHAEtdPdAyWJzRBnh4brXbCR9JFLjLM40hsBMoscAJ8cHMIc71+p\n"
+  "Qa+lg5JiYb551mLgtPWLy12xdhog7SXiJl3NvnMgbMZXHDqkU2YZCidnVz+xqMdh\n"
+  "mjQFK4AtRwg=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "published 2014-10-05 12:00:00\n"
+  "bandwidth 1000 1000 1000\n"
+  "reject *:*\n"
+  "router-sig-ed25519 4DSdPePrToNx3WQ+4GfFelB8IyHu5Z9vTbbLZ02vfYEsCF9QeaeHbYagY/yjdt+9e71jmfM+W5MfRQd8FJ1+Dg\n"
+  "router-signature\n"
+  "-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "cv1yL8HhQzQfjzkSosziu2kMecNUQGle4d103h6tVMoZS1ua1xiDpVKeuWPl9Z0+\n"
+  "wpFwRkOmK0HpNeOXCNHJwfJaWBGQXunB3WQ6Oi1BLilwLtWQixGTYG0hZ6xYLTnX\n"
+  "PdSQIbsohSgCzo9HLTAgTnkyBgklIO1PHJBJsaNOwfI=\n"
+  "-----END SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "\n"
+  ;
+
+static const char EX_RI_ED_MISSING_CROSSCERT2[] =
+  "router fred 127.0.0.1 9001 0 9002\n"
+  "identity-ed25519\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQQABf54AXXgm0CUWQr+rxvgdIslqaFdBiwosT+9PaC8zOxYGIsZAQAgBAA6yeH7\n"
+  "3AfGIGuDpVihVUUo0QwguWDPwk2dBJan7B0qgPWF5Y4YL5XDh2nMatskUrtUGCr1\n"
+  "abLYlJPozmYd6QBSv6eyBfITS/oNOMyZpjDiIjcLQD08tVQ2Jho+WmN64wc=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "signing-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAMdyTK/VPZloLUaLsvj1+NOFs33/E9HmA0VgvZ1nNUrR+PxSR71QF7Tw\n"
+  "DKz+/p2rJE+MPfQ/Na3dH0vH4CDZ+FH2m4A8SB9emF8aKxdc/7KCjQNDQCNlEQYn\n"
+  "O9WvZJhbNPHUmX0z4OotI+Sk3qBzVHu0BGDsPYC9gwszIumDUILxAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "onion-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAL8o6CJiLfW4vdRFvJ2nFt/H/ei0ov83rilOuwSmNORmL9lvnHY++HrD\n"
+  "dmEEvBv74xqWJxGbJ6OQ3VOwRpf2X/cb4gAvsQDqDmNwpJsrPYRQVXp/KY/8z7bJ\n"
+  "dM4CjcsuJHHmj3yc3iCzgqt/Xr6vR24X4bee12/bP7R8IETvWoiHAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key qpNEGrLMVn28Odonk/nDtZq1ljy0fBshwgoAm4X1yzQ=\n"
+  "onion-key-crosscert\n"
+  "-----BEGIN CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "i4RKGIeaUrO6nzfdtb6j+ijYJh1Vgc9bsHMpW9cVCOjoJKFW9xljgl9xp6LytviN\n"
+  "ppKYCt9/JflbZUZjny34ESltPGrdquvHe8TtdQazjiZBWQok/kKnx2i+PioRF/xI\n"
+  "P8D0512kbJjXSuuq9tGl94RKPM/ySGjkTJPevN4TaJE=\n"
+  "-----END CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "published 2014-10-05 12:00:00\n"
+  "bandwidth 1000 1000 1000\n"
+  "reject *:*\n"
+  "router-sig-ed25519 pMAOpepn5Q9MxcV9+Yiftu50oBzBsItQcBV9qdZCIt3lvSFqFY9+wJjaShvW3N9ICHkunrC0h/w5VEfx4SQdDA\n"
+  "router-signature\n"
+  "-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "Du5fJYDzvEeGqKTJwgaQsJJgz39K/J4qEM2TZ3Mh0XuDM1ZWDtjyzP03PaPQqbJ1\n"
+  "FsN5IStjOqN3O1IWuLzGaZGpGVuqcyYOxjs7REkGQn2LfqCjpzjaAdcsL0fI4ain\n"
+  "o/in8GQ6S/qhsx8enKlN0tffTmWmH9bmmVz0+yYmBSo=\n"
+  "-----END SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "\n"
+  ;
+static const char EX_RI_ED_MISSING_CROSSCERT_SIGN[] =
+  "router fred 127.0.0.1 9001 0 9002\n"
+  "identity-ed25519\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQQABf54AfoVFYuJnDNBWbjbTqfXACUtXWPipmqEYC++Ok/+4VoFAQAgBADH7JzI\n"
+  "fjSMV158AMiftgNY+KyHYIECuL9SnV3CSO+8+I7+r9n+A3DQQmGLULo/uZnkbteJ\n"
+  "+uy6uRG4kW0fnuBlKhseJQm9hjNGWzC8hmebp1M+bxwG41EGI7BZvnTrRgM=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "signing-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBALEqlijoFIDX1y1i5zfei8DuDIsFtSw56PGgnMRGcybwD1PRQCheCUZM\n"
+  "erQgFCWjgLgvGJERBK/oILW1dFXp4MAR5RgnrPGTfWTinCj32obMLN1gIczpq6a9\n"
+  "P9uv6Cz0ApSxpA/AuvjyAZwQKbUXuMvIY4aTprAKSqqVohk6E+E1AgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "onion-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAMZbbBjGV7xPri4XNmejq4add93p+XsWlsfbM930bcC2JZiwg4g4cq6W\n"
+  "idl8VDmCXeaWg5y3kb82Ch/Q9vPG0QYQbXxUA3JxQKKbcEK3QsEvqQh8Nb7krILK\n"
+  "YnSGAnLG2Nc3PnKb7Wpb8M3rAysC5O99Gq1mSfm8ntj3zlIM7NSHAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key CYcpfIF4T9PJcfROfVJTUYl0zNd4Ia5u0L9eng/EBSo=\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key-crosscert\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQoABf54AcfsnMh+NIxXXnwAyJ+2A1j4rIdggQK4v1KdXcJI77z4AMRc2LxiKbyr\n"
+  "fqRVynHuB031C4TN/HAlNPBjVoRvQRgzpiyyoyCqMDxLZdM8KtzdLLeqZJOXtWod\n"
+  "UXbYG3L70go=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "onion-key-crosscert\n"
+  "-----BEGIN CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "BRwRAK2lWxWGS49k8gXFHLEQ/h4k8gOQxM0WgCaN4LjAOilLHFjsjXkmKgttVpHl\n"
+  "f0V9ebSf+HgkpQnDSD8ittnr/0QaohUbD4lzslW4e/tQYEiM46soSoFft85J6U3G\n"
+  "D3D63+GmaOfIaa4nv7CD0Rw/Jz0zTuyEuARsdJIr1IY=\n"
+  "-----END CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "published 2014-10-05 12:00:00\n"
+  "bandwidth 1000 1000 1000\n"
+  "reject *:*\n"
+  "router-sig-ed25519 7XfV5r7FXbXPEvrxlecWmAJxat/6VT+/4tE5cHrQnvLM4zslysstWH6/AfIfcmUuDlQ0watmfg1MvVnjavcfDA\n"
+  "router-signature\n"
+  "-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "eigLL3S/oMGL2tJULt9bl3S0iY+YIxdKeGFCcKZci59zD786m+n+BpGM3yPpvrXr\n"
+  "bGvl4IBqCa1I+TqPP1rM9lIEcUWaBT7Zo5uMcL1o+zZl1ZWPWVVKP5hC5ehDueu8\n"
+  "/blzNhTEFAp23ftDK9PnFf+bXxqbgKkEoZsxnd3e9Ns=\n"
+  "-----END SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "\n"
+  ;
+
+static const char EX_RI_ED_BAD_SIG1[] =
+  "router fred 127.0.0.1 9001 0 9002\n"
+  "identity-ed25519\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQQABf54AR8QC+SNBpPOTVY198IQBANNwZjy+SBqQNxfzjEmo204AQAgBABjz4FP\n"
+  "zW/G+fu7YirvANvvqJeb7S1YYJnf6IrPaPsPRzDqJcO3/sTzFC5OSb9iJmzQAWnn\n"
+  "ADPOl+nOJC58XJnJ7CUJdPtyoVdMvUiUT/Jtg4RuCN1iDaDYaTh2VavImAY=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "signing-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAKuLC0kzCBTV6+WPZcAOQPKjqbjvMIyaehIQS1o90dYM+Tosrhtk3bw8\n"
+  "QBLMaiWL3kfIWPZuWi2ai40dmqAXMrXH3yBgKRNZ6zZSbUUuJ1IknqmrQ2PKjC/p\n"
+  "sIW2awC6Tq+zrZ7vntDb02zY857vP59j8eolTDg1Vvn6l2ieL+WhAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "onion-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAMnBQPOJBQLZ3NAa70n6lGZGvS3DYZFNOZ2QnHVeVvOSFIFsuvHtnUdX\n"
+  "svDafznYAuRFRVqJS2xtKKGu0cmy6ulEbBF+4uAEMwQY7dGRPMgVF1Z33U0CSd08\n"
+  "ChCJGPTE7tGGuoeSIGN3mfC4z2v9SP3McBdAiLHisPzaUjfRTcwRAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key W8fUvBpKBoePmqb70rdJUcRT0NhELDWH7/BSXJtkXS0=\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key-crosscert 1\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQoABf54AWPPgU/Nb8b5+7tiKu8A2++ol5vtLVhgmd/ois9o+w9HAAPwWqmL0HXa\n"
+  "bYKrKPWQYnpQHQ3Ty0MmCgj3ABF940JURnV161RlN8CRAOJaeQ0Z8wBRLFC1NqLT\n"
+  "+GVdtewGeQA=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "onion-key-crosscert\n"
+  "-----BEGIN CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "x0vT5Wv7Guc0/Vu2BqomWwenh8oda9+8K/7ILi5GQL/WC29Tj51i0EE7PVSnSMJ7\n"
+  "33I/V+N5neauqWnbg7TxYaLsPfr6SpPTpBL1Xt0OiwT1//PvPYZ1gCcF3ig3KcfI\n"
+  "mreQd5C5Vri6ukWkMtz/zNDaDpDanzaNXTdaUXmFHF4=\n"
+  "-----END CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "published 2014-10-05 12:00:00\n"
+  "bandwidth 1000 1000 1000\n"
+  "reject *:*\n"
+  "router-sig-ed25519 4DSdPePrToNx3WQ+4GfFelB8IyHu5Z9vTbbLZ02vfYEsCF9QeaeHbYagY/yjdt+9e71jmfM+W5MfRQd8FJ1+Dg\n"
+  "router-signature\n"
+  "-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "Hci/Br1+NNymDZBmQy1QWMlCeLe8Z1vtZ2ZTj42jDhWg1OC/v72ptI072x4x5cmi\n"
+  "X3EONy8wQUvTNowkfG6/V/B768C7FYJYBId1GAFZZymXnON9zUYnE3z1J20eu6l6\n"
+  "QepmmdvRmteIHMQ7HLSrBuDuXZUDJD0yXm6g8bMT+Ek=\n"
+  "-----END SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "\n"
+  "\n"
+  "\n"
+  ;
+static const char EX_RI_ED_BAD_SIG2[] =
+  "router fred 127.0.0.1 9001 0 9002\n"
+  "identity-ed25519\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQQABf54AW8fyx54c7vQQA/AmShAitFP7XI1CLdifEVPSrFKwYq6AQAgBAChqjVA\n"
+  "/wKKJZ30BIQoXe5+QMiPR6meNxF1lBttQ2t5AhauZbH5XzRhZkdGo114wuyPNEM9\n"
+  "PrBwp5akTtari9doVy6gs3McqdoIbRdWevpaGj5g5oOEOtA9b5UNWQSwUAs=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "signing-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBALp0Croi9zhpGxi9sUj54jr/flZdzxVVS+8VNldJG2c1soSx8kwlwotu\n"
+  "7mGGudJDAzDHGo5F5CCPEfQov2OmDehpefYUz/AaMLly6PrLRJlcUcpLogGf1+KU\n"
+  "1lLwE8kanXUkgvDhVQiFvNjy2Dxxuv3AHH4WdZZfbMbm8FJRGoHzAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "onion-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAMoI9vQT4g2sV2dViGOWOzxckk367T9sMjVwcYfJCmnixGxjWeKScQFB\n"
+  "K9v1uK73cfZR8AxiUGK4/iOX/9en14mJOGF7fftAqypFLAt1TBvb07IgXljOBoHc\n"
+  "Paw4oZoJQzEoazt0Oa181LyNnNIoaZpHVZd1+a1Gs1gKoM4xDBv1AgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key KjyvXYkMcpke5ZsUYf2gZAUNeEoz8NAwYoQvvbcDGiw=\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key-crosscert 0\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQoABf54AaGqNUD/AoolnfQEhChd7n5AyI9HqZ43EXWUG21Da3kCAI6MRHm7GpCF\n"
+  "/3zDGR/6jKe625uFZX9HpLt6FgAdGSJeMQ9W4Np9VkrFXAB3gvh7xxRzSgZ1rXgR\n"
+  "lUomgi7N1gc=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "onion-key-crosscert\n"
+  "-----BEGIN CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "xJXvCCpP4ExBuT3OTsdn2HJB0HidupmQq5zBh8fx/ox6+047ZBOM7+hVxxWapcMg\n"
+  "PMXbcLD4L/FCBpA/rjnFUE/9kztdq7FH/rOdi0nB6FZWhwDcsZuyfvbnDTxz5iHJ\n"
+  "87gd5nXA5PE649SRCxW5LX0OtSiPFPazu4KyyBgnTIM=\n"
+  "-----END CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "published 2014-10-05 12:00:00\n"
+  "bandwidth 1000 1000 1000\n"
+  "reject *:*\n"
+  "router-sig-ed25519 4DSdPePrToNx3WQ+4GfFelB8IyHu5Z9vTbbLZ02vfYEsCF9QeaeHbYagY/yjdt+9e71jmfM+W5MfRQd8FJ1+Dgxx\n"
+  "router-signature\n"
+  "-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "tk4kBNYqB8utOmX30HrV8YfnwBXYODIiL3M/juRS6nPn0uvbW7pjoZ3ck/ahgW+6\n"
+  "FNQsgTJnEADCWS1r6v7PcvzQjtrOUUpNxGJxYw1r8yZkvmIxSQD6GMzuTxq7o1VA\n"
+  "/wZYDLonLhCWRdPjxnrl12+z92NdyISJCHMLRVqs2QY=\n"
+  "-----END SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "\n"
+  "\n"
+  ;
+static const char EX_RI_ED_BAD_SIG3[] =
+  "router fred 127.0.0.1 9001 0 9002\n"
+  "identity-ed25519\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQQABf54AYYiKZrFWZ/Cj5mZbfK11MZHYbwchllsUl4qPqY9gfi6AQAgBAB4irxT\n"
+  "86FYA0NbZssSTmfyG6Edcf0ge61OwB4QD35kHCrvuZk2HnmL+63Tj4QoFqIVnwVC\n"
+  "3wRGJGcmS7y+vS64GUXbuyTgqgpl/KuoHo5Aqe6IxJlVWYtU6W0M6FV9tAM=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "signing-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAMUEvXTVTl5xkQ2MTEsB4sXQ3MQkz8sQrU63rlqglpi1yUv24fotjzvE\n"
+  "oJpeKJBwwg5WBW/fW0bUDJF2cOHRHkj/R4Is3m+2PR1Kn3UbYfxNkFkTE11l099V\n"
+  "H6xlsi0TJOJKlgrcbSuB7se2QctZVhwsdsJvFRptC9Qd+klAPb7tAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "onion-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAMooTeSUX7GPoyklSd1/6cF1u8e2LbjOLIpZrMon0Xt7c/aNwlrG9rVo\n"
+  "TSokHs3AQ2H2XIceySVRRWR4AdX9KApO4CX0gGTuVUmq6hFJWMnHdAs2mKL0kt1w\n"
+  "I+YWzjUqn4jIVa2nMbyHVQWzIysWwWiO4yduIjAYpBbWd9Biew4BAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key BN0I+pLmFkDQD5iRsdkcped4eZwGIuXnLiX2K0Zoi2I=\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key-crosscert 1\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQoABf54AXiKvFPzoVgDQ1tmyxJOZ/IboR1x/SB7rU7AHhAPfmQcAOrIvaG/xJqe\n"
+  "adM6mai+FlV8Dbt6QrXTcNHJU1m+CUDthA9TPTAYz9D8W0mTEQ6KEAKGfQrNLy2r\n"
+  "G1B+9wWSpA4=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "onion-key-crosscert\n"
+  "-----BEGIN CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "BpLBsl6Yo64QzczJn0TjdcXC1Jv9IhUG2m/Re3v0voCELOP+t5vkZXXLoVL23oKv\n"
+  "JheSkWiuAIEPsatb4afXZ8wZxPcQjwy3zTOBM7p9CG5fA+KYpqKTxAi+dhVYlcDo\n"
+  "M7S5nMV63FclkZIT70FFTHwWed1sAKwEO3/Ny24eppc=\n"
+  "-----END CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "published 2014-10-05 12:00:00\n"
+  "bandwidth 1000 1000 1000\n"
+  "reject *:*\n"
+  "router-sig-ed25519 abcdvEzGFYMcJ/Ea7sbessW1qRJmnNNo2Khkkl0rEEgtLX0b4L4MMhK/ktS52Y6jX3PRQWK5PZc6gjV7Jaldh+g0Aw\n"
+  "router-signature\n"
+  "-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "Vyj7g3eQ3K4+tm49fJkAtsAYnYHcEiMnlucYCEPeKojzYStNfZwQO2SG5gsoBIif\n"
+  "urgQZ/heaF4uiGFg64UFw08doXqQkd5SHO3B4astslITvmq0jyaqzSXhdB5uUzvp\n"
+  "QCR0fqGLVS1acUiqGbRr4PiZ9G7OJkm230N3rGdet+0=\n"
+  "-----END SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "\n"
+  ;
+static const char EX_RI_ED_BAD_SIG4[] =
+  "router fred 127.0.0.1 9001 0 9002\n"
+  "identity-ed25519\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQQABf55AaEnncX/t0cbLm1xrtlUpkXghaA8fVuV7g1VF3YNfCaIAQAgBAC7Ki3S\n"
+  "zzH9Aezz5X4fbwHeF+BQEDfVasfyTxTI4fhRi7t3RxHzBJd60uEMXy2FchD8VO5d\n"
+  "j4Dl7R4btrohPVSVBQZuemBQSW6g3ufNl0txpFWu0R7vBPTFH6oyXYfY9gQ=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "signing-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBALGKwzhOui2/jJPjU1ngW5IZRPcoDk7RAfGDO4xaef4VfAFHCV9CQO1c\n"
+  "/wQ09CcRdggTvUcv9hJTGJhSObUUooCkxw4/35f/A6/NoW1Gi0JqF9EsQWHpuAfr\n"
+  "n/ATlJQ9oGdTCNDq/BXSPWXhoI6UhUe0wiD4P4x4QwaYHcZh+lE5AgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "onion-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAOKrizVm2h5/jE/HqqLCBLWJZVVoGspasCtDDqHhSqsPzyjpqa52iMKi\n"
+  "q/deJ92le3J2NJRGKxPmPQqWxwhIjnMS5kUMoW182iLpO/G9qyPZ0dh6jXB0NBLF\n"
+  "ySfW6V2s3h4G4D2P+fqnsnzQnAX7YufkvgDau/qTWi2CqD0CjavDAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key A9h8jY9dPbhHTDbIc/NYWXmRP65wwSMrkY1MN8dV3BM=\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key-crosscert 1\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQoABf55AbsqLdLPMf0B7PPlfh9vAd4X4FAQN9Vqx/JPFMjh+FGLAN8xr/w3KFVi\n"
+  "yXoP/az6hIbJh0HYCwH8D1rPoQLcdpe8XVwFSrHGarZesdslIwc9dZa/D1dx3OGO\n"
+  "UhJOrdv51QY=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "onion-key-crosscert\n"
+  "-----BEGIN CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "bLmdO7ME5vq+c9y/Hd8EyBviMBTeo85sHZF/z6Pehc3Wg3i1BJ8DHSd1cK24Pg48\n"
+  "4WUrGTfonewuzJBDd3MLkKe6epXmvUgvuQN5wQszq1+u9ap/mRf6b3nEG0MHxMlO\n"
+  "FLx5MBsScuo+Q+pwXZa8vPuKTtEjqbVZivdKExJuIX0=\n"
+  "-----END CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "published 2014-10-05 12:00:00\n"
+  "bandwidth 1000 1000 1000\n"
+  "reject *:*\n"
+  " router-sig-ed25519 4DSdPePrToNx3WQ+4GfFelB8IyHu5Z9vTbbLZ02vfYEsCF9QeaeHbYagY/yjdt+9e71jmfM+W5MfRQd8FJ1+Dgxx\n"
+  "router-signature\n"
+  "-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "LqNGEa10zwSPeomBXTfgvBnnWAdWyiR7KYZq9T++jK4ctR6hUaWngH8qSteUrkMx\n"
+  "gyWb6UMmlxdfOG0sdcU463HsqV7zObaKya8/WwQ9elj3FfsToswUCeOaLR/Rg7wC\n"
+  "zcUjI5VsneQoXT2WVZbZBLsLB3+7QfezVHRMB377GAY=\n"
+  "-----END SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  ;
+
+static const char EX_RI_ED_BAD_CROSSCERT1[] =
+  "router fred 127.0.0.1 9001 0 9002\n"
+  "identity-ed25519\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQQABf55AV1AfOvQWKlWsbzoBdJc5m72ShIJuA8eNV15basjhXYdAQAgBABy+KQK\n"
+  "3oLDGtqL5kwRmjAsls/+C6SAoAALll7U7wNSH7en5RVBal4RUzCf57ea/KG0c9V8\n"
+  "2DmZ3PdOt2aY/M2bWGmmH/tyyapOoV98dhDwFU7zcx/pMfRnJTDRSDwl8QE=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "signing-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAMP6xbqbj+x1mq5XImjeT0rUzqKZTgBd5zvK4Xcy9IifJuFC9+mMzrY4\n"
+  "WhYbdClxKUkDMkit9MVhek+P/w5TSHKl6AuqGaO09ID+hZpoUSdoBUYktynxfGsx\n"
+  "kIDu0XvgtAeSyJaVvoV1SKVChY0IBbzUqbHt4O2Q1BhzFCKEJTEzAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "onion-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBANwWlBh7e/eSLlhto5YUdj1iGYOq+yAmlosDItVfYrSPJuUfM2ocMBAn\n"
+  "udbRbWiADoqsbKn/gwwHCC/f1HX2FkRXxxnOlJKLo+NEi8tGmOlcQXSQol1pCpvK\n"
+  "sA9TxtYr+Ft4LRpxNrexF+pIBxqzwetqQrZbKYr0CFJi8q1qlMynAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key cs1AP+xF5cXTLuKeOeItdoDAzfALTJkwk9lB4mtC4QI=\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key-crosscert 3\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQoABf55AXL4pAregsMa2ovmTBGaMCyWz/4LpICgAAuWXtTvA1IfAKo6ANUq+hi+\n"
+  "xb3J4aYafnszlj87oi/DR+SDf29wzwNw8gmaqGzJ5GbfISfABuTUCzlilZyVnLxi\n"
+  "BHcCH6PWiAQ=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "onion-key-crosscert\n"
+  "-----BEGIN CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "qC9Kph/kGtONR2DxZDoIFFgnDFC+/7H07EgCiYQdIFIROc+gGK9qBOgeFEptrkXF\n"
+  "XdE35xxox5xSASQvp7hjFwxUtJRGOtf2O98regqeeaz6O9VPXHkLf51uqX3bVgq8\n"
+  "KvFAsFFS66GxhtbrVjpyRgIwHAYvse1WVESfLuZZTn0=\n"
+  "-----END CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "published 2014-10-05 12:00:00\n"
+  "bandwidth 1000 1000 1000\n"
+  "reject *:*\n"
+  "router-sig-ed25519 3uW8Q1aetIQLOsqSco128ZUaHlhqdYiBvrxV7x75BGNS5RzIMTEwYDNtEX1LNPFJ5N0YOV0HEEOLhrJUV9QCBA\n"
+  "router-signature\n"
+  "-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "WuD7S/saTYBxKvItITbHRi8n+e6g/oVbosicfbRbafYPzPp4Prb+RK03UTafzXrV\n"
+  "QEQIzDNhfePcIMH8qX+qrogLMXFqiXx6TVQ0GqNvqirokk8ar3AgtRtewhChAuAj\n"
+  "8pmQTj2JpZn/iB3PCE2l/93O9LHZfp44hc8QOWKs6BE=\n"
+  "-----END SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "\n"
+  "\n"
+  "\n"
+  ;
+static const char EX_RI_ED_BAD_CROSSCERT4[] =
+  "router fred 127.0.0.1 9001 0 9002\n"
+  "identity-ed25519\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQQABf55AW5TTGF9jCMl7aALZzqypD9Bj8WYnAPIrKCoIJdgMbY0AQAgBAB7eCn8\n"
+  "rukx7t/egZUdqU7+FYqsnO4wdmOkLZkp0+gpF3jjk6N1Q0037NNVNZBjONB0Nm2F\n"
+  "CpB3nWSJliSSKr5tOYsuBPFy5VVGYeKPakpOoxanQ1UcqevMBAQy0zf9hwA=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "signing-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBALeS5YbeDuKQ5iiuUvh3REoyJ47/YU9lslWmTrVBf9b66pMnYJv/awPu\n"
+  "m2HredUAJ3VzwQ38VJA39w3fQXUhQDnQ0OPpKzeAmIiuG+6WdW/mBSK7uKcezC23\n"
+  "LA1d6Afyl79LjZz/n+ENXqNMlJk4QPcPHuRnAvwBl3t8YVRPJmxhAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "onion-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAPprokY7utWuO/0252dBB5MCxmVD/dROaIBDyFtpdH+YVv04rkOlDzYD\n"
+  "W4mgHVBMxEm/cspTgQmJ4exRHJPpcSe1RYHt1ONZdLYr6D7OOWf0y1IUrVSzF6K4\n"
+  "lqlmNuH1H4+TKGbkvixYc5GU/2ZmAy6gFEuphYnBbsN2Ywc38mnfAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key Cgo6xniGfEiuYoLSPUdE4Vb2D4zj2NQzC1lRjysRRXs=\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key-crosscert 1\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQoABf54AU3MlHAEtdPdAyWJzRBnh4brXbCR9JFLjLM40hsBMoscAJ8cHMIc71+p\n"
+  "Qa+lg5JiYb551mLgtPWLy12xdhog7SXiJl3NvnMgbMZXHDqkU2YZCidnVz+xqMdh\n"
+  "mjQFK4AtRwg=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "onion-key-crosscert\n"
+  "-----BEGIN CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "bi4M/AJLZF7/vSNmOj4uhrgKBQA/KfcZy5e58mhGL4owxd9vaWfl3aelvb9jf9zN\n"
+  "Q7FMv8f9aXzeVIoXIpRJxSKIJgBtG2wnMumIc80pqBvTyGInharszb6njfm0bg1u\n"
+  "PfJkbQYyf/dA5l5UwCrjFs06ImDmjFTAdsSWf6DfZ/k=\n"
+  "-----END CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "published 2014-10-05 12:00:00\n"
+  "bandwidth 1000 1000 1000\n"
+  "reject *:*\n"
+  "router-sig-ed25519 4DSdPePrToNx3WQ+4GfFelB8IyHu5Z9vTbbLZ02vfYEsCF9QeaeHbYagY/yjdt+9e71jmfM+W5MfRQd8FJ1+Dgxx\n"
+  "router-signature\n"
+  "-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "io16v+e0pK3sbFzPGnkQrAjrRgIOJHrVZ1RXcxZ1+UNXagWM/MOLhQpkU/cw49Wd\n"
+  "4rQeZD3JQh16330eXbxc97AyDgp0b30He846SI0MfW/DnmGI8ZNeYfLbMv2bmbs9\n"
+  "QULzyIH8C+5mnMI1arcuiAua+Dpa34F79vgqPuvw5fU=\n"
+  "-----END SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "\n"
+  "\n"
+  ;
+static const char EX_RI_ED_BAD_CROSSCERT3[] =
+  "router fred 127.0.0.1 9001 0 9002\n"
+  "identity-ed25519\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQQABf55AVB+j+B2yPgGywvp7nvejyhMh9ejKmw7LCwufV83Zl9eAQAgBAConA3B\n"
+  "jJ3X2tES40jd94rRUFS2/s/Yv7E4LEQ9z0+jz8horNivzK3O/t7IGxJggi+b41/9\n"
+  "Uaqt+wqtVuKj0xJ9jwBlCXFt28G2P9s4ZyXYgGZqo7MlJlboybnOMvmoTQA=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "signing-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAPWuEWckT4aYAVNrZzLA8xVwfXp0wzfXeTWBztLS8VzssN6w/+cwXdeY\n"
+  "N1YNc2DiD3u8f+7kmuZIqL1EFQUwTvRwEzQXm2dqGM7qkm5ZGNMb5FKu+QwO2ImI\n"
+  "FLNiO5zO/LqP3cf/2L8/DuvruLenUrhRtecGFaHmhDYl+2brHIiPAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "onion-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAMtHTfk0gDvp9+PtIG8Ks7rgCiJZ2aihSvr6WaKHYuIprgspFuga98cg\n"
+  "D//J80CrgH5Dw68YnkG+gU40IxP7YzhQ4glFlJGu3s2y7Qazcv5ww1XtHur+GDoA\n"
+  "cY0zCLhltNQFxIsoVUepY97XA6Y2ejYJjyqNXQcAmoPNoVhnTdkhAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key ibZf57LptdOK3WpVFXkYMatEEqPhuVWxsnkwF6638V4=\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key-crosscert 0\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQoABf55AaicDcGMndfa0RLjSN33itFQVLb+z9i/sTgsRD3PT6PPAEbkxCdI/bH/\n"
+  "B06DAjRuoDiv1HKsGuW+UN1iGEiWu2ieFzf3m0Z7BL9p2u2zIbHYkP50b3T3sebD\n"
+  "1AksemmMdA0=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "onion-key-crosscert\n"
+  "-----BEGIN CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "BpLBsl6Yo64QzczJn0TjdcXC1Jv9IhUG2m/Re3v0voCELOP+t5vkZXXLoVL23oKv\n"
+  "JheSkWiuAIEPsatb4afXZ8wZxPcQjwy3zTOBM7p9CG5fA+KYpqKTxAi+dhVYlcDo\n"
+  "M7S5nMV63FclkZIT70FFTHwWed1sAKwEO3/Ny24eppc=\n"
+  "-----END CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "published 2014-10-05 12:00:00\n"
+  "bandwidth 1000 1000 1000\n"
+  "reject *:*\n"
+  "router-sig-ed25519 XS4zVi46Xl3xKhuozPCDlW0QRFD4qUhJmkefonQNsRlMVsrPkALnP2tfnfdfTc69hbNa22pOjJNf6Gm505EnAw\n"
+  "router-signature\n"
+  "-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "Q+R3OpO8VhfvFbXuE5qolhVbgosBHy2A5QS91TMzCbsxa8pBA6Li4QdPR37wvdLq\n"
+  "KayfmmNCMKU5qiZMyXqJZm4fdpxiSi50Z0tYlXM3b2OVfza3+pSOEBl89fN6G4Qc\n"
+  "pAmM14eEo1UzXrqZw76tMS2CwOYF5vR2xFGCYC0b5hM=\n"
+  "-----END SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "\n"
+  "\n"
+  "\n"
+  ;
+static const char EX_RI_ED_BAD_CROSSCERT5[] =
+  "router fred 127.0.0.1 9001 0 9002\n"
+  "identity-ed25519\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQQABf55AaCfOaispi7dJhK0c8HXJHIwoBkMgRpmmHu+3Zce/soMAQAgBAB5bAIo\n"
+  "5i4TSY/bV2KQAyziRwvgJm+nEiECClflPbP9Um+zOzOgxtDmNnR5UFQj+VWNG4uf\n"
+  "5lnaryN+PfUXZMTcs8AARof3fFz9tVPINHDrsGvKt8gpzgZEHkVioAXOFwg=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "signing-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAL3Fr/ovZ9SMGYrAM24taKBm/NpemZaXdD/JeBXFYm5Zs3szLwJC4Etm\n"
+  "zjNL6tVy+I21O1g3cs16TkflcidsjPXNx//PHAn7bqWMekjrt3SQdkHW2gDPgT2c\n"
+  "zYJ/hBR96JYG796jP3pkfJz6Iz5uT/ci3A/cdaVbzM1uZbMUgYGzAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "onion-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAMHB+1dWa8BBrKE94vTqfbkSEuysG5LyyZF/WrqHq/3W+ocDLz795k8O\n"
+  "2Zvgr9im/Ib4hD7IyrtRexcuBdwujdG7cBALdCcWiUTGAMkl96HNETSX+lUVIpJ9\n"
+  "pMsc9O7+yz+/0Cl2RpILZCdE/7I96qHpZl3tzlRKSu15WeIm5U77AgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key GXi0a2VLcRHQMMYys85zu3IPqOn5ZTsOixYyQvTGnQs=\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key-crosscert 1\n"
+  "-----BEGIN BUTTERED CRUMPET-----\n"
+  "AQoABf54AU3MlHAEtdPdAyWJzRBnh4brXbCR9JFLjLM40hsBMoscAJ8cHMIc71+p\n"
+  "Qa+lg5JiYb551mLgtPWLy12xdhog7SXiJl3NvnMgbMZXHDqkU2YZCidnVz+xqMdh\n"
+  "mjQFK4AtRwg=\n"
+  "-----END BUTTERED CRUMPET-----\n"
+  "onion-key-crosscert\n"
+  "-----BEGIN CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "T9NHMBhuJo+TlfU3TztNgCc9fK1naNRwPOyoqr5R6lJvJ40jkHnIVOFuvuzvZ35O\n"
+  "QgPbyFcMjv6leV5xcW+/I9tWaBUFXiRGI27qjCFth4Gxq2B6B2dIcQliLXSvW9b+\n"
+  "CMTgDwVa4h2R2PMh18TRx1596ywE09YhCgBF3CwYsiM=\n"
+  "-----END CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "published 2014-10-05 12:00:00\n"
+  "bandwidth 1000 1000 1000\n"
+  "reject *:*\n"
+  "router-sig-ed25519 sRpiP9kyW/DGOphp4V2VCtcKNA8i7zGuv2tnljNIPTB7r7KsTvdUk/Ha9ArRQEivO4nC2HHENtknDl3GtWIPCA\n"
+  "router-signature\n"
+  "-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "DtORw3+gO/yUUIp70xDaWSOgQZrJAAoZTNCB7q5WCoZOngeaCiC1Gtc+Fmdn7tER\n"
+  "uPqQC5H/Kh3Mi82PCj0JxvNivnNTNY1AZVaIX5YoioXVOkWF0B2pqMvFuDSdm2oJ\n"
+  "29PqSVcklquu19EjJRTopIHvYn3sFhQL4LarMsYY11c=\n"
+  "-----END SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "\n"
+  "\n"
+  "\n"
+  ;
+static const char EX_RI_ED_BAD_CROSSCERT6[] =
+  "router fred 127.0.0.1 9001 0 9002\n"
+  "identity-ed25519\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQQABf55ARMMCtQ8pObC5bq02AUE9Lx2bqsZBBkeOsDZVaEq6JavAQAgBABtV0xF\n"
+  "CsWXL/uFIBnoEsnXBeU1MvYRFrj1vR7QHdWXnxywXvBYUAC8lu/uyc8qqLp+aQSJ\n"
+  "5JzpDYlg3hp1fl5k97iv5F9WrR6s554YpmgYy9agFaxZ4LmRgz7n0UJ8mwM=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "signing-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAO5qd1TndKD2pEs1ZLWsHlvfO/E7cA0H7NKGLSioGpBf4P0rtkueX4ci\n"
+  "kJNa/4Fn/QsLECqEF2lUjkIc8YL+HMS6qteKvN8+nn16DfvnIhPDNZWTJjLl1bOI\n"
+  "sWSSiduhanoWQnhRtl3Rxg3opdNd9ApO0DLUNy4Qy18Ai6SgksfHAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "onion-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAJkMYNpK7eJJyGwD/xG/iNg6gzzbIwrOSvmtoP7Rot42qtBiQ9A9kdsy\n"
+  "sazwkWkM93U1+1OaAADPYxeHoyHnuia95Cnc5y2lFSH3I7gnGGSPKSTwXtdyvDWZ\n"
+  "P1LbmQ4Bnh5leTCNZ/eFC4/GjNVzqHxjbb8a11dQhA8dOk8PrUq9AgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key HdSQOqvLr4YnJE1XzzVIddgKgnjaHKJqnq0GqF4wXDg=\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key-crosscert 0\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQoABf55AW1XTEUKxZcv+4UgGegSydcF5TUy9hEWuPW9HtAd1ZefACVwif1deQry\n"
+  "K5GeemRa32sGzujVDDe75WRiPKFT3l/EtjTq3oeVq2xwbVJklnG3ASejKTr3YcHt\n"
+  "ov0jOl0jywc=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "onion-key-crosscert\n"
+  "-----BEGIN NAUGHTY MARMOSET-----\n"
+  "BpLBsl6Yo64QzczJn0TjdcXC1Jv9IhUG2m/Re3v0voCELOP+t5vkZXXLoVL23oKv\n"
+  "JheSkWiuAIEPsatb4afXZ8wZxPcQjwy3zTOBM7p9CG5fA+KYpqKTxAi+dhVYlcDo\n"
+  "M7S5nMV63FclkZIT70FFTHwWed1sAKwEO3/Ny24eppc=\n"
+  "-----END NAUGHTY MARMOSET-----\n"
+  "published 2014-10-05 12:00:00\n"
+  "bandwidth 1000 1000 1000\n"
+  "reject *:*\n"
+  "router-sig-ed25519 lNY8TRX/FZdH5eFbsBkFHuRi8bPDsE5P+v7zExyD/IXnKS/ffYlP8qw1XIPdEDOIzGQ14+kyPX0SotaAqHRtBA\n"
+  "router-signature\n"
+  "-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "BHamS+epF77iozo5cBt+tbs22m9GhwY55DRXpEWAtvn67jsMnmn7qCOLONigK1RT\n"
+  "adZNezIydcCxXltgHTdKaZw4lcqv3s0KL8kI8frbBmm7PjXtWnrdXBYY+YK54MN/\n"
+  "t4N3162o9hzzKSwye0gPjgzpQ1xtEIkzWhBcmE9Vw5s=\n"
+  "-----END SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "\n"
+  ;
+static const char EX_RI_ED_BAD_CROSSCERT7[] =
+  "router fred 127.0.0.1 9001 0 9002\n"
+  "identity-ed25519\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQQABf55AfVmH2ReTyatl4VnS5YREtCM2dwikWuAPffq6M5bysZxAQAgBAAXoqE7\n"
+  "taqwLDXLZrZukpF1eBkCwYQK9uzctHTuMdqOHChguvkfX7V4H3O76Ayqvz+Z1ut1\n"
+  "KYRdgiArn3viRaBv3ZKT4Z75suMI3bjqGOSGLAKfOa0uLkOmKblHHhSUkwQ=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "signing-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAOLNugzUezzzw+N1SuQWzILJYkUJyQDoVXSZjT0dzBplHCjlrv0WZCUP\n"
+  "/pbonE7SlCChIovHcdiASaLj7MVaGgYDq3M1Vtgt5vhgGl10/+evBAD1QEt8AVfr\n"
+  "5+PH/sbZvOWucAhNUhOlqFKAn4vdRY39VEEXC5/Jz5fsk1E/DBu5AgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "onion-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAKxzg1hsYMS+0zAIrgYxSGO0GbKRrL/VhdlMEGu7ACaoqlGnmGQS3B4B\n"
+  "gLk8xDdx9N//8+YTx0hUIxP38w08lubPl1WXMq8s7wAiFd06Nklf65mHs0sXVtS1\n"
+  "EG3f97PQqmBpEJOwYBATNcA9e6F62P8SXNkpSjOzNaE0h9wHNKk7AgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key msdr3O4W4bm/xdmZLzj35363ZSFex8yQxLWsV3wRCAQ=\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key-crosscert 1\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "VQoABx54AU3MlHAEtgPdAyWJzRBnh4brXbCR9JFLjLM40hsBMoscAJ8cHMIc71+p\n"
+  "Qa+lg5JiYb551mLgtPWLy12xdhog7SXiJl3NvnMgbMZXHDqkU2YZCidnVz+xqMdh\n"
+  "mjQFK4AtRwg=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "onion-key-crosscert\n"
+  "-----BEGIN CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "RJJRiU0vjVtRi3bVZru3aTvV5l56X/WOOp/ii316yPAS3aAMpOm1+piFVR5MNqcB\n"
+  "ZGyrA2Kx0hawdL2buU47iZ12GOCi4f1Es4V4N0TQgJICsKX38DsRdct9c1qMcqpp\n"
+  "1aENSRuaw0szTIr9OgR7/8stqR5c3iF1H5fOhmTi6xM=\n"
+  "-----END CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "published 2014-10-05 12:00:00\n"
+  "bandwidth 1000 1000 1000\n"
+  "reject *:*\n"
+  "router-sig-ed25519 4DSdPePrToNx3WQ+4GfFelB8IyHu5Z9vTbbLZ02vfYEsCF9QeaeHbYagY/yjdt+9e71jmfM+W5MfRQd8FJ1+Dgxx\n"
+  "router-signature\n"
+  "-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "F3ZqvsyL6RRhPEnNFFIZY4WJM7LK082rseWzRkGNXjwoEwOWUK8enQ4Wjit+wozW\n"
+  "4HVIY1F+vP7gm6IiOEAFgEpB4C8FGuyoFw2q0ONA2tqTcvBJDDnqbx08FO7v2Dij\n"
+  "d3ucfc5gf7YNaoFCMMuyAzC56eyNk4U+6cSKy6wnJds=\n"
+  "-----END SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  ;
+
+static const char EX_RI_ED_MISPLACED1[] =
+  "router fred 127.0.0.1 9001 0 9002\n"
+  "signing-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAKT6OIN6TsDB+xcp1uLeE0K3aiHGqa7hdxMBGpvcD0UFSyzpVv1A/fJa\n"
+  "tClDCwTpfTGbyK2L7AO75Ci0c7jf6Pq+V7L6R7o12g6WBTMrgsceC4YqXSKpXNhi\n"
+  "oudJyPfVzBfKcJUSynv89FUQOyul/WRRqWTfv0xUsJ3yjuOESfCNAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "identity-ed25519\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQQABf55AbBV9NVz0Hdl0Uiv87LiXaTAoeSXE+bheNG4Dju1GzQHAQAgBAD16h+T\n"
+  "ygzSgPN4Qat5ITthvm+lvMwMVGbVNWMxNy9i33NGhgp8kqMp2iPAY+LhX8It2b+X\n"
+  "8H9cBmYLO5G7AlMPj7GsuWdCdP/M/ldMvFfznlqeE3pCpRas6W48CFJ+9Ao=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "onion-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBANMO/MepK3uCkKTLRCwIWc/8URVza2gEmDx6mDTJIB/Mw8U8VRDuu4iJ\n"
+  "v+LL3D8/HGLvT9a8OXbl5525Zszt8XueF3uePBF0Qp0fjGBL8GFqmrmFe6plurPJ\n"
+  "TfrS/m3q+KhXAUowmghciVGDY0kMiDG9X/t/zKLMKWVDYRZk+fupAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key I8yDO62Flx5O/QsFvgb2ArIRqwJLWetHMeZdxngRl2A=\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key-crosscert 1\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQoABf55AfXqH5PKDNKA83hBq3khO2G+b6W8zAxUZtU1YzE3L2LfAGC1uXxN2KwW\n"
+  "w4PqRidM1UPZ5jVOHceZYNQcTzzzArfBpr9OraOO2up4TGte8GVqjJNxrZc1gfjn\n"
+  "CwPW5WxpFg0=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "onion-key-crosscert\n"
+  "-----BEGIN CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "jLg3D3VO4i0sN8p2qtB6+5C3tai/K4M89mP7z2abQnUTbynOacPoNXIk4o64DjBJ\n"
+  "kaR42yfA7yQZ8Rj8abwgz0Zz6zbd+JjE+s/EklrEEtOl+jZAl3i+92FaHROJojXq\n"
+  "hw+ZEPOb9zgb1UQ7S1Fo+GoqA5bdGm/Wg1kSQielkNE=\n"
+  "-----END CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "published 2014-10-05 12:00:00\n"
+  "bandwidth 1000 1000 1000\n"
+  "reject *:*\n"
+  "router-sig-ed25519 TRKvIl/wIIRD4Xcmd6HYmy7tD0KhVGgoStpWPtX0zmXGZ7+jugItrY0frDu9n82syiruuA45ZOs1Rfi4CbOSCg\n"
+  "router-signature\n"
+  "-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "NYpRfurB1YhFmDAdRc2Sd77S7By2V/0kgEHpJhtySb7efiQsyOA4ZBr1zEFPAXdp\n"
+  "TviKzyS9kN2fnz3hORoqFul33BDZbiLMNLtt5tzp62TYtmIg9IZdjjczbJUgbVLt\n"
+  "KCJL0vM7fdbXkZX61GIBbMYwzwIiHvVxG7F/AS5RbtE=\n"
+  "-----END SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "\n"
+  ;
+static const char EX_RI_ED_MISPLACED2[] =
+  "router fred 127.0.0.1 9001 0 9002\n"
+  "identity-ed25519\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQQABf55AfJo9FIePrxeDNnWT6SWkoz0/L27018XjUNWEHfaR06MAQAgBAAMgolK\n"
+  "nLg3ZnVv0skzHCfmX+ZR9Ttwj7FNXfhXCsyr860S79OW5LD0/m1GcS9JflWhP+FO\n"
+  "ng5cRb+aqNc8Ul+/4sQudZRx8w4U3d5rOuMGCqhQXnktH9AFzQHFq0jpAAU=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "signing-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAPeK/znKLRvSUmCIUiZOgfhiRFt7XGN//C2GFuey4xkKiIr9LWMuVe9m\n"
+  "Wx39Ea2UGEtNGCEVvZdJMDVRl7heFTfJTN4L1YeyWx6iNRWlpAmgQOKII7slHwlq\n"
+  "seEULOLOXc9AsU/v9ba9G54DFbHfe2k44ZOwEmaQZW5VF/I0YMMdAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "onion-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAKFRzlrqPPxEW0nboAJ1qzKFb/vFtvRW0xNVb8RtbOY/NY5FV1hS8yfH\n"
+  "igtugkrOBmWah7cmJhiON2j+TKeBxEoXwJMZeyV+HLbr7nY/mFhad4BQ3Frkl8d6\n"
+  "1kQMhOJswMdwnnVHPNGUob4YAX0SpFA6MpBVj92zmMBeaihqUS9VAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key br8svioLcJCAQxoo3KvlT288p8rb4lQIZNLlplkIKkw=\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key-crosscert 0\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQoABf55AQyCiUqcuDdmdW/SyTMcJ+Zf5lH1O3CPsU1d+FcKzKvzAG9XqwmRm0uJ\n"
+  "E49NoHcWr9IzdIwSGo+PJSkVpk95a5p2s065BetCWxEEBJQniajQf2hZ36zmV9rq\n"
+  "a6puqkEAKAM=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "onion-key-crosscert\n"
+  "-----BEGIN CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "d6QGIVAJL5JjHUyV+aicLIdBYyxHwviKpPcp7uldRF8vfDGFpu0qFgJ5KT+3t36w\n"
+  "QY1r75bvUMG/ZzGKDg95dcK0X2AK6GFlcrYyCoQEVOsuPc1QEUeK9P2s7viNQE4V\n"
+  "tRwG/CvJhPfcnxErzVGfXIeYRL1r/hPNFDZSeSxPPM0=\n"
+  "-----END CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "published 2014-10-05 12:00:00\n"
+  "bandwidth 1000 1000 1000\n"
+  "router-sig-ed25519 ts9pFk8PnDWtXgQad09XC/ZCbruSx1U1pNOMWF9fyoNG0CodxdDH9Vglg+BOS7Nd9fmsINfPWKCVdVuSSM7zCA\n"
+  "reject *:*\n"
+  "router-signature\n"
+  "-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "YMl6mpQm7UCsPQhZKMm0aZ7fzGevWzRbQO+de20HTn7fVqMWQf2hBDJe9QTN/uDK\n"
+  "/VKYT8SnIBexbrSMy1N5q8kNFKxxUtwA9GRtz620Vvc4m+lz/tnT9qucIKCDL5iJ\n"
+  "eRpnls0JoAMIHKl99zdUioYubmOZuqUaRAdT8ulWy+Y=\n"
+  "-----END SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "\n"
+  ;
+static const char EX_RI_ED_BAD_CERT1[] =
+  "router fred 127.0.0.1 9001 0 9002\n"
+  "identity-ed25519\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQoABf55AYf+rX8a5rzdTBGPvLdQIP8XcElDDQnJIruGqfDTj+tjAP+3XOL2UTmn\n"
+  "Hu39PbLZV+m9DIj/DvG38M0hP4MmHUjP/iZG5PaCX6/aMe+nQSNuTl0IDGpIo1l8\n"
+  "dZToQTFSzAQ=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "signing-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAM4o2DrTwn3wrvUMm41S/hFL5ZtRHGRDh26o8htn14AKMC65vpygKFY7\n"
+  "fUQVClAiJthAs5fD/8sE5XDtQrLnFv5OegQx8kSPuwyS/+5pI1bdxRJvKMOUl2Tc\n"
+  "fAUhzeNBmPvW3lMi9Fksw5sCSAKQ5VH/+DlYvBGZIO49pTnOAty1AgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "onion-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAMzIsJeEWWjN3Lp6qrzaJGn8uhJPJyjy2Wt3sp7z7iD/yBWW6Q7Jku3e\n"
+  "C5QfKmSmNi2pNjS0SqPjqZZNsbcxpq/bEOcZdysZG1lqi/QgxUevk57RWjh3EFsG\n"
+  "TwK3ougKWB5Q6/3m32dNsnnnDqzVapgZo7Zd3V/aCo0BVtL5VXZbAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key W28nwT/5FJ818M78y/5sNOkxhQ7ENBhjVhGG2j6KvFY=\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key-crosscert 0\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQoABf55AYf+rX8a5rzdTBGPvLdQIP8XcElDDQnJIruGqfDTj+tjAP+3XOL2UTmn\n"
+  "Hu39PbLZV+m9DIj/DvG38M0hP4MmHUjP/iZG5PaCX6/aMe+nQSNuTl0IDGpIo1l8\n"
+  "dZToQTFSzAQ=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "onion-key-crosscert\n"
+  "-----BEGIN CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "FWnEjvFob0ObgqohMT7miwGsAuioCT7Urz6tyWaGWph/TP9hbFWj4MPK5mt998mn\n"
+  "xA8zHSF5n/edu7wVX+rtnPrYPBmg+qN8+Pq6XMg64CwtWu+sqigsi6vtz/TfAIDL\n"
+  "mypENmSY32sWPvy/CA8dAZ2ASh57EH9a+WcFModpXkM=\n"
+  "-----END CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "published 2014-10-05 12:00:00\n"
+  "bandwidth 1000 1000 1000\n"
+  "reject *:*\n"
+  "router-sig-ed25519 88YqJdGJS4O6XiUCNrc9xbOHxujvcN/TkCoRuQQeKfZGHM+4IhI6AcXFlPIfDYq0SAavMhVmzsDDw0ROl7vyCQ\n"
+  "router-signature\n"
+  "-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "cU4WDO3w9ZfVRbNUgxOQMbwS2xWXvaL+cZmIV6AAjAZVWkLEpif4g6uYu+jJUZOS\n"
+  "NUT7lNOMwTu4tE4b1YJpnD9T8iW0DlOXxlvRBMQYmKwhQuYk898BDGTSk+0AY0HJ\n"
+  "vv8wRVewDajNhW7tFY907IdHvPXG0u83GANxkYrRyUg=\n"
+  "-----END SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "\n"
+  ;
+static const char EX_RI_ED_BAD_CERT2[] =
+  "router fred 127.0.0.1 9001 0 9002\n"
+  "identity-ed25519\n"
+  "-----BEGIN WOBBLY RUTABAGA-----\n"
+  "helo\n"
+  "-----END WOBBLY RUTABAGA-----\n"
+  "signing-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBANZvqyqFeiekh8ApqIGK4ZtOqjaX87EzDestvAWwamVOXiPoUrzXgM3O\n"
+  "l8uuTnMA4TfnjLyyA2TnaMzJylOI1OMHuW/D9B/liWDstSxWNNIlKgLQ/Dh9xBS7\n"
+  "uQb2PYlI+iMkPKPyJQSTDdGHE7cdFPewUfhRtJU3F5ztm/3FLBFvAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "onion-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBANZl8U/Z8KCPS7EBDzt8i9kNETXS7vnp9gnw3BQNXfjiDtDg9eO7ChxY\n"
+  "NBwuOTXmRxfX3W9kvZ0op9Hno6hixIhHzDql+vZ+hN7yPanVVDglSUXcr31yBm5K\n"
+  "kA+ZnRvH3oVQ97E4rRzpi09dtI13Pzu7JS5jRMtH+JF1kQBoNC0dAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key lUrEL+TVXpjjHQ2BIKk34vblyDmoyMro1a6/9hJ4VRc=\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key-crosscert 0\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQoABf55Abm5E7FBdd3F8N1xuz/vdv03zh2lABrmGjzPQ3AFJtntALNeQTgjv0JL\n"
+  "jON4+SPNi0B2Bva3yKaSsdxiHQ1rIwQqIUVkzXmmX4jmsvJK/9gERAdD7GafTKZQ\n"
+  "BaZbNXBvmQw=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "onion-key-crosscert\n"
+  "-----BEGIN CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "OxkqFsw1vHUQ9iPYcKC/MHUBtbLPK6JY2i81ccAai2eW118UXcTbeCRccrXyqSkl\n"
+  "RLcooZyli1D6wg9x7O8+2+HXIbUa6WcTOD1Qi7Z9wKZfk4sDUy7QHKENMRfAXwX3\n"
+  "U/gqd4BflMPp4+XrYfPzz+6yQPWp0t9wXbFv5hZ9F3k=\n"
+  "-----END CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "published 2014-10-05 12:00:00\n"
+  "bandwidth 1000 1000 1000\n"
+  "reject *:*\n"
+  "router-sig-ed25519 fW6Bt4R3xVk5KMDyOcYg8n5ANP0OrQq2PQFK2cW0lTAdi+eX+oT/BeWnkrn0uSWOC/t4omCmH4Rdl8M9xtpfBA\n"
+  "router-signature\n"
+  "-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "DHxiQXuLxZR0ylqwUGGePgN4KF4ItlOV/DuGmmszCO/Ut0p+5s4FP2v6Mm9M92Wj\n"
+  "75rS9xF/Ts0Kf49dvgc+c5VTvhX5I5SwGQkRk0RNJtNoP0t+qXBHaFV8BlAeaWF6\n"
+  "Lg3O+GUK325fQv9uDPCe37mFQV9jafAzsZUrO/ggb1U=\n"
+  "-----END SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "\n"
+  ;
+static const char EX_RI_ED_BAD_CERT3[] =
+  "router fred 127.0.0.1 9001 0 9002\n"
+  "identity-ed25519\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "BVVVnf55AW5TTGF9jCMl7aALZzqypD9Bj8WYnAPIrKCoIJdgMbY0AQAgBAB7eCn8\n"
+  "rukx7t/egZUdqU7+FYqsnO4wdmOkLZkp0+gpF3jjk6N1Q0037NNVNZBjONB0Nm2F\n"
+  "CpB3nWSJliSSKr5tOYsuBPFy5VVGYeKPakpOoxanQ1UcqevMBAQy0zf9hwA=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "signing-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAPgeQNbKwpnTU+qW/2djh66hptS9rcy1B4vdyWkDTdREao2ECuCv691Y\n"
+  "oIw3MpTWvpC1qHIKorunusR0FKgwXw3xQTikXbDq/1ptsekzoIA1R/hltQV3UuGH\n"
+  "zdzHuQXAMX7Fdll2gyya03c3Yq5s+xSDvGdkEeaIoctKjwxp4SdNAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "onion-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAOzWuH4cPW9rIrfi8MrruMUg4IUVHz4BxfY4/szMIUvzeEAdHn4FYkWy\n"
+  "Vt7MDtUELZsmZeFNmkn72kLxnrdZ5XhxZBriq1Fzq11cSWRBF+SyE1MdcouY4GyG\n"
+  "drw6T8xb8ty19q0eO6C/gw27iqXPAp1clvkroLg6Nv9lGZvsedVDAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key /vYZ+9yLqG7yUnutoI57s96JBl36GTz0IDWE244rbzE=\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key-crosscert 0\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQoABf55AZ4zVBWP/fIYEgWmyj0WpO6CkXRJjtrWXtiT02k3IddiAMpYgMemGIpN\n"
+  "xj7TQRULsHHYvo4fLcKrSgndQbUUhfLTUuVhIzbnE2TBLMVOEkpxKU6mTuvTT/3h\n"
+  "MJugrwTWVg4=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "onion-key-crosscert\n"
+  "-----BEGIN CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "c/Vqu3wtsTsYMdnhTS9Tn1Pq6jDmH4uRD5WmbaCKKrkin2DjuYSMVpypndkdlZDE\n"
+  "He7uF7SUO3QG/UcRIXYOsg9MSLUmvn2kIwef8ykyqlRh95Csjo5DyattUhL2w4QF\n"
+  "tJkJBQAnXWaAVW1O8XimGCAvJ84cxbmZEcpN6WKjrXI=\n"
+  "-----END CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "published 2014-10-05 12:00:00\n"
+  "bandwidth 1000 1000 1000\n"
+  "reject *:*\n"
+  "router-sig-ed25519 Ue7bkPpOoc8ca7cyQj/Vq3BP5X4vwLA5QmpLGw/WfRNVRPojJRxU3RVqWMi3JbsJFRTe6pH6ZHyXER33G5aAAA\n"
+  "router-signature\n"
+  "-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "ifKUtbxmqHVs8A0oT5n7Te0c6D/XqWQTc0RxX9OKGspzh6wNX26h0Xa2vpK1Q9Zu\n"
+  "sj61I7vbHuZN6rxiWs9IzJgb//XaNJasX1pd9tbGSXW+yYzc9G9kaa7vp3HcnhIP\n"
+  "XVWzzS8WmOiVNGcF65j6f7yGloTgN7cHMptgJG7pWes=\n"
+  "-----END SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "\n"
+  ;
+static const char EX_RI_BAD_EI_DIGEST2[] =
+  "router fred 127.0.0.1 9001 0 9002\n"
+  "identity-ed25519\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQQABf55ATrK8IVBWLO2yXKCqXLXJOTu89W2b+hREPO+tCrxjVqWAQAgBACG/vVx\n"
+  "NK8wKVZvf34d75ZObSR0ge1N2RrAIKNslNXBq/tcllIrNE4S0ZNcMpA+hxXoVFeo\n"
+  "jbxifYX7nTs5N3GrGPmkiuo82v2X6ZwoIXJGFnvWMxCjsYsUVDDxoT6h/w8=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "extra-info-digest E5FAC29E766D63F96AD175069640E803F2723765 99oo\n"
+  "signing-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAK9wHSdRalxkuAybrSCA3dlEC1ZGc7oHOzXRGLg+z6batuiCdQtus1Rk\n"
+  "LP821eZJtEMAE56aewCIHDcTiCxVa6DMqmxRjm5pfW4G5H5QCPYT6Fu0RoYck3Ef\n"
+  "vkgits5/fNYGPPVC7k8AdGax5dKj5oFVGq+JWolYFRv6tyR9AThvAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "onion-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAKxjxTQ/T/MHpFbk7/zwA7l5b3IW3yVcyVe6eIGFoYun8FI0fbYRmR4M\n"
+  "G5Asu07gP9Bbgt3AFPuEqrjg4u+lIkgqTcCgKWJbAgm7fslwaDTXQ36A7I1M95PD\n"
+  "GJ10Dk5v4dVbrqwoF7MSrQPFtMO91RP11nGPSvDqXZJ4XpwqwdxpAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key LuVmHxpj4F5mPXGNi4MtxbIbLMav6frJRBsRgAvpdzo=\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key-crosscert 0\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQoABf55AYb+9XE0rzApVm9/fh3vlk5tJHSB7U3ZGsAgo2yU1cGrAKBcSzwi4lY/\n"
+  "salCELOLdeZzOjDNnBd6cKp2WJg7Yz5zFlbVbyNk0iwfGmucHk8vQZe5BS0Oq/Pz\n"
+  "B1u/BcJv8gk=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "onion-key-crosscert\n"
+  "-----BEGIN CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "QsAQVdDVHtasDbhrZG4ZxImdTTMY7fz3vouAiGyZx6/jCCB5v0gHwTn4xo6pgLEW\n"
+  "LQfMhQZIr76Ky67c0hAN2hihuDlfvhfVe9c2c5UOH1BOhq3llE3Hc3xGyEy3rw7r\n"
+  "5y38YGi759CvsP2/L8JfXMuBg89OcgJYFa27Q6e6MdQ=\n"
+  "-----END CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "published 2014-10-05 12:00:00\n"
+  "bandwidth 1000 1000 1000\n"
+  "reject *:*\n"
+  "router-sig-ed25519 5zoQ0dufeeOJ/tE/BgcWgM8JpfW1ELSXLz4dI+K8YRH/gUtaPmYJgU2QfeUHD0oy1iwv4Qvl8Ferga7aBk1+DA\n"
+  "router-signature\n"
+  "-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "D6KRMwkb6JmVEnpZ825SD3LMB84UmVy0i94xk44OwhoWNKLXhaSTWJgf6AqnPG5o\n"
+  "QrCypSb44bYLn+VaDN5LVUl36jeZqCT4xd+4ZwIRdPOUj7vcVmyUDg3lXcAIk97Q\n"
+  "E5PrQY1mQuLSIjjKInAR2NRBumNJtRw31Y/DTB7tODU=\n"
+  "-----END SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "\n"
+  ;
diff --git a/src/test/include.am b/src/test/include.am
index c672b3fedc..0ef556a9bf 100644
--- a/src/test/include.am
+++ b/src/test/include.am
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ src_test_AM_CPPFLAGS = -DSHARE_DATADIR="\"$(datadir)\"" \
         -DLOCALSTATEDIR="\"$(localstatedir)\"" \
         -DBINDIR="\"$(bindir)\""	       \
 	-I"$(top_srcdir)/src/or" -I"$(top_srcdir)/src/ext" \
+	-I"$(top_srcdir)/src/trunnel" \
+	-I"$(top_srcdir)/src/ext/trunnel" \
 	-DTOR_UNIT_TESTS
 
