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| author | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2012-12-04 21:27:07 -0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2013-01-03 11:29:46 -0500 |
| commit | f58d4dfcd61aec7ea1900873ca08ecc31d7a7ef7 (patch) | |
| tree | 12e9b9fbcbbaf319638926575b913daaea05f7e9 /src/or/onion_tap.c | |
| parent | 5fa1c7484cba293e6467acbca06a4143ce9da68d (diff) | |
| download | tor-f58d4dfcd61aec7ea1900873ca08ecc31d7a7ef7.tar.gz tor-f58d4dfcd61aec7ea1900873ca08ecc31d7a7ef7.zip | |
Massive refactoring of the various handshake types
The three handshake types are now accessed from a unified interface;
their state is abstracted from the rest of the cpath state, and so on.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/or/onion_tap.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/onion_tap.c | 26 |
1 files changed, 15 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/onion_tap.c b/src/or/onion_tap.c index 464b8451df..0ec526cd02 100644 --- a/src/or/onion_tap.c +++ b/src/or/onion_tap.c @@ -35,9 +35,9 @@ * The meeting point/cookies and auth are zeroed out for now. */ int -onion_skin_create(crypto_pk_t *dest_router_key, +onion_skin_TAP_create(crypto_pk_t *dest_router_key, crypto_dh_t **handshake_state_out, - char *onion_skin_out) /* ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN bytes */ + char *onion_skin_out) /* TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN bytes */ { char challenge[DH_KEY_LEN]; crypto_dh_t *dh = NULL; @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ onion_skin_create(crypto_pk_t *dest_router_key, tor_assert(handshake_state_out); tor_assert(onion_skin_out); *handshake_state_out = NULL; - memset(onion_skin_out, 0, ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN); + memset(onion_skin_out, 0, TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN); if (!(dh = crypto_dh_new(DH_TYPE_CIRCUIT))) goto err; @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ onion_skin_create(crypto_pk_t *dest_router_key, /* set meeting point, meeting cookie, etc here. Leave zero for now. */ if (crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt(dest_router_key, onion_skin_out, - ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN, + TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN, challenge, DH_KEY_LEN, PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, 1)<0) goto err; @@ -85,14 +85,17 @@ onion_skin_create(crypto_pk_t *dest_router_key, * next key_out_len bytes of key material in key_out. */ int -onion_skin_server_handshake(const char *onion_skin, /*ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN*/ +onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake( + /*TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN*/ + const char *onion_skin, crypto_pk_t *private_key, crypto_pk_t *prev_private_key, - char *handshake_reply_out, /*ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN*/ + /*TAP_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN*/ + char *handshake_reply_out, char *key_out, size_t key_out_len) { - char challenge[ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN]; + char challenge[TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN]; crypto_dh_t *dh = NULL; ssize_t len; char *key_material=NULL; @@ -107,8 +110,9 @@ onion_skin_server_handshake(const char *onion_skin, /*ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN*/ break; note_crypto_pk_op(DEC_ONIONSKIN); len = crypto_pk_private_hybrid_decrypt(k, challenge, - ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN, - onion_skin, ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN, + TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN, + onion_skin, + TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN, PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING,0); if (len>0) break; @@ -175,8 +179,8 @@ onion_skin_server_handshake(const char *onion_skin, /*ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN*/ * After the invocation, call crypto_dh_free on handshake_state. */ int -onion_skin_client_handshake(crypto_dh_t *handshake_state, - const char *handshake_reply, /* ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN bytes */ +onion_skin_TAP_client_handshake(crypto_dh_t *handshake_state, + const char *handshake_reply, /* TAP_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN bytes */ char *key_out, size_t key_out_len) { |