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authorNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2015-05-21 10:48:52 -0400
committerNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2015-05-21 10:48:52 -0400
commiteb7f4d0059d447f79362be22c9c0c3c66ec85857 (patch)
treecddc4986e918d274e066f97e19769e8232f7ce28 /src/or/rendservice.c
parentb668d3017b205527edbcc7360109d0785046b465 (diff)
parent712bf069781d7a6336501aab628f62ada4f4c4d7 (diff)
downloadtor-eb7f4d0059d447f79362be22c9c0c3c66ec85857.tar.gz
tor-eb7f4d0059d447f79362be22c9c0c3c66ec85857.zip
Merge remote-tracking branch 'yawning/bug16052a_027'
Diffstat (limited to 'src/or/rendservice.c')
-rw-r--r--src/or/rendservice.c79
1 files changed, 78 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c
index daca4ccda4..0329d70924 100644
--- a/src/or/rendservice.c
+++ b/src/or/rendservice.c
@@ -147,6 +147,13 @@ typedef struct rend_service_t {
/** If true, we don't close circuits for making requests to unsupported
* ports. */
int allow_unknown_ports;
+ /** The maximum number of simultanious streams-per-circuit that are allowed
+ * to be established, or 0 if no limit is set.
+ */
+ int max_streams_per_circuit;
+ /** If true, we close circuits that exceed the max_streams_per_circuit
+ * limit. */
+ int max_streams_close_circuit;
} rend_service_t;
/** Returns a escaped string representation of the service, <b>s</b>.
@@ -259,6 +266,23 @@ rend_add_service(rend_service_t *service)
service->intro_nodes = smartlist_new();
+ if (service->max_streams_per_circuit < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Hidden service (%s) configured with negative max "
+ "streams per circuit; ignoring.",
+ rend_service_escaped_dir(service));
+ rend_service_free(service);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (service->max_streams_close_circuit < 0 ||
+ service->max_streams_close_circuit > 1) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Hidden service (%s) configured with invalid "
+ "max streams handling; ignoring.",
+ rend_service_escaped_dir(service));
+ rend_service_free(service);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
if (service->auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH &&
smartlist_len(service->clients) == 0) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Hidden service (%s) with client authorization but no "
@@ -539,6 +563,33 @@ rend_config_services(const or_options_t *options, int validate_only)
log_info(LD_CONFIG,
"HiddenServiceDirGroupReadable=%d for %s",
service->dir_group_readable, service->directory);
+ } else if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "HiddenServiceMaxStreams")) {
+ service->max_streams_per_circuit = (int)tor_parse_long(line->value,
+ 10, 0, 65535, &ok, NULL);
+ if (!ok) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
+ "HiddenServiceMaxStreams should be between 0 and %d, not %s",
+ 65535, line->value);
+ rend_service_free(service);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ log_info(LD_CONFIG,
+ "HiddenServiceMaxStreams=%d for %s",
+ service->max_streams_per_circuit, service->directory);
+ } else if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit")) {
+ service->max_streams_close_circuit = (int)tor_parse_long(line->value,
+ 10, 0, 1, &ok, NULL);
+ if (!ok) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
+ "HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit should be 0 or 1, not %s",
+ line->value);
+ rend_service_free(service);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ log_info(LD_CONFIG,
+ "HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit=%d for %s",
+ (int)service->max_streams_close_circuit, service->directory);
+
} else if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient")) {
/* Parse auth type and comma-separated list of client names and add a
* rend_authorized_client_t for each client to the service's list
@@ -758,7 +809,10 @@ rend_config_services(const or_options_t *options, int validate_only)
return 0;
}
-/** Add the ephemeral service <b>pk</b>/<b>ports</b> if possible.
+/** Add the ephemeral service <b>pk</b>/<b>ports</b> if possible, with
+ * <b>max_streams_per_circuit</b> streams allowed per rendezvous circuit,
+ * and circuit closure on max streams being exceeded set by
+ * <b>max_streams_close_circuit</b>.
*
* Regardless of sucess/failure, callers should not touch pk/ports after
* calling this routine, and may assume that correct cleanup has been done
@@ -769,6 +823,8 @@ rend_config_services(const or_options_t *options, int validate_only)
rend_service_add_ephemeral_status_t
rend_service_add_ephemeral(crypto_pk_t *pk,
smartlist_t *ports,
+ int max_streams_per_circuit,
+ int max_streams_close_circuit,
char **service_id_out)
{
*service_id_out = NULL;
@@ -782,6 +838,8 @@ rend_service_add_ephemeral(crypto_pk_t *pk,
s->ports = ports;
s->intro_period_started = time(NULL);
s->n_intro_points_wanted = NUM_INTRO_POINTS_DEFAULT;
+ s->max_streams_per_circuit = max_streams_per_circuit;
+ s->max_streams_close_circuit = max_streams_close_circuit;
if (rend_service_derive_key_digests(s) < 0) {
rend_service_free(s);
return RSAE_BADPRIVKEY;
@@ -3795,6 +3853,25 @@ rend_service_set_connection_addr_port(edge_connection_t *conn,
serviceid, (unsigned)circ->base_.n_circ_id);
return -2;
}
+ if (service->max_streams_per_circuit > 0) {
+ /* Enforce the streams-per-circuit limit, and refuse to provide a
+ * mapping if this circuit will exceed the limit. */
+#define MAX_STREAM_WARN_INTERVAL 600
+ static struct ratelim_t stream_ratelim =
+ RATELIM_INIT(MAX_STREAM_WARN_INTERVAL);
+ if (circ->rend_data->nr_streams >= service->max_streams_per_circuit) {
+ log_fn_ratelim(&stream_ratelim, LOG_WARN, LD_REND,
+ "Maximum streams per circuit limit reached on rendezvous "
+ "circuit %u; %s. Circuit has %d out of %d streams.",
+ (unsigned)circ->base_.n_circ_id,
+ service->max_streams_close_circuit ?
+ "closing circuit" :
+ "ignoring open stream request",
+ circ->rend_data->nr_streams,
+ service->max_streams_per_circuit);
+ return service->max_streams_close_circuit ? -2 : -1;
+ }
+ }
matching_ports = smartlist_new();
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(service->ports, rend_service_port_config_t *, p,
{