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authorNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2018-02-15 09:05:55 -0500
committerNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2018-03-01 16:05:17 -0500
commit1fe0bae508120bbf4954de6b590dd0c722a883bc (patch)
treedfbadd8c8d1bb8bdf4b56f509cae9baa93396817 /src/test/test_protover.c
parent8b405c609e82fbfb5470967fc4c45165c708e72b (diff)
downloadtor-1fe0bae508120bbf4954de6b590dd0c722a883bc.tar.gz
tor-1fe0bae508120bbf4954de6b590dd0c722a883bc.zip
Forbid UINT32_MAX as a protocol version
The C code and the rust code had different separate integer overflow bugs here. That suggests that we're better off just forbidding this pathological case. Also, add tests for expected behavior on receiving a bad protocol list in a consensus. Fixes another part of 25249.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/test/test_protover.c')
-rw-r--r--src/test/test_protover.c21
1 files changed, 18 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/src/test/test_protover.c b/src/test/test_protover.c
index 4c41b6db6b..8d061c69ca 100644
--- a/src/test/test_protover.c
+++ b/src/test/test_protover.c
@@ -257,12 +257,27 @@ test_protover_all_supported(void *arg)
tt_str_op(msg, OP_EQ, "Sleen=0-2147483648");
tor_free(msg);
- /* Rust seems to experience an internal error here */
- tt_assert(! protover_all_supported("Sleen=0-4294967295", &msg));
- tt_str_op(msg, OP_EQ, "Sleen=0-4294967295");
+ /* This case is allowed. */
+ tt_assert(! protover_all_supported("Sleen=0-4294967294", &msg));
+ tt_str_op(msg, OP_EQ, "Sleen=0-4294967294");
tor_free(msg);
+ /* If we get an unparseable list, we say "yes, that's supported." */
+ tor_capture_bugs_(1);
+ tt_assert(protover_all_supported("Fribble", &msg));
+ tt_ptr_op(msg, OP_EQ, NULL);
+ tor_end_capture_bugs_();
+
+ /* This case is forbidden. Since it came from a protover_all_supported,
+ * it can trigger a bug message. */
+ tor_capture_bugs_(1);
+ tt_assert(protover_all_supported("Sleen=0-4294967295", &msg));
+ tt_ptr_op(msg, OP_EQ, NULL);
+ tor_free(msg);
+ tor_end_capture_bugs_();
+
done:
+ tor_end_capture_bugs_();
tor_free(msg);
}