 # -L flags need to go in LDFLAGS. -l flags need to go in LDADD.
@@ -67,6 +69,8 @@ src_test_test_SOURCES = \
 	src/test/test_extorport.c \
 	src/test/test_hs.c \
 	src/test/test_introduce.c \
+	src/test/test_keypin.c \
+	src/test/test_link_handshake.c \
 	src/test/test_logging.c \
 	src/test/test_microdesc.c \
 	src/test/test_nodelist.c \
@@ -135,7 +139,7 @@ src_test_bench_LDFLAGS = @TOR_LDFLAGS_zlib@ @TOR_LDFLAGS_openssl@ \
         @TOR_LDFLAGS_libevent@
 src_test_bench_LDADD = src/or/libtor.a src/common/libor.a \
 	src/common/libor-crypto.a $(LIBDONNA) \
-	src/common/libor-event.a \
+	src/common/libor-event.a src/trunnel/libor-trunnel.a \
 	@TOR_ZLIB_LIBS@ @TOR_LIB_MATH@ @TOR_LIBEVENT_LIBS@ \
 	@TOR_OPENSSL_LIBS@ @TOR_LIB_WS32@ @TOR_LIB_GDI@ @CURVE25519_LIBS@ \
 	@TOR_SYSTEMD_LIBS@
diff --git a/src/test/test.c b/src/test/test.c
index f30b8ae1af..7ad849f49e 100644
--- a/src/test/test.c
+++ b/src/test/test.c
@@ -1137,6 +1137,8 @@ extern struct testcase_t guardfraction_tests[];
 extern struct testcase_t extorport_tests[];
 extern struct testcase_t hs_tests[];
 extern struct testcase_t introduce_tests[];
+extern struct testcase_t keypin_tests[];
+extern struct testcase_t link_handshake_tests[];
 extern struct testcase_t logging_tests[];
 extern struct testcase_t microdesc_tests[];
 extern struct testcase_t nodelist_tests[];
@@ -1183,6 +1185,8 @@ struct testgroup_t testgroups[] = {
   { "extorport/", extorport_tests },
   { "hs/", hs_tests },
   { "introduce/", introduce_tests },
+  { "keypin/", keypin_tests },
+  { "link-handshake/", link_handshake_tests },
   { "nodelist/", nodelist_tests },
   { "oom/", oom_tests },
   { "options/", options_tests },
diff --git a/src/test/test_containers.c b/src/test/test_containers.c
index 79085a748e..3d150f5abf 100644
--- a/src/test/test_containers.c
+++ b/src/test/test_containers.c
@@ -496,6 +496,43 @@ test_container_smartlist_join(void *arg)
 }
 
 static void
+test_container_smartlist_pos(void *arg)
+{
+  (void) arg;
+  smartlist_t *sl = smartlist_new();
+
+  smartlist_add(sl, tor_strdup("This"));
+  smartlist_add(sl, tor_strdup("is"));
+  smartlist_add(sl, tor_strdup("a"));
+  smartlist_add(sl, tor_strdup("test"));
+  smartlist_add(sl, tor_strdup("for"));
+  smartlist_add(sl, tor_strdup("a"));
+  smartlist_add(sl, tor_strdup("function"));
+
+  /* Test string_pos */
+  tt_int_op(smartlist_string_pos(NULL, "Fred"), ==, -1);
+  tt_int_op(smartlist_string_pos(sl, "Fred"), ==, -1);
+  tt_int_op(smartlist_string_pos(sl, "This"), ==, 0);
+  tt_int_op(smartlist_string_pos(sl, "a"), ==, 2);
+  tt_int_op(smartlist_string_pos(sl, "function"), ==, 6);
+
+  /* Test pos */
+  tt_int_op(smartlist_pos(NULL, "Fred"), ==, -1);
+  tt_int_op(smartlist_pos(sl, "Fred"), ==, -1);
+  tt_int_op(smartlist_pos(sl, "This"), ==, -1);
+  tt_int_op(smartlist_pos(sl, "a"), ==, -1);
+  tt_int_op(smartlist_pos(sl, "function"), ==, -1);
+  tt_int_op(smartlist_pos(sl, smartlist_get(sl,0)), ==, 0);
+  tt_int_op(smartlist_pos(sl, smartlist_get(sl,2)), ==, 2);
+  tt_int_op(smartlist_pos(sl, smartlist_get(sl,5)), ==, 5);
+  tt_int_op(smartlist_pos(sl, smartlist_get(sl,6)), ==, 6);
+
+ done:
+  SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
+  smartlist_free(sl);
+}
+
+static void
 test_container_smartlist_ints_eq(void *arg)
 {
   smartlist_t *sl1 = NULL, *sl2 = NULL;
@@ -1053,6 +1090,7 @@ struct testcase_t container_tests[] = {
   CONTAINER_LEGACY(smartlist_overlap),
   CONTAINER_LEGACY(smartlist_digests),
   CONTAINER_LEGACY(smartlist_join),
+  CONTAINER_LEGACY(smartlist_pos),
   CONTAINER(smartlist_ints_eq, 0),
   CONTAINER_LEGACY(bitarray),
   CONTAINER_LEGACY(digestset),
diff --git a/src/test/test_crypto.c b/src/test/test_crypto.c
index 7944864bd7..6cba850f30 100644
--- a/src/test/test_crypto.c
+++ b/src/test/test_crypto.c
@@ -698,9 +698,18 @@ test_crypto_formats(void *arg)
   for (idx = 0; idx < 10; ++idx) {
     i = base64_encode(data2, 1024, data1, idx, 0);
     tt_int_op(i, OP_GE, 0);
+    tt_int_op(i, OP_EQ, strlen(data2));
     j = base64_decode(data3, 1024, data2, i);
     tt_int_op(j,OP_EQ, idx);
     tt_mem_op(data3,OP_EQ, data1, idx);
+
+    i = base64_encode_nopad(data2, 1024, (uint8_t*)data1, idx);
+    tt_int_op(i, OP_GE, 0);
+    tt_int_op(i, OP_EQ, strlen(data2));
+    tt_assert(! strchr(data2, '='));
+    j = base64_decode_nopad((uint8_t*)data3, 1024, data2, i);
+    tt_int_op(j, OP_EQ, idx);
+    tt_mem_op(data3,OP_EQ, data1, idx);
   }
 
   strlcpy(data1, "Test string that contains 35 chars.", 1024);
@@ -1264,6 +1273,8 @@ test_crypto_ed25519_simple(void *arg)
   tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, ed25519_public_key_generate(&pub2, &sec1));
 
   tt_mem_op(pub1.pubkey, OP_EQ, pub2.pubkey, sizeof(pub1.pubkey));
+  tt_assert(ed25519_pubkey_eq(&pub1, &pub2));
+  tt_assert(ed25519_pubkey_eq(&pub1, &pub1));
 
   memcpy(&kp1.pubkey, &pub1, sizeof(pub1));
   memcpy(&kp1.seckey, &sec1, sizeof(sec1));
@@ -1283,6 +1294,7 @@ test_crypto_ed25519_simple(void *arg)
   /* Wrong public key doesn't work. */
   tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, ed25519_public_key_generate(&pub2, &sec2));
   tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, ed25519_checksig(&sig2, msg, msg_len, &pub2));
+  tt_assert(! ed25519_pubkey_eq(&pub1, &pub2));
 
   /* Wrong message doesn't work. */
   tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, ed25519_checksig(&sig2, msg, msg_len, &pub1));
@@ -1421,9 +1433,10 @@ test_crypto_ed25519_test_vectors(void *arg)
 static void
 test_crypto_ed25519_encode(void *arg)
 {
-  char buf[ED25519_BASE64_LEN+1];
+  char buf[ED25519_SIG_BASE64_LEN+1];
   ed25519_keypair_t kp;
   ed25519_public_key_t pk;
+  ed25519_signature_t sig1, sig2;
   char *mem_op_hex_tmp = NULL;
   (void) arg;
 
@@ -1434,6 +1447,11 @@ test_crypto_ed25519_encode(void *arg)
   tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, ed25519_public_from_base64(&pk, buf));
   tt_mem_op(kp.pubkey.pubkey, OP_EQ, pk.pubkey, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
 
+  tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, ed25519_sign(&sig1, (const uint8_t*)"ABC", 3, &kp));
+  tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, ed25519_signature_to_base64(buf, &sig1));
+  tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, ed25519_signature_from_base64(&sig2, buf));
+  tt_mem_op(sig1.sig, OP_EQ, sig2.sig, ED25519_SIG_LEN);
+
   /* Test known value. */
   tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, ed25519_public_from_base64(&pk,
                              "lVIuIctLjbGZGU5wKMNXxXlSE3cW4kaqkqm04u6pxvM"));
diff --git a/src/test/test_dir.c b/src/test/test_dir.c
index a949f5de73..3e9e955b2b 100644
--- a/src/test/test_dir.c
+++ b/src/test/test_dir.c
@@ -14,15 +14,18 @@
 #define NETWORKSTATUS_PRIVATE
 #include "or.h"
 #include "config.h"
+#include "crypto_ed25519.h"
 #include "directory.h"
 #include "dirserv.h"
 #include "dirvote.h"
 #include "hibernate.h"
 #include "networkstatus.h"
 #include "router.h"
+#include "routerkeys.h"
 #include "routerlist.h"
 #include "routerparse.h"
 #include "test.h"
+#include "torcert.h"
 
 static void
 test_dir_nicknames(void *arg)
@@ -87,8 +90,11 @@ test_dir_formats(void *arg)
   routerinfo_t *rp1 = NULL, *rp2 = NULL;
   addr_policy_t *ex1, *ex2;
   routerlist_t *dir1 = NULL, *dir2 = NULL;
+  uint8_t *rsa_cc = NULL;
+  tor_cert_t *ntor_cc = NULL;
   or_options_t *options = get_options_mutable();
   const addr_policy_t *p;
+  time_t now = time(NULL);
 
