Forbid UINT32_MAX as a protocol version

The C code and the rust code had different separate integer overflow
bugs here.  That suggests that we're better off just forbidding this
pathological case.

Also, add tests for expected behavior on receiving a bad protocol
list in a consensus.

Fixes another part of 25249.

1 files changed, 6 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/src/or/protover.c b/src/or/protover.c
index f32316f8e7..a035b5c83b 100644
--- a/src/or/protover.c
+++ b/src/or/protover.c
@@ -103,6 +103,9 @@ proto_entry_free(proto_entry_t *entry)
   tor_free(entry);
 }
 
+/** The largest possible protocol version. */
+#define MAX_PROTOCOL_VERSION (UINT32_MAX-1)
+
 /**
  * Given a string <b>s</b> and optional end-of-string pointer
  * <b>end_of_range</b>, parse the protocol range and store it in
@@ -130,7 +133,7 @@ parse_version_range(const char *s, const char *end_of_range,
 
   /* Note that this wouldn't be safe if we didn't know that eventually,
    * we'd hit a NUL */
-  low = (uint32_t) tor_parse_ulong(s, 10, 0, UINT32_MAX, &ok, &next);
+  low = (uint32_t) tor_parse_ulong(s, 10, 0, MAX_PROTOCOL_VERSION, &ok, &next);
   if (!ok)
     goto error;
   if (next > end_of_range)
@@ -148,7 +151,8 @@ parse_version_range(const char *s, const char *end_of_range,
   if (!TOR_ISDIGIT(*s)) {
     goto error;
   }
-  high = (uint32_t) tor_parse_ulong(s, 10, 0, UINT32_MAX, &ok, &next);
+  high = (uint32_t) tor_parse_ulong(s, 10, 0,
+                                    MAX_PROTOCOL_VERSION, &ok, &next);
   if (!ok)
     goto error;
   if (next != end_of_range)