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authorNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2014-09-30 16:00:17 -0400
committerNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2015-05-28 10:40:56 -0400
commit818e6f939d4bd241e762970da4c6360858993cd5 (patch)
tree08cabd70d8748a62b919555ebba4941a88533ee7 /src/or/routerkeys.c
parenta9720b90f860323781d37dbba6ce04f312ec3632 (diff)
downloadtor-818e6f939d4bd241e762970da4c6360858993cd5.tar.gz
tor-818e6f939d4bd241e762970da4c6360858993cd5.zip
prop220: Implement certificates and key storage/creation
For prop220, we have a new ed25519 certificate type. This patch implements the code to create, parse, and validate those, along with code for routers to maintain their own sets of certificates and keys. (Some parts of master identity key encryption are done, but the implementation of that isn't finished)
Diffstat (limited to 'src/or/routerkeys.c')
-rw-r--r--src/or/routerkeys.c453
1 files changed, 453 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/routerkeys.c b/src/or/routerkeys.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fb61c310bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/or/routerkeys.c
@@ -0,0 +1,453 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2014, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+#include "or.h"
+#include "config.h"
+#include "routerkeys.h"
+#include "torcert.h"
+
+/**
+ * Read an ed25519 key and associated certificates from files beginning with
+ * <b>fname</b>, with certificate type <b>cert_type</b>. On failure, return
+ * NULL; on success return the keypair.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE is set in <b>flags</b>, then create the key (and
+ * certificate if requested) if it doesn't exist, and save it to disk.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT is set in <b>flags</b>, load/create a certificate
+ * too and store it in *<b>cert_out</b>. Fail if the cert can't be
+ * found/created. To create a certificate, <b>signing_key</b> must be set to
+ * the key that should sign it; <b>now</b> to the current time, and
+ * <b>lifetime</b> to the lifetime of the key.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_REPLACE is set in <b>flags</b>, then create and save new key
+ * whether we can read the old one or not.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG is set in <b>flags</b>, set the extra_strong
+ * flag when creating the secret key.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT is set in <b>flags</b>, and
+ * we create a new certificate, create it with the signing key embedded.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT is set in <b>flags</b>, and we create a new key,
+ * store the public key in a separate file from the secret key.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_MISSING_SECRET_OK is set in <b>flags</b>, and we find a
+ * public key file but no secret key file, return successfully anyway.
+ */
+ed25519_keypair_t *
+ed_key_init_from_file(const char *fname, uint32_t flags,
+ int severity,
+ const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key,
+ time_t now,
+ time_t lifetime,
+ uint8_t cert_type,
+ struct tor_cert_st **cert_out)
+{
+ char *secret_fname = NULL;
+ char *public_fname = NULL;
+ char *cert_fname = NULL;
+ int created_pk = 0, created_sk = 0, created_cert = 0;
+ const int try_to_load = ! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_REPLACE);
+
+ char tag[8];
+ tor_snprintf(tag, sizeof(tag), "type%d", (int)cert_type);
+
+ tor_cert_t *cert = NULL;
+ char *got_tag = NULL;
+ ed25519_keypair_t *keypair = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(ed25519_keypair_t));
+
+ tor_asprintf(&secret_fname, "%s_secret_key", fname);
+ tor_asprintf(&public_fname, "%s_public_key", fname);
+ tor_asprintf(&cert_fname, "%s_cert", fname);
+
+ /* Try to read the secret key. */
+ const int have_secret = try_to_load &&
+ ed25519_seckey_read_from_file(&keypair->seckey,
+ &got_tag, secret_fname) == 0;
+
+ if (have_secret) {
+ if (strcmp(got_tag, tag)) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s has wrong tag", secret_fname);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Derive the public key */
+ if (ed25519_public_key_generate(&keypair->pubkey, &keypair->seckey)<0) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s can't produce a public key", secret_fname);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If it's absent and that's okay, try to read the pubkey. */
+ int found_public = 0;
+ if (!have_secret && try_to_load && (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_MISSING_SECRET_OK)) {
+ tor_free(got_tag);
+ found_public = ed25519_pubkey_read_from_file(&keypair->pubkey,
+ &got_tag, public_fname) == 0;
+ if (found_public && strcmp(got_tag, tag)) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s has wrong tag", public_fname);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If it's absent, and we're not supposed to make a new keypair, fail. */
+ if (!have_secret && !found_public && !(flags & INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* if it's absent, make a new keypair and save it. */
