protover: TROVE-2018-005 Fix potential DoS in protover protocol parsing.

In protover.c, the `expand_protocol_list()` function expands a `smartlist_t` of
`proto_entry_t`s to their protocol name concatenated with each version number.
For example, given a `proto_entry_t` like so:

    proto_entry_t *proto = tor_malloc(sizeof(proto_entry_t));
    proto_range_t *range = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(proto_range_t));

    proto->name = tor_strdup("DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa[19KB]aaa");
    proto->ranges = smartlist_new();

    range->low = 1;
    range->high = 65536;

    smartlist_add(proto->ranges, range);

(Where `[19KB]` is roughly 19KB of `"a"` bytes.)  This would expand in
`expand_protocol_list()` to a `smartlist_t` containing 65536 copies of the
string, e.g.:

    "DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa[19KB]aaa=1"
    "DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa[19KB]aaa=2"
    […]
    "DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa[19KB]aaa=65535"

Thus constituting a potential resource exhaustion attack.

The Rust implementation is not subject to this attack, because it instead
expands the above string into a `HashMap<String, HashSet<u32>` prior to #24031,
and a `HashMap<UnvalidatedProtocol, ProtoSet>` after).  Neither Rust version is
subject to this attack, because it only stores the `String` once per protocol.
(Although a related, but apparently of too minor impact to be usable, DoS bug
has been fixed in #24031. [0])

[0]: https://bugs.torproject.org/24031

 * ADDS hard limit on protocol name lengths in protover.c and checks in
   parse_single_entry() and expand_protocol_list().
 * ADDS tests to ensure the bug is caught.
 * FIXES #25517: https://bugs.torproject.org/25517

1 files changed, 24 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/test/test_protover.c b/src/test/test_protover.c
index 7bf1471ebd..7a4fffad8b 100644
--- a/src/test/test_protover.c
+++ b/src/test/test_protover.c
@@ -125,6 +125,13 @@ test_protover_parse_fail(void *arg)
   /* Broken range */
   elts = parse_protocol_list("Link=1,9-8,3");
   tt_ptr_op(elts, OP_EQ, NULL);
+
+  /* Protocol name too long */
+  elts = parse_protocol_list("DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"
+                             "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"
+                             "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa");
+  tt_ptr_op(elts, OP_EQ, NULL);
+
 #endif
  done:
   ;
@@ -219,6 +226,15 @@ test_protover_vote(void *arg)
   tt_str_op(result, OP_EQ, "");
   tor_free(result);
 
+  /* Protocol name too long */
+  smartlist_clear(lst);
+  smartlist_add(lst, (void*) "DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"
+                             "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"
+                             "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa");
+  result = protover_compute_vote(lst, 1);
+  tt_str_op(result, OP_EQ, "");
+  tor_free(result);
+
  done:
   tor_free(result);
   smartlist_free(lst);
@@ -300,6 +316,14 @@ test_protover_all_supported(void *arg)
   tt_assert(protover_all_supported("Sleen=0-4294967295", &msg));
   tor_end_capture_bugs_();
 
+  /* Protocol name too long */
+  tor_capture_bugs_(1);
+  tt_assert(protover_all_supported("DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"
+                                   "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"
+                                   "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"
+                                   "aaaaaaaaaaaa=1-65536", &msg));
+  tor_end_capture_bugs_();
+
  done:
   tor_end_capture_bugs_();
   tor_free(msg);