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authorNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2013-02-14 12:06:59 -0500
committerNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2013-02-14 12:06:59 -0500
commit1070a720ad7f45fa82b77be0512056a06e535b72 (patch)
tree2ff76f12390f5f7c88b1b62080ebe73b5e58873c /src/or/routerlist.c
parent91027218e29090b18d42e1868367cc2a9e149900 (diff)
downloadtor-1070a720ad7f45fa82b77be0512056a06e535b72.tar.gz
tor-1070a720ad7f45fa82b77be0512056a06e535b72.zip
Be more robust when excluding existing nodes as new dirguards
In addition to rejecting them post-hoc, avoid picking them in the first place. This makes us less likely to decide that we can't add guards at all.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/or/routerlist.c')
-rw-r--r--src/or/routerlist.c3
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c
index 90b707bcdb..837245db3e 100644
--- a/src/or/routerlist.c
+++ b/src/or/routerlist.c
@@ -1153,6 +1153,7 @@ router_pick_directory_server_impl(dirinfo_type_t type, int flags)
int requireother = ! (flags & PDS_ALLOW_SELF);
int fascistfirewall = ! (flags & PDS_IGNORE_FASCISTFIREWALL);
int prefer_tunnel = (flags & PDS_PREFER_TUNNELED_DIR_CONNS_);
+ int for_guard = (flags & PDS_FOR_GUARD);
int try_excluding = 1, n_excluded = 0;
if (!consensus)
@@ -1192,6 +1193,8 @@ router_pick_directory_server_impl(dirinfo_type_t type, int flags)
if ((type & MICRODESC_DIRINFO) && !is_trusted &&
!node->rs->version_supports_microdesc_cache)
continue;
+ if (for_guard && node->using_as_guard)
+ continue; /* Don't make the same node a guard twice. */
if (try_excluding &&
routerset_contains_routerstatus(options->ExcludeNodes, status,
country)) {