+ if (!have_secret && !found_public) {
+ const int split = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT);
+ tor_free(keypair);
+ keypair = ed_key_new(signing_key, flags, now, lifetime,
+ cert_type, &cert);
+ if (!keypair) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't create keypair");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ created_pk = created_sk = created_cert = 1;
+ if (ed25519_seckey_write_to_file(&keypair->seckey, secret_fname, tag) < 0
+ ||
+ (split &&
+ ed25519_pubkey_write_to_file(&keypair->pubkey, public_fname, tag) < 0)
+ ||
+ (cert &&
+ crypto_write_tagged_contents_to_file(cert_fname, "ed25519v1-cert",
+ tag, cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len) < 0)) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't write keys or cert to file.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* If we're not supposed to get a cert, we're done. */
+ if (! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT))
+ goto done;
+
+ /* Read a cert. */
+ uint8_t certbuf[256];
+ ssize_t cert_body_len = crypto_read_tagged_contents_from_file(
+ cert_fname, "ed25519v1-cert",
+ &got_tag, certbuf, sizeof(certbuf));
+ if (cert_body_len >= 0 && !strcmp(got_tag, tag))
+ cert = tor_cert_parse(certbuf, cert_body_len);
+
+ /* If we got it, check it to the extent we can. */
+ if (cert) {
+ int bad_cert = 0;
+
+ if (! cert) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Cert was unparseable");
+ bad_cert = 1;
+ } else if (!tor_memeq(cert->signed_key.pubkey, keypair->pubkey.pubkey,
+ ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Cert was for wrong key");
+ bad_cert = 1;
+ } else if (tor_cert_checksig(cert, &signing_key->pubkey, now) < 0 &&
+ (signing_key || cert->cert_expired)) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Can't check certificate");
+ bad_cert = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (bad_cert) {
+ tor_cert_free(cert);
+ cert = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If we got a cert, we're done. */
+ if (cert)
+ goto done;
+
+ /* If we didn't get a cert, and we're not supposed to make one, fail. */
+ if (!signing_key || !(flags & INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* We have keys but not a certificate, so make one. */
+ uint32_t cert_flags = 0;
+ if (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT)
+ cert_flags |= CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY;
+ cert = tor_cert_create(signing_key, cert_type,
+ &keypair->pubkey,
+ now, lifetime,
+ cert_flags);
+
+ if (! cert)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Write it to disk. */
+ created_cert = 1;
+ if (crypto_write_tagged_contents_to_file(cert_fname, "ed25519v1-cert",
+ tag, cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len) < 0) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't write cert to disk.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ done:
+ if (cert_out)
+ *cert_out = cert;
+ else
+ tor_cert_free(cert);
+
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ err:
+ memwipe(keypair, 0, sizeof(*keypair));
+ tor_free(keypair);
+ tor_cert_free(cert);
+ if (cert_out)
+ *cert_out = NULL;
+ if (created_sk)
+ unlink(secret_fname);
+ if (created_pk)
+ unlink(public_fname);
+ if (created_cert)
+ unlink(cert_fname);
+
+ cleanup:
+ tor_free(secret_fname);
+ tor_free(public_fname);
+ tor_free(cert_fname);
+
+ return keypair;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Create a new signing key and (optionally) certficiate; do not read or write
+ * from disk. See ed_key_init_from_file() for more information.
+ */
+ed25519_keypair_t *
+ed_key_new(const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key,
+ uint32_t flags,
+ time_t now,
+ time_t lifetime,
+ uint8_t cert_type,
+ struct tor_cert_st **cert_out)
+{
+ if (cert_out)
+ *cert_out = NULL;
+
+ const int extra_strong = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG);
+ ed25519_keypair_t *keypair = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(ed25519_keypair_t));
+ if (ed25519_keypair_generate(keypair, extra_strong) < 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT))
+ return keypair;
+
+ tor_assert(signing_key);
+ tor_assert(cert_out);
+ uint32_t cert_flags = 0;
+ if (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT)
+ cert_flags |= CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY;
+ tor_cert_t *cert = tor_cert_create(signing_key, cert_type,
+ &keypair->pubkey,
+ now, lifetime,
+ cert_flags);
+ if (! cert)
+ goto err;
+
+ *cert_out = cert;
+ return keypair;
+
+ err:
+ tor_free(keypair);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static ed25519_keypair_t *master_identity_key = NULL;
+static ed25519_keypair_t *master_signing_key = NULL;
+static ed25519_keypair_t *current_link_key = NULL;
+static ed25519_keypair_t *current_auth_key = NULL;
+static tor_cert_t *signing_key_cert = NULL;
+static tor_cert_t *link_key_cert = NULL;
+static tor_cert_t *auth_key_cert = NULL;
+
+/**
+ * Running as a server: load, reload, or refresh our ed25519 keys and
+ * certificates, creating and saving new ones as needed.
