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| author | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2014-10-01 11:54:07 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2015-05-28 10:40:57 -0400 |
| commit | efa21bb94188863e4ff5d8a288144cd93db00fe3 (patch) | |
| tree | 34cc8c4bd847477e4b57773f48c0d298ef15d3ef /src/or/routerlist.h | |
| parent | fe5d2477aabbf06c940c33a266d6ebb3a7b19fe1 (diff) | |
| download | tor-efa21bb94188863e4ff5d8a288144cd93db00fe3.tar.gz tor-efa21bb94188863e4ff5d8a288144cd93db00fe3.zip | |
Implement proposal 228: cross-certification with onion keys
Routers now use TAP and ntor onion keys to sign their identity keys,
and put these signatures in their descriptors. That allows other
parties to be confident that the onion keys are indeed controlled by
the router that generated the descriptor.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/or/routerlist.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/routerlist.h | 7 |
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.h b/src/or/routerlist.h index 78c3fbb880..200533fe91 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.h +++ b/src/or/routerlist.h @@ -118,13 +118,15 @@ WRA_WAS_ADDED(was_router_added_t s) { * - not in the consensus * - neither in the consensus nor in any networkstatus document * - it was outdated. + * - its certificates were expired. */ static INLINE int WRA_WAS_OUTDATED(was_router_added_t s) { return (s == ROUTER_WAS_TOO_OLD || s == ROUTER_IS_ALREADY_KNOWN || s == ROUTER_NOT_IN_CONSENSUS || - s == ROUTER_NOT_IN_CONSENSUS_OR_NETWORKSTATUS); + s == ROUTER_NOT_IN_CONSENSUS_OR_NETWORKSTATUS || + s == ROUTER_CERTS_EXPIRED); } /** Return true iff the outcome code in <b>s</b> indicates that the descriptor * was flat-out rejected. */ @@ -138,7 +140,8 @@ static INLINE int WRA_NEVER_DOWNLOADABLE(was_router_added_t s) { return (s == ROUTER_AUTHDIR_REJECTS || s == ROUTER_BAD_EI || - s == ROUTER_WAS_TOO_OLD); + s == ROUTER_WAS_TOO_OLD || + s == ROUTER_CERTS_EXPIRED); } was_router_added_t router_add_to_routerlist(routerinfo_t *router, const char **msg, |