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authorNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2014-08-28 17:38:22 -0400
committerNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2014-09-25 11:58:13 -0400
commite84e1c97458a7b0f449b6689caa0b3da2853f471 (patch)
treef2c4df982535a07a4cbab6aa79c4efb8188afab4 /src/test/test_crypto.c
parente72a5b3c070451e7762b1d22553cf077c50eb123 (diff)
downloadtor-e84e1c97458a7b0f449b6689caa0b3da2853f471.tar.gz
tor-e84e1c97458a7b0f449b6689caa0b3da2853f471.zip
More generic passphrase hashing code, including scrypt support
Uses libscrypt when found; otherwise, we don't have scrypt and we only support openpgp rfc2440 s2k hashing, or pbkdf2. Includes documentation and unit tests; coverage around 95%. Remaining uncovered code is sanity-checks that shouldn't be reachable fwict.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/test/test_crypto.c')
-rw-r--r--src/test/test_crypto.c177
1 files changed, 175 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/src/test/test_crypto.c b/src/test/test_crypto.c
index d0024750cf..d36d65745c 100644
--- a/src/test/test_crypto.c
+++ b/src/test/test_crypto.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#ifdef CURVE25519_ENABLED
#include "crypto_curve25519.h"
#endif
+#include "crypto_s2k.h"
extern const char AUTHORITY_SIGNKEY_3[];
extern const char AUTHORITY_SIGNKEY_A_DIGEST[];
@@ -696,7 +697,7 @@ test_crypto_formats(void)
/** Run unit tests for our secret-to-key passphrase hashing functionality. */
static void
-test_crypto_s2k(void)
+test_crypto_s2k_rfc2440(void)
{
char buf[29];
char buf2[29];
@@ -727,6 +728,165 @@ test_crypto_s2k(void)
tor_free(buf3);
}
+static void
+run_s2k_tests(const unsigned flags, const unsigned type,
+ int speclen, const int keylen, int legacy)
+{
+ uint8_t buf[S2K_MAXLEN], buf2[S2K_MAXLEN], buf3[S2K_MAXLEN];
+ int r;
+ size_t sz;
+ const char pw1[] = "You can't come in here unless you say swordfish!";
+ const char pw2[] = "Now, I give you one more guess.";
+
+ r = secret_to_key_new(buf, sizeof(buf), &sz,
+ pw1, strlen(pw1), flags);
+ tt_int_op(r, ==, S2K_OKAY);
+ tt_int_op(buf[0], ==, type);
+
+ tt_int_op(sz, ==, keylen + speclen);
+
+ if (legacy) {
+ memmove(buf, buf+1, sz-1);
+ --sz;
+ --speclen;
+ }
+
+ tt_int_op(S2K_OKAY, ==,
+ secret_to_key_check(buf, sz, pw1, strlen(pw1)));
+
+ tt_int_op(S2K_BAD_SECRET, ==,
+ secret_to_key_check(buf, sz, pw2, strlen(pw2)));
+
+ /* Move key to buf2, and clear it. */
+ memset(buf3, 0, sizeof(buf3));
+ memcpy(buf2, buf+speclen, keylen);
+ memset(buf+speclen, 0, sz - speclen);
+
+ /* Derivekey should produce the same results. */
+ tt_int_op(S2K_OKAY, ==,
+ secret_to_key_derivekey(buf3, keylen, buf, speclen, pw1, strlen(pw1)));
+
+ tt_mem_op(buf2, ==, buf3, keylen);
+
+ /* Derivekey with a longer output should fill the output. */
+ memset(buf2, 0, sizeof(buf2));
+ tt_int_op(S2K_OKAY, ==,
+ secret_to_key_derivekey(buf2, sizeof(buf2), buf, speclen,
+ pw1, strlen(pw1)));
+
+ tt_mem_op(buf2, !=, buf3, keylen);
+
+ memset(buf3, 0, sizeof(buf3));
+ tt_int_op(S2K_OKAY, ==,
+ secret_to_key_derivekey(buf3, sizeof(buf3), buf, speclen,
+ pw1, strlen(pw1)));
+ tt_mem_op(buf2, ==, buf3, sizeof(buf3));
+ tt_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero((char*)buf2+keylen, sizeof(buf2)-keylen));
+
+ done:
+ ;
+}
+
+static void
+test_crypto_s2k_general(void *arg)
+{
+ const char *which = arg;
+
+ if (!strcmp(which, "scrypt")) {
+ run_s2k_tests(0, 2, 19, 32, 0);
+ } else if (!strcmp(which, "scrypt-low")) {
+ run_s2k_tests(S2K_FLAG_LOW_MEM, 2, 19, 32, 0);
+ } else if (!strcmp(which, "pbkdf2")) {
+ run_s2k_tests(S2K_FLAG_USE_PBKDF2, 1, 18, 20, 0);
+ } else if (!strcmp(which, "rfc2440")) {
+ run_s2k_tests(S2K_FLAG_NO_SCRYPT, 0, 10, 20, 0);
+ } else if (!strcmp(which, "rfc2440-legacy")) {
+ run_s2k_tests(S2K_FLAG_NO_SCRYPT, 0, 10, 20, 1);