   (void)arg;
   pk1 = pk_generate(0);
@@ -127,14 +133,33 @@ test_dir_formats(void *arg)
   ex2->prt_min = ex2->prt_max = 24;
   r2 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(routerinfo_t));
   r2->addr = 0x0a030201u; /* 10.3.2.1 */
+  ed25519_keypair_t kp1, kp2;
+  ed25519_secret_key_from_seed(&kp1.seckey,
+                          (const uint8_t*)"YYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY");
+  ed25519_public_key_generate(&kp1.pubkey, &kp1.seckey);
+  ed25519_secret_key_from_seed(&kp2.seckey,
+                          (const uint8_t*)"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX");
+  ed25519_public_key_generate(&kp2.pubkey, &kp2.seckey);
+  r2->signing_key_cert = tor_cert_create(&kp1,
+                                         CERT_TYPE_ID_SIGNING,
+                                         &kp2.pubkey,
+                                         now, 86400,
+                                         CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY);
+  char cert_buf[256];
+  base64_encode(cert_buf, sizeof(cert_buf),
+                (const char*)r2->signing_key_cert->encoded,
+                r2->signing_key_cert->encoded_len,
+                BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE);
   r2->platform = tor_strdup(platform);
   r2->cache_info.published_on = 5;
   r2->or_port = 9005;
   r2->dir_port = 0;
   r2->onion_pkey = crypto_pk_dup_key(pk2);
   r2->onion_curve25519_pkey = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(curve25519_public_key_t));
-  curve25519_public_from_base64(r2->onion_curve25519_pkey,
-                                "skyinAnvardNostarsNomoonNowindormistsorsnow");
+  curve25519_keypair_t r2_onion_keypair;
+  curve25519_keypair_generate(&r2_onion_keypair, 0);
+  r2->onion_curve25519_pkey = tor_memdup(&r2_onion_keypair.pubkey,
+                                         sizeof(curve25519_public_key_t));
   r2->identity_pkey = crypto_pk_dup_key(pk1);
   r2->bandwidthrate = r2->bandwidthburst = r2->bandwidthcapacity = 3000;
   r2->exit_policy = smartlist_new();
@@ -150,7 +175,7 @@ test_dir_formats(void *arg)
   /* XXXX025 router_dump_to_string should really take this from ri.*/
   options->ContactInfo = tor_strdup("Magri White "
                                     "<magri@elsewhere.example.com>");
-  buf = router_dump_router_to_string(r1, pk2);
+  buf = router_dump_router_to_string(r1, pk2, NULL, NULL, NULL);
   tor_free(options->ContactInfo);
   tt_assert(buf);
 
@@ -183,7 +208,7 @@ test_dir_formats(void *arg)
   tt_str_op(buf,OP_EQ, buf2);
   tor_free(buf);
 
-  buf = router_dump_router_to_string(r1, pk2);
+  buf = router_dump_router_to_string(r1, pk2, NULL, NULL, NULL);
   tt_assert(buf);
   cp = buf;
   rp1 = router_parse_entry_from_string((const char*)cp,NULL,1,0,NULL,NULL);
@@ -201,6 +226,10 @@ test_dir_formats(void *arg)
 
   strlcpy(buf2,
           "router Fred 10.3.2.1 9005 0 0\n"
+          "identity-ed25519\n"
+          "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n", sizeof(buf2));
+  strlcat(buf2, cert_buf, sizeof(buf2));
+  strlcat(buf2, "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
           "platform Tor "VERSION" on ", sizeof(buf2));
   strlcat(buf2, get_uname(), sizeof(buf2));
   strlcat(buf2, "\n"
@@ -215,19 +244,52 @@ test_dir_formats(void *arg)
   strlcat(buf2, pk2_str, sizeof(buf2));
   strlcat(buf2, "signing-key\n", sizeof(buf2));
   strlcat(buf2, pk1_str, sizeof(buf2));
+  int rsa_cc_len;
+  rsa_cc = make_tap_onion_key_crosscert(pk2,
+                                        &kp1.pubkey,
+                                        pk1,
+                                        &rsa_cc_len);
+  tt_assert(rsa_cc);
+  base64_encode(cert_buf, sizeof(cert_buf), (char*)rsa_cc, rsa_cc_len,
+                BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE);
+  strlcat(buf2, "onion-key-crosscert\n"
+          "-----BEGIN CROSSCERT-----\n", sizeof(buf2));
+  strlcat(buf2, cert_buf, sizeof(buf2));
+  strlcat(buf2, "-----END CROSSCERT-----\n", sizeof(buf2));
+  int ntor_cc_sign;
+  ntor_cc = make_ntor_onion_key_crosscert(&r2_onion_keypair,
+                                          &kp1.pubkey,
+                                          r2->cache_info.published_on,
+                                          MIN_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME,
+                                          &ntor_cc_sign);
+  tt_assert(ntor_cc);
+  base64_encode(cert_buf, sizeof(cert_buf),
+                (char*)ntor_cc->encoded, ntor_cc->encoded_len,
+                BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE);
+  tor_snprintf(buf2+strlen(buf2), sizeof(buf2)-strlen(buf2),
+               "ntor-onion-key-crosscert %d\n"
+               "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+               "%s"
+               "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n", ntor_cc_sign, cert_buf);
+
   strlcat(buf2, "hidden-service-dir\n", sizeof(buf2));
-  strlcat(buf2, "ntor-onion-key "
-          "skyinAnvardNostarsNomoonNowindormistsorsnow=\n", sizeof(buf2));
+  strlcat(buf2, "ntor-onion-key ", sizeof(buf2));
+  base64_encode(cert_buf, sizeof(cert_buf),
+                (const char*)r2_onion_keypair.pubkey.public_key, 32,
+                BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE);
+  strlcat(buf2, cert_buf, sizeof(buf2));
   strlcat(buf2, "accept *:80\nreject 18.0.0.0/8:24\n", sizeof(buf2));
-  strlcat(buf2, "router-signature\n", sizeof(buf2));
+  strlcat(buf2, "router-sig-ed25519 ", sizeof(buf2));
 
-  buf = router_dump_router_to_string(r2, pk1);
+  buf = router_dump_router_to_string(r2, pk1, pk2, &r2_onion_keypair, &kp2);
+  tt_assert(buf);
   buf[strlen(buf2)] = '\0'; /* Don't compare the sig; it's never the same
                              * twice */
-  tt_str_op(buf,OP_EQ, buf2);
+
+  tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, buf2);
   tor_free(buf);
 
-  buf = router_dump_router_to_string(r2, pk1);
+  buf = router_dump_router_to_string(r2, pk1, NULL, NULL, NULL);
   cp = buf;
   rp2 = router_parse_entry_from_string((const char*)cp,NULL,1,0,NULL,NULL);
   tt_assert(rp2);
@@ -280,6 +342,7 @@ test_dir_formats(void *arg)
   if (rp2)
     routerinfo_free(rp2);
 
+  tor_free(rsa_cc);
   tor_free(buf);
   tor_free(pk1_str);
   tor_free(pk2_str);
@@ -293,7 +356,7 @@ test_dir_formats(void *arg)
 #include "failing_routerdescs.inc"
 
 static void
-test_dir_routerparse_bad(void *arg)
+test_dir_routerinfo_parsing(void *arg)
 {
   (void) arg;
 
@@ -318,6 +381,8 @@ test_dir_routerparse_bad(void *arg)
   CHECK_OK(EX_RI_MINIMAL);
   CHECK_OK(EX_RI_MAXIMAL);
 
+  CHECK_OK(EX_RI_MINIMAL_ED);
+
   /* good annotations prepended */
   routerinfo_free(ri);
   ri = router_parse_entry_from_string(EX_RI_MINIMAL, NULL, 0, 0,
@@ -376,8 +441,28 @@ test_dir_routerparse_bad(void *arg)
   CHECK_FAIL(EX_RI_BAD_FAMILY, 0);
   CHECK_FAIL(EX_RI_ZERO_ORPORT, 0);
 
+  CHECK_FAIL(EX_RI_ED_MISSING_CROSSCERT, 0);
+  CHECK_FAIL(EX_RI_ED_MISSING_CROSSCERT2, 0);
+  CHECK_FAIL(EX_RI_ED_MISSING_CROSSCERT_SIGN, 0);
+  CHECK_FAIL(EX_RI_ED_BAD_SIG1, 0);
+  CHECK_FAIL(EX_RI_ED_BAD_SIG2, 0);
+  CHECK_FAIL(EX_RI_ED_BAD_SIG3, 0);
+  CHECK_FAIL(EX_RI_ED_BAD_SIG4, 0);
+  CHECK_FAIL(EX_RI_ED_BAD_CROSSCERT1, 0);
+  CHECK_FAIL(EX_RI_ED_BAD_CROSSCERT3, 0);
+  CHECK_FAIL(EX_RI_ED_BAD_CROSSCERT4, 0);
+  CHECK_FAIL(EX_RI_ED_BAD_CROSSCERT5, 0);
+  CHECK_FAIL(EX_RI_ED_BAD_CROSSCERT6, 0);
+  CHECK_FAIL(EX_RI_ED_BAD_CROSSCERT7, 0);
+  CHECK_FAIL(EX_RI_ED_MISPLACED1, 0);
+  CHECK_FAIL(EX_RI_ED_MISPLACED2, 0);
+  CHECK_FAIL(EX_RI_ED_BAD_CERT1, 0);
+  CHECK_FAIL(EX_RI_ED_BAD_CERT2, 0);
+  CHECK_FAIL(EX_RI_ED_BAD_CERT3, 0);
+
   /* This is allowed; we just ignore it. */
   CHECK_OK(EX_RI_BAD_EI_DIGEST);
+  CHECK_OK(EX_RI_BAD_EI_DIGEST2);
 
 #undef CHECK_FAIL
 #undef CHECK_OK
@@ -433,20 +518,34 @@ test_dir_extrainfo_parsing(void *arg)
   tt_assert(ei->pending_sig);
   CHECK_OK(EX_EI_MAXIMAL);
   tt_assert(ei->pending_sig);
+  CHECK_OK(EX_EI_GOOD_ED_EI);
+  tt_assert(ei->pending_sig);
 
   map = (struct digest_ri_map_t *)digestmap_new();
   ADD(EX_EI_MINIMAL);
   ADD(EX_EI_MAXIMAL);
+  ADD(EX_EI_GOOD_ED_EI);
   ADD(EX_EI_BAD_FP);
   ADD(EX_EI_BAD_NICKNAME);
   ADD(EX_EI_BAD_TOKENS);
   ADD(EX_EI_BAD_START);
   ADD(EX_EI_BAD_PUBLISHED);
 
+  ADD(EX_EI_ED_MISSING_SIG);
+  ADD(EX_EI_ED_MISSING_CERT);
+  ADD(EX_EI_ED_BAD_CERT1);
+  ADD(EX_EI_ED_BAD_CERT2);
+  ADD(EX_EI_ED_BAD_SIG1);
+  ADD(EX_EI_ED_BAD_SIG2);
+  ADD(EX_EI_ED_MISPLACED_CERT);
+  ADD(EX_EI_ED_MISPLACED_SIG);
+
   CHECK_OK(EX_EI_MINIMAL);
   tt_assert(!ei->pending_sig);
   CHECK_OK(EX_EI_MAXIMAL);
   tt_assert(!ei->pending_sig);
+  CHECK_OK(EX_EI_GOOD_ED_EI);
+  tt_assert(!ei->pending_sig);
 
   CHECK_FAIL(EX_EI_BAD_SIG1,1);
   CHECK_FAIL(EX_EI_BAD_SIG2,1);
@@ -457,6 +556,15 @@ test_dir_extrainfo_parsing(void *arg)
   CHECK_FAIL(EX_EI_BAD_START,0);
   CHECK_FAIL(EX_EI_BAD_PUBLISHED,0);
 
+  CHECK_FAIL(EX_EI_ED_MISSING_SIG,0);
+  CHECK_FAIL(EX_EI_ED_MISSING_CERT,0);
+  CHECK_FAIL(EX_EI_ED_BAD_CERT1,0);
+  CHECK_FAIL(EX_EI_ED_BAD_CERT2,0);
+  CHECK_FAIL(EX_EI_ED_BAD_SIG1,0);
+  CHECK_FAIL(EX_EI_ED_BAD_SIG2,0);
+  CHECK_FAIL(EX_EI_ED_MISPLACED_CERT,0);
+  CHECK_FAIL(EX_EI_ED_MISPLACED_SIG,0);
+
 #undef CHECK_OK
 #undef CHECK_FAIL
 
@@ -1394,6 +1502,7 @@ generate_ri_from_rs(const vote_routerstatus_t *vrs)
   static time_t published = 0;
 
