Combine DH_BYTES and DH_KEY_LEN; put them in a lib/defs header.

10 files changed, 33 insertions, 35 deletions

diff --git a/src/or/hs_circuit.c b/src/or/hs_circuit.c
index 9fcb30ecc6..853669846e 100644
--- a/src/or/hs_circuit.c
+++ b/src/or/hs_circuit.c
@@ -102,7 +102,8 @@ create_rend_cpath(const uint8_t *ntor_key_seed, size_t seed_len,
 /* We are a v2 legacy HS client: Create and return a crypt path for the hidden
  * service on the other side of the rendezvous circuit <b>circ</b>. Initialize
  * the crypt path crypto using the body of the RENDEZVOUS1 cell at
- * <b>rend_cell_body</b> (which must be at least DH_KEY_LEN+DIGEST_LEN bytes).
+ * <b>rend_cell_body</b> (which must be at least DH1024_KEY_LEN+DIGEST_LEN
+ * bytes).
  */
 static crypt_path_t *
 create_rend_cpath_legacy(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *rend_cell_body)
@@ -110,7 +111,7 @@ create_rend_cpath_legacy(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *rend_cell_body)
   crypt_path_t *hop = NULL;
   char keys[DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN];
 
-  /* first DH_KEY_LEN bytes are g^y from the service. Finish the dh
+  /* first DH1024_KEY_LEN bytes are g^y from the service. Finish the dh
    * handshake...*/
   tor_assert(circ->build_state);
   tor_assert(circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath);
@@ -118,7 +119,7 @@ create_rend_cpath_legacy(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *rend_cell_body)
 
   tor_assert(hop->rend_dh_handshake_state);
   if (crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, hop->rend_dh_handshake_state,
-                               (char*)rend_cell_body, DH_KEY_LEN,
+                               (char*)rend_cell_body, DH1024_KEY_LEN,
                                keys, DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN)<0) {
     log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't complete DH handshake.");
     goto err;
@@ -130,7 +131,7 @@ create_rend_cpath_legacy(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *rend_cell_body)
     goto err;
 
   /* Check whether the digest is right... */
-  if (tor_memneq(keys, rend_cell_body+DH_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN)) {
+  if (tor_memneq(keys, rend_cell_body+DH1024_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN)) {
     log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Incorrect digest of key material.");
     goto err;
   }
@@ -1244,4 +1245,3 @@ hs_circ_cleanup(circuit_t *circ)
     hs_circuitmap_remove_circuit(circ);
   }
 }
-
diff --git a/src/or/hs_common.h b/src/or/hs_common.h
index 6d60d7799f..11806365e4 100644
--- a/src/or/hs_common.h
+++ b/src/or/hs_common.h
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@
  * bigger than the 84 bytes needed for version 3 so we need to pad up to that
  * length so it is indistinguishable between versions. */
 #define HS_LEGACY_RENDEZVOUS_CELL_SIZE \
-  (REND_COOKIE_LEN + DH_KEY_LEN + DIGEST_LEN)
+  (REND_COOKIE_LEN + DH1024_KEY_LEN + DIGEST_LEN)
 
 /* Type of authentication key used by an introduction point. */
 typedef enum {
diff --git a/src/or/onion.c b/src/or/onion.c
index 776aacbf78..2b30870e5d 100644
--- a/src/or/onion.c
+++ b/src/or/onion.c
@@ -558,7 +558,7 @@ onion_skin_server_handshake(int type,
                                         (char*)keys_out, keys_out_len)<0)
       return -1;
     r = TAP_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN;
-    memcpy(rend_nonce_out, reply_out+DH_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
+    memcpy(rend_nonce_out, reply_out+DH1024_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
     break;
   case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_FAST:
     if (onionskin_len != CREATE_FAST_LEN)
@@ -635,7 +635,7 @@ onion_skin_client_handshake(int type,
                                         msg_out) < 0)
       return -1;
 
-    memcpy(rend_authenticator_out, reply+DH_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
+    memcpy(rend_authenticator_out, reply+DH1024_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
 
     return 0;
   case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_FAST:
diff --git a/src/or/onion_tap.c b/src/or/onion_tap.c
index cf5963b19e..0f9f638fa2 100644
--- a/src/or/onion_tap.c
+++ b/src/or/onion_tap.c
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ onion_skin_TAP_create(crypto_pk_t *dest_router_key,
                   crypto_dh_t **handshake_state_out,
                   char *onion_skin_out) /* TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN bytes */
 {
-  char challenge[DH_KEY_LEN];
+  char challenge[DH1024_KEY_LEN];
   crypto_dh_t *dh = NULL;
   int dhbytes, pkbytes;
 
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ onion_skin_TAP_create(crypto_pk_t *dest_router_key,
   /* set meeting point, meeting cookie, etc here. Leave zero for now. */
   if (crypto_pk_obsolete_public_hybrid_encrypt(dest_router_key, onion_skin_out,
                                       TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN,
-                                      challenge, DH_KEY_LEN,
+                                      challenge, DH1024_KEY_LEN,
                                       PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, 1)<0)
     goto err;
 