+ } else {
+ tt_fail();
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+test_crypto_s2k_errors(void *arg)
+{
+ uint8_t buf[S2K_MAXLEN], buf2[S2K_MAXLEN];
+ size_t sz;
+
+ (void)arg;
+
+ /* Bogus specifiers: simple */
+ tt_int_op(S2K_BAD_LEN, ==,
+ secret_to_key_derivekey(buf, sizeof(buf),
+ (const uint8_t*)"", 0, "ABC", 3));
+ tt_int_op(S2K_BAD_ALGORITHM, ==,
+ secret_to_key_derivekey(buf, sizeof(buf),
+ (const uint8_t*)"\x10", 1, "ABC", 3));
+ tt_int_op(S2K_BAD_LEN, ==,
+ secret_to_key_derivekey(buf, sizeof(buf),
+ (const uint8_t*)"\x01\x02", 2, "ABC", 3));
+
+ tt_int_op(S2K_BAD_LEN, ==,
+ secret_to_key_check((const uint8_t*)"", 0, "ABC", 3));
+ tt_int_op(S2K_BAD_ALGORITHM, ==,
+ secret_to_key_check((const uint8_t*)"\x10", 1, "ABC", 3));
+ tt_int_op(S2K_BAD_LEN, ==,
+ secret_to_key_check((const uint8_t*)"\x01\x02", 2, "ABC", 3));
+
+ /* too long gets "BAD_LEN" too */
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ buf[0] = 2;
+ tt_int_op(S2K_BAD_LEN, ==,
+ secret_to_key_derivekey(buf2, sizeof(buf2),
+ buf, sizeof(buf), "ABC", 3));
+
+ /* Truncated output */
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBSCRYPT_H
+ tt_int_op(S2K_TRUNCATED, ==, secret_to_key_new(buf, 50, &sz,
+ "ABC", 3, 0));
+ tt_int_op(S2K_TRUNCATED, ==, secret_to_key_new(buf, 50, &sz,
+ "ABC", 3, S2K_FLAG_LOW_MEM));
+#endif
+ tt_int_op(S2K_TRUNCATED, ==, secret_to_key_new(buf, 37, &sz,
+ "ABC", 3, S2K_FLAG_USE_PBKDF2));
+ tt_int_op(S2K_TRUNCATED, ==, secret_to_key_new(buf, 29, &sz,
+ "ABC", 3, S2K_FLAG_NO_SCRYPT));
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBSCRYPT_H
+ tt_int_op(S2K_TRUNCATED, ==, secret_to_key_make_specifier(buf, 18, 0));
+ tt_int_op(S2K_TRUNCATED, ==, secret_to_key_make_specifier(buf, 18,
+ S2K_FLAG_LOW_MEM));
+#endif
+ tt_int_op(S2K_TRUNCATED, ==, secret_to_key_make_specifier(buf, 17,
+ S2K_FLAG_USE_PBKDF2));
+ tt_int_op(S2K_TRUNCATED, ==, secret_to_key_make_specifier(buf, 9,
+ S2K_FLAG_NO_SCRYPT));
+
+ /* Now try using type-specific bogus specifiers. */
+
+ /* It's a bad pbkdf2 buffer if it has an iteration count that would overflow
+ * int32_t. */
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ buf[0] = 1; /* pbkdf2 */
+ buf[17] = 100; /* 1<<100 is much bigger than INT32_MAX */
+ tt_int_op(S2K_BAD_PARAMS, ==,
+ secret_to_key_derivekey(buf2, sizeof(buf2),
+ buf, 18, "ABC", 3));
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBSCRYPT_H
+ /* It's a bad scrypt buffer if N would overflow uint64 */
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ buf[0] = 2; /* scrypt */
+ buf[17] = 100; /* 1<<100 is much bigger than UINT64_MAX */
+ tt_int_op(S2K_BAD_PARAMS, ==,
+ secret_to_key_derivekey(buf2, sizeof(buf2),
+ buf, 19, "ABC", 3));
+#endif
+
+ done:
+ ;
+}
+
/** Test AES-CTR encryption and decryption with IV. */
static void
test_crypto_aes_iv(void *arg)
@@ -1288,7 +1448,20 @@ struct testcase_t crypto_tests[] = {
{ "pk_fingerprints", test_crypto_pk_fingerprints, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
CRYPTO_LEGACY(digests),
CRYPTO_LEGACY(dh),
- CRYPTO_LEGACY(s2k),
+ CRYPTO_LEGACY(s2k_rfc2440),
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBSCRYPT_H
+ { "s2k_scrypt", test_crypto_s2k_general, 0, &pass_data,
+ (void*)"scrypt" },
+ { "s2k_scrypt_low", test_crypto_s2k_general, 0, &pass_data,
+ (void*)"scrypt-low" },
+#endif
+ { "s2k_pbkdf2", test_crypto_s2k_general, 0, &pass_data,
+ (void*)"pbkdf2" },
+ { "s2k_rfc2440_general", test_crypto_s2k_general, 0, &pass_data,
+ (void*)"rfc2440" },
+ { "s2k_rfc2440_legacy", test_crypto_s2k_general, 0, &pass_data,
+ (void*)"rfc2440-legacy" },
+ { "s2k_errors", test_crypto_s2k_errors, 0, NULL, NULL },
{ "aes_iv_AES", test_crypto_aes_iv, TT_FORK, &pass_data, (void*)"aes" },
{ "aes_iv_EVP", test_crypto_aes_iv, TT_FORK, &pass_data, (void*)"evp" },
CRYPTO_LEGACY(base32_decode),