   r = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(routerinfo_t));
+  r->cert_expiration_time = TIME_MAX;
   memcpy(r->cache_info.identity_digest, rs->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
   memcpy(r->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest, rs->descriptor_digest,
          DIGEST_LEN);
@@ -3108,7 +3217,7 @@ test_dir_packages(void *arg)
 struct testcase_t dir_tests[] = {
   DIR_LEGACY(nicknames),
   DIR_LEGACY(formats),
-  DIR(routerparse_bad, 0),
+  DIR(routerinfo_parsing, 0),
   DIR(extrainfo_parsing, 0),
   DIR(parse_router_list, TT_FORK),
   DIR(load_routers, TT_FORK),
diff --git a/src/test/test_keypin.c b/src/test/test_keypin.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..afd4ca201d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/test_keypin.c
@@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2014, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+#include "orconfig.h"
+#define KEYPIN_PRIVATE
+#include "or.h"
+#include "keypin.h"
+#include "util.h"
+
+#include "test.h"
+
+static void
+test_keypin_parse_line(void *arg)
+{
+  (void)arg;
+  keypin_ent_t *ent = NULL;
+
+  /* Good line */
+  ent = keypin_parse_journal_line(
+                "aGVyZSBpcyBhIGdvb2Qgc2hhMSE "
+                "VGhpcyBlZDI1NTE5IHNjb2ZmcyBhdCB0aGUgc2hhMS4");
+  tt_assert(ent);
+  tt_mem_op(ent->rsa_id, ==, "here is a good sha1!", 20);
+  tt_mem_op(ent->ed25519_key, ==, "This ed25519 scoffs at the sha1.", 32);
+  tor_free(ent); ent = NULL;
+
+  /* Good line with extra stuff we will ignore. */
+  ent = keypin_parse_journal_line(
+                "aGVyZSBpcyBhIGdvb2Qgc2hhMSE "
+                "VGhpcyBlZDI1NTE5IHNjb2ZmcyBhdCB0aGUgc2hhMS4helloworld");
+  tt_assert(ent);
+  tt_mem_op(ent->rsa_id, ==, "here is a good sha1!", 20);
+  tt_mem_op(ent->ed25519_key, ==, "This ed25519 scoffs at the sha1.", 32);
+  tor_free(ent); ent = NULL;
+
+  /* Bad line: no space in the middle. */
+  ent = keypin_parse_journal_line(
+                "aGVyZSBpcyBhIGdvb2Qgc2hhMSE?"
+                "VGhpcyBlZDI1NTE5IHNjb2ZmcyBhdCB0aGUgc2hhMS4");
+  tt_assert(! ent);
+
+  /* Bad line: bad base64 in RSA ID */
+  ent = keypin_parse_journal_line(
+                "aGVyZSBpcyBhIGdv!2Qgc2hhMSE "
+                "VGhpcyBlZDI1NTE5IHNjb2ZmcyBhdCB0aGUgc2hhMS4");
+  tt_assert(! ent);
+
+  /* Bad line: bad base64 in Ed25519 */
+  ent = keypin_parse_journal_line(
+                "aGVyZSBpcyBhIGdvb2Qgc2hhMSE "
+                "VGhpcyBlZDI1NTE5IHNjb2ZmcyB!dCB0aGUgc2hhMS4");
+  tt_assert(! ent);
+
+ done:
+  tor_free(ent);
+}
+
+static smartlist_t *mock_addent_got = NULL;
+static void
+mock_addent(keypin_ent_t *ent)
+{
+  smartlist_add(mock_addent_got, ent);
+  keypin_add_entry_to_map__real(ent);
+}
+
+static void
+test_keypin_parse_file(void *arg)
+{
+  (void)arg;
+
+  mock_addent_got = smartlist_new();
+  MOCK(keypin_add_entry_to_map, mock_addent);
+
+  /* Simple, minimal, correct example. */
+  const char data1[] =
+"PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT0 PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT0\n"
+"TG9yYXggaXBzdW0gZ3J1dnZ1bHU cyB0aG5lZWQgYW1ldCwgc25lcmdlbGx5IG9uY2UtbGU\n"
+"ciBsZXJraW0sIHNlZCBkbyBiYXI YmFsb290IHRlbXBvciBnbHVwcGl0dXMgdXQgbGFib3I\n"
+"ZSBldCB0cnVmZnVsYSBtYWduYSA YWxpcXVhLiBVdCBlbmltIGFkIGdyaWNrbGUtZ3Jhc3M\n"
+"dmVuaWFtLCBxdWlzIG1pZmYtbXU ZmZlcmVkIGdhLXp1bXBjbyBsYWJvcmlzIG5pc2kgdXQ\n"
+"Y3J1ZmZ1bHVzIGV4IGVhIHNjaGw b3BwaXR5IGNvbnNlcXVhdC4gRHVpcyBhdXRlIHNuYXI\n"
+"Z2dsZSBpbiBzd29tZWVzd2FucyA aW4gdm9sdXB0YXRlIGF4ZS1oYWNrZXIgZXNzZSByaXA\n"
+"cHVsdXMgY3J1bW1paSBldSBtb28 ZiBudWxsYSBzbnV2di5QTFVHSFBMT1ZFUlhZWlpZLi4\n";
+
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, keypin_load_journal_impl(data1, strlen(data1)));
+  tt_int_op(8, ==, smartlist_len(mock_addent_got));
+  keypin_ent_t *ent = smartlist_get(mock_addent_got, 2);
+  tt_mem_op(ent->rsa_id, ==, "r lerkim, sed do bar", 20);
+  tt_mem_op(ent->ed25519_key, ==, "baloot tempor gluppitus ut labor", 32);
+
+  /* More complex example: weird lines, bogus lines,
+     duplicate/conflicting lines */
+  const char data2[] =
+    "PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT0 PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT0\n"
+    "# This is a comment.\n"
+    "     \n"
+    "QXQgdGhlIGVuZCBvZiB0aGUgeWU YXIgS3VycmVta2FybWVycnVrIHNhaWQgdG8gaGltLCA\n"
+    "IllvdSBoYXZlIG1hZGUgYSBnb28 ZCBiZWdpbm5pbmcuIiBCdXQgbm8gbW9yZS4gV2l6YXI\n"
+    "\n"
+    "ZHMgc3BlYWsgdHJ1dGgsIGFuZCA aXQgd2FzIHRydWUgdGhhdCBhbGwgdGhlIG1hc3Rlcgo\n"
+    "@reserved for a future extension \n"
+    "eSBvZiBOYW1lcyB0aGF0IEdlZCA aGFkIHRvaWxlZCbyB3aW4gdGhhdCB5ZWFyIHdhcyA\n"
+    "eSBvZiBOYW1lcyB0aGF0IEdlZCA aGFkIHRvaWxlZCbyB3aW4gdGhhdCB5ZWFyIHdhcy"
+              "A line too long\n"
+    "dGhlIG1lcmUgc3RhcnQgb2Ygd2g YXQgaGUgbXVzdCBnbyBvb!BsZWFybmluZy4uLi4uLi4\n"
+    "ZHMgc3BlYWsgdaJ1dGgsIGFuZCA aXQgd2FzIHRydWUgdGhhdCBhbGwgdGhlIG1hc3Rlcgo\n"
+    "ZHMgc3BlYWsgdHJ1dGgsIGFuZCA aXQgd2FzIHRydaUgdGhhdCBhbGwgdGhlIG1hc3Rlcgo\n"
+    ;
+
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, keypin_load_journal_impl(data2, strlen(data2)));
+  tt_int_op(11, ==, smartlist_len(mock_addent_got));
+  ent = smartlist_get(mock_addent_got, 9);
+  tt_mem_op(ent->rsa_id, ==, "\"You have made a goo", 20);
+  tt_mem_op(ent->ed25519_key, ==, "d beginning.\" But no more. Wizar", 32);
+
+  ent = smartlist_get(mock_addent_got, 10);
+  tt_mem_op(ent->rsa_id, ==, "ds speak truth, and ", 20);
+  tt_mem_op(ent->ed25519_key, ==, "it was true that all the master\n", 32);
+
+  /* File truncated before NL */
+  const char data3[] =
+    "Tm8gZHJhZ29uIGNhbiByZXNpc3Q IHRoZSBmYXNjaW5hdGlvbiBvZiByaWRkbGluZyB0YWw";
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, keypin_load_journal_impl(data3, strlen(data3)));
+  tt_int_op(12, ==, smartlist_len(mock_addent_got));
+  ent = smartlist_get(mock_addent_got, 11);
+  tt_mem_op(ent->rsa_id, ==, "No dragon can resist", 20);
+  tt_mem_op(ent->ed25519_key, ==, " the fascination of riddling tal", 32);
+
+ done:
+  keypin_clear();
+  smartlist_free(mock_addent_got);
+}
+
+#define ADD(a,b) keypin_check_and_add((const uint8_t*)(a),(const uint8_t*)(b))
+#define LONE_RSA(a) keypin_check_lone_rsa((const uint8_t*)(a))
+
+static void
+test_keypin_add_entry(void *arg)
+{
+  (void)arg;
+  keypin_clear();
+
+  tt_int_op(KEYPIN_ADDED, ==, ADD("ambassadors-at-large",
+                                  "bread-and-butter thing-in-itself"));
+  tt_int_op(KEYPIN_ADDED, ==, ADD("gentleman-adventurer",
+                                  "cloak-and-dagger what's-his-face"));
+
+  tt_int_op(KEYPIN_FOUND, ==, ADD("ambassadors-at-large",
+                                  "bread-and-butter thing-in-itself"));
+  tt_int_op(KEYPIN_FOUND, ==, ADD("ambassadors-at-large",
+                                  "bread-and-butter thing-in-itself"));
+  tt_int_op(KEYPIN_FOUND, ==, ADD("gentleman-adventurer",
+                                  "cloak-and-dagger what's-his-face"));
+
+  tt_int_op(KEYPIN_ADDED, ==, ADD("Johnnies-come-lately",
+                                  "run-of-the-mill root-mean-square"));
+
+  tt_int_op(KEYPIN_MISMATCH, ==, ADD("gentleman-adventurer",
+                                     "hypersentimental closefistedness"));
+
+  tt_int_op(KEYPIN_MISMATCH, ==, ADD("disestablismentarian",
+                                     "cloak-and-dagger what's-his-face"));
+
+  tt_int_op(KEYPIN_FOUND, ==, ADD("gentleman-adventurer",
+                                  "cloak-and-dagger what's-his-face"));
+
+  tt_int_op(KEYPIN_NOT_FOUND, ==, LONE_RSA("Llanfairpwllgwyngyll"));
+  tt_int_op(KEYPIN_MISMATCH, ==, LONE_RSA("Johnnies-come-lately"));
+
+ done:
+  keypin_clear();
+}
+
+static void
+test_keypin_journal(void *arg)
+{
+  (void)arg;
+  char *contents = NULL;
+  const char *fname = get_fname("keypin-journal");
+
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, keypin_load_journal(fname)); /* ENOENT is okay */
+  update_approx_time(1217709000);
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, keypin_open_journal(fname));
+
+  tt_int_op(KEYPIN_ADDED, ==, ADD("king-of-the-herrings",
+                                  "good-for-nothing attorney-at-law"));
+  tt_int_op(KEYPIN_ADDED, ==, ADD("yellowish-red-yellow",
+                                  "salt-and-pepper high-muck-a-muck"));
+  tt_int_op(KEYPIN_FOUND, ==, ADD("yellowish-red-yellow",
+                                  "salt-and-pepper high-muck-a-muck"));
+  keypin_close_journal();
+  keypin_clear();
+
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, keypin_load_journal(fname));
+  update_approx_time(1231041600);
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, keypin_open_journal(fname));
+  tt_int_op(KEYPIN_FOUND, ==, ADD("yellowish-red-yellow",
+                                  "salt-and-pepper high-muck-a-muck"));
+  tt_int_op(KEYPIN_ADDED, ==, ADD("theatre-in-the-round",
+                                  "holier-than-thou jack-in-the-box"));
+  tt_int_op(KEYPIN_ADDED, ==, ADD("no-deposit-no-return",
+                                  "across-the-board will-o-the-wisp"));
+  tt_int_op(KEYPIN_MISMATCH, ==, ADD("intellectualizations",
+                                     "salt-and-pepper high-muck-a-muck"));
+  keypin_close_journal();
+  keypin_clear();
+
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, keypin_load_journal(fname));
+  update_approx_time(1412278354);
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, keypin_open_journal(fname));
+  tt_int_op(KEYPIN_FOUND, ==, ADD("yellowish-red-yellow",
+                                  "salt-and-pepper high-muck-a-muck"));
+  tt_int_op(KEYPIN_MISMATCH, ==, ADD("intellectualizations",
+                                     "salt-and-pepper high-muck-a-muck"));
+  tt_int_op(KEYPIN_FOUND, ==, ADD("theatre-in-the-round",
+                                  "holier-than-thou jack-in-the-box"));
+  tt_int_op(KEYPIN_MISMATCH, ==, ADD("counterrevolutionary",
+                                     "holier-than-thou jack-in-the-box"));
+  tt_int_op(KEYPIN_MISMATCH, ==, ADD("no-deposit-no-return",
+                                     "floccinaucinihilipilificationism"));
+  keypin_close_journal();
+
+  contents = read_file_to_str(fname, RFTS_BIN, NULL);
+  tt_assert(contents);
+  tt_str_op(contents,==,
+    "\n"
+    "@opened-at 2008-08-02 20:30:00\n"
+    "a2luZy1vZi10aGUtaGVycmluZ3M Z29vZC1mb3Itbm90aGluZyBhdHRvcm5leS1hdC1sYXc\n"
+    "eWVsbG93aXNoLXJlZC15ZWxsb3c c2FsdC1hbmQtcGVwcGVyIGhpZ2gtbXVjay1hLW11Y2s\n"
+    "\n"
+    "@opened-at 2009-01-04 04:00:00\n"
+    "dGhlYXRyZS1pbi10aGUtcm91bmQ aG9saWVyLXRoYW4tdGhvdSBqYWNrLWluLXRoZS1ib3g\n"
+    "bm8tZGVwb3NpdC1uby1yZXR1cm4 YWNyb3NzLXRoZS1ib2FyZCB3aWxsLW8tdGhlLXdpc3A\n"
+    "\n"
+    "@opened-at 2014-10-02 19:32:34\n");
+
+ done:
+  tor_free(contents);
+  keypin_clear();
+}
+
+#undef ADD
+#undef LONE_RSA
+
+#define TEST(name, flags)                                       \
+  { #name , test_keypin_ ## name, (flags), NULL, NULL }
+
+struct testcase_t keypin_tests[] = {
+  TEST( parse_line, 0 ),
+  TEST( parse_file, TT_FORK ),
+  TEST( add_entry, TT_FORK ),
+  TEST( journal, TT_FORK ),
+  END_OF_TESTCASES
+};
+
diff --git a/src/test/test_link_handshake.c b/src/test/test_link_handshake.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bfdd6f3d1a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/test_link_handshake.c
@@ -0,0 +1,914 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2014, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+#include "orconfig.h"
+
+#define CHANNELTLS_PRIVATE
+#define CONNECTION_PRIVATE
+#define TOR_CHANNEL_INTERNAL_
+#include "or.h"
+#include "config.h"
+#include "connection.h"
+#include "connection_or.h"
+#include "channeltls.h"
+#include "link_handshake.h"
+#include "scheduler.h"
+
+#include "test.h"
+
+var_cell_t *mock_got_var_cell = NULL;
+
+static void
+mock_write_var_cell(const var_cell_t *vc, or_connection_t *conn)
+{
+  (void)conn;
+
+  var_cell_t *newcell = var_cell_new(vc->payload_len);
+  memcpy(newcell, vc, sizeof(var_cell_t));
+  memcpy(newcell->payload, vc->payload, vc->payload_len);
+
+  mock_got_var_cell = newcell;
+}
+static int
+mock_tls_cert_matches_key(const tor_tls_t *tls, const tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
+{
+  (void) tls;
+  (void) cert; // XXXX look at this.
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int mock_send_netinfo_called = 0;
+static int
+mock_send_netinfo(or_connection_t *conn)
+{
+  (void) conn;
+  ++mock_send_netinfo_called;// XXX check_this
+  return 0;
+}
+
+static int mock_close_called = 0;
+static void
+mock_close_for_err(or_connection_t *orconn, int flush)
+{
+  (void)orconn;
+  (void)flush;
+  ++mock_close_called;
+}
+
+static int mock_send_authenticate_called = 0;
+static int
+mock_send_authenticate(or_connection_t *conn, int type)
+{
+  (void) conn;
+  (void) type;
+  ++mock_send_authenticate_called;// XXX check_this
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/* Test good certs cells */
+static void
+test_link_handshake_certs_ok(void *arg)
+{
+  (void) arg;
+
+  or_connection_t *c1 = or_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_OR, AF_INET);
+  or_connection_t *c2 = or_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_OR, AF_INET);
+  var_cell_t *cell1 = NULL, *cell2 = NULL;
+  certs_cell_t *cc1 = NULL, *cc2 = NULL;
+  channel_tls_t *chan1 = NULL, *chan2 = NULL;
+  crypto_pk_t *key1 = NULL, *key2 = NULL;
+
+  scheduler_init();
+
+  MOCK(tor_tls_cert_matches_key, mock_tls_cert_matches_key);
+  MOCK(connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf, mock_write_var_cell);
+  MOCK(connection_or_send_netinfo, mock_send_netinfo);
+
+  key1 = pk_generate(2);
+  key2 = pk_generate(3);
+
+  /* We need to make sure that our TLS certificates are set up before we can
+   * actually generate a CERTS cell.
+   */
+  tt_int_op(tor_tls_context_init(TOR_TLS_CTX_IS_PUBLIC_SERVER,
+                                 key1, key2, 86400), ==, 0);
+
+  c1->base_.state = OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3;
+  c1->link_proto = 3;
+  tt_int_op(connection_init_or_handshake_state(c1, 1), ==, 0);
+
+  c2->base_.state = OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3;
+  c2->link_proto = 3;
+  tt_int_op(connection_init_or_handshake_state(c2, 0), ==, 0);
+
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, connection_or_send_certs_cell(c1));
+  tt_assert(mock_got_var_cell);
+  cell1 = mock_got_var_cell;
+
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, connection_or_send_certs_cell(c2));
+  tt_assert(mock_got_var_cell);
+  cell2 = mock_got_var_cell;
+
+  tt_int_op(cell1->command, ==, CELL_CERTS);
+  tt_int_op(cell1->payload_len, >, 1);
+
+  tt_int_op(cell2->command, ==, CELL_CERTS);
+  tt_int_op(cell2->payload_len, >, 1);
+
+  tt_int_op(cell1->payload_len, ==,
+            certs_cell_parse(&cc1, cell1->payload, cell1->payload_len));
+  tt_int_op(cell2->payload_len, ==,
+            certs_cell_parse(&cc2, cell2->payload, cell2->payload_len));
+
+  tt_int_op(2, ==, cc1->n_certs);
+  tt_int_op(2, ==, cc2->n_certs);
+
+  tt_int_op(certs_cell_get_certs(cc1, 0)->cert_type, ==,
+            CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_AUTH);
+  tt_int_op(certs_cell_get_certs(cc1, 1)->cert_type, ==,
+            CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_ID);
+
+  tt_int_op(certs_cell_get_certs(cc2, 0)->cert_type, ==,
+            CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_LINK);
+  tt_int_op(certs_cell_get_certs(cc2, 1)->cert_type, ==,
+            CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_ID);
+
+  chan1 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*chan1));
+  channel_tls_common_init(chan1);
+  c1->chan = chan1;
+  chan1->conn = c1;
+  c1->base_.address = tor_strdup("C1");
+  c1->tls = tor_tls_new(-1, 0);
+  c1->link_proto = 4;
+  c1->base_.conn_array_index = -1;
+  crypto_pk_get_digest(key2, c1->identity_digest);
+
+  channel_tls_process_certs_cell(cell2, chan1);
+
+  tt_assert(c1->handshake_state->received_certs_cell);
+  tt_assert(c1->handshake_state->auth_cert == NULL);
+  tt_assert(c1->handshake_state->id_cert);
+  tt_assert(! tor_mem_is_zero(
+                  (char*)c1->handshake_state->authenticated_peer_id, 20));
+
+  chan2 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*chan2));
+  channel_tls_common_init(chan2);
+  c2->chan = chan2;
+  chan2->conn = c2;
+  c2->base_.address = tor_strdup("C2");
+  c2->tls = tor_tls_new(-1, 1);
+  c2->link_proto = 4;
+  c2->base_.conn_array_index = -1;
+  crypto_pk_get_digest(key1, c2->identity_digest);
+
+  channel_tls_process_certs_cell(cell1, chan2);
+
+  tt_assert(c2->handshake_state->received_certs_cell);
+  tt_assert(c2->handshake_state->auth_cert);
+  tt_assert(c2->handshake_state->id_cert);
+  tt_assert(tor_mem_is_zero(
+                (char*)c2->handshake_state->authenticated_peer_id, 20));
+
+ done:
+  UNMOCK(tor_tls_cert_matches_key);
+  UNMOCK(connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf);
+  UNMOCK(connection_or_send_netinfo);
+  connection_free_(TO_CONN(c1));
+  connection_free_(TO_CONN(c2));
+  tor_free(cell1);
+  tor_free(cell2);
+  certs_cell_free(cc1);
+  certs_cell_free(cc2);
+  circuitmux_free(chan1->base_.cmux);
+  tor_free(chan1);
+  circuitmux_free(chan2->base_.cmux);
+  tor_free(chan2);
+  crypto_pk_free(key1);
+  crypto_pk_free(key2);
+}
+
+typedef struct certs_data_s {
+  or_connection_t *c;
+  channel_tls_t *chan;
+  certs_cell_t *ccell;
+  var_cell_t *cell;
+  crypto_pk_t *key1, *key2;
+} certs_data_t;
+
+
+static int
+recv_certs_cleanup(const struct testcase_t *test, void *obj)
+{
+  (void)test;
+  certs_data_t *d = obj;
+  UNMOCK(tor_tls_cert_matches_key);
+  UNMOCK(connection_or_send_netinfo);
+  UNMOCK(connection_or_close_for_error);
+
+  if (d) {
+    tor_free(d->cell);
+    certs_cell_free(d->ccell);
+    connection_free_(TO_CONN(d->c));
+    circuitmux_free(d->chan->base_.cmux);
+    tor_free(d->chan);
+    crypto_pk_free(d->key1);
+    crypto_pk_free(d->key2);
+    tor_free(d);
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static void *
+recv_certs_setup(const struct testcase_t *test)
+{
+  (void)test;
+  certs_data_t *d = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*d));
+  certs_cell_cert_t *ccc1 = NULL;
+  certs_cell_cert_t *ccc2 = NULL;
+  ssize_t n;
+
+  d->c = or_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_OR, AF_INET);
+  d->chan = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*d->chan));
+  d->c->chan = d->chan;
+  d->c->base_.address = tor_strdup("HaveAnAddress");
+  d->c->base_.state = OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3;
+  d->chan->conn = d->c;
+  tt_int_op(connection_init_or_handshake_state(d->c, 1), ==, 0);
+  d->c->link_proto = 4;
+
+  d->key1 = pk_generate(2);
+  d->key2 = pk_generate(3);
+
+  tt_int_op(tor_tls_context_init(TOR_TLS_CTX_IS_PUBLIC_SERVER,
+                                 d->key1, d->key2, 86400), ==, 0);
+  d->ccell = certs_cell_new();
+  ccc1 = certs_cell_cert_new();
+  certs_cell_add_certs(d->ccell, ccc1);
+  ccc2 = certs_cell_cert_new();
+  certs_cell_add_certs(d->ccell, ccc2);
+  d->ccell->n_certs = 2;
+  ccc1->cert_type = 1;
+  ccc2->cert_type = 2;
+
+  const tor_x509_cert_t *a,*b;
+  const uint8_t *enca, *encb;
+  size_t lena, lenb;
+  tor_tls_get_my_certs(1, &a, &b);
+  tor_x509_cert_get_der(a, &enca, &lena);
+  tor_x509_cert_get_der(b, &encb, &lenb);
+  certs_cell_cert_setlen_body(ccc1, lena);
+  ccc1->cert_len = lena;
+  certs_cell_cert_setlen_body(ccc2, lenb);
+  ccc2->cert_len = lenb;
+
+  memcpy(certs_cell_cert_getarray_body(ccc1), enca, lena);
+  memcpy(certs_cell_cert_getarray_body(ccc2), encb, lenb);
+
+  d->cell = var_cell_new(4096);
+  d->cell->command = CELL_CERTS;
+
+  n = certs_cell_encode(d->cell->payload, 4096, d->ccell);
+  tt_int_op(n, >, 0);
+  d->cell->payload_len = n;
+
+  MOCK(tor_tls_cert_matches_key, mock_tls_cert_matches_key);
+  MOCK(connection_or_send_netinfo, mock_send_netinfo);
+  MOCK(connection_or_close_for_error, mock_close_for_err);
+
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, d->c->handshake_state->received_certs_cell);
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, mock_send_authenticate_called);
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, mock_send_netinfo_called);
+
+  return d;
+ done:
+  recv_certs_cleanup(test, d);
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+static struct testcase_setup_t setup_recv_certs = {
+  .setup_fn = recv_certs_setup,
+  .cleanup_fn = recv_certs_cleanup
+};
+
+static void
+test_link_handshake_recv_certs_ok(void *arg)
+{
+  certs_data_t *d = arg;
+  channel_tls_process_certs_cell(d->cell, d->chan);
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, mock_close_called);
+  tt_int_op(d->c->handshake_state->authenticated, ==, 1);
+  tt_int_op(d->c->handshake_state->received_certs_cell, ==, 1);
+  tt_assert(d->c->handshake_state->id_cert != NULL);
+  tt_assert(d->c->handshake_state->auth_cert == NULL);
+
+ done:
+  ;
+}
+
+static void
+test_link_handshake_recv_certs_ok_server(void *arg)
+{
+  certs_data_t *d = arg;
+  d->c->handshake_state->started_here = 0;
+  certs_cell_get_certs(d->ccell, 0)->cert_type = 3;
+  certs_cell_get_certs(d->ccell, 1)->cert_type = 2;
+  ssize_t n = certs_cell_encode(d->cell->payload, 2048, d->ccell);
+  tt_int_op(n, >, 0);
+  d->cell->payload_len = n;
+  channel_tls_process_certs_cell(d->cell, d->chan);
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, mock_close_called);
+  tt_int_op(d->c->handshake_state->authenticated, ==, 0);
+  tt_int_op(d->c->handshake_state->received_certs_cell, ==, 1);
+  tt_assert(d->c->handshake_state->id_cert != NULL);
+  tt_assert(d->c->handshake_state->auth_cert != NULL);
+
+ done:
+  ;
+}
+
+#define CERTS_FAIL(name, code)                          \
+  static void                                                           \
+  test_link_handshake_recv_certs_ ## name (void *arg)                   \
+  {                                                                     \
+    certs_data_t *d = arg;                                              \
+    { code ; }                                                          \
+    channel_tls_process_certs_cell(d->cell, d->chan);                   \
+    tt_int_op(1, ==, mock_close_called);                                \
+    tt_int_op(0, ==, mock_send_authenticate_called);                    \
+    tt_int_op(0, ==, mock_send_netinfo_called);                         \
+  done:                                                                 \
+    ;                                                                   \
+  }
+
+CERTS_FAIL(badstate, d->c->base_.state = OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING)
+CERTS_FAIL(badproto, d->c->link_proto = 2)
+CERTS_FAIL(duplicate, d->c->handshake_state->received_certs_cell = 1)
+CERTS_FAIL(already_authenticated,
+           d->c->handshake_state->authenticated = 1)
+CERTS_FAIL(empty, d->cell->payload_len = 0)
+CERTS_FAIL(bad_circid, d->cell->circ_id = 1)
+CERTS_FAIL(truncated_1, d->cell->payload[0] = 5)
+CERTS_FAIL(truncated_2, {
+           d->cell->payload_len = 4;
+           memcpy(d->cell->payload, "\x01\x01\x00\x05", 4);})
+CERTS_FAIL(truncated_3, {
+           d->cell->payload_len = 7;
+           memcpy(d->cell->payload, "\x01\x01\x00\x05""abc", 7);})
+#define REENCODE() do {                                                 \
+    ssize_t n = certs_cell_encode(d->cell->payload, 4096, d->ccell);    \
+    tt_int_op(n, >, 0);                                                 \
+    d->cell->payload_len = n;                                           \
+  } while (0)
+
+CERTS_FAIL(not_x509, {
+    certs_cell_cert_setlen_body(certs_cell_get_certs(d->ccell, 0), 3);
+    certs_cell_get_certs(d->ccell, 0)->cert_len = 3;
+    REENCODE();
+    })
+CERTS_FAIL(both_link, {
+    certs_cell_get_certs(d->ccell, 0)->cert_type = 1;
+    certs_cell_get_certs(d->ccell, 1)->cert_type = 1;
+    REENCODE();
+    })
+CERTS_FAIL(both_id_rsa, {
+    certs_cell_get_certs(d->ccell, 0)->cert_type = 2;
+    certs_cell_get_certs(d->ccell, 1)->cert_type = 2;
+    REENCODE();
+    })
+CERTS_FAIL(both_auth, {
+    certs_cell_get_certs(d->ccell, 0)->cert_type = 3;
+    certs_cell_get_certs(d->ccell, 1)->cert_type = 3;
+    REENCODE();
+    })
+CERTS_FAIL(wrong_labels_1, {
+    certs_cell_get_certs(d->ccell, 0)->cert_type = 2;
+    certs_cell_get_certs(d->ccell, 1)->cert_type = 1;
+    REENCODE();
+    })
+CERTS_FAIL(wrong_labels_2, {
+    const tor_x509_cert_t *a;
+    const tor_x509_cert_t *b;
+    const uint8_t *enca;
+    size_t lena;
+    tor_tls_get_my_certs(1, &a, &b);
+    tor_x509_cert_get_der(a, &enca, &lena);
+    certs_cell_cert_setlen_body(certs_cell_get_certs(d->ccell, 1), lena);
+    memcpy(certs_cell_cert_getarray_body(certs_cell_get_certs(d->ccell, 1)),
+           enca, lena);
+    certs_cell_get_certs(d->ccell, 1)->cert_len = lena;
+    REENCODE();
+  })
+CERTS_FAIL(wrong_labels_3, {
+    certs_cell_get_certs(d->ccell, 0)->cert_type = 2;
+    certs_cell_get_certs(d->ccell, 1)->cert_type = 3;
+    REENCODE();
+    })
+CERTS_FAIL(server_missing_certs, {
+  d->c->handshake_state->started_here = 0;
+  })
+CERTS_FAIL(server_wrong_labels_1, {
+  d->c->handshake_state->started_here = 0;
+  certs_cell_get_certs(d->ccell, 0)->cert_type = 2;
+  certs_cell_get_certs(d->ccell, 1)->cert_type = 3;
+  REENCODE();
+  })
+
+static void
+test_link_handshake_send_authchallenge(void *arg)
+{
+  (void)arg;
+
+  or_connection_t *c1 = or_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_OR, AF_INET);
+  var_cell_t *cell1=NULL, *cell2=NULL;
+
+  MOCK(connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf, mock_write_var_cell);
+
+  tt_int_op(connection_init_or_handshake_state(c1, 0), ==, 0);
+  c1->base_.state = OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3;
+  tt_assert(! mock_got_var_cell);
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, connection_or_send_auth_challenge_cell(c1));
+  cell1 = mock_got_var_cell;
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, connection_or_send_auth_challenge_cell(c1));
+  cell2 = mock_got_var_cell;
+  tt_int_op(36, ==, cell1->payload_len);
+  tt_int_op(36, ==, cell2->payload_len);
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, cell1->circ_id);
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, cell2->circ_id);
+  tt_int_op(CELL_AUTH_CHALLENGE, ==, cell1->command);
+  tt_int_op(CELL_AUTH_CHALLENGE, ==, cell2->command);
+
+  tt_mem_op("\x00\x01\x00\x01", ==, cell1->payload + 32, 4);
+  tt_mem_op("\x00\x01\x00\x01", ==, cell2->payload + 32, 4);
+  tt_mem_op(cell1->payload, !=, cell2->payload, 32);
+
+ done:
+  UNMOCK(connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf);
+  connection_free_(TO_CONN(c1));
+  tor_free(cell1);
+  tor_free(cell2);
+}
+
+typedef struct authchallenge_data_s {
+  or_connection_t *c;
+  channel_tls_t *chan;
+  var_cell_t *cell;
+} authchallenge_data_t;
+
+static int
+recv_authchallenge_cleanup(const struct testcase_t *test, void *obj)
+{
+  (void)test;
+  authchallenge_data_t *d = obj;
+
+  UNMOCK(connection_or_send_netinfo);
+  UNMOCK(connection_or_close_for_error);
+  UNMOCK(connection_or_send_authenticate_cell);
+
+  if (d) {
+    tor_free(d->cell);
+    connection_free_(TO_CONN(d->c));
+    circuitmux_free(d->chan->base_.cmux);
+    tor_free(d->chan);
+    tor_free(d);
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static void *
+recv_authchallenge_setup(const struct testcase_t *test)
+{
+  (void)test;
+  authchallenge_data_t *d = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*d));
+  d->c = or_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_OR, AF_INET);
+  d->chan = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*d->chan));
+  d->c->chan = d->chan;
+  d->c->base_.address = tor_strdup("HaveAnAddress");
+  d->c->base_.state = OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3;
+  d->chan->conn = d->c;
+  tt_int_op(connection_init_or_handshake_state(d->c, 1), ==, 0);
+  d->c->link_proto = 4;
+  d->c->handshake_state->received_certs_cell = 1;
+  d->cell = var_cell_new(128);
+  d->cell->payload_len = 38;
+  d->cell->payload[33] = 2;
+  d->cell->payload[35] = 7;
+  d->cell->payload[37] = 1;
+  d->cell->command = CELL_AUTH_CHALLENGE;
+
+  get_options_mutable()->ORPort_set = 1;
+
+  MOCK(connection_or_close_for_error, mock_close_for_err);
+  MOCK(connection_or_send_netinfo, mock_send_netinfo);
+  MOCK(connection_or_send_authenticate_cell, mock_send_authenticate);
+
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, d->c->handshake_state->received_auth_challenge);
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, mock_send_authenticate_called);
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, mock_send_netinfo_called);
+
+  return d;
+ done:
+  recv_authchallenge_cleanup(test, d);
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+static struct testcase_setup_t setup_recv_authchallenge = {
+  .setup_fn = recv_authchallenge_setup,
+  .cleanup_fn = recv_authchallenge_cleanup
+};
+
+static void
+test_link_handshake_recv_authchallenge_ok(void *arg)
+{
+  authchallenge_data_t *d = arg;
+
+  channel_tls_process_auth_challenge_cell(d->cell, d->chan);
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, mock_close_called);
+  tt_int_op(1, ==, d->c->handshake_state->received_auth_challenge);
+  tt_int_op(1, ==, mock_send_authenticate_called);
+  tt_int_op(1, ==, mock_send_netinfo_called);
+ done:
+  ;
+}
+
+static void
+test_link_handshake_recv_authchallenge_ok_noserver(void *arg)
+{
+  authchallenge_data_t *d = arg;
+  get_options_mutable()->ORPort_set = 0;
+
+  channel_tls_process_auth_challenge_cell(d->cell, d->chan);
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, mock_close_called);
+  tt_int_op(1, ==, d->c->handshake_state->received_auth_challenge);
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, mock_send_authenticate_called);
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, mock_send_netinfo_called);
+ done:
+  ;
+}
+
+static void
+test_link_handshake_recv_authchallenge_ok_unrecognized(void *arg)
+{
+  authchallenge_data_t *d = arg;
+  d->cell->payload[37] = 99;
+
+  channel_tls_process_auth_challenge_cell(d->cell, d->chan);
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, mock_close_called);
+  tt_int_op(1, ==, d->c->handshake_state->received_auth_challenge);
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, mock_send_authenticate_called);
+  tt_int_op(1, ==, mock_send_netinfo_called);
+ done:
+  ;
+}
+
+#define AUTHCHALLENGE_FAIL(name, code)                          \
+  static void                                                           \
+  test_link_handshake_recv_authchallenge_ ## name (void *arg)           \
+  {                                                                     \
+    authchallenge_data_t *d = arg;                                      \
+    { code ; }                                                          \
+    channel_tls_process_auth_challenge_cell(d->cell, d->chan);          \
+    tt_int_op(1, ==, mock_close_called);                                \
+    tt_int_op(0, ==, mock_send_authenticate_called);                    \
+    tt_int_op(0, ==, mock_send_netinfo_called);                         \
+  done:                                                                 \
+    ;                                                                   \
+  }
+
+AUTHCHALLENGE_FAIL(badstate,
+                   d->c->base_.state = OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING)
+AUTHCHALLENGE_FAIL(badproto,
+                   d->c->link_proto = 2)
+AUTHCHALLENGE_FAIL(as_server,
+                   d->c->handshake_state->started_here = 0;)
+AUTHCHALLENGE_FAIL(duplicate,
+                   d->c->handshake_state->received_auth_challenge = 1)
+AUTHCHALLENGE_FAIL(nocerts,
+                   d->c->handshake_state->received_certs_cell = 0)
+AUTHCHALLENGE_FAIL(tooshort,
+                   d->cell->payload_len = 33)
+AUTHCHALLENGE_FAIL(truncated,
+                   d->cell->payload_len = 34)
+AUTHCHALLENGE_FAIL(nonzero_circid,
+                   d->cell->circ_id = 1337)
+
+
+static tor_x509_cert_t *mock_peer_cert = NULL;
+static tor_x509_cert_t *
+mock_get_peer_cert(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+  (void)tls;
+  return mock_peer_cert;
+}
+
+static int
+mock_get_tlssecrets(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out)
+{
+  (void)tls;
+  memcpy(secrets_out, "int getRandomNumber(){return 4;}", 32);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+mock_set_circid_type(channel_t *chan,
+                     crypto_pk_t *identity_rcvd,
+                     int consider_identity)
+{
+  (void) chan;
+  (void) identity_rcvd;
+  (void) consider_identity;
+}
+
+typedef struct authenticate_data_s {
+  or_connection_t *c1, *c2;
+  channel_tls_t *chan2;
+  var_cell_t *cell;
+  crypto_pk_t *key1, *key2;
+} authenticate_data_t;
+
+static int
+authenticate_data_cleanup(const struct testcase_t *test, void *arg)
+{
+  (void) test;
+  UNMOCK(connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf);
+  UNMOCK(tor_tls_get_peer_cert);
+  UNMOCK(tor_tls_get_tlssecrets);
+  UNMOCK(connection_or_close_for_error);
+  UNMOCK(channel_set_circid_type);
+  authenticate_data_t *d = arg;
+  if (d) {
+    tor_free(d->cell);
+    connection_free_(TO_CONN(d->c1));
+    connection_free_(TO_CONN(d->c2));
+    circuitmux_free(d->chan2->base_.cmux);
+    tor_free(d->chan2);
+    crypto_pk_free(d->key1);
+    crypto_pk_free(d->key2);
+    tor_free(d);
+  }
+  mock_peer_cert = NULL;
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static void *
+authenticate_data_setup(const struct testcase_t *test)
+{
+  authenticate_data_t *d = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*d));
+
+  scheduler_init();
+
+  MOCK(connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf, mock_write_var_cell);
+  MOCK(tor_tls_get_peer_cert, mock_get_peer_cert);
+  MOCK(tor_tls_get_tlssecrets, mock_get_tlssecrets);
+  MOCK(connection_or_close_for_error, mock_close_for_err);
+  MOCK(channel_set_circid_type, mock_set_circid_type);
+  d->c1 = or_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_OR, AF_INET);
+  d->c2 = or_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_OR, AF_INET);
+
+  d->key1 = pk_generate(2);
+  d->key2 = pk_generate(3);
+  tt_int_op(tor_tls_context_init(TOR_TLS_CTX_IS_PUBLIC_SERVER,
+                                 d->key1, d->key2, 86400), ==, 0);
+
+  d->c1->base_.state = OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3;
+  d->c1->link_proto = 3;
+  tt_int_op(connection_init_or_handshake_state(d->c1, 1), ==, 0);
+
+  d->c2->base_.state = OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3;
+  d->c2->link_proto = 3;
+  tt_int_op(connection_init_or_handshake_state(d->c2, 0), ==, 0);
+  var_cell_t *cell = var_cell_new(16);
+  cell->command = CELL_CERTS;
+  or_handshake_state_record_var_cell(d->c1, d->c1->handshake_state, cell, 1);
+  or_handshake_state_record_var_cell(d->c2, d->c2->handshake_state, cell, 0);
+  memset(cell->payload, 0xf0, 16);
+  or_handshake_state_record_var_cell(d->c1, d->c1->handshake_state, cell, 0);
+  or_handshake_state_record_var_cell(d->c2, d->c2->handshake_state, cell, 1);
+  tor_free(cell);
+
+  d->chan2 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*d->chan2));
+  channel_tls_common_init(d->chan2);
+  d->c2->chan = d->chan2;
+  d->chan2->conn = d->c2;
+  d->c2->base_.address = tor_strdup("C2");
+  d->c2->tls = tor_tls_new(-1, 1);
+  d->c2->handshake_state->received_certs_cell = 1;
+
+  const tor_x509_cert_t *id_cert=NULL, *link_cert=NULL, *auth_cert=NULL;
+  tt_assert(! tor_tls_get_my_certs(1, &link_cert, &id_cert));
+
+  const uint8_t *der;
+  size_t sz;
+  tor_x509_cert_get_der(id_cert, &der, &sz);
+  d->c1->handshake_state->id_cert = tor_x509_cert_decode(der, sz);
+  d->c2->handshake_state->id_cert = tor_x509_cert_decode(der, sz);
+
+  tor_x509_cert_get_der(link_cert, &der, &sz);
+  mock_peer_cert = tor_x509_cert_decode(der, sz);
+  tt_assert(mock_peer_cert);
+  tt_assert(! tor_tls_get_my_certs(0, &auth_cert, &id_cert));
+  tor_x509_cert_get_der(auth_cert, &der, &sz);
+  d->c2->handshake_state->auth_cert = tor_x509_cert_decode(der, sz);
+
+  /* Make an authenticate cell ... */
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, connection_or_send_authenticate_cell(d->c1,
+                                             AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET));
+  tt_assert(mock_got_var_cell);
+  d->cell = mock_got_var_cell;
+  mock_got_var_cell = NULL;
+
+  return d;
+ done:
+  authenticate_data_cleanup(test, d);
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+static struct testcase_setup_t setup_authenticate = {
+  .setup_fn = authenticate_data_setup,
+  .cleanup_fn = authenticate_data_cleanup
+};
+
+static void
+test_link_handshake_auth_cell(void *arg)
+{
+  authenticate_data_t *d = arg;
+  auth1_t *auth1 = NULL;
+  crypto_pk_t *auth_pubkey = NULL;
+
+  /* Is the cell well-formed on the outer layer? */
+  tt_int_op(d->cell->command, ==, CELL_AUTHENTICATE);
+  tt_int_op(d->cell->payload[0], ==, 0);
+  tt_int_op(d->cell->payload[1], ==, 1);
+  tt_int_op(ntohs(get_uint16(d->cell->payload + 2)), ==,
+            d->cell->payload_len - 4);
+
+  /* Check it out for plausibility... */
+  auth_ctx_t ctx;
+  ctx.is_ed = 0;
+  tt_int_op(d->cell->payload_len-4, ==, auth1_parse(&auth1,
+                                             d->cell->payload+4,
+                                             d->cell->payload_len - 4, &ctx));
+  tt_assert(auth1);
+
+  tt_mem_op(auth1->type, ==, "AUTH0001", 8);
+  tt_mem_op(auth1->tlssecrets, ==, "int getRandomNumber(){return 4;}", 32);
+  tt_int_op(auth1_getlen_sig(auth1), >, 120);
+
+  /* Is the signature okay? */
+  uint8_t sig[128];
+  uint8_t digest[32];
+
+  auth_pubkey = tor_tls_cert_get_key(d->c2->handshake_state->auth_cert);
+  int n = crypto_pk_public_checksig(
+              auth_pubkey,
+              (char*)sig, sizeof(sig), (char*)auth1_getarray_sig(auth1),
+              auth1_getlen_sig(auth1));
+  tt_int_op(n, ==, 32);
+  const uint8_t *start = d->cell->payload+4, *end = auth1->end_of_signed;
+  crypto_digest256((char*)digest,
+                   (const char*)start, end-start, DIGEST_SHA256);
+  tt_mem_op(sig, ==, digest, 32);
+
+  /* Then feed it to c2. */
+  tt_int_op(d->c2->handshake_state->authenticated, ==, 0);
+  channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(d->cell, d->chan2);
+  tt_int_op(mock_close_called, ==, 0);
+  tt_int_op(d->c2->handshake_state->authenticated, ==, 1);
+
+ done:
+  auth1_free(auth1);
+  crypto_pk_free(auth_pubkey);
+}
+
+#define AUTHENTICATE_FAIL(name, code)                           \
+  static void                                                   \
+  test_link_handshake_auth_ ## name (void *arg)                 \
+  {                                                             \
+    authenticate_data_t *d = arg;                               \
+    { code ; }                                                  \
+    tt_int_op(d->c2->handshake_state->authenticated, ==, 0);    \
+    channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(d->cell, d->chan2);   \
+    tt_int_op(mock_close_called, ==, 1);                        \
+    tt_int_op(d->c2->handshake_state->authenticated, ==, 0);    \
+   done:                                                        \
+   ;                                                            \
+  }
+
+AUTHENTICATE_FAIL(badstate,
+                  d->c2->base_.state = OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING)
+AUTHENTICATE_FAIL(badproto,
+                  d->c2->link_proto = 2)
+AUTHENTICATE_FAIL(atclient,
+                  d->c2->handshake_state->started_here = 1)
+AUTHENTICATE_FAIL(duplicate,
+                  d->c2->handshake_state->received_authenticate = 1)
+static void
+test_link_handshake_auth_already_authenticated(void *arg)
+{
+  authenticate_data_t *d = arg;
+  d->c2->handshake_state->authenticated = 1;
+  channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(d->cell, d->chan2);
+  tt_int_op(mock_close_called, ==, 1);
+  tt_int_op(d->c2->handshake_state->authenticated, ==, 1);
+ done:
+  ;
+}
+AUTHENTICATE_FAIL(nocerts,
+                  d->c2->handshake_state->received_certs_cell = 0)
+AUTHENTICATE_FAIL(noidcert,
+                  tor_x509_cert_free(d->c2->handshake_state->id_cert);
+                  d->c2->handshake_state->id_cert = NULL)
+AUTHENTICATE_FAIL(noauthcert,
+                  tor_x509_cert_free(d->c2->handshake_state->auth_cert);
+                  d->c2->handshake_state->auth_cert = NULL)
+AUTHENTICATE_FAIL(tooshort,
+                  d->cell->payload_len = 3)
+AUTHENTICATE_FAIL(badtype,
+                  d->cell->payload[0] = 0xff)
+AUTHENTICATE_FAIL(truncated_1,
+                  d->cell->payload[2]++)
+AUTHENTICATE_FAIL(truncated_2,
+                  d->cell->payload[3]++)
+AUTHENTICATE_FAIL(tooshort_1,
+                  tt_int_op(d->cell->payload_len, >=, 260);
+                  d->cell->payload[2] -= 1;
+                  d->cell->payload_len -= 256;)
+AUTHENTICATE_FAIL(badcontent,
+                  d->cell->payload[10] ^= 0xff)
+AUTHENTICATE_FAIL(badsig_1,
+                  d->cell->payload[d->cell->payload_len - 5] ^= 0xff)
+
+#define TEST(name, flags)                                       \
+  { #name , test_link_handshake_ ## name, (flags), NULL, NULL }
+
+#define TEST_RCV_AUTHCHALLENGE(name)                            \
+  { "recv_authchallenge/" #name ,                               \
+    test_link_handshake_recv_authchallenge_ ## name, TT_FORK,   \
+      &setup_recv_authchallenge, NULL }
+
+#define TEST_RCV_CERTS(name)                                    \
+  { "recv_certs/" #name ,                                       \
+      test_link_handshake_recv_certs_ ## name, TT_FORK,         \
+      &setup_recv_certs, NULL }
+
+#define TEST_AUTHENTICATE(name)                                         \
+  { "authenticate/" #name , test_link_handshake_auth_ ## name, TT_FORK, \
+      &setup_authenticate, NULL }
+
+struct testcase_t link_handshake_tests[] = {
+  TEST(certs_ok, TT_FORK),
+  //TEST(certs_bad, TT_FORK),
+  TEST_RCV_CERTS(ok),
+  TEST_RCV_CERTS(ok_server),
+  TEST_RCV_CERTS(badstate),
+  TEST_RCV_CERTS(badproto),
+  TEST_RCV_CERTS(duplicate),
+  TEST_RCV_CERTS(already_authenticated),
+  TEST_RCV_CERTS(empty),
+  TEST_RCV_CERTS(bad_circid),
+  TEST_RCV_CERTS(truncated_1),
+  TEST_RCV_CERTS(truncated_2),
+  TEST_RCV_CERTS(truncated_3),
+  TEST_RCV_CERTS(not_x509),
+  TEST_RCV_CERTS(both_link),
+  TEST_RCV_CERTS(both_id_rsa),
+  TEST_RCV_CERTS(both_auth),
+  TEST_RCV_CERTS(wrong_labels_1),
+  TEST_RCV_CERTS(wrong_labels_2),
+  TEST_RCV_CERTS(wrong_labels_3),
+  TEST_RCV_CERTS(server_missing_certs),
+  TEST_RCV_CERTS(server_wrong_labels_1),
+
+  TEST(send_authchallenge, TT_FORK),
+  TEST_RCV_AUTHCHALLENGE(ok),
+  TEST_RCV_AUTHCHALLENGE(ok_noserver),
+  TEST_RCV_AUTHCHALLENGE(ok_unrecognized),
+  TEST_RCV_AUTHCHALLENGE(badstate),
+  TEST_RCV_AUTHCHALLENGE(badproto),
+  TEST_RCV_AUTHCHALLENGE(as_server),
+  TEST_RCV_AUTHCHALLENGE(duplicate),
+  TEST_RCV_AUTHCHALLENGE(nocerts),
+  TEST_RCV_AUTHCHALLENGE(tooshort),
+  TEST_RCV_AUTHCHALLENGE(truncated),
+  TEST_RCV_AUTHCHALLENGE(nonzero_circid),
+
+  TEST_AUTHENTICATE(cell),
+  TEST_AUTHENTICATE(badstate),
+  TEST_AUTHENTICATE(badproto),
+  TEST_AUTHENTICATE(atclient),
+  TEST_AUTHENTICATE(duplicate),
+  TEST_AUTHENTICATE(already_authenticated),
+  TEST_AUTHENTICATE(nocerts),
+  TEST_AUTHENTICATE(noidcert),
+  TEST_AUTHENTICATE(noauthcert),
+  TEST_AUTHENTICATE(tooshort),
+  TEST_AUTHENTICATE(badtype),
+  TEST_AUTHENTICATE(truncated_1),
+  TEST_AUTHENTICATE(truncated_2),
+  TEST_AUTHENTICATE(tooshort_1),
+  TEST_AUTHENTICATE(badcontent),
+  TEST_AUTHENTICATE(badsig_1),
+  //TEST_AUTHENTICATE(),
+
+  END_OF_TESTCASES
+};
diff --git a/src/test/test_microdesc.c b/src/test/test_microdesc.c
index fb3df77edc..3c22e1809a 100644
--- a/src/test/test_microdesc.c
+++ b/src/test/test_microdesc.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #include "networkstatus.h"
 #include "routerlist.h"
 #include "routerparse.h"
+#include "torcert.h"
 
 #include "test.h"
 
@@ -335,6 +336,59 @@ static const char test_ri[] =
   "t0xkIE39ss/EwmQr7iIgkdVH4oRIMsjYnFFJBG26nYY=\n"
   "-----END SIGNATURE-----\n";
 
+static const char test_ri2[] =
+  "router test001a 127.0.0.1 5001 0 7001\n"
+  "identity-ed25519\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQQABf/FAf5iDuKCZP2VxnAaQWdklilAh6kaEeFX4z8261Yx2T1/AQAgBADCp8vO\n"
+  "B8K1F9g2DzwuwvVCnPFLSK1qknVqPpNucHLH9DY7fuIYogBAdz4zHv1qC7RKaMNG\n"
+  "Jux/tMO2tzPcm62Ky5PjClMQplKUOnZNQ+RIpA3wYCIfUDy/cQnY7XWgNQ0=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "platform Tor 0.2.6.0-alpha-dev on Darwin\n"
+  "protocols Link 1 2 Circuit 1\n"
+  "published 2014-10-08 12:58:04\n"
+  "fingerprint B7E2 7F10 4213 C36F 13E7 E982 9182 845E 4959 97A0\n"
+  "uptime 0\n"
+  "bandwidth 1073741824 1073741824 0\n"
+  "extra-info-digest 568F27331B6D8C73E7024F1EF5D097B90DFC7CDB\n"
+  "caches-extra-info\n"
+  "onion-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAL2R8EfubUcahxha4u02P4VAR0llQIMwFAmrHPjzcK7apcQgDOf2ovOA\n"
+  "+YQnJFxlpBmCoCZC6ssCi+9G0mqo650lFuTMP5I90BdtjotfzESfTykHLiChyvhd\n"
+  "l0dlqclb2SU/GKem/fLRXH16aNi72CdSUu/1slKs/70ILi34QixRAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "signing-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAN8+78KUVlgHXdMMkYJxcwh1Zv2y+Gb5eWUyltUaQRajhrT9ij2T5JZs\n"
+  "M0g85xTcuM3jNVVpV79+33hiTohdC6UZ+Bk4USQ7WBFzRbVFSXoVKLBJFkCOIexg\n"
+  "SMGNd5WEDtHWrXl58mizmPFu1eG6ZxHzt7RuLSol5cwBvawXPNkFAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "onion-key-crosscert\n"
+  "-----BEGIN CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "ETFDzU49bvNfoZnKK1j6JeBP2gDirgj6bBCgWpUYs663OO9ypbZRO0JwWANssKl6\n"
+  "oaq9vKTsKGRsaNnqnz/JGMhehymakjjNtqg7crWwsahe8+7Pw9GKmW+YjFtcOkUf\n"
+  "KfOn2bmKBa1FoJb4yW3oXzHcdlLSRuCciKqPn+Hky5o=\n"
+  "-----END CROSSCERT-----\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key-crosscert 0\n"
+  "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "AQoABf2dAcKny84HwrUX2DYPPC7C9UKc8UtIrWqSdWo+k25wcsf0AFohutG+xI06\n"
+  "Ef21c5Zl1j8Hw6DzHDjYyJevXLFuOneaL3zcH2Ldn4sjrG3kc5UuVvRfTvV120UO\n"
+  "xk4f5s5LGwY=\n"
+  "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+  "hidden-service-dir\n"
+  "contact auth1@test.test\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key hbxdRnfVUJJY7+KcT4E3Rs7/zuClbN3hJrjSBiEGMgI=\n"
+  "reject *:*\n"
+  "router-sig-ed25519 5aQXyTif7PExIuL2di37UvktmJECKnils2OWz2vDi"
+                     "hFxi+5TTAAPxYkS5clhc/Pjvw34itfjGmTKFic/8httAQ\n"
+  "router-signature\n"
+  "-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----\n"
+  "BaUB+aFPQbb3BwtdzKsKqV3+6cRlSqJF5bI3UTmwRoJk+Z5Pz+W5NWokNI0xArHM\n"
+  "T4T5FZCCP9350jXsUCIvzyIyktU6aVRCGFt76rFlo1OETpN8GWkMnQU0w18cxvgS\n"
+  "cf34GXHv61XReJF3AlzNHFpbrPOYmowmhrTULKyMqow=\n"
+  "-----END SIGNATURE-----\n";
+
 static const char test_md_8[] =
   "onion-key\n"
   "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
@@ -365,6 +419,26 @@ static const char test_md_18[] =
   "p reject 25,119,135-139,445,563,1214,4661-4666,6346-6429,6699,6881-6999\n"
   "id rsa1024 Cd47okjCHD83YGzThGBDptXs9Z4\n";
 
+static const char test_md2_18[] =
+  "onion-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAL2R8EfubUcahxha4u02P4VAR0llQIMwFAmrHPjzcK7apcQgDOf2ovOA\n"
+  "+YQnJFxlpBmCoCZC6ssCi+9G0mqo650lFuTMP5I90BdtjotfzESfTykHLiChyvhd\n"
+  "l0dlqclb2SU/GKem/fLRXH16aNi72CdSUu/1slKs/70ILi34QixRAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key hbxdRnfVUJJY7+KcT4E3Rs7/zuClbN3hJrjSBiEGMgI=\n"
+  "id rsa1024 t+J/EEITw28T5+mCkYKEXklZl6A\n";
+
+static const char test_md2_21[] =
+  "onion-key\n"
+  "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "MIGJAoGBAL2R8EfubUcahxha4u02P4VAR0llQIMwFAmrHPjzcK7apcQgDOf2ovOA\n"
+  "+YQnJFxlpBmCoCZC6ssCi+9G0mqo650lFuTMP5I90BdtjotfzESfTykHLiChyvhd\n"
+  "l0dlqclb2SU/GKem/fLRXH16aNi72CdSUu/1slKs/70ILi34QixRAgMBAAE=\n"
+  "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+  "ntor-onion-key hbxdRnfVUJJY7+KcT4E3Rs7/zuClbN3hJrjSBiEGMgI=\n"
+  "id ed25519 wqfLzgfCtRfYNg88LsL1QpzxS0itapJ1aj6TbnByx/Q\n";
+
 static void
 test_md_generate(void *arg)
 {
@@ -391,6 +465,25 @@ test_md_generate(void *arg)
   md = dirvote_create_microdescriptor(ri, 18);
   tt_str_op(md->body, OP_EQ, test_md_18);
 
+  microdesc_free(md);
+  md = NULL;
+  md = dirvote_create_microdescriptor(ri, 21);
+  tt_str_op(md->body, ==, test_md_18);
+
+  ri = router_parse_entry_from_string(test_ri2, NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL);
+
+  microdesc_free(md);
+  md = NULL;
+  md = dirvote_create_microdescriptor(ri, 18);
+  tt_str_op(md->body, ==, test_md2_18);
+
+  microdesc_free(md);
+  md = NULL;
+  md = dirvote_create_microdescriptor(ri, 21);
+  tt_str_op(md->body, ==, test_md2_21);
+  tt_assert(ed25519_pubkey_eq(md->ed25519_identity_pkey,
+                              &ri->signing_key_cert->signing_key));
+
  done:
   microdesc_free(md);
   routerinfo_free(ri);
diff --git a/src/test/test_routerkeys.c b/src/test/test_routerkeys.c
index 60b6bb5a72..26f9701f49 100644
--- a/src/test/test_routerkeys.c
+++ b/src/test/test_routerkeys.c
@@ -8,11 +8,17 @@
 #include "or.h"
 #include "config.h"
 #include "router.h"
+#include "routerkeys.h"
 #include "util.h"
 #include "crypto.h"
-
+#include "torcert.h"
 #include "test.h"
 
+#ifdef _WIN32
+/* For mkdir() */
+#include <direct.h>
+#endif
+
 static void
 test_routerkeys_write_fingerprint(void *arg)
 {
@@ -75,11 +81,543 @@ test_routerkeys_write_fingerprint(void *arg)
   tor_free(cp2);
 }
 