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(
     log_info(LD_PROTOCOL,
              "Couldn't decrypt onionskin: client may be using old onion key");
     goto err;
-  } else if (len != DH_KEY_LEN) {
+  } else if (len != DH1024_KEY_LEN) {
     log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
            "Unexpected onionskin length after decryption: %ld",
            (long)len);
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(
     goto err;
     /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
   }
-  if (crypto_dh_get_public(dh, handshake_reply_out, DH_KEY_LEN)) {
+  if (crypto_dh_get_public(dh, handshake_reply_out, DH1024_KEY_LEN)) {
     /* LCOV_EXCL_START
      * This can only fail if the length of the key we just allocated is too
      * big. That should be impossible. */
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(
   key_material_len = DIGEST_LEN+key_out_len;
   key_material = tor_malloc(key_material_len);
   len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, dh, challenge,
-                                 DH_KEY_LEN, key_material,
+                                 DH1024_KEY_LEN, key_material,
                                  key_material_len);
   if (len < 0) {
     log_info(LD_GENERAL, "crypto_dh_compute_secret failed.");
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(
   }
 
   /* send back H(K|0) as proof that we learned K. */
-  memcpy(handshake_reply_out+DH_KEY_LEN, key_material, DIGEST_LEN);
+  memcpy(handshake_reply_out+DH1024_KEY_LEN, key_material, DIGEST_LEN);
 
   /* use the rest of the key material for our shared keys, digests, etc */
   memcpy(key_out, key_material+DIGEST_LEN, key_out_len);
@@ -212,12 +212,12 @@ onion_skin_TAP_client_handshake(crypto_dh_t *handshake_state,
   ssize_t len;
   char *key_material=NULL;
   size_t key_material_len;
-  tor_assert(crypto_dh_get_bytes(handshake_state) == DH_KEY_LEN);
+  tor_assert(crypto_dh_get_bytes(handshake_state) == DH1024_KEY_LEN);
 
   key_material_len = DIGEST_LEN + key_out_len;
   key_material = tor_malloc(key_material_len);
   len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, handshake_state,
-                                 handshake_reply, DH_KEY_LEN, key_material,
+                                 handshake_reply, DH1024_KEY_LEN, key_material,
                                  key_material_len);
   if (len < 0) {
     if (msg_out)
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ onion_skin_TAP_client_handshake(crypto_dh_t *handshake_state,
     goto err;
   }
 
-  if (tor_memneq(key_material, handshake_reply+DH_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN)) {
+  if (tor_memneq(key_material, handshake_reply+DH1024_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN)) {
     /* H(K) does *not* match. Something fishy. */
     if (msg_out)
       *msg_out = "Digest DOES NOT MATCH on onion handshake. Bug or attack.";
diff --git a/src/or/onion_tap.h b/src/or/onion_tap.h
index fdc2ce9123..5b1eacce70 100644
--- a/src/or/onion_tap.h
+++ b/src/or/onion_tap.h
@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@
 
 #define TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN (PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING_OVERHEAD+\
                                  CIPHER_KEY_LEN+\
-                                 DH_KEY_LEN)
-#define TAP_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN (DH_KEY_LEN+DIGEST_LEN)
+                                 DH1024_KEY_LEN)
+#define TAP_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN (DH1024_KEY_LEN+DIGEST_LEN)
 
 int onion_skin_TAP_create(crypto_pk_t *router_key,
                       crypto_dh_t **handshake_state_out,
diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h
index 63349cffbb..3d3972fb8f 100644
--- a/src/or/or.h
+++ b/src/or/or.h
@@ -1542,8 +1542,6 @@ typedef struct crypt_path_reference_t crypt_path_reference_t;
 
 #define CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN (20*2+16*2)
 
-#define DH_KEY_LEN DH_BYTES
-
 typedef struct cpath_build_state_t cpath_build_state_t;
 
 /** "magic" value for an origin_circuit_t */
diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c
index 1da695706c..b714574563 100644
--- a/src/or/rendclient.c
+++ b/src/or/rendclient.c
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
   }
 
