summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/src/or/connection_or.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2017-09-11 10:00:11 -0400
committerNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2017-09-11 10:00:11 -0400
commit3124c921e7af15548b8b16d5f239bfdcd178b2ca (patch)
treebc58c6a9f9b761672ce00d5e19bc5fce3bbe02fa /src/or/connection_or.c
parent362bc880b1c4bbccba8698b872c16fc6a6da168e (diff)
downloadtor-3124c921e7af15548b8b16d5f239bfdcd178b2ca.tar.gz
tor-3124c921e7af15548b8b16d5f239bfdcd178b2ca.zip
Split the behavior of node_supports_ed25519_link_authentication().
Before, this function meant "can we connect to this node and authenticate it using its ed25519 key?" Now it can additionally mean, "when somebody else connects to this node, do we expect that they can authenticate using the node's ed25519 key"? This change lets us future-proof our link authentication a bit. Closes ticket 20895. No backport needed, since ed25519 link authentication support has not been in any LTS release yet, and existing releases with it should be obsolete before any releases without support for linkauth=3 are released.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/or/connection_or.c')
-rw-r--r--src/or/connection_or.c2
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c
index d890b58da6..29c1166b3c 100644
--- a/src/or/connection_or.c
+++ b/src/or/connection_or.c
@@ -886,7 +886,7 @@ connection_or_check_canonicity(or_connection_t *conn, int started_here)
const node_t *r = node_get_by_id(id_digest);
if (r &&
- node_supports_ed25519_link_authentication(r) &&
+ node_supports_ed25519_link_authentication(r, 1) &&
! node_ed25519_id_matches(r, ed_id)) {
/* If this node is capable of proving an ed25519 ID,
* we can't call this a canonical connection unless both IDs match. */