+static void
+test_routerkeys_ed_certs(void *args)
+{
+  (void)args;
+  ed25519_keypair_t kp1, kp2;
+  tor_cert_t *cert[2] = {NULL, NULL};
+  tor_cert_t *parsed_cert[2] = {NULL, NULL};
+  time_t now = 1412094534;
+  uint8_t *junk = NULL;
+  char *base64 = NULL;
+
+  tt_int_op(0,==,ed25519_keypair_generate(&kp1, 0));
+  tt_int_op(0,==,ed25519_keypair_generate(&kp2, 0));
+
+  for (int i = 0; i <= 1; ++i) {
+    uint32_t flags = i ? CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY : 0;
+
+    cert[i] = tor_cert_create(&kp1, 5, &kp2.pubkey, now, 10000, flags);
+    tt_assert(cert[i]);
+
+    tt_assert(cert[i]->sig_bad == 0);
+    tt_assert(cert[i]->sig_ok == 1);
+    tt_assert(cert[i]->cert_expired == 0);
+    tt_assert(cert[i]->cert_valid == 1);
+    tt_int_op(cert[i]->cert_type, ==, 5);
+    tt_mem_op(cert[i]->signed_key.pubkey, ==, &kp2.pubkey.pubkey, 32);
+    tt_mem_op(cert[i]->signing_key.pubkey, ==, &kp1.pubkey.pubkey, 32);
+    tt_int_op(cert[i]->signing_key_included, ==, i);
+
+    tt_assert(cert[i]->encoded);
+    tt_int_op(cert[i]->encoded_len, ==, 104 + 36 * i);
+    tt_int_op(cert[i]->encoded[0], ==, 1);
+    tt_int_op(cert[i]->encoded[1], ==, 5);
+
+    parsed_cert[i] = tor_cert_parse(cert[i]->encoded, cert[i]->encoded_len);
+    tt_assert(parsed_cert[i]);
+    tt_int_op(cert[i]->encoded_len, ==, parsed_cert[i]->encoded_len);
+    tt_mem_op(cert[i]->encoded, ==, parsed_cert[i]->encoded,
+              cert[i]->encoded_len);
+    tt_assert(parsed_cert[i]->sig_bad == 0);
+    tt_assert(parsed_cert[i]->sig_ok == 0);
+    tt_assert(parsed_cert[i]->cert_expired == 0);
+    tt_assert(parsed_cert[i]->cert_valid == 0);
+
+    /* Expired */
+    tt_int_op(tor_cert_checksig(parsed_cert[i], &kp1.pubkey, now + 30000),
+              <, 0);
+    tt_assert(parsed_cert[i]->cert_expired == 1);
+    parsed_cert[i]->cert_expired = 0;
+
+    /* Wrong key */
+    tt_int_op(tor_cert_checksig(parsed_cert[i], &kp2.pubkey, now), <, 0);
+    tt_assert(parsed_cert[i]->sig_bad== 1);
+    parsed_cert[i]->sig_bad = 0;
+
+    /* Missing key */
+    int ok = tor_cert_checksig(parsed_cert[i], NULL, now);
+    tt_int_op(ok < 0, ==, i == 0);
+    tt_assert(parsed_cert[i]->sig_bad == 0);
+    tt_assert(parsed_cert[i]->sig_ok == (i != 0));
+    tt_assert(parsed_cert[i]->cert_valid == (i != 0));
+    parsed_cert[i]->sig_bad = 0;
+    parsed_cert[i]->sig_ok = 0;
+    parsed_cert[i]->cert_valid = 0;
+
+    /* Right key */
+    tt_int_op(tor_cert_checksig(parsed_cert[i], &kp1.pubkey, now), ==, 0);
+    tt_assert(parsed_cert[i]->sig_bad == 0);
+    tt_assert(parsed_cert[i]->sig_ok == 1);
+    tt_assert(parsed_cert[i]->cert_expired == 0);
+    tt_assert(parsed_cert[i]->cert_valid == 1);
+  }
+
+  /* Now try some junky certs. */
+  /* - Truncated */
+  tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==,tor_cert_parse(cert[0]->encoded, cert[0]->encoded_len-1));
+
+  /* - First byte modified */
+  cert[0]->encoded[0] = 99;
+  tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==,tor_cert_parse(cert[0]->encoded, cert[0]->encoded_len));
+  cert[0]->encoded[0] = 1;
+
+  /* - Extra byte at the end*/
+  junk = tor_malloc_zero(cert[0]->encoded_len + 1);
+  memcpy(junk, cert[0]->encoded, cert[0]->encoded_len);
+  tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, tor_cert_parse(junk, cert[0]->encoded_len+1));
+
+  /* - Multiple signing key instances */
+  tor_free(junk);
+  junk = tor_malloc_zero(104 + 36 * 2);
+  junk[0] = 1; /* version */
+  junk[1] = 5; /* cert type */
+  junk[6] = 1; /* key type */
+  junk[39] = 2; /* n_extensions */
+  junk[41] = 32; /* extlen */
+  junk[42] = 4; /* exttype */
+  junk[77] = 32; /* extlen */
+  junk[78] = 4; /* exttype */
+  tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, tor_cert_parse(junk, 104 + 36 * 2));
+
+ done:
+  tor_cert_free(cert[0]);
+  tor_cert_free(cert[1]);
+  tor_cert_free(parsed_cert[0]);
+  tor_cert_free(parsed_cert[1]);
+  tor_free(junk);
+  tor_free(base64);
+}
+
+static void
+test_routerkeys_ed_key_create(void *arg)
+{
+  (void)arg;
+  tor_cert_t *cert = NULL;
+  ed25519_keypair_t *kp1 = NULL, *kp2 = NULL;
+  time_t now = time(NULL);
+
+  /* This is a simple alias for 'make a new keypair' */
+  kp1 = ed_key_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, &cert);
+  tt_assert(kp1);
+
+  /* Create a new certificate signed by kp1. */
+  kp2 = ed_key_new(kp1, INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT, now, 3600, 4, &cert);
+  tt_assert(kp2);
+  tt_assert(cert);
+  tt_mem_op(&cert->signed_key, ==, &kp2->pubkey, sizeof(ed25519_public_key_t));
+  tt_assert(! cert->signing_key_included);
+
+  tt_int_op(cert->valid_until, >=, now);
+  tt_int_op(cert->valid_until, <=, now+7200);
+
+  /* Create a new key-including certificate signed by kp1 */
+  ed25519_keypair_free(kp2);
+  tor_cert_free(cert);
+  cert = NULL; kp2 = NULL;
+  kp2 = ed_key_new(kp1, (INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT|
+                         INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT),
+                   now, 3600, 4, &cert);
+  tt_assert(kp2);
+  tt_assert(cert);
+  tt_assert(cert->signing_key_included);
+  tt_mem_op(&cert->signed_key, ==, &kp2->pubkey, sizeof(ed25519_public_key_t));
+  tt_mem_op(&cert->signing_key, ==, &kp1->pubkey,sizeof(ed25519_public_key_t));
+
+ done:
+  ed25519_keypair_free(kp1);
+  ed25519_keypair_free(kp2);
+  tor_cert_free(cert);
+}
+
+static void
+test_routerkeys_ed_key_init_basic(void *arg)
+{
+  (void) arg;
+
+  tor_cert_t *cert = NULL, *cert2 = NULL;
+  ed25519_keypair_t *kp1 = NULL, *kp2 = NULL, *kp3 = NULL;
+  time_t now = time(NULL);
+  char *fname1 = tor_strdup(get_fname("test_ed_key_1"));
+  char *fname2 = tor_strdup(get_fname("test_ed_key_2"));
+  struct stat st;
+
+  unlink(fname1);
+  unlink(fname2);
+
+  /* Fail to load a key that isn't there. */
+  kp1 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, 0, LOG_INFO, NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert);
+  tt_assert(kp1 == NULL);
+  tt_assert(cert == NULL);
+
+  /* Create the key if requested to do so. */
+  kp1 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE, LOG_INFO,
+                              NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert);
+  tt_assert(kp1 != NULL);
+  tt_assert(cert == NULL);
+  tt_int_op(stat(get_fname("test_ed_key_1_cert"), &st), <, 0);
+  tt_int_op(stat(get_fname("test_ed_key_1_secret_key"), &st), ==, 0);
+
+  /* Fail to load if we say we need a cert */
+  kp2 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT, LOG_INFO,
+                              NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert);
+  tt_assert(kp2 == NULL);
+
+  /* Fail to load if we say the wrong key type */
+  kp2 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, 0, LOG_INFO,
+                              NULL, now, 0, 6, &cert);
+  tt_assert(kp2 == NULL);
+
+  /* Load successfully if we're not picky, whether we say "create" or not. */
+  kp2 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE, LOG_INFO,
+                              NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert);
+  tt_assert(kp2 != NULL);
+  tt_assert(cert == NULL);
+  tt_mem_op(kp1, ==, kp2, sizeof(*kp1));
+  ed25519_keypair_free(kp2); kp2 = NULL;
+
+  kp2 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, 0, LOG_INFO,
+                              NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert);
+  tt_assert(kp2 != NULL);
+  tt_assert(cert == NULL);
+  tt_mem_op(kp1, ==, kp2, sizeof(*kp1));
+  ed25519_keypair_free(kp2); kp2 = NULL;
+
+  /* Now create a key with a cert. */
+  kp2 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname2, (INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE|
+                                       INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT),
+                              LOG_INFO, kp1, now, 7200, 7, &cert);
+  tt_assert(kp2 != NULL);
+  tt_assert(cert != NULL);
+  tt_mem_op(kp1, !=, kp2, sizeof(*kp1));
+  tt_int_op(stat(get_fname("test_ed_key_2_cert"), &st), ==, 0);
+  tt_int_op(stat(get_fname("test_ed_key_2_secret_key"), &st), ==, 0);
+
+  tt_assert(cert->cert_valid == 1);
+  tt_mem_op(&cert->signed_key, ==, &kp2->pubkey, 32);
+
+  /* Now verify we can load the cert... */
+  kp3 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname2, (INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE|
+                                       INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT),
+                              LOG_INFO, kp1, now, 7200, 7, &cert2);
+  tt_mem_op(kp2, ==, kp3, sizeof(*kp2));
+  tt_mem_op(cert2->encoded, ==, cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len);
+  ed25519_keypair_free(kp3); kp3 = NULL;
+  tor_cert_free(cert2); cert2 = NULL;
+
+  /* ... even without create... */
+  kp3 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname2, INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT,
+                              LOG_INFO, kp1, now, 7200, 7, &cert2);
+  tt_mem_op(kp2, ==, kp3, sizeof(*kp2));
+  tt_mem_op(cert2->encoded, ==, cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len);
+  ed25519_keypair_free(kp3); kp3 = NULL;
+  tor_cert_free(cert2); cert2 = NULL;
+
+  /* ... but that we don't crash or anything if we say we don't want it. */
+  kp3 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname2, INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT,
+                              LOG_INFO, kp1, now, 7200, 7, NULL);
+  tt_mem_op(kp2, ==, kp3, sizeof(*kp2));
+  ed25519_keypair_free(kp3); kp3 = NULL;
+
+  /* Fail if we're told the wrong signing key */
+  kp3 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname2, INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT,
+                              LOG_INFO, kp2, now, 7200, 7, &cert2);
+  tt_assert(kp3 == NULL);
+  tt_assert(cert2 == NULL);
+
+ done:
+  ed25519_keypair_free(kp1);
+  ed25519_keypair_free(kp2);
+  ed25519_keypair_free(kp3);
+  tor_cert_free(cert);
+  tor_cert_free(cert2);
+  tor_free(fname1);
+  tor_free(fname2);
+}
+
+static void
+test_routerkeys_ed_key_init_split(void *arg)
+{
+  (void) arg;
+
+  tor_cert_t *cert = NULL;
+  ed25519_keypair_t *kp1 = NULL, *kp2 = NULL;
+  time_t now = time(NULL);
+  char *fname1 = tor_strdup(get_fname("test_ed_key_3"));
+  char *fname2 = tor_strdup(get_fname("test_ed_key_4"));
+  struct stat st;
+  const uint32_t flags = INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT|INIT_ED_KEY_MISSING_SECRET_OK;
+
+  unlink(fname1);
+  unlink(fname2);
+
+  /* Can't load key that isn't there. */
+  kp1 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, flags, LOG_INFO, NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert);
+  tt_assert(kp1 == NULL);
+  tt_assert(cert == NULL);
+
+  /* Create a split key */
+  kp1 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, flags|INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE,
+                              LOG_INFO, NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert);
+  tt_assert(kp1 != NULL);
+  tt_assert(cert == NULL);
+  tt_int_op(stat(get_fname("test_ed_key_3_cert"), &st), <, 0);
+  tt_int_op(stat(get_fname("test_ed_key_3_secret_key"), &st), ==, 0);
+  tt_int_op(stat(get_fname("test_ed_key_3_public_key"), &st), ==, 0);
+
+  /* Load it. */
+  kp2 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, flags|INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE,
+                              LOG_INFO, NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert);
+  tt_assert(kp2 != NULL);
+  tt_assert(cert == NULL);
+  tt_mem_op(kp1, ==, kp2, sizeof(*kp2));
+  ed25519_keypair_free(kp2); kp2 = NULL;
+
+  /* Okay, try killing the secret key and loading it. */
+  unlink(get_fname("test_ed_key_3_secret_key"));
+  kp2 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, flags,
+                              LOG_INFO, NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert);
+  tt_assert(kp2 != NULL);
+  tt_assert(cert == NULL);
+  tt_mem_op(&kp1->pubkey, ==, &kp2->pubkey, sizeof(kp2->pubkey));
+  tt_assert(tor_mem_is_zero((char*)kp2->seckey.seckey,
+                            sizeof(kp2->seckey.seckey)));
+  ed25519_keypair_free(kp2); kp2 = NULL;
+
+  /* Even when we're told to "create", don't create if there's a public key */
+  kp2 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, flags|INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE,
+                              LOG_INFO, NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert);
+  tt_assert(kp2 != NULL);
+  tt_assert(cert == NULL);
+  tt_mem_op(&kp1->pubkey, ==, &kp2->pubkey, sizeof(kp2->pubkey));
+  tt_assert(tor_mem_is_zero((char*)kp2->seckey.seckey,
+                            sizeof(kp2->seckey.seckey)));
+  ed25519_keypair_free(kp2); kp2 = NULL;
+
+  /* Make sure we fail on a tag mismatch, though */
+  kp2 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, flags,
+                              LOG_INFO, NULL, now, 0, 99, &cert);
+  tt_assert(kp2 == NULL);
+
+ done:
+  ed25519_keypair_free(kp1);
+  ed25519_keypair_free(kp2);
+  tor_cert_free(cert);
+  tor_free(fname1);
+  tor_free(fname2);
+}
+
+static void
+test_routerkeys_ed_keys_init_all(void *arg)
+{
+  (void)arg;
+  char *dir = tor_strdup(get_fname("test_ed_keys_init_all"));
+  or_options_t *options = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(or_options_t));
+  time_t now = time(NULL);
+  ed25519_public_key_t id;
+  ed25519_keypair_t sign, auth;
+  tor_cert_t *link_cert = NULL;
+
+  get_options_mutable()->ORPort_set = 1;
+
+  crypto_pk_t *rsa = pk_generate(0);
+
+  set_server_identity_key(rsa);
+  set_client_identity_key(rsa);
+
+  router_initialize_tls_context();
+
+  options->SigningKeyLifetime = 30*86400;
+  options->TestingAuthKeyLifetime = 2*86400;
+  options->TestingLinkCertLifetime = 2*86400;
+  options->TestingSigningKeySlop = 2*86400;
+  options->TestingAuthKeySlop = 2*3600;
+  options->TestingLinkKeySlop = 2*3600;
+
+#ifdef _WIN32
+  mkdir(dir);
+  mkdir(get_fname("test_ed_keys_init_all/keys"));
+#else
+  mkdir(dir, 0700);
+  mkdir(get_fname("test_ed_keys_init_all/keys"), 0700);
+#endif
+
+  options->DataDirectory = dir;
+
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, load_ed_keys(options, now));
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, generate_ed_link_cert(options, now));
+  tt_assert(get_master_identity_key());
+  tt_assert(get_master_identity_key());
+  tt_assert(get_master_signing_keypair());
+  tt_assert(get_current_auth_keypair());
+  tt_assert(get_master_signing_key_cert());
+  tt_assert(get_current_link_cert_cert());
+  tt_assert(get_current_auth_key_cert());
+  memcpy(&id, get_master_identity_key(), sizeof(id));
+  memcpy(&sign, get_master_signing_keypair(), sizeof(sign));
+  memcpy(&auth, get_current_auth_keypair(), sizeof(auth));
+  link_cert = tor_cert_dup(get_current_link_cert_cert());
+
+  /* Call load_ed_keys again, but nothing has changed. */
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, load_ed_keys(options, now));
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, generate_ed_link_cert(options, now));
+  tt_mem_op(&id, ==, get_master_identity_key(), sizeof(id));
+  tt_mem_op(&sign, ==, get_master_signing_keypair(), sizeof(sign));
+  tt_mem_op(&auth, ==, get_current_auth_keypair(), sizeof(auth));
+  tt_assert(tor_cert_eq(link_cert, get_current_link_cert_cert()));
+
+  /* Force a reload: we make new link/auth keys. */
+  routerkeys_free_all();
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, load_ed_keys(options, now));
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, generate_ed_link_cert(options, now));
+  tt_mem_op(&id, ==, get_master_identity_key(), sizeof(id));
+  tt_mem_op(&sign, ==, get_master_signing_keypair(), sizeof(sign));
+  tt_assert(tor_cert_eq(link_cert, get_current_link_cert_cert()));
+  tt_mem_op(&auth, !=, get_current_auth_keypair(), sizeof(auth));
+  tt_assert(get_master_signing_key_cert());
+  tt_assert(get_current_link_cert_cert());
+  tt_assert(get_current_auth_key_cert());
+  tor_cert_free(link_cert);
+  link_cert = tor_cert_dup(get_current_link_cert_cert());
+  memcpy(&auth, get_current_auth_keypair(), sizeof(auth));
+
+  /* Force a link/auth-key regeneration by advancing time. */
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, load_ed_keys(options, now+3*86400));
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, generate_ed_link_cert(options, now+3*86400));
+  tt_mem_op(&id, ==, get_master_identity_key(), sizeof(id));
+  tt_mem_op(&sign, ==, get_master_signing_keypair(), sizeof(sign));
+  tt_assert(! tor_cert_eq(link_cert, get_current_link_cert_cert()));
+  tt_mem_op(&auth, !=, get_current_auth_keypair(), sizeof(auth));
+  tt_assert(get_master_signing_key_cert());
+  tt_assert(get_current_link_cert_cert());
+  tt_assert(get_current_auth_key_cert());
+  tor_cert_free(link_cert);
+  link_cert = tor_cert_dup(get_current_link_cert_cert());
+  memcpy(&auth, get_current_auth_keypair(), sizeof(auth));
+
+  /* Force a signing-key regeneration by advancing time. */
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, load_ed_keys(options, now+100*86400));
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, generate_ed_link_cert(options, now+100*86400));
+  tt_mem_op(&id, ==, get_master_identity_key(), sizeof(id));
+  tt_mem_op(&sign, !=, get_master_signing_keypair(), sizeof(sign));
+  tt_assert(! tor_cert_eq(link_cert, get_current_link_cert_cert()));
+  tt_mem_op(&auth, !=, get_current_auth_keypair(), sizeof(auth));
+  tt_assert(get_master_signing_key_cert());
+  tt_assert(get_current_link_cert_cert());
+  tt_assert(get_current_auth_key_cert());
+  memcpy(&sign, get_master_signing_keypair(), sizeof(sign));
+  tor_cert_free(link_cert);
+  link_cert = tor_cert_dup(get_current_link_cert_cert());
+  memcpy(&auth, get_current_auth_keypair(), sizeof(auth));
+
+  /* Demonstrate that we can start up with no secret identity key */
+  routerkeys_free_all();
+  unlink(get_fname("test_ed_keys_init_all/keys/"
+                   "ed25519_master_id_secret_key"));
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, load_ed_keys(options, now));
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, generate_ed_link_cert(options, now));
+  tt_mem_op(&id, ==, get_master_identity_key(), sizeof(id));
+  tt_mem_op(&sign, ==, get_master_signing_keypair(), sizeof(sign));
+  tt_assert(! tor_cert_eq(link_cert, get_current_link_cert_cert()));
+  tt_mem_op(&auth, !=, get_current_auth_keypair(), sizeof(auth));
+  tt_assert(get_master_signing_key_cert());
+  tt_assert(get_current_link_cert_cert());
+  tt_assert(get_current_auth_key_cert());
+
+  /* But we're in trouble if we have no id key and our signing key has
+     expired. */
+  log_global_min_severity_ = LOG_ERR; /* Suppress warnings.
+                                       * XXX (better way to do this)? */
+  routerkeys_free_all();
+  tt_int_op(-1, ==, load_ed_keys(options, now+200*86400));
+
+ done:
+  tor_free(dir);
+  tor_free(options);
+  routerkeys_free_all();
+}
+
+static void
+test_routerkeys_cross_certify_ntor(void *args)
+{
+  (void) args;
+
+  tor_cert_t *cert = NULL;
+  curve25519_keypair_t onion_keys;
+  ed25519_public_key_t master_key;
+  ed25519_public_key_t onion_check_key;
+  time_t now = time(NULL);
+  int sign;
+
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, ed25519_public_from_base64(&master_key,
+                               "IamwritingthesetestsOnARainyAfternoonin2014"));
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, curve25519_keypair_generate(&onion_keys, 0));
+  cert = make_ntor_onion_key_crosscert(&onion_keys,
+                                       &master_key,
+                                       now, 10000,
+                                       &sign);
+  tt_assert(cert);
+  tt_assert(sign == 0 || sign == 1);
+  tt_int_op(cert->cert_type, ==, CERT_TYPE_ONION_ID);
+  tt_int_op(1, ==, ed25519_pubkey_eq(&cert->signed_key, &master_key));
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, ed25519_public_key_from_curve25519_public_key(
+                               &onion_check_key, &onion_keys.pubkey, sign));
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, tor_cert_checksig(cert, &onion_check_key, now));
+
+ done:
+  tor_cert_free(cert);
+}
+
+static void
+test_routerkeys_cross_certify_tap(void *args)
+{
+  (void)args;
+  uint8_t *cc = NULL;
+  int cc_len;
+  ed25519_public_key_t master_key;
+  crypto_pk_t *onion_key = pk_generate(2), *id_key = pk_generate(1);
+  char digest[20];
+  char buf[128];
+  int n;
+
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, ed25519_public_from_base64(&master_key,
+                               "IAlreadyWroteTestsForRouterdescsUsingTheseX"));
+
+  cc = make_tap_onion_key_crosscert(onion_key,
+                                    &master_key,
+                                    id_key, &cc_len);
+  tt_assert(cc);
+  tt_assert(cc_len);
+
+  n = crypto_pk_public_checksig(onion_key, buf, sizeof(buf),
+                                (char*)cc, cc_len);
+  tt_int_op(n,>,0);
+  tt_int_op(n,==,52);
+
+  crypto_pk_get_digest(id_key, digest);
+  tt_mem_op(buf,==,digest,20);
+  tt_mem_op(buf+20,==,master_key.pubkey,32);
+
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, check_tap_onion_key_crosscert(cc, cc_len,
+                                    onion_key, &master_key, (uint8_t*)digest));
+
+ done:
+  tor_free(cc);
+}
+
 #define TEST(name, flags)                                       \
   { #name , test_routerkeys_ ## name, (flags), NULL, NULL }
 
 struct testcase_t routerkeys_tests[] = {
   TEST(write_fingerprint, TT_FORK),
+  TEST(ed_certs, TT_FORK),
+  TEST(ed_key_create, TT_FORK),
+  TEST(ed_key_init_basic, TT_FORK),
+  TEST(ed_key_init_split, TT_FORK),
+  TEST(ed_keys_init_all, TT_FORK),
+  TEST(cross_certify_ntor, 0),
+  TEST(cross_certify_tap, 0),
   END_OF_TESTCASES
 };
 
