summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/src/or
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2005-04-23 14:26:02 +0000
committerNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2005-04-23 14:26:02 +0000
commit5827e2e216ad759f240a0c332848cadf65794742 (patch)
tree0290c3e0f18d499ad77d106f622a28e395241dc8 /src/or
parentad4eca60ec0839abdaff69a0a896436cbd5b30d6 (diff)
downloadtor-5827e2e216ad759f240a0c332848cadf65794742.tar.gz
tor-5827e2e216ad759f240a0c332848cadf65794742.zip
Fix "JAP-client" hideous ASN1 bug, twice. (Fix1: check more thoroughly for TLS errors when handling certs. Fix2: stop assert(0)ing on uncaught TLS errors.)debian-version-0.1.0.3-rc-200504231430-1
svn:r4085
Diffstat (limited to 'src/or')
-rw-r--r--src/or/buffers.c3
-rw-r--r--src/or/connection_or.c5
2 files changed, 7 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/buffers.c b/src/or/buffers.c
index fe6b8d739d..7edc2cdf34 100644
--- a/src/or/buffers.c
+++ b/src/or/buffers.c
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ int read_to_buf_tls(tor_tls *tls, size_t at_most, buf_t *buf) {
(int)buf_datalen(buf), (int)tor_tls_get_pending_bytes(tls),
(int)at_most);
- assert_no_tls_errors();
+ check_no_tls_errors();
r = tor_tls_read(tls, buf->mem+buf->datalen, at_most);
if (r<0)
return r;
@@ -281,6 +281,7 @@ int flush_buf_tls(tor_tls *tls, buf_t *buf, size_t *buf_flushlen)
/* we want to let tls write even if flushlen is zero, because it might
* have a partial record pending */
+ check_no_tls_errors();
r = tor_tls_write(tls, buf->mem, *buf_flushlen);
if (r < 0) {
return r;
diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c
index 4f8943e60a..4c9163e696 100644
--- a/src/or/connection_or.c
+++ b/src/or/connection_or.c
@@ -378,6 +378,7 @@ int connection_tls_start_handshake(connection_t *conn, int receiving) {
* Return -1 if <b>conn</b> is broken, else return 0.
*/
int connection_tls_continue_handshake(connection_t *conn) {
+ check_no_tls_errors();
switch (tor_tls_handshake(conn->tls)) {
case TOR_TLS_ERROR:
case TOR_TLS_CLOSE:
@@ -442,16 +443,19 @@ connection_tls_finish_handshake(connection_t *conn) {
conn->state = OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN;
connection_watch_events(conn, EV_READ);
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"tls handshake done. verifying.");
+ check_no_tls_errors();
if (! tor_tls_peer_has_cert(conn->tls)) {
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Peer didn't send a cert! Closing.");
/* XXX we should handle this case rather than just closing. */
return -1;
}
+ check_no_tls_errors();
if (tor_tls_get_peer_cert_nickname(conn->tls, nickname, sizeof(nickname))) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Other side (%s:%d) has a cert without a valid nickname. Closing.",
conn->address, conn->port);
return -1;
}
+ check_no_tls_errors();
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG, "Other side (%s:%d) claims to be router '%s'",
conn->address, conn->port, nickname);
@@ -460,6 +464,7 @@ connection_tls_finish_handshake(connection_t *conn) {
nickname, conn->address, conn->port);
return -1;
}
+ check_no_tls_errors();
#if 0
if (tor_tls_check_lifetime(conn->tls, LOOSE_CERT_ALLOW_SKEW)<0) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Other side '%s' (%s:%d) has a very highly skewed clock, or an expired certificate. Closing.",