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| author | David Goulet <dgoulet@ev0ke.net> | 2015-09-02 14:53:39 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2015-09-02 10:47:20 -0400 |
| commit | 07b3028db74af246ca98c2d3a86d5efde9aa33c2 (patch) | |
| tree | 36afeb232f96610861c14f5216355e9c7e0ab632 /src/or/routerset.h | |
| parent | f6bd8fbb806abaf4015d8b8e08a737bc09ec63f6 (diff) | |
| download | tor-07b3028db74af246ca98c2d3a86d5efde9aa33c2.tar.gz tor-07b3028db74af246ca98c2d3a86d5efde9aa33c2.zip | |
Prohibit the use of one entry node with an HS
In a nutshell, since a circuit can not exit at its entry point, it's very
easy for an attacker to find the hidden service guard if only one EntryNodes
is specified since for that guard, the HS will refuse to build a rendezvous
circuit to it.
For now, the best solution is to stop tor to allow a single EntryNodes for
an hidden service.
Fixes #14917
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@ev0ke.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/or/routerset.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/routerset.h | 1 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/routerset.h b/src/or/routerset.h index 8d41de8b6b..aca7c6e74e 100644 --- a/src/or/routerset.h +++ b/src/or/routerset.h @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ void routerset_subtract_nodes(smartlist_t *out, char *routerset_to_string(const routerset_t *routerset); int routerset_equal(const routerset_t *old, const routerset_t *new); void routerset_free(routerset_t *routerset); +int routerset_len(const routerset_t *set); #ifdef ROUTERSET_PRIVATE STATIC char * routerset_get_countryname(const char *c); |