diff --git a/src/trunnel/ed25519_cert.c b/src/trunnel/ed25519_cert.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2a84e4b163
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/trunnel/ed25519_cert.c
@@ -0,0 +1,887 @@
+/* ed25519_cert.c -- generated by Trunnel v1.2.
+ * https://gitweb.torproject.org/trunnel.git
+ * You probably shouldn't edit this file.
+ */
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "trunnel-impl.h"
+
+#include "ed25519_cert.h"
+
+#define TRUNNEL_SET_ERROR_CODE(obj) \
+  do {                              \
+    (obj)->trunnel_error_code_ = 1; \
+  } while (0)
+
+#if defined(__COVERITY__) || defined(__clang_analyzer__)
+/* If we're runnning a static analysis tool, we don't want it to complain
+ * that some of our remaining-bytes checks are dead-code. */
+int edcert_deadcode_dummy__ = 0;
+#define OR_DEADCODE_DUMMY || edcert_deadcode_dummy__
+#else
+#define OR_DEADCODE_DUMMY
+#endif
+
+#define CHECK_REMAINING(nbytes, label)                           \
+  do {                                                           \
+    if (remaining < (nbytes) OR_DEADCODE_DUMMY) {                \
+      goto label;                                                \
+    }                                                            \
+  } while (0)
+
+ed25519_cert_extension_t *
+ed25519_cert_extension_new(void)
+{
+  ed25519_cert_extension_t *val = trunnel_calloc(1, sizeof(ed25519_cert_extension_t));
+  if (NULL == val)
+    return NULL;
+  return val;
+}
+
+/** Release all storage held inside 'obj', but do not free 'obj'.
+ */
+static void
+ed25519_cert_extension_clear(ed25519_cert_extension_t *obj)
+{
+  (void) obj;
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_WIPE(&obj->un_unparsed);
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_CLEAR(&obj->un_unparsed);
+}
+
+void
+ed25519_cert_extension_free(ed25519_cert_extension_t *obj)
+{
+  if (obj == NULL)
+    return;
+  ed25519_cert_extension_clear(obj);
+  trunnel_memwipe(obj, sizeof(ed25519_cert_extension_t));
+  trunnel_free_(obj);
+}
+
+uint16_t
+ed25519_cert_extension_get_ext_length(ed25519_cert_extension_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->ext_length;
+}
+int
+ed25519_cert_extension_set_ext_length(ed25519_cert_extension_t *inp, uint16_t val)
+{
+  inp->ext_length = val;
+  return 0;
+}
+uint8_t
+ed25519_cert_extension_get_ext_type(ed25519_cert_extension_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->ext_type;
+}
+int
+ed25519_cert_extension_set_ext_type(ed25519_cert_extension_t *inp, uint8_t val)
+{
+  inp->ext_type = val;
+  return 0;
+}
+uint8_t
+ed25519_cert_extension_get_ext_flags(ed25519_cert_extension_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->ext_flags;
+}
+int
+ed25519_cert_extension_set_ext_flags(ed25519_cert_extension_t *inp, uint8_t val)
+{
+  inp->ext_flags = val;
+  return 0;
+}
+size_t
+ed25519_cert_extension_getlen_un_signing_key(const ed25519_cert_extension_t *inp)
+{
+  (void)inp;  return 32;
+}
+
+uint8_t
+ed25519_cert_extension_get_un_signing_key(const ed25519_cert_extension_t *inp, size_t idx)
+{
+  trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+  return inp->un_signing_key[idx];
+}
+
+int
+ed25519_cert_extension_set_un_signing_key(ed25519_cert_extension_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
+{
+  trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+  inp->un_signing_key[idx] = elt;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+uint8_t *
+ed25519_cert_extension_getarray_un_signing_key(ed25519_cert_extension_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->un_signing_key;
+}
+size_t
+ed25519_cert_extension_getlen_un_unparsed(const ed25519_cert_extension_t *inp)
+{
+  return TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&inp->un_unparsed);
+}
+
+uint8_t
+ed25519_cert_extension_get_un_unparsed(ed25519_cert_extension_t *inp, size_t idx)
+{
+  return TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_GET(&inp->un_unparsed, idx);
+}
+
+int
+ed25519_cert_extension_set_un_unparsed(ed25519_cert_extension_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
+{
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_SET(&inp->un_unparsed, idx, elt);
+  return 0;
+}
+int
+ed25519_cert_extension_add_un_unparsed(ed25519_cert_extension_t *inp, uint8_t elt)
+{
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_ADD(uint8_t, &inp->un_unparsed, elt, {});
+  return 0;
+ trunnel_alloc_failed:
+  TRUNNEL_SET_ERROR_CODE(inp);
+  return -1;
+}
+
+uint8_t *
+ed25519_cert_extension_getarray_un_unparsed(ed25519_cert_extension_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->un_unparsed.elts_;
+}
+int
+ed25519_cert_extension_setlen_un_unparsed(ed25519_cert_extension_t *inp, size_t newlen)
+{
+  uint8_t *newptr;
+  newptr = trunnel_dynarray_setlen(&inp->un_unparsed.allocated_,
+                 &inp->un_unparsed.n_, inp->un_unparsed.elts_, newlen,
+                 sizeof(inp->un_unparsed.elts_[0]), (trunnel_free_fn_t) NULL,
+                 &inp->trunnel_error_code_);
+  if (newptr == NULL)
+    goto trunnel_alloc_failed;
+  inp->un_unparsed.elts_ = newptr;
+  return 0;
+ trunnel_alloc_failed:
+  TRUNNEL_SET_ERROR_CODE(inp);
+  return -1;
+}
+const char *
+ed25519_cert_extension_check(const ed25519_cert_extension_t *obj)
+{
+  if (obj == NULL)
+    return "Object was NULL";
+  if (obj->trunnel_error_code_)
+    return "A set function failed on this object";
+  switch (obj->ext_type) {
+
+    case CERTEXT_SIGNED_WITH_KEY:
+      break;
+
+    default:
+      break;
+  }
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+ed25519_cert_extension_encoded_len(const ed25519_cert_extension_t *obj)
+{
+  ssize_t result = 0;
+
+  if (NULL != ed25519_cert_extension_check(obj))
+     return -1;
+
+
+  /* Length of u16 ext_length */
+  result += 2;
+
+  /* Length of u8 ext_type */
+  result += 1;
+
+  /* Length of u8 ext_flags */
+  result += 1;
+  switch (obj->ext_type) {
+
+    case CERTEXT_SIGNED_WITH_KEY:
+
+      /* Length of u8 un_signing_key[32] */
+      result += 32;
+      break;
+
+    default:
+
+      /* Length of u8 un_unparsed[] */
+      result += TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->un_unparsed);
+      break;
+  }
+  return result;
+}
+int
+ed25519_cert_extension_clear_errors(ed25519_cert_extension_t *obj)
+{
+  int r = obj->trunnel_error_code_;
+  obj->trunnel_error_code_ = 0;
+  return r;
+}
+ssize_t
+ed25519_cert_extension_encode(uint8_t *output, const size_t avail, const ed25519_cert_extension_t *obj)
+{
+  ssize_t result = 0;
+  size_t written = 0;
+  uint8_t *ptr = output;
+  const char *msg;
+#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN
+  const ssize_t encoded_len = ed25519_cert_extension_encoded_len(obj);
+#endif
+
+  uint8_t *backptr_ext_length = NULL;
+
+  if (NULL != (msg = ed25519_cert_extension_check(obj)))
+    goto check_failed;
+
+#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN
+  trunnel_assert(encoded_len >= 0);
+#endif
+
+  /* Encode u16 ext_length */
+  backptr_ext_length = ptr;
+  trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+  if (avail - written < 2)
+    goto truncated;
+  trunnel_set_uint16(ptr, trunnel_htons(obj->ext_length));
+  written += 2; ptr += 2;
+
+  /* Encode u8 ext_type */
+  trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+  if (avail - written < 1)
+    goto truncated;
+  trunnel_set_uint8(ptr, (obj->ext_type));
+  written += 1; ptr += 1;
+
+  /* Encode u8 ext_flags */
+  trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+  if (avail - written < 1)
+    goto truncated;
+  trunnel_set_uint8(ptr, (obj->ext_flags));
+  written += 1; ptr += 1;
+  {
+    size_t written_before_union = written;
+
+    /* Encode union un[ext_type] */
+    trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+    switch (obj->ext_type) {
+
+      case CERTEXT_SIGNED_WITH_KEY:
+
+        /* Encode u8 un_signing_key[32] */
+        trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+        if (avail - written < 32)
+          goto truncated;
+        memcpy(ptr, obj->un_signing_key, 32);
+        written += 32; ptr += 32;
+        break;
+
+      default:
+
+        /* Encode u8 un_unparsed[] */
+        {
+          size_t elt_len = TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->un_unparsed);
+          trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+          if (avail - written < elt_len)
+            goto truncated;
+          memcpy(ptr, obj->un_unparsed.elts_, elt_len);
+          written += elt_len; ptr += elt_len;
+        }
+        break;
+    }
+    /* Write the length field back to ext_length */
+    trunnel_assert(written >= written_before_union);
+#if UINT16_MAX < SIZE_MAX
+    if (written - written_before_union > UINT16_MAX)
+      goto check_failed;
+#endif
+    trunnel_set_uint16(backptr_ext_length, trunnel_htons(written - written_before_union));
+  }
+
+
+  trunnel_assert(ptr == output + written);
+#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN
+  {
+    trunnel_assert(encoded_len >= 0);
+    trunnel_assert((size_t)encoded_len == written);
+  }
+
+#endif
+
+  return written;
+
+ truncated:
+  result = -2;
+  goto fail;
+ check_failed:
+  (void)msg;
+  result = -1;
+  goto fail;
+ fail:
+  trunnel_assert(result < 0);
+  return result;
+}
+
+/** As ed25519_cert_extension_parse(), but do not allocate the output
+ * object.
+ */
+static ssize_t
+ed25519_cert_extension_parse_into(ed25519_cert_extension_t *obj, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in)
+{
+  const uint8_t *ptr = input;
+  size_t remaining = len_in;
+  ssize_t result = 0;
+  (void)result;
+
+  /* Parse u16 ext_length */
+  CHECK_REMAINING(2, truncated);
+  obj->ext_length = trunnel_ntohs(trunnel_get_uint16(ptr));
+  remaining -= 2; ptr += 2;
+
+  /* Parse u8 ext_type */
+  CHECK_REMAINING(1, truncated);
+  obj->ext_type = (trunnel_get_uint8(ptr));
+  remaining -= 1; ptr += 1;
+
+  /* Parse u8 ext_flags */
+  CHECK_REMAINING(1, truncated);
+  obj->ext_flags = (trunnel_get_uint8(ptr));
+  remaining -= 1; ptr += 1;
+  {
+    size_t remaining_after;
+    CHECK_REMAINING(obj->ext_length, truncated);
+    remaining_after = remaining - obj->ext_length;
+    remaining = obj->ext_length;
+
+    /* Parse union un[ext_type] */
+    switch (obj->ext_type) {
+
+      case CERTEXT_SIGNED_WITH_KEY:
+
+        /* Parse u8 un_signing_key[32] */
+        CHECK_REMAINING(32, fail);
+        memcpy(obj->un_signing_key, ptr, 32);
+        remaining -= 32; ptr += 32;
+        break;
+
+      default:
+
+        /* Parse u8 un_unparsed[] */
+        TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_EXPAND(uint8_t, &obj->un_unparsed, remaining, {});
+        obj->un_unparsed.n_ = remaining;
+        memcpy(obj->un_unparsed.elts_, ptr, remaining);
+        ptr += remaining; remaining -= remaining;
+        break;
+    }
+    if (remaining != 0)
+      goto fail;
+    remaining = remaining_after;
+  }
+  trunnel_assert(ptr + remaining == input + len_in);
+  return len_in - remaining;
+
+ truncated:
+  return -2;
+ trunnel_alloc_failed:
+  return -1;
+ fail:
+  result = -1;
+  return result;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+ed25519_cert_extension_parse(ed25519_cert_extension_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in)
+{
+  ssize_t result;
+  *output = ed25519_cert_extension_new();
+  if (NULL == *output)
+    return -1;
+  result = ed25519_cert_extension_parse_into(*output, input, len_in);
+  if (result < 0) {
+    ed25519_cert_extension_free(*output);
+    *output = NULL;
+  }
+  return result;
+}
+ed25519_cert_t *
+ed25519_cert_new(void)
+{
+  ed25519_cert_t *val = trunnel_calloc(1, sizeof(ed25519_cert_t));
+  if (NULL == val)
+    return NULL;
+  val->version = 1;
+  return val;
+}
+
+/** Release all storage held inside 'obj', but do not free 'obj'.
+ */
+static void
+ed25519_cert_clear(ed25519_cert_t *obj)
+{
+  (void) obj;
+  {
+
+    unsigned idx;
+    for (idx = 0; idx < TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->ext); ++idx) {
+      ed25519_cert_extension_free(TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_GET(&obj->ext, idx));
+    }
+  }
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_WIPE(&obj->ext);
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_CLEAR(&obj->ext);
+}
+
+void
+ed25519_cert_free(ed25519_cert_t *obj)
+{
+  if (obj == NULL)
+    return;
+  ed25519_cert_clear(obj);
+  trunnel_memwipe(obj, sizeof(ed25519_cert_t));
+  trunnel_free_(obj);
+}
+
+uint8_t
+ed25519_cert_get_version(ed25519_cert_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->version;
+}
+int
+ed25519_cert_set_version(ed25519_cert_t *inp, uint8_t val)
+{
+  if (! ((val == 1))) {
+     TRUNNEL_SET_ERROR_CODE(inp);
+     return -1;
+  }
+  inp->version = val;
+  return 0;
+}
+uint8_t
+ed25519_cert_get_cert_type(ed25519_cert_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->cert_type;
+}
+int
+ed25519_cert_set_cert_type(ed25519_cert_t *inp, uint8_t val)
+{
+  inp->cert_type = val;
+  return 0;
+}
+uint32_t
+ed25519_cert_get_exp_field(ed25519_cert_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->exp_field;
+}
+int
+ed25519_cert_set_exp_field(ed25519_cert_t *inp, uint32_t val)
+{
+  inp->exp_field = val;
+  return 0;
+}
+uint8_t
+ed25519_cert_get_cert_key_type(ed25519_cert_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->cert_key_type;
+}
+int
+ed25519_cert_set_cert_key_type(ed25519_cert_t *inp, uint8_t val)
+{
+  inp->cert_key_type = val;
+  return 0;
+}
+size_t
+ed25519_cert_getlen_certified_key(const ed25519_cert_t *inp)
+{
+  (void)inp;  return 32;
+}
+
+uint8_t
+ed25519_cert_get_certified_key(const ed25519_cert_t *inp, size_t idx)
+{
+  trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+  return inp->certified_key[idx];
+}
+
+int
+ed25519_cert_set_certified_key(ed25519_cert_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
+{
+  trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+  inp->certified_key[idx] = elt;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+uint8_t *
+ed25519_cert_getarray_certified_key(ed25519_cert_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->certified_key;
+}
+uint8_t
+ed25519_cert_get_n_extensions(ed25519_cert_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->n_extensions;
+}
+int
+ed25519_cert_set_n_extensions(ed25519_cert_t *inp, uint8_t val)
+{
+  inp->n_extensions = val;
+  return 0;
+}
+size_t
+ed25519_cert_getlen_ext(const ed25519_cert_t *inp)
+{
+  return TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&inp->ext);
+}
+
+struct ed25519_cert_extension_st *
+ed25519_cert_get_ext(ed25519_cert_t *inp, size_t idx)
+{
+  return TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_GET(&inp->ext, idx);
+}
+
+int
+ed25519_cert_set_ext(ed25519_cert_t *inp, size_t idx, struct ed25519_cert_extension_st * elt)
+{
+  ed25519_cert_extension_t *oldval = TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_GET(&inp->ext, idx);
+  if (oldval && oldval != elt)
+    ed25519_cert_extension_free(oldval);
+  return ed25519_cert_set0_ext(inp, idx, elt);
+}
+int
+ed25519_cert_set0_ext(ed25519_cert_t *inp, size_t idx, struct ed25519_cert_extension_st * elt)
+{
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_SET(&inp->ext, idx, elt);
+  return 0;
+}
+int
+ed25519_cert_add_ext(ed25519_cert_t *inp, struct ed25519_cert_extension_st * elt)
+{
+#if SIZE_MAX >= UINT8_MAX
+  if (inp->ext.n_ == UINT8_MAX)
+    goto trunnel_alloc_failed;
+#endif
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_ADD(struct ed25519_cert_extension_st *, &inp->ext, elt, {});
+  return 0;
+ trunnel_alloc_failed:
+  TRUNNEL_SET_ERROR_CODE(inp);
+  return -1;
+}
+
+struct ed25519_cert_extension_st * *
+ed25519_cert_getarray_ext(ed25519_cert_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->ext.elts_;
+}
+int
+ed25519_cert_setlen_ext(ed25519_cert_t *inp, size_t newlen)
+{
+  struct ed25519_cert_extension_st * *newptr;
+#if UINT8_MAX < SIZE_MAX
+  if (newlen > UINT8_MAX)
+    goto trunnel_alloc_failed;
+#endif
+  newptr = trunnel_dynarray_setlen(&inp->ext.allocated_,
+                 &inp->ext.n_, inp->ext.elts_, newlen,
+                 sizeof(inp->ext.elts_[0]), (trunnel_free_fn_t) ed25519_cert_extension_free,
+                 &inp->trunnel_error_code_);
+  if (newptr == NULL)
+    goto trunnel_alloc_failed;
+  inp->ext.elts_ = newptr;
+  return 0;
+ trunnel_alloc_failed:
+  TRUNNEL_SET_ERROR_CODE(inp);
+  return -1;
+}
+size_t
+ed25519_cert_getlen_signature(const ed25519_cert_t *inp)
+{
+  (void)inp;  return 64;
+}
+
+uint8_t
+ed25519_cert_get_signature(const ed25519_cert_t *inp, size_t idx)
+{
+  trunnel_assert(idx < 64);
+  return inp->signature[idx];
+}
+
+int
+ed25519_cert_set_signature(ed25519_cert_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
+{
+  trunnel_assert(idx < 64);
+  inp->signature[idx] = elt;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+uint8_t *
+ed25519_cert_getarray_signature(ed25519_cert_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->signature;
+}
+const char *
+ed25519_cert_check(const ed25519_cert_t *obj)
+{
+  if (obj == NULL)
+    return "Object was NULL";
+  if (obj->trunnel_error_code_)
+    return "A set function failed on this object";
+  if (! (obj->version == 1))
+    return "Integer out of bounds";
+  {
+    const char *msg;
+
+    unsigned idx;
+    for (idx = 0; idx < TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->ext); ++idx) {
+      if (NULL != (msg = ed25519_cert_extension_check(TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_GET(&obj->ext, idx))))
+        return msg;
+    }
+  }
+  if (TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->ext) != obj->n_extensions)
+    return "Length mismatch for ext";
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+ed25519_cert_encoded_len(const ed25519_cert_t *obj)
+{
+  ssize_t result = 0;
+
+  if (NULL != ed25519_cert_check(obj))
+     return -1;
+
+
+  /* Length of u8 version IN [1] */
+  result += 1;
+
+  /* Length of u8 cert_type */
+  result += 1;
+
+  /* Length of u32 exp_field */
+  result += 4;
+
+  /* Length of u8 cert_key_type */
+  result += 1;
+
+  /* Length of u8 certified_key[32] */
+  result += 32;
+
+  /* Length of u8 n_extensions */
+  result += 1;
+
+  /* Length of struct ed25519_cert_extension ext[n_extensions] */
+  {
+
+    unsigned idx;
+    for (idx = 0; idx < TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->ext); ++idx) {
+      result += ed25519_cert_extension_encoded_len(TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_GET(&obj->ext, idx));
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* Length of u8 signature[64] */
+  result += 64;
+  return result;
+}
+int
+ed25519_cert_clear_errors(ed25519_cert_t *obj)
+{
+  int r = obj->trunnel_error_code_;
+  obj->trunnel_error_code_ = 0;
+  return r;
+}
+ssize_t
+ed25519_cert_encode(uint8_t *output, const size_t avail, const ed25519_cert_t *obj)
+{
+  ssize_t result = 0;
+  size_t written = 0;
+  uint8_t *ptr = output;
+  const char *msg;
+#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN
+  const ssize_t encoded_len = ed25519_cert_encoded_len(obj);
+#endif
+
+  if (NULL != (msg = ed25519_cert_check(obj)))
+    goto check_failed;
+
+#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN
+  trunnel_assert(encoded_len >= 0);
+#endif
+
+  /* Encode u8 version IN [1] */
+  trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+  if (avail - written < 1)
+    goto truncated;
+  trunnel_set_uint8(ptr, (obj->version));
+  written += 1; ptr += 1;
+
+  /* Encode u8 cert_type */
+  trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+  if (avail - written < 1)
+    goto truncated;
+  trunnel_set_uint8(ptr, (obj->cert_type));
+  written += 1; ptr += 1;
+
+  /* Encode u32 exp_field */
+  trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+  if (avail - written < 4)
+    goto truncated;
+  trunnel_set_uint32(ptr, trunnel_htonl(obj->exp_field));
+  written += 4; ptr += 4;
+
+  /* Encode u8 cert_key_type */
+  trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+  if (avail - written < 1)
+    goto truncated;
+  trunnel_set_uint8(ptr, (obj->cert_key_type));
+  written += 1; ptr += 1;
+
+  /* Encode u8 certified_key[32] */
+  trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+  if (avail - written < 32)
+    goto truncated;
+  memcpy(ptr, obj->certified_key, 32);
+  written += 32; ptr += 32;
+
+  /* Encode u8 n_extensions */
+  trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+  if (avail - written < 1)
+    goto truncated;
+  trunnel_set_uint8(ptr, (obj->n_extensions));
+  written += 1; ptr += 1;
+
+  /* Encode struct ed25519_cert_extension ext[n_extensions] */
+  {
+
+    unsigned idx;
+    for (idx = 0; idx < TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->ext); ++idx) {
+      trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+      result = ed25519_cert_extension_encode(ptr, avail - written, TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_GET(&obj->ext, idx));
+      if (result < 0)
+        goto fail; /* XXXXXXX !*/
+      written += result; ptr += result;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* Encode u8 signature[64] */
+  trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+  if (avail - written < 64)
+    goto truncated;
+  memcpy(ptr, obj->signature, 64);
+  written += 64; ptr += 64;
+
+
+  trunnel_assert(ptr == output + written);
+#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN
+  {
+    trunnel_assert(encoded_len >= 0);
+    trunnel_assert((size_t)encoded_len == written);
+  }
+
+#endif
+
+  return written;
+
+ truncated:
+  result = -2;
+  goto fail;
+ check_failed:
+  (void)msg;
+  result = -1;
+  goto fail;
+ fail:
+  trunnel_assert(result < 0);
+  return result;
+}
+
+/** As ed25519_cert_parse(), but do not allocate the output object.
+ */
+static ssize_t
+ed25519_cert_parse_into(ed25519_cert_t *obj, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in)
+{
+  const uint8_t *ptr = input;
+  size_t remaining = len_in;
+  ssize_t result = 0;
+  (void)result;
+
+  /* Parse u8 version IN [1] */
+  CHECK_REMAINING(1, truncated);
+  obj->version = (trunnel_get_uint8(ptr));
+  remaining -= 1; ptr += 1;
+  if (! (obj->version == 1))
+    goto fail;
+
+  /* Parse u8 cert_type */
+  CHECK_REMAINING(1, truncated);
+  obj->cert_type = (trunnel_get_uint8(ptr));
+  remaining -= 1; ptr += 1;
+
+  /* Parse u32 exp_field */
+  CHECK_REMAINING(4, truncated);
+  obj->exp_field = trunnel_ntohl(trunnel_get_uint32(ptr));
+  remaining -= 4; ptr += 4;
+
+  /* Parse u8 cert_key_type */
+  CHECK_REMAINING(1, truncated);
+  obj->cert_key_type = (trunnel_get_uint8(ptr));
+  remaining -= 1; ptr += 1;
+
+  /* Parse u8 certified_key[32] */
+  CHECK_REMAINING(32, truncated);
+  memcpy(obj->certified_key, ptr, 32);
+  remaining -= 32; ptr += 32;
+
+  /* Parse u8 n_extensions */
+  CHECK_REMAINING(1, truncated);
+  obj->n_extensions = (trunnel_get_uint8(ptr));
+  remaining -= 1; ptr += 1;
+
+  /* Parse struct ed25519_cert_extension ext[n_extensions] */
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_EXPAND(ed25519_cert_extension_t *, &obj->ext, obj->n_extensions, {});
+  {
+    ed25519_cert_extension_t * elt;
+    unsigned idx;
+    for (idx = 0; idx < obj->n_extensions; ++idx) {
+      result = ed25519_cert_extension_parse(&elt, ptr, remaining);
+      if (result < 0)
+        goto relay_fail;
+      trunnel_assert((size_t)result <= remaining);
+      remaining -= result; ptr += result;
+      TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_ADD(ed25519_cert_extension_t *, &obj->ext, elt, {ed25519_cert_extension_free(elt);});
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* Parse u8 signature[64] */
+  CHECK_REMAINING(64, truncated);
+  memcpy(obj->signature, ptr, 64);
+  remaining -= 64; ptr += 64;
+  trunnel_assert(ptr + remaining == input + len_in);
+  return len_in - remaining;
+
+ truncated:
+  return -2;
+ relay_fail:
+  if (result >= 0) result = -1;
+  return result;
+ trunnel_alloc_failed:
+  return -1;
+ fail:
+  result = -1;
+  return result;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+ed25519_cert_parse(ed25519_cert_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in)
+{
+  ssize_t result;
+  *output = ed25519_cert_new();
+  if (NULL == *output)
+    return -1;
+  result = ed25519_cert_parse_into(*output, input, len_in);
+  if (result < 0) {
+    ed25519_cert_free(*output);
+    *output = NULL;
+  }
+  return result;
+}
diff --git a/src/trunnel/ed25519_cert.h b/src/trunnel/ed25519_cert.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3ddf95ef9f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/trunnel/ed25519_cert.h
@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
+/* ed25519_cert.h -- generated by by Trunnel v1.2.
+ * https://gitweb.torproject.org/trunnel.git
+ * You probably shouldn't edit this file.
+ */
+#ifndef TRUNNEL_ED25519_CERT_H
+#define TRUNNEL_ED25519_CERT_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include "trunnel.h"
+
+#define CERTEXT_SIGNED_WITH_KEY 4
+#define CERTEXT_FLAG_AFFECTS_VALIDATION 1
+#if !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE) && !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE_ED25519_CERT_EXTENSION)
+struct ed25519_cert_extension_st {
+  uint16_t ext_length;
+  uint8_t ext_type;
+  uint8_t ext_flags;
+  uint8_t un_signing_key[32];
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_HEAD(, uint8_t) un_unparsed;
+  uint8_t trunnel_error_code_;
+};
+#endif
+typedef struct ed25519_cert_extension_st ed25519_cert_extension_t;
+#if !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE) && !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE_ED25519_CERT)
+struct ed25519_cert_st {
+  uint8_t version;
+  uint8_t cert_type;
+  uint32_t exp_field;
+  uint8_t cert_key_type;
+  uint8_t certified_key[32];
+  uint8_t n_extensions;
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_HEAD(, struct ed25519_cert_extension_st *) ext;
+  uint8_t signature[64];
+  uint8_t trunnel_error_code_;
+};
+#endif
+typedef struct ed25519_cert_st ed25519_cert_t;
+/** Return a newly allocated ed25519_cert_extension with all elements
+ * set to zero.
+ */
+ed25519_cert_extension_t *ed25519_cert_extension_new(void);
+/** Release all storage held by the ed25519_cert_extension in
+ * 'victim'. (Do nothing if 'victim' is NULL.)
+ */
+void ed25519_cert_extension_free(ed25519_cert_extension_t *victim);
+/** Try to parse a ed25519_cert_extension from the buffer in 'input',
+ * using up to 'len_in' bytes from the input buffer. On success,
+ * return the number of bytes consumed and set *output to the newly
+ * allocated ed25519_cert_extension_t. On failure, return -2 if the
+ * input appears truncated, and -1 if the input is otherwise invalid.
+ */
+ssize_t ed25519_cert_extension_parse(ed25519_cert_extension_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in);
+/** Return the number of bytes we expect to need to encode the
+ * ed25519_cert_extension in 'obj'. On failure, return a negative
+ * value. Note that this value may be an overestimate, and can even be
+ * an underestimate for certain unencodeable objects.
+ */
+ssize_t ed25519_cert_extension_encoded_len(const ed25519_cert_extension_t *obj);
+/** Try to encode the ed25519_cert_extension from 'input' into the
+ * buffer at 'output', using up to 'avail' bytes of the output buffer.
+ * On success, return the number of bytes used. On failure, return -2
+ * if the buffer was not long enough, and -1 if the input was invalid.
+ */
+ssize_t ed25519_cert_extension_encode(uint8_t *output, const size_t avail, const ed25519_cert_extension_t *input);
+/** Check whether the internal state of the ed25519_cert_extension in
+ * 'obj' is consistent. Return NULL if it is, and a short message if
+ * it is not.
+ */
+const char *ed25519_cert_extension_check(const ed25519_cert_extension_t *obj);
+/** Clear any errors that were set on the object 'obj' by its setter
+ * functions. Return true iff errors were cleared.
+ */
+int ed25519_cert_extension_clear_errors(ed25519_cert_extension_t *obj);
+/** Return the value of the ext_length field of the
+ * ed25519_cert_extension_t in 'inp'
+ */
+uint16_t ed25519_cert_extension_get_ext_length(ed25519_cert_extension_t *inp);
+/** Set the value of the ext_length field of the
+ * ed25519_cert_extension_t in 'inp' to 'val'. Return 0 on success;
+ * return -1 and set the error code on 'inp' on failure.
+ */
+int ed25519_cert_extension_set_ext_length(ed25519_cert_extension_t *inp, uint16_t val);
+/** Return the value of the ext_type field of the
+ * ed25519_cert_extension_t in 'inp'
+ */
+uint8_t ed25519_cert_extension_get_ext_type(ed25519_cert_extension_t *inp);
+/** Set the value of the ext_type field of the
+ * ed25519_cert_extension_t in 'inp' to 'val'. Return 0 on success;
+ * return -1 and set the error code on 'inp' on failure.
+ */
+int ed25519_cert_extension_set_ext_type(ed25519_cert_extension_t *inp, uint8_t val);
+/** Return the value of the ext_flags field of the
+ * ed25519_cert_extension_t in 'inp'
+ */
+uint8_t ed25519_cert_extension_get_ext_flags(ed25519_cert_extension_t *inp);
+/** Set the value of the ext_flags field of the
+ * ed25519_cert_extension_t in 'inp' to 'val'. Return 0 on success;
+ * return -1 and set the error code on 'inp' on failure.
+ */
+int ed25519_cert_extension_set_ext_flags(ed25519_cert_extension_t *inp, uint8_t val);
+/** Return the (constant) length of the array holding the
+ * un_signing_key field of the ed25519_cert_extension_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+size_t ed25519_cert_extension_getlen_un_signing_key(const ed25519_cert_extension_t *inp);
+/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field
+ * un_signing_key of the ed25519_cert_extension_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t ed25519_cert_extension_get_un_signing_key(const ed25519_cert_extension_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field
+ * un_signing_key of the ed25519_cert_extension_t in 'inp', so that it
+ * will hold the value 'elt'.
+ */
+int ed25519_cert_extension_set_un_signing_key(ed25519_cert_extension_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
+/** Return a pointer to the 32-element array field un_signing_key of
+ * 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t * ed25519_cert_extension_getarray_un_signing_key(ed25519_cert_extension_t *inp);
+/** Return the length of the dynamic array holding the un_unparsed
+ * field of the ed25519_cert_extension_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+size_t ed25519_cert_extension_getlen_un_unparsed(const ed25519_cert_extension_t *inp);
+/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the dynamic array field
+ * un_unparsed of the ed25519_cert_extension_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t ed25519_cert_extension_get_un_unparsed(ed25519_cert_extension_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the dynamic array field
+ * un_unparsed of the ed25519_cert_extension_t in 'inp', so that it
+ * will hold the value 'elt'.
+ */
+int ed25519_cert_extension_set_un_unparsed(ed25519_cert_extension_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
+/** Append a new element 'elt' to the dynamic array field un_unparsed
+ * of the ed25519_cert_extension_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+int ed25519_cert_extension_add_un_unparsed(ed25519_cert_extension_t *inp, uint8_t elt);
+/** Return a pointer to the variable-length array field un_unparsed of
+ * 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t * ed25519_cert_extension_getarray_un_unparsed(ed25519_cert_extension_t *inp);
+/** Change the length of the variable-length array field un_unparsed
+ * of 'inp' to 'newlen'.Fill extra elements with 0. Return 0 on
+ * success; return -1 and set the error code on 'inp' on failure.
+ */
+int ed25519_cert_extension_setlen_un_unparsed(ed25519_cert_extension_t *inp, size_t newlen);
+/** Return a newly allocated ed25519_cert with all elements set to
+ * zero.
+ */
+ed25519_cert_t *ed25519_cert_new(void);
+/** Release all storage held by the ed25519_cert in 'victim'. (Do
+ * nothing if 'victim' is NULL.)
+ */
+void ed25519_cert_free(ed25519_cert_t *victim);
+/** Try to parse a ed25519_cert from the buffer in 'input', using up
+ * to 'len_in' bytes from the input buffer. On success, return the
+ * number of bytes consumed and set *output to the newly allocated
+ * ed25519_cert_t. On failure, return -2 if the input appears
+ * truncated, and -1 if the input is otherwise invalid.
+ */
+ssize_t ed25519_cert_parse(ed25519_cert_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in);
+/** Return the number of bytes we expect to need to encode the
+ * ed25519_cert in 'obj'. On failure, return a negative value. Note
+ * that this value may be an overestimate, and can even be an
+ * underestimate for certain unencodeable objects.
+ */
+ssize_t ed25519_cert_encoded_len(const ed25519_cert_t *obj);
+/** Try to encode the ed25519_cert from 'input' into the buffer at
+ * 'output', using up to 'avail' bytes of the output buffer. On
+ * success, return the number of bytes used. On failure, return -2 if
+ * the buffer was not long enough, and -1 if the input was invalid.
+ */
+ssize_t ed25519_cert_encode(uint8_t *output, const size_t avail, const ed25519_cert_t *input);
+/** Check whether the internal state of the ed25519_cert in 'obj' is
+ * consistent. Return NULL if it is, and a short message if it is not.
+ */
+const char *ed25519_cert_check(const ed25519_cert_t *obj);
+/** Clear any errors that were set on the object 'obj' by its setter
+ * functions. Return true iff errors were cleared.
+ */
+int ed25519_cert_clear_errors(ed25519_cert_t *obj);
+/** Return the value of the version field of the ed25519_cert_t in
+ * 'inp'
+ */
+uint8_t ed25519_cert_get_version(ed25519_cert_t *inp);
+/** Set the value of the version field of the ed25519_cert_t in 'inp'
+ * to 'val'. Return 0 on success; return -1 and set the error code on
+ * 'inp' on failure.
+ */
+int ed25519_cert_set_version(ed25519_cert_t *inp, uint8_t val);
+/** Return the value of the cert_type field of the ed25519_cert_t in
+ * 'inp'
+ */
+uint8_t ed25519_cert_get_cert_type(ed25519_cert_t *inp);
+/** Set the value of the cert_type field of the ed25519_cert_t in
+ * 'inp' to 'val'. Return 0 on success; return -1 and set the error
+ * code on 'inp' on failure.
+ */
+int ed25519_cert_set_cert_type(ed25519_cert_t *inp, uint8_t val);
+/** Return the value of the exp_field field of the ed25519_cert_t in
+ * 'inp'
+ */
+uint32_t ed25519_cert_get_exp_field(ed25519_cert_t *inp);
+/** Set the value of the exp_field field of the ed25519_cert_t in
+ * 'inp' to 'val'. Return 0 on success; return -1 and set the error
+ * code on 'inp' on failure.
+ */
+int ed25519_cert_set_exp_field(ed25519_cert_t *inp, uint32_t val);
+/** Return the value of the cert_key_type field of the ed25519_cert_t
+ * in 'inp'
+ */
+uint8_t ed25519_cert_get_cert_key_type(ed25519_cert_t *inp);
+/** Set the value of the cert_key_type field of the ed25519_cert_t in
+ * 'inp' to 'val'. Return 0 on success; return -1 and set the error
+ * code on 'inp' on failure.
+ */
+int ed25519_cert_set_cert_key_type(ed25519_cert_t *inp, uint8_t val);
+/** Return the (constant) length of the array holding the
+ * certified_key field of the ed25519_cert_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+size_t ed25519_cert_getlen_certified_key(const ed25519_cert_t *inp);
+/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field
+ * certified_key of the ed25519_cert_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t ed25519_cert_get_certified_key(const ed25519_cert_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field
+ * certified_key of the ed25519_cert_t in 'inp', so that it will hold
+ * the value 'elt'.
+ */
+int ed25519_cert_set_certified_key(ed25519_cert_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
+/** Return a pointer to the 32-element array field certified_key of
+ * 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t * ed25519_cert_getarray_certified_key(ed25519_cert_t *inp);
+/** Return the value of the n_extensions field of the ed25519_cert_t
+ * in 'inp'
+ */
+uint8_t ed25519_cert_get_n_extensions(ed25519_cert_t *inp);
+/** Set the value of the n_extensions field of the ed25519_cert_t in
+ * 'inp' to 'val'. Return 0 on success; return -1 and set the error
+ * code on 'inp' on failure.
+ */
+int ed25519_cert_set_n_extensions(ed25519_cert_t *inp, uint8_t val);
+/** Return the length of the dynamic array holding the ext field of
+ * the ed25519_cert_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+size_t ed25519_cert_getlen_ext(const ed25519_cert_t *inp);
+/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the dynamic array field
+ * ext of the ed25519_cert_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+struct ed25519_cert_extension_st * ed25519_cert_get_ext(ed25519_cert_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the dynamic array field
+ * ext of the ed25519_cert_t in 'inp', so that it will hold the value
+ * 'elt'. Free the previous value, if any.
+ */
+int ed25519_cert_set_ext(ed25519_cert_t *inp, size_t idx, struct ed25519_cert_extension_st * elt);
+/** As ed25519_cert_set_ext, but does not free the previous value.
+ */
+int ed25519_cert_set0_ext(ed25519_cert_t *inp, size_t idx, struct ed25519_cert_extension_st * elt);
+/** Append a new element 'elt' to the dynamic array field ext of the
+ * ed25519_cert_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+int ed25519_cert_add_ext(ed25519_cert_t *inp, struct ed25519_cert_extension_st * elt);
+/** Return a pointer to the variable-length array field ext of 'inp'.
+ */
+struct ed25519_cert_extension_st * * ed25519_cert_getarray_ext(ed25519_cert_t *inp);
+/** Change the length of the variable-length array field ext of 'inp'
+ * to 'newlen'.Fill extra elements with NULL; free removed elements.
+ * Return 0 on success; return -1 and set the error code on 'inp' on
+ * failure.
+ */
+int ed25519_cert_setlen_ext(ed25519_cert_t *inp, size_t newlen);
+/** Return the (constant) length of the array holding the signature
+ * field of the ed25519_cert_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+size_t ed25519_cert_getlen_signature(const ed25519_cert_t *inp);
+/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field
+ * signature of the ed25519_cert_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t ed25519_cert_get_signature(const ed25519_cert_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field
+ * signature of the ed25519_cert_t in 'inp', so that it will hold the
+ * value 'elt'.
+ */
+int ed25519_cert_set_signature(ed25519_cert_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
+/** Return a pointer to the 64-element array field signature of 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t * ed25519_cert_getarray_signature(ed25519_cert_t *inp);
+
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/trunnel/ed25519_cert.trunnel b/src/trunnel/ed25519_cert.trunnel
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c46f1b6c6b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/trunnel/ed25519_cert.trunnel
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+
+struct ed25519_cert {
+  u8 version IN [1];
+  u8 cert_type;
+  u32 exp_field;
+  u8 cert_key_type;
+  u8 certified_key[32];
+  u8 n_extensions;
+  struct ed25519_cert_extension ext[n_extensions];
+  u8 signature[64];
+}
+
+const CERTEXT_SIGNED_WITH_KEY = 4;
+const CERTEXT_FLAG_AFFECTS_VALIDATION = 1;
+
+struct ed25519_cert_extension {
+  u16 ext_length;
+  u8 ext_type;
+  u8 ext_flags;
+  union un[ext_type] with length ext_length {
+    CERTEXT_SIGNED_WITH_KEY : u8 signing_key[32];
+    default: u8 unparsed[];
+  };
+}
+
+/*
+struct cert_revocation {
+  u8 prefix[8];
+  u8 version IN [1];
+  u8 keytype;
+  u8 identity_key[32];
+  u8 revoked_key[32];
+  u64 published;
+  u8 n_extensions;
+  struct cert_extension ext[n_extensions];
+  u8 signature[64];
+}
+
+struct crosscert_ed_rsa {
+  u8 ed_key[32];
+  u32 expiration_date;
+  u8 signature[128];
+}
+
+struct auth02_cell {
+  u8 type[8];
+  u8 cid[32];
+  u8 sid[32];
+  u8 cid_ed[32];
+  u8 sid_ed[32];
+  u8 slog[32];
+  u8 clog[32];
+  u8 scert[32];
+  u8 tlssecrets[32];
+  u8 rand[24];
+  u8 sig[64];
+}
+
+const LS_IPV4 = 0x00;
+const LS_IPV6 = 0x01;
+const LS_LEGACY_ID = 0x02;
+const LS_ED25519_ID = 0x03;
+
+// amended from tor.trunnel
+struct link_specifier {
+  u8 ls_type;
+  u8 ls_len;
+  union un[ls_type] with length ls_len {
+    LS_IPV4: u32 ipv4_addr; u16 ipv4_port;
+    LS_IPV6: u8 ipv6_addr[16]; u16 ipv6_port;
+    LS_LEGACY_ID: u8 legacy_id[20];
+    LS_ED25519_ID: u8 ed25519_id[32];
+    default: u8 unrecognized[];
+  };
+}
+*/
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/src/trunnel/include.am b/src/trunnel/include.am
index 54e3db287e..9bf37fe58b 100644
--- a/src/trunnel/include.am
+++ b/src/trunnel/include.am
@@ -9,15 +9,24 @@ endif
 
 AM_CPPFLAGS += -I$(srcdir)/src/ext/trunnel -I$(srcdir)/src/trunnel
 
+TRUNNELINPUTS = \
+	src/trunnel/ed25519_cert.trunnel \
+	src/trunnel/link_handshake.trunnel \
+	src/trunnel/pwbox.trunnel
+
 TRUNNELSOURCES = \
-  src/ext/trunnel/trunnel.c \
-  src/trunnel/pwbox.c
+	src/ext/trunnel/trunnel.c \
+	src/trunnel/ed25519_cert.c \
+	src/trunnel/link_handshake.c \
+	src/trunnel/pwbox.c
 
 TRUNNELHEADERS = \
-  src/ext/trunnel/trunnel.h \
-  src/ext/trunnel/trunnel-impl.h \
-  src/trunnel/trunnel-local.h \
-  src/trunnel/pwbox.h
+	src/ext/trunnel/trunnel.h		\
+	src/ext/trunnel/trunnel-impl.h		\
+	src/trunnel/trunnel-local.h 		\
+	src/trunnel/ed25519_cert.h		\
+	src/trunnel/link_handshake.h	 	\
+	src/trunnel/pwbox.h
 