   if (crypto_dh_get_public(cpath->rend_dh_handshake_state, tmp+dh_offset,
-                           DH_KEY_LEN)<0) {
+                           DH1024_KEY_LEN)<0) {
     log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't extract g^x.");
     status = -2;
     goto perm_err;
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
   r = crypto_pk_obsolete_public_hybrid_encrypt(intro_key, payload+DIGEST_LEN,
                                       sizeof(payload)-DIGEST_LEN,
                                       tmp,
-                                      (int)(dh_offset+DH_KEY_LEN),
+                                      (int)(dh_offset+DH1024_KEY_LEN),
                                       PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, 0);
   if (r<0) {
     log_warn(LD_BUG,"Internal error: hybrid pk encrypt failed.");
@@ -874,7 +874,7 @@ int
 rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
                                size_t request_len)
 {
-  if (request_len != DH_KEY_LEN+DIGEST_LEN) {
+  if (request_len != DH1024_KEY_LEN+DIGEST_LEN) {
     log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,"Incorrect length (%d) on RENDEZVOUS2 cell.",
              (int)request_len);
     goto err;
diff --git a/src/or/rendmid.c b/src/or/rendmid.c
index 56b65079ab..38c1c52e43 100644
--- a/src/or/rendmid.c
+++ b/src/or/rendmid.c
@@ -157,7 +157,8 @@ rend_mid_introduce_legacy(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
    * to revise this protocol anyway.
    */
   if (request_len < (DIGEST_LEN+(MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1)+REND_COOKIE_LEN+
-                     DH_KEY_LEN+CIPHER_KEY_LEN+PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING_OVERHEAD)) {
+                     DH1024_KEY_LEN+CIPHER_KEY_LEN+
+                     PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING_OVERHEAD)) {
     log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Impossibly short INTRODUCE1 cell on circuit %u; "
              "responding with nack.",
              (unsigned)circ->p_circ_id);
@@ -367,4 +368,3 @@ rend_mid_rendezvous(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
   circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), reason);
   return -1;
 }
-
diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c
index b2023c72cb..f55b9b776c 100644
--- a/src/or/rendservice.c
+++ b/src/or/rendservice.c
@@ -2005,7 +2005,7 @@ rend_service_receive_introduction(origin_circuit_t *circuit,
    * part 1. */
   replay = replaycache_add_test_and_elapsed(
       service->accepted_intro_dh_parts,
-      parsed_req->dh, DH_KEY_LEN,
+      parsed_req->dh, DH1024_KEY_LEN,
       &elapsed);
 
   if (replay) {
@@ -2055,7 +2055,7 @@ rend_service_receive_introduction(origin_circuit_t *circuit,
   }
   if (crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, dh,
                                (char *)(parsed_req->dh),
-                               DH_KEY_LEN, keys,
+                               DH1024_KEY_LEN, keys,
                                DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN)<0) {
     log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't complete DH handshake");
     reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL;
@@ -2336,7 +2336,7 @@ rend_service_begin_parse_intro(const uint8_t *request,
   /* min key length plus digest length plus nickname length */
   if (request_len <
         (DIGEST_LEN + REND_COOKIE_LEN + (MAX_NICKNAME_LEN + 1) +
-         DH_KEY_LEN + 42)) {
+         DH1024_KEY_LEN + 42)) {
     if (err_msg_out) {
       tor_asprintf(&err_msg,
                    "got a truncated INTRODUCE%d cell",
@@ -2872,14 +2872,14 @@ rend_service_parse_intro_plaintext(
    */
 
   ver_invariant_len = intro->plaintext_len - ver_specific_len;
-  if (ver_invariant_len < REND_COOKIE_LEN + DH_KEY_LEN) {
+  if (ver_invariant_len < REND_COOKIE_LEN + DH1024_KEY_LEN) {
     tor_asprintf(&err_msg,
         "decrypted plaintext of INTRODUCE%d cell was truncated (%ld bytes)",
         (int)(intro->type),
         (long)(intro->plaintext_len));
     status = -5;
     goto err;
-  } else if (ver_invariant_len > REND_COOKIE_LEN + DH_KEY_LEN) {
+  } else if (ver_invariant_len > REND_COOKIE_LEN + DH1024_KEY_LEN) {
     tor_asprintf(&err_msg,
         "decrypted plaintext of INTRODUCE%d cell was too long (%ld bytes)",
         (int)(intro->type),
@@ -2892,7 +2892,7 @@ rend_service_parse_intro_plaintext(
            REND_COOKIE_LEN);
     memcpy(intro->dh,
            intro->plaintext + ver_specific_len + REND_COOKIE_LEN,
-           DH_KEY_LEN);
+           DH1024_KEY_LEN);
   }
 
   /* Flag it as being fully parsed */
@@ -3449,12 +3449,12 @@ rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit)
   /* All we need to do is send a RELAY_RENDEZVOUS1 cell... */
   memcpy(buf, rend_cookie, REND_COOKIE_LEN);
   if (crypto_dh_get_public(hop->rend_dh_handshake_state,
-                           buf+REND_COOKIE_LEN, DH_KEY_LEN)<0) {
+                           buf+REND_COOKIE_LEN, DH1024_KEY_LEN)<0) {
     log_warn(LD_GENERAL,"Couldn't get DH public key.");
     reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL;
     goto err;
   }
-  memcpy(buf+REND_COOKIE_LEN+DH_KEY_LEN, hop->rend_circ_nonce,
+  memcpy(buf+REND_COOKIE_LEN+DH1024_KEY_LEN, hop->rend_circ_nonce,
          DIGEST_LEN);
 
   /* Send the cell */
diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.h b/src/or/rendservice.h
index b2644d8b40..a9b3689d2b 100644
--- a/src/or/rendservice.h
+++ b/src/or/rendservice.h
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ struct rend_intro_cell_s {
   /* Rendezvous cookie */
   uint8_t rc[REND_COOKIE_LEN];
   /* Diffie-Hellman data */
-  uint8_t dh[DH_KEY_LEN];
+  uint8_t dh[DH1024_KEY_LEN];
 };
 
 #ifdef RENDSERVICE_PRIVATE