+ */
+int
+load_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, time_t now)
+{
+ ed25519_keypair_t *id = NULL;
+ ed25519_keypair_t *sign = NULL;
+ ed25519_keypair_t *link = NULL;
+ ed25519_keypair_t *auth = NULL;
+ const ed25519_keypair_t *use_signing = NULL;
+ tor_cert_t *sign_cert = NULL;
+ tor_cert_t *link_cert = NULL;
+ tor_cert_t *auth_cert = NULL;
+
+#define FAIL(msg) do { \
+ log_warn(LD_OR, (msg)); \
+ goto err; \
+ } while (0)
+#define SET_KEY(key, newval) do { \
+ ed25519_keypair_free(key); \
+ key = (newval); \
+ } while (0)
+#define SET_CERT(cert, newval) do { \
+ tor_cert_free(cert); \
+ cert = (newval); \
+ } while (0)
+#define EXPIRES_SOON(cert, interval) \
+ (!(cert) || (cert)->valid_until < now + (interval))
+
+ /* XXXX support encrypted identity keys fully */
+
+ /* XXXX use options. */
+ (void) options;
+
+ id = ed_key_init_from_file(
+ options_get_datadir_fname2(options, "keys", "ed25519_master_id"),
+ (INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE|INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT|
+ INIT_ED_KEY_MISSING_SECRET_OK|
+ INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG),
+ LOG_WARN, NULL, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
+ if (!id)
+ FAIL("Missing identity key");
+
+ if (!master_signing_key || EXPIRES_SOON(signing_key_cert, 86400/*???*/)) {
+ uint32_t flags = (INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE|
+ INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG|
+ INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT|
+ INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT);
+ const ed25519_keypair_t *sign_with_id = id;
+ if (master_signing_key) {
+ flags |= INIT_ED_KEY_REPLACE; /* it's expired, so force-replace it. */
+ }
+ if (tor_mem_is_zero((char*)id->seckey.seckey, sizeof(id->seckey))) {
+ sign_with_id = NULL;
+ flags &= ~INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE;
+ }
+ sign = ed_key_init_from_file(
+ options_get_datadir_fname2(options, "keys", "ed25519_signing"),
+ flags, LOG_WARN,
+ sign_with_id, now, 30*86400/*XXX option*/,
+ CERT_TYPE_ID_SIGNING, &sign_cert);
+ if (!sign)
+ FAIL("Missing signing key");
+ use_signing = sign;
+ } else {
+ use_signing = master_signing_key;
+ }
+
+ /* At this point we no longer need our secret identity key. So wipe
+ * it, if we loaded it in the first place. */
+ memwipe(id->seckey.seckey, 0, sizeof(id->seckey));
+
+ if (!current_link_key || EXPIRES_SOON(link_key_cert, 7200/*???*/)) {
+ link = ed_key_new(use_signing, INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT,
+ now, 2*86400/*XXX option??*/,
+ CERT_TYPE_SIGNING_LINK, &link_cert);
+
+ if (!link)
+ FAIL("Can't create link key");
+ }
+
+ if (!current_auth_key || EXPIRES_SOON(auth_key_cert, 7200)/*???*/) {
+ auth = ed_key_new(use_signing, INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT,
+ now, 2*86400/*XXX option??*/,
+ CERT_TYPE_SIGNING_AUTH, &auth_cert);
+
+ if (!auth)
+ FAIL("Can't create auth key");
+ }
+
+ /* We've generated or loaded everything. Put them in memory. */
+
+ if (! master_identity_key) {
+ SET_KEY(master_identity_key, id);
+ } else {
+ tor_free(id);
+ }
+ if (sign) {
+ SET_KEY(master_signing_key, sign);
+ SET_CERT(signing_key_cert, sign_cert);
+ }
+ if (link) {
+ SET_KEY(current_link_key, link);
+ SET_CERT(link_key_cert, link_cert);
+ }
+ if (auth) {
+ SET_KEY(current_auth_key, auth);
+ SET_CERT(auth_key_cert, auth_cert);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+ err:
+ ed25519_keypair_free(id);
+ ed25519_keypair_free(sign);
+ ed25519_keypair_free(link);
+ ed25519_keypair_free(auth);
+ tor_cert_free(sign_cert);
+ tor_cert_free(link_cert);
+ tor_cert_free(auth_cert);
+ return -1;
+#undef FAIL
+#undef SET_KEY
+#undef SET_CERT
+#undef EXPIRES_SOON
+}
+
+const ed25519_public_key_t *
+get_master_identity_key(void)
+{
+ if (!master_identity_key)
+ return NULL;
+ return &master_identity_key->pubkey;
+}
+
+const ed25519_keypair_t *
+get_master_signing_keypair(void)
+{
+ return master_signing_key;
+}
+
+const struct tor_cert_st *
+get_master_signing_key_cert(void)
+{
+ return signing_key_cert;
+}
+
+const ed25519_keypair_t *
+get_current_link_keypair(void)
+{
+ return current_link_key;
+}
+
+const ed25519_keypair_t *
+get_current_auth_keypair(void)
+{
+ return current_auth_key;
+}
+
+const tor_cert_t *
+get_current_link_key_cert(void)
+{
+ return link_key_cert;
+}
+
+const tor_cert_t *
+get_current_auth_key_cert(void)
+{
+ return auth_key_cert;
+}
+
+void
+routerkeys_free_all(void)
+{
+ ed25519_keypair_free(master_identity_key);
+ ed25519_keypair_free(master_signing_key);
+ ed25519_keypair_free(current_link_key);
+ ed25519_keypair_free(current_auth_key);
+ tor_cert_free(signing_key_cert);
+ tor_cert_free(link_key_cert);
+ tor_cert_free(auth_key_cert);
+
+ master_identity_key = master_signing_key = NULL;
+ current_link_key = current_auth_key = NULL;
+ signing_key_cert = link_key_cert = auth_key_cert = NULL;
+}
+