 src_trunnel_libor_trunnel_a_SOURCES = $(TRUNNELSOURCES)
 src_trunnel_libor_trunnel_a_CPPFLAGS = -DTRUNNEL_LOCAL_H $(AM_CPPFLAGS)
diff --git a/src/trunnel/link_handshake.c b/src/trunnel/link_handshake.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9630d1340d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/trunnel/link_handshake.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1885 @@
+/* link_handshake.c -- generated by Trunnel v1.4-pre.
+ * https://gitweb.torproject.org/trunnel.git
+ * You probably shouldn't edit this file.
+ */
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "trunnel-impl.h"
+
+#include "link_handshake.h"
+
+#define TRUNNEL_SET_ERROR_CODE(obj) \
+  do {                              \
+    (obj)->trunnel_error_code_ = 1; \
+  } while (0)
+
+#if defined(__COVERITY__) || defined(__clang_analyzer__)
+/* If we're runnning a static analysis tool, we don't want it to complain
+ * that some of our remaining-bytes checks are dead-code. */
+int linkhandshake_deadcode_dummy__ = 0;
+#define OR_DEADCODE_DUMMY || linkhandshake_deadcode_dummy__
+#else
+#define OR_DEADCODE_DUMMY
+#endif
+
+#define CHECK_REMAINING(nbytes, label)                           \
+  do {                                                           \
+    if (remaining < (nbytes) OR_DEADCODE_DUMMY) {                \
+      goto label;                                                \
+    }                                                            \
+  } while (0)
+
+auth_challenge_cell_t *
+auth_challenge_cell_new(void)
+{
+  auth_challenge_cell_t *val = trunnel_calloc(1, sizeof(auth_challenge_cell_t));
+  if (NULL == val)
+    return NULL;
+  return val;
+}
+
+/** Release all storage held inside 'obj', but do not free 'obj'.
+ */
+static void
+auth_challenge_cell_clear(auth_challenge_cell_t *obj)
+{
+  (void) obj;
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_WIPE(&obj->methods);
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_CLEAR(&obj->methods);
+}
+
+void
+auth_challenge_cell_free(auth_challenge_cell_t *obj)
+{
+  if (obj == NULL)
+    return;
+  auth_challenge_cell_clear(obj);
+  trunnel_memwipe(obj, sizeof(auth_challenge_cell_t));
+  trunnel_free_(obj);
+}
+
+size_t
+auth_challenge_cell_getlen_challenge(const auth_challenge_cell_t *inp)
+{
+  (void)inp;  return 32;
+}
+
+uint8_t
+auth_challenge_cell_get_challenge(const auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t idx)
+{
+  trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+  return inp->challenge[idx];
+}
+
+int
+auth_challenge_cell_set_challenge(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
+{
+  trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+  inp->challenge[idx] = elt;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+uint8_t *
+auth_challenge_cell_getarray_challenge(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->challenge;
+}
+uint16_t
+auth_challenge_cell_get_n_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->n_methods;
+}
+int
+auth_challenge_cell_set_n_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, uint16_t val)
+{
+  inp->n_methods = val;
+  return 0;
+}
+size_t
+auth_challenge_cell_getlen_methods(const auth_challenge_cell_t *inp)
+{
+  return TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&inp->methods);
+}
+
+uint16_t
+auth_challenge_cell_get_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t idx)
+{
+  return TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_GET(&inp->methods, idx);
+}
+
+int
+auth_challenge_cell_set_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t idx, uint16_t elt)
+{
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_SET(&inp->methods, idx, elt);
+  return 0;
+}
+int
+auth_challenge_cell_add_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, uint16_t elt)
+{
+#if SIZE_MAX >= UINT16_MAX
+  if (inp->methods.n_ == UINT16_MAX)
+    goto trunnel_alloc_failed;
+#endif
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_ADD(uint16_t, &inp->methods, elt, {});
+  return 0;
+ trunnel_alloc_failed:
+  TRUNNEL_SET_ERROR_CODE(inp);
+  return -1;
+}
+
+uint16_t *
+auth_challenge_cell_getarray_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->methods.elts_;
+}
+int
+auth_challenge_cell_setlen_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t newlen)
+{
+  uint16_t *newptr;
+#if UINT16_MAX < SIZE_MAX
+  if (newlen > UINT16_MAX)
+    goto trunnel_alloc_failed;
+#endif
+  newptr = trunnel_dynarray_setlen(&inp->methods.allocated_,
+                 &inp->methods.n_, inp->methods.elts_, newlen,
+                 sizeof(inp->methods.elts_[0]), (trunnel_free_fn_t) NULL,
+                 &inp->trunnel_error_code_);
+  if (newptr == NULL)
+    goto trunnel_alloc_failed;
+  inp->methods.elts_ = newptr;
+  return 0;
+ trunnel_alloc_failed:
+  TRUNNEL_SET_ERROR_CODE(inp);
+  return -1;
+}
+const char *
+auth_challenge_cell_check(const auth_challenge_cell_t *obj)
+{
+  if (obj == NULL)
+    return "Object was NULL";
+  if (obj->trunnel_error_code_)
+    return "A set function failed on this object";
+  if (TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->methods) != obj->n_methods)
+    return "Length mismatch for methods";
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+auth_challenge_cell_encoded_len(const auth_challenge_cell_t *obj)
+{
+  ssize_t result = 0;
+
+  if (NULL != auth_challenge_cell_check(obj))
+     return -1;
+
+
+  /* Length of u8 challenge[32] */
+  result += 32;
+
+  /* Length of u16 n_methods */
+  result += 2;
+
+  /* Length of u16 methods[n_methods] */
+  result += 2 * TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->methods);
+  return result;
+}
+int
+auth_challenge_cell_clear_errors(auth_challenge_cell_t *obj)
+{
+  int r = obj->trunnel_error_code_;
+  obj->trunnel_error_code_ = 0;
+  return r;
+}
+ssize_t
+auth_challenge_cell_encode(uint8_t *output, const size_t avail, const auth_challenge_cell_t *obj)
+{
+  ssize_t result = 0;
+  size_t written = 0;
+  uint8_t *ptr = output;
+  const char *msg;
+#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN
+  const ssize_t encoded_len = auth_challenge_cell_encoded_len(obj);
+#endif
+
+  if (NULL != (msg = auth_challenge_cell_check(obj)))
+    goto check_failed;
+
+#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN
+  trunnel_assert(encoded_len >= 0);
+#endif
+
+  /* Encode u8 challenge[32] */
+  trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+  if (avail - written < 32)
+    goto truncated;
+  memcpy(ptr, obj->challenge, 32);
+  written += 32; ptr += 32;
+
+  /* Encode u16 n_methods */
+  trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+  if (avail - written < 2)
+    goto truncated;
+  trunnel_set_uint16(ptr, trunnel_htons(obj->n_methods));
+  written += 2; ptr += 2;
+
+  /* Encode u16 methods[n_methods] */
+  {
+
+    unsigned idx;
+    for (idx = 0; idx < TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->methods); ++idx) {
+      trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+      if (avail - written < 2)
+        goto truncated;
+      trunnel_set_uint16(ptr, trunnel_htons(TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_GET(&obj->methods, idx)));
+      written += 2; ptr += 2;
+    }
+  }
+
+
+  trunnel_assert(ptr == output + written);
+#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN
+  {
+    trunnel_assert(encoded_len >= 0);
+    trunnel_assert((size_t)encoded_len == written);
+  }
+
+#endif
+
+  return written;
+
+ truncated:
+  result = -2;
+  goto fail;
+ check_failed:
+  (void)msg;
+  result = -1;
+  goto fail;
+ fail:
+  trunnel_assert(result < 0);
+  return result;
+}
+
+/** As auth_challenge_cell_parse(), but do not allocate the output
+ * object.
+ */
+static ssize_t
+auth_challenge_cell_parse_into(auth_challenge_cell_t *obj, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in)
+{
+  const uint8_t *ptr = input;
+  size_t remaining = len_in;
+  ssize_t result = 0;
+  (void)result;
+
+  /* Parse u8 challenge[32] */
+  CHECK_REMAINING(32, truncated);
+  memcpy(obj->challenge, ptr, 32);
+  remaining -= 32; ptr += 32;
+
+  /* Parse u16 n_methods */
+  CHECK_REMAINING(2, truncated);
+  obj->n_methods = trunnel_ntohs(trunnel_get_uint16(ptr));
+  remaining -= 2; ptr += 2;
+
+  /* Parse u16 methods[n_methods] */
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_EXPAND(uint16_t, &obj->methods, obj->n_methods, {});
+  {
+    uint16_t elt;
+    unsigned idx;
+    for (idx = 0; idx < obj->n_methods; ++idx) {
+      CHECK_REMAINING(2, truncated);
+      elt = trunnel_ntohs(trunnel_get_uint16(ptr));
+      remaining -= 2; ptr += 2;
+      TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_ADD(uint16_t, &obj->methods, elt, {});
+    }
+  }
+  trunnel_assert(ptr + remaining == input + len_in);
+  return len_in - remaining;
+
+ truncated:
+  return -2;
+ trunnel_alloc_failed:
+  return -1;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+auth_challenge_cell_parse(auth_challenge_cell_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in)
+{
+  ssize_t result;
+  *output = auth_challenge_cell_new();
+  if (NULL == *output)
+    return -1;
+  result = auth_challenge_cell_parse_into(*output, input, len_in);
+  if (result < 0) {
+    auth_challenge_cell_free(*output);
+    *output = NULL;
+  }
+  return result;
+}
+auth_ctx_t *
+auth_ctx_new(void)
+{
+  auth_ctx_t *val = trunnel_calloc(1, sizeof(auth_ctx_t));
+  if (NULL == val)
+    return NULL;
+  return val;
+}
+
+/** Release all storage held inside 'obj', but do not free 'obj'.
+ */
+static void
+auth_ctx_clear(auth_ctx_t *obj)
+{
+  (void) obj;
+}
+
+void
+auth_ctx_free(auth_ctx_t *obj)
+{
+  if (obj == NULL)
+    return;
+  auth_ctx_clear(obj);
+  trunnel_memwipe(obj, sizeof(auth_ctx_t));
+  trunnel_free_(obj);
+}
+
+uint8_t
+auth_ctx_get_is_ed(auth_ctx_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->is_ed;
+}
+int
+auth_ctx_set_is_ed(auth_ctx_t *inp, uint8_t val)
+{
+  inp->is_ed = val;
+  return 0;
+}
+certs_cell_cert_t *
+certs_cell_cert_new(void)
+{
+  certs_cell_cert_t *val = trunnel_calloc(1, sizeof(certs_cell_cert_t));
+  if (NULL == val)
+    return NULL;
+  return val;
+}
+
+/** Release all storage held inside 'obj', but do not free 'obj'.
+ */
+static void
+certs_cell_cert_clear(certs_cell_cert_t *obj)
+{
+  (void) obj;
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_WIPE(&obj->body);
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_CLEAR(&obj->body);
+}
+
+void
+certs_cell_cert_free(certs_cell_cert_t *obj)
+{
+  if (obj == NULL)
+    return;
+  certs_cell_cert_clear(obj);
+  trunnel_memwipe(obj, sizeof(certs_cell_cert_t));
+  trunnel_free_(obj);
+}
+
+uint8_t
+certs_cell_cert_get_cert_type(certs_cell_cert_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->cert_type;
+}
+int
+certs_cell_cert_set_cert_type(certs_cell_cert_t *inp, uint8_t val)
+{
+  inp->cert_type = val;
+  return 0;
+}
+uint16_t
+certs_cell_cert_get_cert_len(certs_cell_cert_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->cert_len;
+}
+int
+certs_cell_cert_set_cert_len(certs_cell_cert_t *inp, uint16_t val)
+{
+  inp->cert_len = val;
+  return 0;
+}
+size_t
+certs_cell_cert_getlen_body(const certs_cell_cert_t *inp)
+{
+  return TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&inp->body);
+}
+
+uint8_t
+certs_cell_cert_get_body(certs_cell_cert_t *inp, size_t idx)
+{
+  return TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_GET(&inp->body, idx);
+}
+
+int
+certs_cell_cert_set_body(certs_cell_cert_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
+{
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_SET(&inp->body, idx, elt);
+  return 0;
+}
+int
+certs_cell_cert_add_body(certs_cell_cert_t *inp, uint8_t elt)
+{
+#if SIZE_MAX >= UINT16_MAX
+  if (inp->body.n_ == UINT16_MAX)
+    goto trunnel_alloc_failed;
+#endif
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_ADD(uint8_t, &inp->body, elt, {});
+  return 0;
+ trunnel_alloc_failed:
+  TRUNNEL_SET_ERROR_CODE(inp);
+  return -1;
+}
+
+uint8_t *
+certs_cell_cert_getarray_body(certs_cell_cert_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->body.elts_;
+}
+int
+certs_cell_cert_setlen_body(certs_cell_cert_t *inp, size_t newlen)
+{
+  uint8_t *newptr;
+#if UINT16_MAX < SIZE_MAX
+  if (newlen > UINT16_MAX)
+    goto trunnel_alloc_failed;
+#endif
+  newptr = trunnel_dynarray_setlen(&inp->body.allocated_,
+                 &inp->body.n_, inp->body.elts_, newlen,
+                 sizeof(inp->body.elts_[0]), (trunnel_free_fn_t) NULL,
+                 &inp->trunnel_error_code_);
+  if (newptr == NULL)
+    goto trunnel_alloc_failed;
+  inp->body.elts_ = newptr;
+  return 0;
+ trunnel_alloc_failed:
+  TRUNNEL_SET_ERROR_CODE(inp);
+  return -1;
+}
+const char *
+certs_cell_cert_check(const certs_cell_cert_t *obj)
+{
+  if (obj == NULL)
+    return "Object was NULL";
+  if (obj->trunnel_error_code_)
+    return "A set function failed on this object";
+  if (TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->body) != obj->cert_len)
+    return "Length mismatch for body";
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+certs_cell_cert_encoded_len(const certs_cell_cert_t *obj)
+{
+  ssize_t result = 0;
+
+  if (NULL != certs_cell_cert_check(obj))
+     return -1;
+
+
+  /* Length of u8 cert_type */
+  result += 1;
+
+  /* Length of u16 cert_len */
+  result += 2;
+
+  /* Length of u8 body[cert_len] */
+  result += TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->body);
+  return result;
+}
+int
+certs_cell_cert_clear_errors(certs_cell_cert_t *obj)
+{
+  int r = obj->trunnel_error_code_;
+  obj->trunnel_error_code_ = 0;
+  return r;
+}
+ssize_t
+certs_cell_cert_encode(uint8_t *output, const size_t avail, const certs_cell_cert_t *obj)
+{
+  ssize_t result = 0;
+  size_t written = 0;
+  uint8_t *ptr = output;
+  const char *msg;
+#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN
+  const ssize_t encoded_len = certs_cell_cert_encoded_len(obj);
+#endif
+
+  if (NULL != (msg = certs_cell_cert_check(obj)))
+    goto check_failed;
+
+#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN
+  trunnel_assert(encoded_len >= 0);
+#endif
+
+  /* Encode u8 cert_type */
+  trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+  if (avail - written < 1)
+    goto truncated;
+  trunnel_set_uint8(ptr, (obj->cert_type));
+  written += 1; ptr += 1;
+
+  /* Encode u16 cert_len */
+  trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+  if (avail - written < 2)
+    goto truncated;
+  trunnel_set_uint16(ptr, trunnel_htons(obj->cert_len));
+  written += 2; ptr += 2;
+
+  /* Encode u8 body[cert_len] */
+  {
+    size_t elt_len = TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->body);
+    trunnel_assert(obj->cert_len == elt_len);
+    trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+    if (avail - written < elt_len)
+      goto truncated;
+    memcpy(ptr, obj->body.elts_, elt_len);
+    written += elt_len; ptr += elt_len;
+  }
+
+
+  trunnel_assert(ptr == output + written);
+#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN
+  {
+    trunnel_assert(encoded_len >= 0);
+    trunnel_assert((size_t)encoded_len == written);
+  }
+
+#endif
+
+  return written;
+
+ truncated:
+  result = -2;
+  goto fail;
+ check_failed:
+  (void)msg;
+  result = -1;
+  goto fail;
+ fail:
+  trunnel_assert(result < 0);
+  return result;
+}
+
+/** As certs_cell_cert_parse(), but do not allocate the output object.
+ */
+static ssize_t
+certs_cell_cert_parse_into(certs_cell_cert_t *obj, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in)
+{
+  const uint8_t *ptr = input;
+  size_t remaining = len_in;
+  ssize_t result = 0;
+  (void)result;
+
+  /* Parse u8 cert_type */
+  CHECK_REMAINING(1, truncated);
+  obj->cert_type = (trunnel_get_uint8(ptr));
+  remaining -= 1; ptr += 1;
+
+  /* Parse u16 cert_len */
+  CHECK_REMAINING(2, truncated);
+  obj->cert_len = trunnel_ntohs(trunnel_get_uint16(ptr));
+  remaining -= 2; ptr += 2;
+
+  /* Parse u8 body[cert_len] */
+  CHECK_REMAINING(obj->cert_len, truncated);
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_EXPAND(uint8_t, &obj->body, obj->cert_len, {});
+  obj->body.n_ = obj->cert_len;
+  memcpy(obj->body.elts_, ptr, obj->cert_len);
+  ptr += obj->cert_len; remaining -= obj->cert_len;
+  trunnel_assert(ptr + remaining == input + len_in);
+  return len_in - remaining;
+
+ truncated:
+  return -2;
+ trunnel_alloc_failed:
+  return -1;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+certs_cell_cert_parse(certs_cell_cert_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in)
+{
+  ssize_t result;
+  *output = certs_cell_cert_new();
+  if (NULL == *output)
+    return -1;
+  result = certs_cell_cert_parse_into(*output, input, len_in);
+  if (result < 0) {
+    certs_cell_cert_free(*output);
+    *output = NULL;
+  }
+  return result;
+}
+rsa_ed_crosscert_t *
+rsa_ed_crosscert_new(void)
+{
+  rsa_ed_crosscert_t *val = trunnel_calloc(1, sizeof(rsa_ed_crosscert_t));
+  if (NULL == val)
+    return NULL;
+  return val;
+}
+
+/** Release all storage held inside 'obj', but do not free 'obj'.
+ */
+static void
+rsa_ed_crosscert_clear(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *obj)
+{
+  (void) obj;
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_WIPE(&obj->sig);
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_CLEAR(&obj->sig);
+}
+
+void
+rsa_ed_crosscert_free(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *obj)
+{
+  if (obj == NULL)
+    return;
+  rsa_ed_crosscert_clear(obj);
+  trunnel_memwipe(obj, sizeof(rsa_ed_crosscert_t));
+  trunnel_free_(obj);
+}
+
+size_t
+rsa_ed_crosscert_getlen_ed_key(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp)
+{
+  (void)inp;  return 32;
+}
+
+uint8_t
+rsa_ed_crosscert_get_ed_key(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t idx)
+{
+  trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+  return inp->ed_key[idx];
+}
+
+int
+rsa_ed_crosscert_set_ed_key(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
+{
+  trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+  inp->ed_key[idx] = elt;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+uint8_t *
+rsa_ed_crosscert_getarray_ed_key(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->ed_key;
+}
+uint32_t
+rsa_ed_crosscert_get_expiration(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->expiration;
+}
+int
+rsa_ed_crosscert_set_expiration(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, uint32_t val)
+{
+  inp->expiration = val;
+  return 0;
+}
+const uint8_t *
+rsa_ed_crosscert_get_end_of_signed(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->end_of_signed;
+}
+uint8_t
+rsa_ed_crosscert_get_sig_len(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->sig_len;
+}
+int
+rsa_ed_crosscert_set_sig_len(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, uint8_t val)
+{
+  inp->sig_len = val;
+  return 0;
+}
+size_t
+rsa_ed_crosscert_getlen_sig(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp)
+{
+  return TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&inp->sig);
+}
+
+uint8_t
+rsa_ed_crosscert_get_sig(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t idx)
+{
+  return TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_GET(&inp->sig, idx);
+}
+
+int
+rsa_ed_crosscert_set_sig(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
+{
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_SET(&inp->sig, idx, elt);
+  return 0;
+}
+int
+rsa_ed_crosscert_add_sig(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, uint8_t elt)
+{
+#if SIZE_MAX >= UINT8_MAX
+  if (inp->sig.n_ == UINT8_MAX)
+    goto trunnel_alloc_failed;
+#endif
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_ADD(uint8_t, &inp->sig, elt, {});
+  return 0;
+ trunnel_alloc_failed:
+  TRUNNEL_SET_ERROR_CODE(inp);
+  return -1;
+}
+
+uint8_t *
+rsa_ed_crosscert_getarray_sig(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->sig.elts_;
+}
+int
+rsa_ed_crosscert_setlen_sig(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t newlen)
+{
+  uint8_t *newptr;
+#if UINT8_MAX < SIZE_MAX
+  if (newlen > UINT8_MAX)
+    goto trunnel_alloc_failed;
+#endif
+  newptr = trunnel_dynarray_setlen(&inp->sig.allocated_,
+                 &inp->sig.n_, inp->sig.elts_, newlen,
+                 sizeof(inp->sig.elts_[0]), (trunnel_free_fn_t) NULL,
+                 &inp->trunnel_error_code_);
+  if (newptr == NULL)
+    goto trunnel_alloc_failed;
+  inp->sig.elts_ = newptr;
+  return 0;
+ trunnel_alloc_failed:
+  TRUNNEL_SET_ERROR_CODE(inp);
+  return -1;
+}
+const char *
+rsa_ed_crosscert_check(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *obj)
+{
+  if (obj == NULL)
+    return "Object was NULL";
+  if (obj->trunnel_error_code_)
+    return "A set function failed on this object";
+  if (TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->sig) != obj->sig_len)
+    return "Length mismatch for sig";
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+rsa_ed_crosscert_encoded_len(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *obj)
+{
+  ssize_t result = 0;
+
+  if (NULL != rsa_ed_crosscert_check(obj))
+     return -1;
+
+
+  /* Length of u8 ed_key[32] */
+  result += 32;
+
+  /* Length of u32 expiration */
+  result += 4;
+
+  /* Length of u8 sig_len */
+  result += 1;
+
+  /* Length of u8 sig[sig_len] */
+  result += TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->sig);
+  return result;
+}
+int
+rsa_ed_crosscert_clear_errors(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *obj)
+{
+  int r = obj->trunnel_error_code_;
+  obj->trunnel_error_code_ = 0;
+  return r;
+}
+ssize_t
+rsa_ed_crosscert_encode(uint8_t *output, const size_t avail, const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *obj)
+{
+  ssize_t result = 0;
+  size_t written = 0;
+  uint8_t *ptr = output;
+  const char *msg;
+#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN
+  const ssize_t encoded_len = rsa_ed_crosscert_encoded_len(obj);
+#endif
+
+  if (NULL != (msg = rsa_ed_crosscert_check(obj)))
+    goto check_failed;
+
+#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN
+  trunnel_assert(encoded_len >= 0);
+#endif
+
+  /* Encode u8 ed_key[32] */
+  trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+  if (avail - written < 32)
+    goto truncated;
+  memcpy(ptr, obj->ed_key, 32);
+  written += 32; ptr += 32;
+
+  /* Encode u32 expiration */
+  trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+  if (avail - written < 4)
+    goto truncated;
+  trunnel_set_uint32(ptr, trunnel_htonl(obj->expiration));
+  written += 4; ptr += 4;
+
+  /* Encode u8 sig_len */
+  trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+  if (avail - written < 1)
+    goto truncated;
+  trunnel_set_uint8(ptr, (obj->sig_len));
+  written += 1; ptr += 1;
+
+  /* Encode u8 sig[sig_len] */
+  {
+    size_t elt_len = TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->sig);
+    trunnel_assert(obj->sig_len == elt_len);
+    trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+    if (avail - written < elt_len)
+      goto truncated;
+    memcpy(ptr, obj->sig.elts_, elt_len);
+    written += elt_len; ptr += elt_len;
+  }
+
+
+  trunnel_assert(ptr == output + written);
+#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN
+  {
+    trunnel_assert(encoded_len >= 0);
+    trunnel_assert((size_t)encoded_len == written);
+  }
+
+#endif
+
+  return written;
+
+ truncated:
+  result = -2;
+  goto fail;
+ check_failed:
+  (void)msg;
+  result = -1;
+  goto fail;
+ fail:
+  trunnel_assert(result < 0);
+  return result;
+}
+
+/** As rsa_ed_crosscert_parse(), but do not allocate the output
+ * object.
+ */
+static ssize_t
+rsa_ed_crosscert_parse_into(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *obj, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in)
+{
+  const uint8_t *ptr = input;
+  size_t remaining = len_in;
+  ssize_t result = 0;
+  (void)result;
+
+  /* Parse u8 ed_key[32] */
+  CHECK_REMAINING(32, truncated);
+  memcpy(obj->ed_key, ptr, 32);
+  remaining -= 32; ptr += 32;
+
+  /* Parse u32 expiration */
+  CHECK_REMAINING(4, truncated);
+  obj->expiration = trunnel_ntohl(trunnel_get_uint32(ptr));
+  remaining -= 4; ptr += 4;
+  obj->end_of_signed = ptr;
+
+  /* Parse u8 sig_len */
+  CHECK_REMAINING(1, truncated);
+  obj->sig_len = (trunnel_get_uint8(ptr));
+  remaining -= 1; ptr += 1;
+
+  /* Parse u8 sig[sig_len] */
+  CHECK_REMAINING(obj->sig_len, truncated);
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_EXPAND(uint8_t, &obj->sig, obj->sig_len, {});
+  obj->sig.n_ = obj->sig_len;
+  memcpy(obj->sig.elts_, ptr, obj->sig_len);
+  ptr += obj->sig_len; remaining -= obj->sig_len;
+  trunnel_assert(ptr + remaining == input + len_in);
+  return len_in - remaining;
+
+ truncated:
+  return -2;
+ trunnel_alloc_failed:
+  return -1;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+rsa_ed_crosscert_parse(rsa_ed_crosscert_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in)
+{
+  ssize_t result;
+  *output = rsa_ed_crosscert_new();
+  if (NULL == *output)
+    return -1;
+  result = rsa_ed_crosscert_parse_into(*output, input, len_in);
+  if (result < 0) {
+    rsa_ed_crosscert_free(*output);
+    *output = NULL;
+  }
+  return result;
+}
+auth1_t *
+auth1_new(void)
+{
+  auth1_t *val = trunnel_calloc(1, sizeof(auth1_t));
+  if (NULL == val)
+    return NULL;
+  return val;
+}
+
+/** Release all storage held inside 'obj', but do not free 'obj'.
+ */
+static void
+auth1_clear(auth1_t *obj)
+{
+  (void) obj;
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_WIPE(&obj->sig);
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_CLEAR(&obj->sig);
+}
+
+void
+auth1_free(auth1_t *obj)
+{
+  if (obj == NULL)
+    return;
+  auth1_clear(obj);
+  trunnel_memwipe(obj, sizeof(auth1_t));
+  trunnel_free_(obj);
+}
+
+size_t
+auth1_getlen_type(const auth1_t *inp)
+{
+  (void)inp;  return 8;
+}
+
+uint8_t
+auth1_get_type(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
+{
+  trunnel_assert(idx < 8);
+  return inp->type[idx];
+}
+
+int
+auth1_set_type(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
+{
+  trunnel_assert(idx < 8);
+  inp->type[idx] = elt;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+uint8_t *
+auth1_getarray_type(auth1_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->type;
+}
+size_t
+auth1_getlen_cid(const auth1_t *inp)
+{
+  (void)inp;  return 32;
+}
+
+uint8_t
+auth1_get_cid(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
+{
+  trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+  return inp->cid[idx];
+}
+
+int
+auth1_set_cid(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
+{
+  trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+  inp->cid[idx] = elt;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+uint8_t *
+auth1_getarray_cid(auth1_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->cid;
+}
+size_t
+auth1_getlen_sid(const auth1_t *inp)
+{
+  (void)inp;  return 32;
+}
+
+uint8_t
+auth1_get_sid(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
+{
+  trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+  return inp->sid[idx];
+}
+
+int
+auth1_set_sid(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
+{
+  trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+  inp->sid[idx] = elt;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+uint8_t *
+auth1_getarray_sid(auth1_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->sid;
+}
+size_t
+auth1_getlen_u1_cid_ed(const auth1_t *inp)
+{
+  (void)inp;  return 32;
+}
+
+uint8_t
+auth1_get_u1_cid_ed(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
+{
+  trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+  return inp->u1_cid_ed[idx];
+}
+
+int
+auth1_set_u1_cid_ed(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
+{
+  trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+  inp->u1_cid_ed[idx] = elt;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+uint8_t *
+auth1_getarray_u1_cid_ed(auth1_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->u1_cid_ed;
+}
+size_t
+auth1_getlen_u1_sid_ed(const auth1_t *inp)
+{
+  (void)inp;  return 32;
+}
+
+uint8_t
+auth1_get_u1_sid_ed(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
+{
+  trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+  return inp->u1_sid_ed[idx];
+}
+
+int
+auth1_set_u1_sid_ed(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
+{
+  trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+  inp->u1_sid_ed[idx] = elt;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+uint8_t *
+auth1_getarray_u1_sid_ed(auth1_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->u1_sid_ed;
+}
+size_t
+auth1_getlen_slog(const auth1_t *inp)
+{
+  (void)inp;  return 32;
+}
+
+uint8_t
+auth1_get_slog(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
+{
+  trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+  return inp->slog[idx];
+}
+
+int
+auth1_set_slog(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
+{
+  trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+  inp->slog[idx] = elt;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+uint8_t *
+auth1_getarray_slog(auth1_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->slog;
+}
+size_t
+auth1_getlen_clog(const auth1_t *inp)
+{
+  (void)inp;  return 32;
+}
+
+uint8_t
+auth1_get_clog(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
+{
+  trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+  return inp->clog[idx];
+}
+
+int
+auth1_set_clog(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
+{
+  trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+  inp->clog[idx] = elt;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+uint8_t *
+auth1_getarray_clog(auth1_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->clog;
+}
+size_t
+auth1_getlen_scert(const auth1_t *inp)
+{
+  (void)inp;  return 32;
+}
+
+uint8_t
+auth1_get_scert(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
+{
+  trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+  return inp->scert[idx];
+}
+
+int
+auth1_set_scert(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
+{
+  trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+  inp->scert[idx] = elt;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+uint8_t *
+auth1_getarray_scert(auth1_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->scert;
+}
+size_t
+auth1_getlen_tlssecrets(const auth1_t *inp)
+{
+  (void)inp;  return 32;
+}
+
+uint8_t
+auth1_get_tlssecrets(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
+{
+  trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+  return inp->tlssecrets[idx];
+}
+
+int
+auth1_set_tlssecrets(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
+{
+  trunnel_assert(idx < 32);
+  inp->tlssecrets[idx] = elt;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+uint8_t *
+auth1_getarray_tlssecrets(auth1_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->tlssecrets;
+}
+const uint8_t *
+auth1_get_end_of_fixed_part(const auth1_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->end_of_fixed_part;
+}
+size_t
+auth1_getlen_rand(const auth1_t *inp)
+{
+  (void)inp;  return 24;
+}
+
+uint8_t
+auth1_get_rand(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
+{
+  trunnel_assert(idx < 24);
+  return inp->rand[idx];
+}
+
+int
+auth1_set_rand(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
+{
+  trunnel_assert(idx < 24);
+  inp->rand[idx] = elt;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+uint8_t *
+auth1_getarray_rand(auth1_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->rand;
+}
+const uint8_t *
+auth1_get_end_of_signed(const auth1_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->end_of_signed;
+}
+size_t
+auth1_getlen_sig(const auth1_t *inp)
+{
+  return TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&inp->sig);
+}
+
+uint8_t
+auth1_get_sig(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx)
+{
+  return TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_GET(&inp->sig, idx);
+}
+
+int
+auth1_set_sig(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt)
+{
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_SET(&inp->sig, idx, elt);
+  return 0;
+}
+int
+auth1_add_sig(auth1_t *inp, uint8_t elt)
+{
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_ADD(uint8_t, &inp->sig, elt, {});
+  return 0;
+ trunnel_alloc_failed:
+  TRUNNEL_SET_ERROR_CODE(inp);
+  return -1;
+}
+
+uint8_t *
+auth1_getarray_sig(auth1_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->sig.elts_;
+}
+int
+auth1_setlen_sig(auth1_t *inp, size_t newlen)
+{
+  uint8_t *newptr;
+  newptr = trunnel_dynarray_setlen(&inp->sig.allocated_,
+                 &inp->sig.n_, inp->sig.elts_, newlen,
+                 sizeof(inp->sig.elts_[0]), (trunnel_free_fn_t) NULL,
+                 &inp->trunnel_error_code_);
+  if (newptr == NULL)
+    goto trunnel_alloc_failed;
+  inp->sig.elts_ = newptr;
+  return 0;
+ trunnel_alloc_failed:
+  TRUNNEL_SET_ERROR_CODE(inp);
+  return -1;
+}
+const char *
+auth1_check(const auth1_t *obj, const auth_ctx_t *auth_ctx_ctx)
+{
+  if (obj == NULL)
+    return "Object was NULL";
+  if (obj->trunnel_error_code_)
+    return "A set function failed on this object";
+  if (auth_ctx_ctx == NULL)
+    return "Context was NULL";
+  switch (auth_ctx_ctx->is_ed) {
+
+    case 0:
+      break;
+
+    case 1:
+      break;
+
+    default:
+        return "Bad tag for union";
+      break;
+  }
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+auth1_encoded_len(const auth1_t *obj, const auth_ctx_t *auth_ctx_ctx)
+{
+  ssize_t result = 0;
+
+  if (NULL != auth1_check(obj, auth_ctx_ctx))
+     return -1;
+
+
+  /* Length of u8 type[8] */
+  result += 8;
+
+  /* Length of u8 cid[32] */
+  result += 32;
+
+  /* Length of u8 sid[32] */
+  result += 32;
+  switch (auth_ctx_ctx->is_ed) {
+
+    case 0:
+      break;
+
+    case 1:
+
+      /* Length of u8 u1_cid_ed[32] */
+      result += 32;
+
+      /* Length of u8 u1_sid_ed[32] */
+      result += 32;
+      break;
+
+    default:
+      trunnel_assert(0);
+      break;
+  }
+
+  /* Length of u8 slog[32] */
+  result += 32;
+
+  /* Length of u8 clog[32] */
+  result += 32;
+
+  /* Length of u8 scert[32] */
+  result += 32;
+
+  /* Length of u8 tlssecrets[32] */
+  result += 32;
+
+  /* Length of u8 rand[24] */
+  result += 24;
+
+  /* Length of u8 sig[] */
+  result += TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->sig);
+  return result;
+}
+int
+auth1_clear_errors(auth1_t *obj)
+{
+  int r = obj->trunnel_error_code_;
+  obj->trunnel_error_code_ = 0;
+  return r;
+}
+ssize_t
+auth1_encode(uint8_t *output, const size_t avail, const auth1_t *obj, const auth_ctx_t *auth_ctx_ctx)
+{
+  ssize_t result = 0;
+  size_t written = 0;
+  uint8_t *ptr = output;
+  const char *msg;
+#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN
+  const ssize_t encoded_len = auth1_encoded_len(obj, auth_ctx_ctx);
+#endif
+
+  if (NULL != (msg = auth1_check(obj, auth_ctx_ctx)))
+    goto check_failed;
+
+#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN
+  trunnel_assert(encoded_len >= 0);
+#endif
+
+  /* Encode u8 type[8] */
+  trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+  if (avail - written < 8)
+    goto truncated;
+  memcpy(ptr, obj->type, 8);
+  written += 8; ptr += 8;
+
+  /* Encode u8 cid[32] */
+  trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+  if (avail - written < 32)
+    goto truncated;
+  memcpy(ptr, obj->cid, 32);
+  written += 32; ptr += 32;
+
+  /* Encode u8 sid[32] */
+  trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+  if (avail - written < 32)
+    goto truncated;
+  memcpy(ptr, obj->sid, 32);
+  written += 32; ptr += 32;
+
+  /* Encode union u1[auth_ctx.is_ed] */
+  trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+  switch (auth_ctx_ctx->is_ed) {
+
+    case 0:
+      break;
+
+    case 1:
+
+      /* Encode u8 u1_cid_ed[32] */
+      trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+      if (avail - written < 32)
+        goto truncated;
+      memcpy(ptr, obj->u1_cid_ed, 32);
+      written += 32; ptr += 32;
+
+      /* Encode u8 u1_sid_ed[32] */
+      trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+      if (avail - written < 32)
+        goto truncated;
+      memcpy(ptr, obj->u1_sid_ed, 32);
+      written += 32; ptr += 32;
+      break;
+
+    default:
+      trunnel_assert(0);
+      break;
+  }
+
+  /* Encode u8 slog[32] */
+  trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+  if (avail - written < 32)
+    goto truncated;
+  memcpy(ptr, obj->slog, 32);
+  written += 32; ptr += 32;
+
+  /* Encode u8 clog[32] */
+  trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+  if (avail - written < 32)
+    goto truncated;
+  memcpy(ptr, obj->clog, 32);
+  written += 32; ptr += 32;
+
+  /* Encode u8 scert[32] */
+  trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+  if (avail - written < 32)
+    goto truncated;
+  memcpy(ptr, obj->scert, 32);
+  written += 32; ptr += 32;
+
+  /* Encode u8 tlssecrets[32] */
+  trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+  if (avail - written < 32)
+    goto truncated;
+  memcpy(ptr, obj->tlssecrets, 32);
+  written += 32; ptr += 32;
+
+  /* Encode u8 rand[24] */
+  trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+  if (avail - written < 24)
+    goto truncated;
+  memcpy(ptr, obj->rand, 24);
+  written += 24; ptr += 24;
+
+  /* Encode u8 sig[] */
+  {
+    size_t elt_len = TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->sig);
+    trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+    if (avail - written < elt_len)
+      goto truncated;
+    memcpy(ptr, obj->sig.elts_, elt_len);
+    written += elt_len; ptr += elt_len;
+  }
+
+
+  trunnel_assert(ptr == output + written);
+#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN
+  {
+    trunnel_assert(encoded_len >= 0);
+    trunnel_assert((size_t)encoded_len == written);
+  }
+
+#endif
+
+  return written;
+
+ truncated:
+  result = -2;
+  goto fail;
+ check_failed:
+  (void)msg;
+  result = -1;
+  goto fail;
+ fail:
+  trunnel_assert(result < 0);
+  return result;
+}
+
+/** As auth1_parse(), but do not allocate the output object.
+ */
+static ssize_t
+auth1_parse_into(auth1_t *obj, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in, const auth_ctx_t *auth_ctx_ctx)
+{
+  const uint8_t *ptr = input;
+  size_t remaining = len_in;
+  ssize_t result = 0;
+  (void)result;
+  if (auth_ctx_ctx == NULL)
+    return -1;
+
+  /* Parse u8 type[8] */
+  CHECK_REMAINING(8, truncated);
+  memcpy(obj->type, ptr, 8);
+  remaining -= 8; ptr += 8;
+
+  /* Parse u8 cid[32] */
+  CHECK_REMAINING(32, truncated);
+  memcpy(obj->cid, ptr, 32);
+  remaining -= 32; ptr += 32;
+
+  /* Parse u8 sid[32] */
+  CHECK_REMAINING(32, truncated);
+  memcpy(obj->sid, ptr, 32);
+  remaining -= 32; ptr += 32;
+
+  /* Parse union u1[auth_ctx.is_ed] */
+  switch (auth_ctx_ctx->is_ed) {
+
+    case 0:
+      break;
+
+    case 1:
+
+      /* Parse u8 u1_cid_ed[32] */
+      CHECK_REMAINING(32, truncated);
+      memcpy(obj->u1_cid_ed, ptr, 32);
+      remaining -= 32; ptr += 32;
+
+      /* Parse u8 u1_sid_ed[32] */
+      CHECK_REMAINING(32, truncated);
+      memcpy(obj->u1_sid_ed, ptr, 32);
+      remaining -= 32; ptr += 32;
+      break;
+
+    default:
+      goto fail;
+      break;
+  }
+
+  /* Parse u8 slog[32] */
+  CHECK_REMAINING(32, truncated);
+  memcpy(obj->slog, ptr, 32);
+  remaining -= 32; ptr += 32;
+
+  /* Parse u8 clog[32] */
+  CHECK_REMAINING(32, truncated);
+  memcpy(obj->clog, ptr, 32);
+  remaining -= 32; ptr += 32;
+
+  /* Parse u8 scert[32] */
+  CHECK_REMAINING(32, truncated);
+  memcpy(obj->scert, ptr, 32);
+  remaining -= 32; ptr += 32;
+
+  /* Parse u8 tlssecrets[32] */
+  CHECK_REMAINING(32, truncated);
+  memcpy(obj->tlssecrets, ptr, 32);
+  remaining -= 32; ptr += 32;
+  obj->end_of_fixed_part = ptr;
+
+  /* Parse u8 rand[24] */
+  CHECK_REMAINING(24, truncated);
+  memcpy(obj->rand, ptr, 24);
+  remaining -= 24; ptr += 24;
+  obj->end_of_signed = ptr;
+
+  /* Parse u8 sig[] */
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_EXPAND(uint8_t, &obj->sig, remaining, {});
+  obj->sig.n_ = remaining;
+  memcpy(obj->sig.elts_, ptr, remaining);
+  ptr += remaining; remaining -= remaining;
+  trunnel_assert(ptr + remaining == input + len_in);
+  return len_in - remaining;
+
+ truncated:
+  return -2;
+ trunnel_alloc_failed:
+  return -1;
+ fail:
+  result = -1;
+  return result;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+auth1_parse(auth1_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in, const auth_ctx_t *auth_ctx_ctx)
+{
+  ssize_t result;
+  *output = auth1_new();
+  if (NULL == *output)
+    return -1;
+  result = auth1_parse_into(*output, input, len_in, auth_ctx_ctx);
+  if (result < 0) {
+    auth1_free(*output);
+    *output = NULL;
+  }
+  return result;
+}
+certs_cell_t *
+certs_cell_new(void)
+{
+  certs_cell_t *val = trunnel_calloc(1, sizeof(certs_cell_t));
+  if (NULL == val)
+    return NULL;
+  return val;
+}
+
+/** Release all storage held inside 'obj', but do not free 'obj'.
+ */
+static void
+certs_cell_clear(certs_cell_t *obj)
+{
+  (void) obj;
+  {
+
+    unsigned idx;
+    for (idx = 0; idx < TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->certs); ++idx) {
+      certs_cell_cert_free(TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_GET(&obj->certs, idx));
+    }
+  }
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_WIPE(&obj->certs);
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_CLEAR(&obj->certs);
+}
+
+void
+certs_cell_free(certs_cell_t *obj)
+{
+  if (obj == NULL)
+    return;
+  certs_cell_clear(obj);
+  trunnel_memwipe(obj, sizeof(certs_cell_t));
+  trunnel_free_(obj);
+}
+
+uint8_t
+certs_cell_get_n_certs(certs_cell_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->n_certs;
+}
+int
+certs_cell_set_n_certs(certs_cell_t *inp, uint8_t val)
+{
+  inp->n_certs = val;
+  return 0;
+}
+size_t
+certs_cell_getlen_certs(const certs_cell_t *inp)
+{
+  return TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&inp->certs);
+}
+
+struct certs_cell_cert_st *
+certs_cell_get_certs(certs_cell_t *inp, size_t idx)
+{
+  return TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_GET(&inp->certs, idx);
+}
+
+int
+certs_cell_set_certs(certs_cell_t *inp, size_t idx, struct certs_cell_cert_st * elt)
+{
+  certs_cell_cert_t *oldval = TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_GET(&inp->certs, idx);
+  if (oldval && oldval != elt)
+    certs_cell_cert_free(oldval);
+  return certs_cell_set0_certs(inp, idx, elt);
+}
+int
+certs_cell_set0_certs(certs_cell_t *inp, size_t idx, struct certs_cell_cert_st * elt)
+{
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_SET(&inp->certs, idx, elt);
+  return 0;
+}
+int
+certs_cell_add_certs(certs_cell_t *inp, struct certs_cell_cert_st * elt)
+{
+#if SIZE_MAX >= UINT8_MAX
+  if (inp->certs.n_ == UINT8_MAX)
+    goto trunnel_alloc_failed;
+#endif
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_ADD(struct certs_cell_cert_st *, &inp->certs, elt, {});
+  return 0;
+ trunnel_alloc_failed:
+  TRUNNEL_SET_ERROR_CODE(inp);
+  return -1;
+}
+
+struct certs_cell_cert_st * *
+certs_cell_getarray_certs(certs_cell_t *inp)
+{
+  return inp->certs.elts_;
+}
+int
+certs_cell_setlen_certs(certs_cell_t *inp, size_t newlen)
+{
+  struct certs_cell_cert_st * *newptr;
+#if UINT8_MAX < SIZE_MAX
+  if (newlen > UINT8_MAX)
+    goto trunnel_alloc_failed;
+#endif
+  newptr = trunnel_dynarray_setlen(&inp->certs.allocated_,
+                 &inp->certs.n_, inp->certs.elts_, newlen,
+                 sizeof(inp->certs.elts_[0]), (trunnel_free_fn_t) certs_cell_cert_free,
+                 &inp->trunnel_error_code_);
+  if (newptr == NULL)
+    goto trunnel_alloc_failed;
+  inp->certs.elts_ = newptr;
+  return 0;
+ trunnel_alloc_failed:
+  TRUNNEL_SET_ERROR_CODE(inp);
+  return -1;
+}
+const char *
+certs_cell_check(const certs_cell_t *obj)
+{
+  if (obj == NULL)
+    return "Object was NULL";
+  if (obj->trunnel_error_code_)
+    return "A set function failed on this object";
+  {
+    const char *msg;
+
+    unsigned idx;
+    for (idx = 0; idx < TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->certs); ++idx) {
+      if (NULL != (msg = certs_cell_cert_check(TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_GET(&obj->certs, idx))))
+        return msg;
+    }
+  }
+  if (TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->certs) != obj->n_certs)
+    return "Length mismatch for certs";
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+certs_cell_encoded_len(const certs_cell_t *obj)
+{
+  ssize_t result = 0;
+
+  if (NULL != certs_cell_check(obj))
+     return -1;
+
+
+  /* Length of u8 n_certs */
+  result += 1;
+
+  /* Length of struct certs_cell_cert certs[n_certs] */
+  {
+
+    unsigned idx;
+    for (idx = 0; idx < TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->certs); ++idx) {
+      result += certs_cell_cert_encoded_len(TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_GET(&obj->certs, idx));
+    }
+  }
+  return result;
+}
+int
+certs_cell_clear_errors(certs_cell_t *obj)
+{
+  int r = obj->trunnel_error_code_;
+  obj->trunnel_error_code_ = 0;
+  return r;
+}
+ssize_t
+certs_cell_encode(uint8_t *output, const size_t avail, const certs_cell_t *obj)
+{
+  ssize_t result = 0;
+  size_t written = 0;
+  uint8_t *ptr = output;
+  const char *msg;
+#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN
+  const ssize_t encoded_len = certs_cell_encoded_len(obj);
+#endif
+
+  if (NULL != (msg = certs_cell_check(obj)))
+    goto check_failed;
+
+#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN
+  trunnel_assert(encoded_len >= 0);
+#endif
+
+  /* Encode u8 n_certs */
+  trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+  if (avail - written < 1)
+    goto truncated;
+  trunnel_set_uint8(ptr, (obj->n_certs));
+  written += 1; ptr += 1;
+
+  /* Encode struct certs_cell_cert certs[n_certs] */
+  {
+
+    unsigned idx;
+    for (idx = 0; idx < TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->certs); ++idx) {
+      trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
+      result = certs_cell_cert_encode(ptr, avail - written, TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_GET(&obj->certs, idx));
+      if (result < 0)
+        goto fail; /* XXXXXXX !*/
+      written += result; ptr += result;
+    }
+  }
+
+
+  trunnel_assert(ptr == output + written);
+#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN
+  {
+    trunnel_assert(encoded_len >= 0);
+    trunnel_assert((size_t)encoded_len == written);
+  }
+
+#endif
+
+  return written;
+
+ truncated:
+  result = -2;
+  goto fail;
+ check_failed:
+  (void)msg;
+  result = -1;
+  goto fail;
+ fail:
+  trunnel_assert(result < 0);
+  return result;
+}
+
+/** As certs_cell_parse(), but do not allocate the output object.
+ */
+static ssize_t
+certs_cell_parse_into(certs_cell_t *obj, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in)
+{
+  const uint8_t *ptr = input;
+  size_t remaining = len_in;
+  ssize_t result = 0;
+  (void)result;
+
+  /* Parse u8 n_certs */
+  CHECK_REMAINING(1, truncated);
+  obj->n_certs = (trunnel_get_uint8(ptr));
+  remaining -= 1; ptr += 1;
+
+  /* Parse struct certs_cell_cert certs[n_certs] */
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_EXPAND(certs_cell_cert_t *, &obj->certs, obj->n_certs, {});
+  {
+    certs_cell_cert_t * elt;
+    unsigned idx;
+    for (idx = 0; idx < obj->n_certs; ++idx) {
+      result = certs_cell_cert_parse(&elt, ptr, remaining);
+      if (result < 0)
+        goto relay_fail;
+      trunnel_assert((size_t)result <= remaining);
+      remaining -= result; ptr += result;
+      TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_ADD(certs_cell_cert_t *, &obj->certs, elt, {certs_cell_cert_free(elt);});
+    }
+  }
+  trunnel_assert(ptr + remaining == input + len_in);
+  return len_in - remaining;
+
+ truncated:
+  return -2;
+ relay_fail:
+  if (result >= 0) result = -1;
+  return result;
+ trunnel_alloc_failed:
+  return -1;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+certs_cell_parse(certs_cell_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in)
+{
+  ssize_t result;
+  *output = certs_cell_new();
+  if (NULL == *output)
+    return -1;
+  result = certs_cell_parse_into(*output, input, len_in);
+  if (result < 0) {
+    certs_cell_free(*output);
+    *output = NULL;
+  }
+  return result;
+}
diff --git a/src/trunnel/link_handshake.h b/src/trunnel/link_handshake.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..109fe8d065
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/trunnel/link_handshake.h
@@ -0,0 +1,654 @@
+/* link_handshake.h -- generated by by Trunnel v1.4-pre.
+ * https://gitweb.torproject.org/trunnel.git
+ * You probably shouldn't edit this file.
+ */
+#ifndef TRUNNEL_LINK_HANDSHAKE_H
+#define TRUNNEL_LINK_HANDSHAKE_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include "trunnel.h"
+
+#define CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_LINK 1
+#define CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_ID 2
+#define CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_AUTH 3
+#define CERTTYPE_ED_ID_SIGN 4
+#define CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_LINK 5
+#define CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_AUTH 6
+#define CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_EDID 7
+#if !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE) && !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE_AUTH_CHALLENGE_CELL)
+struct auth_challenge_cell_st {
+  uint8_t challenge[32];
+  uint16_t n_methods;
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_HEAD(, uint16_t) methods;
+  uint8_t trunnel_error_code_;
+};
+#endif
+typedef struct auth_challenge_cell_st auth_challenge_cell_t;
+#if !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE) && !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE_AUTH_CTX)
+struct auth_ctx_st {
+  uint8_t is_ed;
+  uint8_t trunnel_error_code_;
+};
+#endif
+typedef struct auth_ctx_st auth_ctx_t;
+#if !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE) && !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE_CERTS_CELL_CERT)
+struct certs_cell_cert_st {
+  uint8_t cert_type;
+  uint16_t cert_len;
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_HEAD(, uint8_t) body;
+  uint8_t trunnel_error_code_;
+};
+#endif
+typedef struct certs_cell_cert_st certs_cell_cert_t;
+#if !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE) && !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE_RSA_ED_CROSSCERT)
+struct rsa_ed_crosscert_st {
+  uint8_t ed_key[32];
+  uint32_t expiration;
+  const uint8_t *end_of_signed;
+  uint8_t sig_len;
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_HEAD(, uint8_t) sig;
+  uint8_t trunnel_error_code_;
+};
+#endif
+typedef struct rsa_ed_crosscert_st rsa_ed_crosscert_t;
+#if !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE) && !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE_AUTH1)
+struct auth1_st {
+  uint8_t type[8];
+  uint8_t cid[32];
+  uint8_t sid[32];
+  uint8_t u1_cid_ed[32];
+  uint8_t u1_sid_ed[32];
+  uint8_t slog[32];
+  uint8_t clog[32];
+  uint8_t scert[32];
+  uint8_t tlssecrets[32];
+  const uint8_t *end_of_fixed_part;
+  uint8_t rand[24];
+  const uint8_t *end_of_signed;
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_HEAD(, uint8_t) sig;
+  uint8_t trunnel_error_code_;
+};
+#endif
+typedef struct auth1_st auth1_t;
+#if !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE) && !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE_CERTS_CELL)
+struct certs_cell_st {
+  uint8_t n_certs;
+  TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_HEAD(, struct certs_cell_cert_st *) certs;
+  uint8_t trunnel_error_code_;
+};
+#endif
+typedef struct certs_cell_st certs_cell_t;
+/** Return a newly allocated auth_challenge_cell with all elements set
+ * to zero.
+ */
+auth_challenge_cell_t *auth_challenge_cell_new(void);
+/** Release all storage held by the auth_challenge_cell in 'victim'.
+ * (Do nothing if 'victim' is NULL.)
+ */
+void auth_challenge_cell_free(auth_challenge_cell_t *victim);
+/** Try to parse a auth_challenge_cell from the buffer in 'input',
+ * using up to 'len_in' bytes from the input buffer. On success,
+ * return the number of bytes consumed and set *output to the newly
+ * allocated auth_challenge_cell_t. On failure, return -2 if the input
+ * appears truncated, and -1 if the input is otherwise invalid.
+ */
+ssize_t auth_challenge_cell_parse(auth_challenge_cell_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in);
+/** Return the number of bytes we expect to need to encode the
+ * auth_challenge_cell in 'obj'. On failure, return a negative value.
+ * Note that this value may be an overestimate, and can even be an
+ * underestimate for certain unencodeable objects.
+ */
+ssize_t auth_challenge_cell_encoded_len(const auth_challenge_cell_t *obj);
+/** Try to encode the auth_challenge_cell from 'input' into the buffer
+ * at 'output', using up to 'avail' bytes of the output buffer. On
+ * success, return the number of bytes used. On failure, return -2 if
+ * the buffer was not long enough, and -1 if the input was invalid.
+ */
+ssize_t auth_challenge_cell_encode(uint8_t *output, const size_t avail, const auth_challenge_cell_t *input);
+/** Check whether the internal state of the auth_challenge_cell in
+ * 'obj' is consistent. Return NULL if it is, and a short message if
+ * it is not.
+ */
+const char *auth_challenge_cell_check(const auth_challenge_cell_t *obj);
+/** Clear any errors that were set on the object 'obj' by its setter
+ * functions. Return true iff errors were cleared.
+ */
+int auth_challenge_cell_clear_errors(auth_challenge_cell_t *obj);
+/** Return the (constant) length of the array holding the challenge
+ * field of the auth_challenge_cell_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+size_t auth_challenge_cell_getlen_challenge(const auth_challenge_cell_t *inp);
+/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field
+ * challenge of the auth_challenge_cell_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t auth_challenge_cell_get_challenge(const auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field
+ * challenge of the auth_challenge_cell_t in 'inp', so that it will
+ * hold the value 'elt'.
+ */
+int auth_challenge_cell_set_challenge(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
+/** Return a pointer to the 32-element array field challenge of 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t * auth_challenge_cell_getarray_challenge(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp);
+/** Return the value of the n_methods field of the
+ * auth_challenge_cell_t in 'inp'
+ */
+uint16_t auth_challenge_cell_get_n_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp);
+/** Set the value of the n_methods field of the auth_challenge_cell_t
+ * in 'inp' to 'val'. Return 0 on success; return -1 and set the error
+ * code on 'inp' on failure.
+ */
+int auth_challenge_cell_set_n_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, uint16_t val);
+/** Return the length of the dynamic array holding the methods field
+ * of the auth_challenge_cell_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+size_t auth_challenge_cell_getlen_methods(const auth_challenge_cell_t *inp);
+/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the dynamic array field
+ * methods of the auth_challenge_cell_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+uint16_t auth_challenge_cell_get_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the dynamic array field
+ * methods of the auth_challenge_cell_t in 'inp', so that it will hold
+ * the value 'elt'.
+ */
+int auth_challenge_cell_set_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t idx, uint16_t elt);
+/** Append a new element 'elt' to the dynamic array field methods of
+ * the auth_challenge_cell_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+int auth_challenge_cell_add_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, uint16_t elt);
+/** Return a pointer to the variable-length array field methods of
+ * 'inp'.
+ */
+uint16_t * auth_challenge_cell_getarray_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp);
+/** Change the length of the variable-length array field methods of
+ * 'inp' to 'newlen'.Fill extra elements with 0. Return 0 on success;
+ * return -1 and set the error code on 'inp' on failure.
+ */
+int auth_challenge_cell_setlen_methods(auth_challenge_cell_t *inp, size_t newlen);
+/** Return a newly allocated auth_ctx with all elements set to zero.
+ */
+auth_ctx_t *auth_ctx_new(void);
+/** Release all storage held by the auth_ctx in 'victim'. (Do nothing
+ * if 'victim' is NULL.)
+ */
+void auth_ctx_free(auth_ctx_t *victim);
+/** Return the value of the is_ed field of the auth_ctx_t in 'inp'
+ */
+uint8_t auth_ctx_get_is_ed(auth_ctx_t *inp);
+/** Set the value of the is_ed field of the auth_ctx_t in 'inp' to
+ * 'val'. Return 0 on success; return -1 and set the error code on
+ * 'inp' on failure.
+ */
+int auth_ctx_set_is_ed(auth_ctx_t *inp, uint8_t val);
+/** Return a newly allocated certs_cell_cert with all elements set to
+ * zero.
+ */
+certs_cell_cert_t *certs_cell_cert_new(void);
+/** Release all storage held by the certs_cell_cert in 'victim'. (Do
+ * nothing if 'victim' is NULL.)
+ */
+void certs_cell_cert_free(certs_cell_cert_t *victim);
+/** Try to parse a certs_cell_cert from the buffer in 'input', using
+ * up to 'len_in' bytes from the input buffer. On success, return the
+ * number of bytes consumed and set *output to the newly allocated
+ * certs_cell_cert_t. On failure, return -2 if the input appears
+ * truncated, and -1 if the input is otherwise invalid.
+ */
+ssize_t certs_cell_cert_parse(certs_cell_cert_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in);
+/** Return the number of bytes we expect to need to encode the
+ * certs_cell_cert in 'obj'. On failure, return a negative value. Note
+ * that this value may be an overestimate, and can even be an
+ * underestimate for certain unencodeable objects.
+ */
+ssize_t certs_cell_cert_encoded_len(const certs_cell_cert_t *obj);
+/** Try to encode the certs_cell_cert from 'input' into the buffer at
+ * 'output', using up to 'avail' bytes of the output buffer. On
+ * success, return the number of bytes used. On failure, return -2 if
+ * the buffer was not long enough, and -1 if the input was invalid.
+ */
+ssize_t certs_cell_cert_encode(uint8_t *output, const size_t avail, const certs_cell_cert_t *input);
+/** Check whether the internal state of the certs_cell_cert in 'obj'
+ * is consistent. Return NULL if it is, and a short message if it is
+ * not.
+ */
+const char *certs_cell_cert_check(const certs_cell_cert_t *obj);
+/** Clear any errors that were set on the object 'obj' by its setter
+ * functions. Return true iff errors were cleared.
+ */
+int certs_cell_cert_clear_errors(certs_cell_cert_t *obj);
+/** Return the value of the cert_type field of the certs_cell_cert_t
+ * in 'inp'
+ */
+uint8_t certs_cell_cert_get_cert_type(certs_cell_cert_t *inp);
+/** Set the value of the cert_type field of the certs_cell_cert_t in
+ * 'inp' to 'val'. Return 0 on success; return -1 and set the error
+ * code on 'inp' on failure.
+ */
+int certs_cell_cert_set_cert_type(certs_cell_cert_t *inp, uint8_t val);
+/** Return the value of the cert_len field of the certs_cell_cert_t in
+ * 'inp'
+ */
+uint16_t certs_cell_cert_get_cert_len(certs_cell_cert_t *inp);
+/** Set the value of the cert_len field of the certs_cell_cert_t in
+ * 'inp' to 'val'. Return 0 on success; return -1 and set the error
+ * code on 'inp' on failure.
+ */
+int certs_cell_cert_set_cert_len(certs_cell_cert_t *inp, uint16_t val);
+/** Return the length of the dynamic array holding the body field of
+ * the certs_cell_cert_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+size_t certs_cell_cert_getlen_body(const certs_cell_cert_t *inp);
+/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the dynamic array field
+ * body of the certs_cell_cert_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t certs_cell_cert_get_body(certs_cell_cert_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the dynamic array field
+ * body of the certs_cell_cert_t in 'inp', so that it will hold the
+ * value 'elt'.
+ */
+int certs_cell_cert_set_body(certs_cell_cert_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
+/** Append a new element 'elt' to the dynamic array field body of the
+ * certs_cell_cert_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+int certs_cell_cert_add_body(certs_cell_cert_t *inp, uint8_t elt);
+/** Return a pointer to the variable-length array field body of 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t * certs_cell_cert_getarray_body(certs_cell_cert_t *inp);
+/** Change the length of the variable-length array field body of 'inp'
+ * to 'newlen'.Fill extra elements with 0. Return 0 on success; return
+ * -1 and set the error code on 'inp' on failure.
+ */
+int certs_cell_cert_setlen_body(certs_cell_cert_t *inp, size_t newlen);
+/** Return a newly allocated rsa_ed_crosscert with all elements set to
+ * zero.
+ */
+rsa_ed_crosscert_t *rsa_ed_crosscert_new(void);
+/** Release all storage held by the rsa_ed_crosscert in 'victim'. (Do
+ * nothing if 'victim' is NULL.)
+ */
+void rsa_ed_crosscert_free(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *victim);
+/** Try to parse a rsa_ed_crosscert from the buffer in 'input', using
+ * up to 'len_in' bytes from the input buffer. On success, return the
+ * number of bytes consumed and set *output to the newly allocated
+ * rsa_ed_crosscert_t. On failure, return -2 if the input appears
+ * truncated, and -1 if the input is otherwise invalid.
+ */
+ssize_t rsa_ed_crosscert_parse(rsa_ed_crosscert_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in);
+/** Return the number of bytes we expect to need to encode the
+ * rsa_ed_crosscert in 'obj'. On failure, return a negative value.
+ * Note that this value may be an overestimate, and can even be an
+ * underestimate for certain unencodeable objects.
+ */
+ssize_t rsa_ed_crosscert_encoded_len(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *obj);
+/** Try to encode the rsa_ed_crosscert from 'input' into the buffer at
+ * 'output', using up to 'avail' bytes of the output buffer. On
+ * success, return the number of bytes used. On failure, return -2 if
+ * the buffer was not long enough, and -1 if the input was invalid.
+ */
+ssize_t rsa_ed_crosscert_encode(uint8_t *output, const size_t avail, const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *input);
+/** Check whether the internal state of the rsa_ed_crosscert in 'obj'
+ * is consistent. Return NULL if it is, and a short message if it is
+ * not.
+ */
+const char *rsa_ed_crosscert_check(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *obj);
+/** Clear any errors that were set on the object 'obj' by its setter
+ * functions. Return true iff errors were cleared.
+ */
+int rsa_ed_crosscert_clear_errors(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *obj);
+/** Return the (constant) length of the array holding the ed_key field
+ * of the rsa_ed_crosscert_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+size_t rsa_ed_crosscert_getlen_ed_key(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp);
+/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field
+ * ed_key of the rsa_ed_crosscert_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t rsa_ed_crosscert_get_ed_key(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field
+ * ed_key of the rsa_ed_crosscert_t in 'inp', so that it will hold the
+ * value 'elt'.
+ */
+int rsa_ed_crosscert_set_ed_key(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
+/** Return a pointer to the 32-element array field ed_key of 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t * rsa_ed_crosscert_getarray_ed_key(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp);
+/** Return the value of the expiration field of the rsa_ed_crosscert_t
+ * in 'inp'
+ */
+uint32_t rsa_ed_crosscert_get_expiration(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp);
+/** Set the value of the expiration field of the rsa_ed_crosscert_t in
+ * 'inp' to 'val'. Return 0 on success; return -1 and set the error
+ * code on 'inp' on failure.
+ */
+int rsa_ed_crosscert_set_expiration(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, uint32_t val);
+/** Return the position for end_of_signed when we parsed this object
+ */
+const uint8_t * rsa_ed_crosscert_get_end_of_signed(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp);
+/** Return the value of the sig_len field of the rsa_ed_crosscert_t in
+ * 'inp'
+ */
+uint8_t rsa_ed_crosscert_get_sig_len(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp);
+/** Set the value of the sig_len field of the rsa_ed_crosscert_t in
+ * 'inp' to 'val'. Return 0 on success; return -1 and set the error
+ * code on 'inp' on failure.
+ */
+int rsa_ed_crosscert_set_sig_len(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, uint8_t val);
+/** Return the length of the dynamic array holding the sig field of
+ * the rsa_ed_crosscert_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+size_t rsa_ed_crosscert_getlen_sig(const rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp);
+/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the dynamic array field
+ * sig of the rsa_ed_crosscert_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t rsa_ed_crosscert_get_sig(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the dynamic array field
+ * sig of the rsa_ed_crosscert_t in 'inp', so that it will hold the
+ * value 'elt'.
+ */
+int rsa_ed_crosscert_set_sig(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
+/** Append a new element 'elt' to the dynamic array field sig of the
+ * rsa_ed_crosscert_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+int rsa_ed_crosscert_add_sig(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, uint8_t elt);
+/** Return a pointer to the variable-length array field sig of 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t * rsa_ed_crosscert_getarray_sig(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp);
+/** Change the length of the variable-length array field sig of 'inp'
+ * to 'newlen'.Fill extra elements with 0. Return 0 on success; return
+ * -1 and set the error code on 'inp' on failure.
+ */
+int rsa_ed_crosscert_setlen_sig(rsa_ed_crosscert_t *inp, size_t newlen);
+/** Return a newly allocated auth1 with all elements set to zero.
+ */
+auth1_t *auth1_new(void);
+/** Release all storage held by the auth1 in 'victim'. (Do nothing if
+ * 'victim' is NULL.)
+ */
+void auth1_free(auth1_t *victim);
+/** Try to parse a auth1 from the buffer in 'input', using up to
+ * 'len_in' bytes from the input buffer. On success, return the number
+ * of bytes consumed and set *output to the newly allocated auth1_t.
+ * On failure, return -2 if the input appears truncated, and -1 if the
+ * input is otherwise invalid.
+ */
+ssize_t auth1_parse(auth1_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in, const auth_ctx_t *auth_ctx_ctx);
+/** Return the number of bytes we expect to need to encode the auth1
+ * in 'obj'. On failure, return a negative value. Note that this value
+ * may be an overestimate, and can even be an underestimate for
+ * certain unencodeable objects.
+ */
+ssize_t auth1_encoded_len(const auth1_t *obj, const auth_ctx_t *auth_ctx_ctx);
+/** Try to encode the auth1 from 'input' into the buffer at 'output',
+ * using up to 'avail' bytes of the output buffer. On success, return
+ * the number of bytes used. On failure, return -2 if the buffer was
+ * not long enough, and -1 if the input was invalid.
+ */
+ssize_t auth1_encode(uint8_t *output, const size_t avail, const auth1_t *input, const auth_ctx_t *auth_ctx_ctx);
+/** Check whether the internal state of the auth1 in 'obj' is
+ * consistent. Return NULL if it is, and a short message if it is not.
+ */
+const char *auth1_check(const auth1_t *obj, const auth_ctx_t *auth_ctx_ctx);
+/** Clear any errors that were set on the object 'obj' by its setter
+ * functions. Return true iff errors were cleared.
+ */
+int auth1_clear_errors(auth1_t *obj);
+/** Return the (constant) length of the array holding the type field
+ * of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+size_t auth1_getlen_type(const auth1_t *inp);
+/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field type
+ * of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t auth1_get_type(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field type
+ * of the auth1_t in 'inp', so that it will hold the value 'elt'.
+ */
+int auth1_set_type(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
+/** Return a pointer to the 8-element array field type of 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t * auth1_getarray_type(auth1_t *inp);
+/** Return the (constant) length of the array holding the cid field of
+ * the auth1_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+size_t auth1_getlen_cid(const auth1_t *inp);
+/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field cid
+ * of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t auth1_get_cid(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field cid
+ * of the auth1_t in 'inp', so that it will hold the value 'elt'.
+ */
+int auth1_set_cid(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
+/** Return a pointer to the 32-element array field cid of 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t * auth1_getarray_cid(auth1_t *inp);
+/** Return the (constant) length of the array holding the sid field of
+ * the auth1_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+size_t auth1_getlen_sid(const auth1_t *inp);
+/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field sid
+ * of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t auth1_get_sid(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field sid
+ * of the auth1_t in 'inp', so that it will hold the value 'elt'.
+ */
+int auth1_set_sid(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
+/** Return a pointer to the 32-element array field sid of 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t * auth1_getarray_sid(auth1_t *inp);
+/** Return the (constant) length of the array holding the u1_cid_ed
+ * field of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+size_t auth1_getlen_u1_cid_ed(const auth1_t *inp);
+/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field
+ * u1_cid_ed of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t auth1_get_u1_cid_ed(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field
+ * u1_cid_ed of the auth1_t in 'inp', so that it will hold the value
+ * 'elt'.
+ */
+int auth1_set_u1_cid_ed(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
+/** Return a pointer to the 32-element array field u1_cid_ed of 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t * auth1_getarray_u1_cid_ed(auth1_t *inp);
+/** Return the (constant) length of the array holding the u1_sid_ed
+ * field of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+size_t auth1_getlen_u1_sid_ed(const auth1_t *inp);
+/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field
+ * u1_sid_ed of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t auth1_get_u1_sid_ed(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field
+ * u1_sid_ed of the auth1_t in 'inp', so that it will hold the value
+ * 'elt'.
+ */
+int auth1_set_u1_sid_ed(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
+/** Return a pointer to the 32-element array field u1_sid_ed of 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t * auth1_getarray_u1_sid_ed(auth1_t *inp);
+/** Return the (constant) length of the array holding the slog field
+ * of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+size_t auth1_getlen_slog(const auth1_t *inp);
+/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field slog
+ * of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t auth1_get_slog(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field slog
+ * of the auth1_t in 'inp', so that it will hold the value 'elt'.
+ */
+int auth1_set_slog(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
+/** Return a pointer to the 32-element array field slog of 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t * auth1_getarray_slog(auth1_t *inp);
+/** Return the (constant) length of the array holding the clog field
+ * of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+size_t auth1_getlen_clog(const auth1_t *inp);
+/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field clog
+ * of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t auth1_get_clog(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field clog
+ * of the auth1_t in 'inp', so that it will hold the value 'elt'.
+ */
+int auth1_set_clog(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
+/** Return a pointer to the 32-element array field clog of 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t * auth1_getarray_clog(auth1_t *inp);
+/** Return the (constant) length of the array holding the scert field
+ * of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+size_t auth1_getlen_scert(const auth1_t *inp);
+/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field
+ * scert of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t auth1_get_scert(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field
+ * scert of the auth1_t in 'inp', so that it will hold the value
+ * 'elt'.
+ */
+int auth1_set_scert(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
+/** Return a pointer to the 32-element array field scert of 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t * auth1_getarray_scert(auth1_t *inp);
+/** Return the (constant) length of the array holding the tlssecrets
+ * field of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+size_t auth1_getlen_tlssecrets(const auth1_t *inp);
+/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field
+ * tlssecrets of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t auth1_get_tlssecrets(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field
+ * tlssecrets of the auth1_t in 'inp', so that it will hold the value
+ * 'elt'.
+ */
+int auth1_set_tlssecrets(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
+/** Return a pointer to the 32-element array field tlssecrets of
+ * 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t * auth1_getarray_tlssecrets(auth1_t *inp);
+/** Return the position for end_of_fixed_part when we parsed this
+ * object
+ */
+const uint8_t * auth1_get_end_of_fixed_part(const auth1_t *inp);
+/** Return the (constant) length of the array holding the rand field
+ * of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+size_t auth1_getlen_rand(const auth1_t *inp);
+/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field rand
+ * of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t auth1_get_rand(const auth1_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field rand
+ * of the auth1_t in 'inp', so that it will hold the value 'elt'.
+ */
+int auth1_set_rand(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
+/** Return a pointer to the 24-element array field rand of 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t * auth1_getarray_rand(auth1_t *inp);
+/** Return the position for end_of_signed when we parsed this object
+ */
+const uint8_t * auth1_get_end_of_signed(const auth1_t *inp);
+/** Return the length of the dynamic array holding the sig field of
+ * the auth1_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+size_t auth1_getlen_sig(const auth1_t *inp);
+/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the dynamic array field
+ * sig of the auth1_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t auth1_get_sig(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the dynamic array field
+ * sig of the auth1_t in 'inp', so that it will hold the value 'elt'.
+ */
+int auth1_set_sig(auth1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt);
+/** Append a new element 'elt' to the dynamic array field sig of the
+ * auth1_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+int auth1_add_sig(auth1_t *inp, uint8_t elt);
+/** Return a pointer to the variable-length array field sig of 'inp'.
+ */
+uint8_t * auth1_getarray_sig(auth1_t *inp);
+/** Change the length of the variable-length array field sig of 'inp'
+ * to 'newlen'.Fill extra elements with 0. Return 0 on success; return
+ * -1 and set the error code on 'inp' on failure.
+ */
+int auth1_setlen_sig(auth1_t *inp, size_t newlen);
+/** Return a newly allocated certs_cell with all elements set to zero.
+ */
+certs_cell_t *certs_cell_new(void);
+/** Release all storage held by the certs_cell in 'victim'. (Do
+ * nothing if 'victim' is NULL.)
+ */
+void certs_cell_free(certs_cell_t *victim);
+/** Try to parse a certs_cell from the buffer in 'input', using up to
+ * 'len_in' bytes from the input buffer. On success, return the number
+ * of bytes consumed and set *output to the newly allocated
+ * certs_cell_t. On failure, return -2 if the input appears truncated,
+ * and -1 if the input is otherwise invalid.
+ */
+ssize_t certs_cell_parse(certs_cell_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in);
+/** Return the number of bytes we expect to need to encode the
+ * certs_cell in 'obj'. On failure, return a negative value. Note that
+ * this value may be an overestimate, and can even be an underestimate
+ * for certain unencodeable objects.
+ */
+ssize_t certs_cell_encoded_len(const certs_cell_t *obj);
+/** Try to encode the certs_cell from 'input' into the buffer at
+ * 'output', using up to 'avail' bytes of the output buffer. On
+ * success, return the number of bytes used. On failure, return -2 if
+ * the buffer was not long enough, and -1 if the input was invalid.
+ */
+ssize_t certs_cell_encode(uint8_t *output, const size_t avail, const certs_cell_t *input);
+/** Check whether the internal state of the certs_cell in 'obj' is
+ * consistent. Return NULL if it is, and a short message if it is not.
+ */
+const char *certs_cell_check(const certs_cell_t *obj);
+/** Clear any errors that were set on the object 'obj' by its setter
+ * functions. Return true iff errors were cleared.
+ */
+int certs_cell_clear_errors(certs_cell_t *obj);
+/** Return the value of the n_certs field of the certs_cell_t in 'inp'
+ */
+uint8_t certs_cell_get_n_certs(certs_cell_t *inp);
+/** Set the value of the n_certs field of the certs_cell_t in 'inp' to
+ * 'val'. Return 0 on success; return -1 and set the error code on
+ * 'inp' on failure.
+ */
+int certs_cell_set_n_certs(certs_cell_t *inp, uint8_t val);
+/** Return the length of the dynamic array holding the certs field of
+ * the certs_cell_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+size_t certs_cell_getlen_certs(const certs_cell_t *inp);
+/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the dynamic array field
+ * certs of the certs_cell_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+struct certs_cell_cert_st * certs_cell_get_certs(certs_cell_t *inp, size_t idx);
+/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the dynamic array field
+ * certs of the certs_cell_t in 'inp', so that it will hold the value
+ * 'elt'. Free the previous value, if any.
+ */
+int certs_cell_set_certs(certs_cell_t *inp, size_t idx, struct certs_cell_cert_st * elt);
+/** As certs_cell_set_certs, but does not free the previous value.
+ */
+int certs_cell_set0_certs(certs_cell_t *inp, size_t idx, struct certs_cell_cert_st * elt);
+/** Append a new element 'elt' to the dynamic array field certs of the
+ * certs_cell_t in 'inp'.
+ */
+int certs_cell_add_certs(certs_cell_t *inp, struct certs_cell_cert_st * elt);
+/** Return a pointer to the variable-length array field certs of
+ * 'inp'.
+ */
+struct certs_cell_cert_st * * certs_cell_getarray_certs(certs_cell_t *inp);
+/** Change the length of the variable-length array field certs of
+ * 'inp' to 'newlen'.Fill extra elements with NULL; free removed
+ * elements. Return 0 on success; return -1 and set the error code on
+ * 'inp' on failure.
+ */
+int certs_cell_setlen_certs(certs_cell_t *inp, size_t newlen);
+
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/trunnel/link_handshake.trunnel b/src/trunnel/link_handshake.trunnel
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b858e17c60
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/trunnel/link_handshake.trunnel
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+
+struct certs_cell {
+  u8 n_certs;
+  struct certs_cell_cert certs[n_certs];
+}
+
+const CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_LINK = 1;
+const CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_ID   = 2;
+const CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_AUTH = 3;
+const CERTTYPE_ED_ID_SIGN      = 4;
+const CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_LINK    = 5;
+const CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_AUTH    = 6;
+const CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_EDID = 7;
+
+struct certs_cell_cert {
+  u8 cert_type;
+  u16 cert_len;
+  u8 body[cert_len];
+}
+
+struct rsa_ed_crosscert {
+  u8 ed_key[32];
+  u32 expiration;
+  @ptr end_of_signed;
+  u8 sig_len;
+  u8 sig[sig_len]; // mismatches spec.
+}
+
+struct auth_challenge_cell {
+  u8 challenge[32];
+  u16 n_methods;
+  u16 methods[n_methods];
+}
+
+context auth_ctx {
+  u8 is_ed;
+}
+
+struct auth1 with context auth_ctx {
+  u8 type[8];
+  u8 cid[32];
+  u8 sid[32];
+  union u1[auth_ctx.is_ed] {
+    0 : ;
+    1 : u8 cid_ed[32];
+        u8 sid_ed[32];
+    default: fail;
+  };
+  u8 slog[32];
+  u8 clog[32];
+  u8 scert[32];
+  u8 tlssecrets[32];
+  @ptr end_of_fixed_part;
+  u8 rand[24];
+  @ptr end_of_signed;
+  u8 sig[];
+}