diff options
author | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2004-11-28 09:05:49 +0000 |
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committer | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2004-11-28 09:05:49 +0000 |
commit | 6f5dbefa7efe0c0c86928777b8821b3fdc91cf45 (patch) | |
tree | e92106bd8cac85684983daf62d952a9d8e6b8f18 /src/or/connection_or.c | |
parent | 67dc7baa59e2b38a6720d843b54257ca0dd9e722 (diff) | |
download | tor-6f5dbefa7efe0c0c86928777b8821b3fdc91cf45.tar.gz tor-6f5dbefa7efe0c0c86928777b8821b3fdc91cf45.zip |
Normalize space: add one between every control keyword and control clause.
svn:r3003
Diffstat (limited to 'src/or/connection_or.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/or/connection_or.c | 36 |
1 files changed, 18 insertions, 18 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index 271f32323f..0facd1aa5d 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ int connection_or_process_inbuf(connection_t *conn) { tor_assert(conn); tor_assert(conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR); - if(conn->state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) + if (conn->state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) return 0; /* don't do anything */ return connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(conn); } @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ int connection_or_finished_connecting(connection_t *conn) log_fn(LOG_INFO,"OR connect() to router at %s:%u finished.", conn->address,conn->port); - if(connection_tls_start_handshake(conn, 0) < 0) { + if (connection_tls_start_handshake(conn, 0) < 0) { /* TLS handshaking error of some kind. */ connection_mark_for_close(conn); return -1; @@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ connection_t *connection_or_connect(uint32_t addr, uint16_t port, tor_assert(id_digest); - if(server_mode(get_options()) && (me=router_get_my_routerinfo()) && + if (server_mode(get_options()) && (me=router_get_my_routerinfo()) && !memcmp(me->identity_digest, id_digest,DIGEST_LEN)) { log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Request to connect to myself! Failing."); return NULL; @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ connection_t *connection_or_connect(uint32_t addr, uint16_t port, * id_digest, but check first to be sure */ /*XXX this is getting called, at least by dirservers. */ conn = connection_get_by_identity_digest(id_digest, CONN_TYPE_OR); - if(conn) { + if (conn) { tor_assert(conn->nickname); log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Asked me to connect to router '%s', but there's already a connection.", conn->nickname); return conn; @@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ connection_t *connection_or_connect(uint32_t addr, uint16_t port, conn->state = OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING; control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_LAUNCHED); - switch(connection_connect(conn, conn->address, addr, port)) { + switch (connection_connect(conn, conn->address, addr, port)) { case -1: router_mark_as_down(conn->identity_digest); control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED); @@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ connection_t *connection_or_connect(uint32_t addr, uint16_t port, /* case 1: fall through */ } - if(connection_tls_start_handshake(conn, 0) >= 0) + if (connection_tls_start_handshake(conn, 0) >= 0) return conn; /* failure */ @@ -263,13 +263,13 @@ connection_t *connection_or_connect(uint32_t addr, uint16_t port, int connection_tls_start_handshake(connection_t *conn, int receiving) { conn->state = OR_CONN_STATE_HANDSHAKING; conn->tls = tor_tls_new(conn->s, receiving, 0); - if(!conn->tls) { + if (!conn->tls) { log_fn(LOG_WARN,"tor_tls_new failed. Closing."); return -1; } connection_start_reading(conn); log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"starting the handshake"); - if(connection_tls_continue_handshake(conn) < 0) { + if (connection_tls_continue_handshake(conn) < 0) { return -1; } return 0; @@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ int connection_tls_start_handshake(connection_t *conn, int receiving) { * Return -1 if <b>conn</b> is broken, else return 0. */ int connection_tls_continue_handshake(connection_t *conn) { - switch(tor_tls_handshake(conn->tls)) { + switch (tor_tls_handshake(conn->tls)) { case TOR_TLS_ERROR: case TOR_TLS_CLOSE: log_fn(LOG_INFO,"tls error. breaking."); @@ -361,13 +361,13 @@ connection_tls_finish_handshake(connection_t *conn) { log_fn(LOG_DEBUG, "Other side (%s:%d) claims to be router '%s'", conn->address, conn->port, nickname); - if(tor_tls_verify(conn->tls, &identity_rcvd) < 0) { + if (tor_tls_verify(conn->tls, &identity_rcvd) < 0) { log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Other side, which claims to be router '%s' (%s:%d), has a cert but it's invalid. Closing.", nickname, conn->address, conn->port); return -1; } #if 0 - if(tor_tls_check_lifetime(conn->tls, LOOSE_CERT_ALLOW_SKEW)<0) { + if (tor_tls_check_lifetime(conn->tls, LOOSE_CERT_ALLOW_SKEW)<0) { log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Other side '%s' (%s:%d) has a very highly skewed clock, or an expired certificate. Closing.", nickname, conn->address, conn->port); return -1; @@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ connection_tls_finish_handshake(connection_t *conn) { crypto_free_pk_env(identity_rcvd); router = router_get_by_nickname(nickname); - if(router && /* we know this nickname */ + if (router && /* we know this nickname */ router->is_verified && /* make sure it's the right guy */ memcmp(digest_rcvd, router->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN) != 0) { log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Identity key not as expected for router claiming to be '%s' (%s:%d) ", nickname, conn->address, conn->port); @@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ connection_tls_finish_handshake(connection_t *conn) { } if (router_get_by_digest(digest_rcvd)) { /* This is a known router; don't cut it slack with its clock skew. */ - if(tor_tls_check_lifetime(conn->tls, TIGHT_CERT_ALLOW_SKEW)<0) { + if (tor_tls_check_lifetime(conn->tls, TIGHT_CERT_ALLOW_SKEW)<0) { log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Router '%s' (%s:%d) has a skewed clock, or an expired certificate; or else our clock is skewed. Closing.", nickname, conn->address, conn->port); return -1; @@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ connection_tls_finish_handshake(connection_t *conn) { return -1; } } else { - if((c=connection_get_by_identity_digest(digest_rcvd, CONN_TYPE_OR))) { + if ((c=connection_get_by_identity_digest(digest_rcvd, CONN_TYPE_OR))) { log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Router '%s' is already connected on fd %d. Dropping fd %d.", nickname, c->s, conn->s); return -1; } @@ -454,15 +454,15 @@ void connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(const cell_t *cell, connection_t *conn) { * push data out as soon as we know there's enough for a tls record, so * during periods of high load we won't read the entire megabyte from * input before pushing any data out. */ - if(conn->outbuf_flushlen-CELL_NETWORK_SIZE < MIN_TLS_FLUSHLEN && + if (conn->outbuf_flushlen-CELL_NETWORK_SIZE < MIN_TLS_FLUSHLEN && conn->outbuf_flushlen >= MIN_TLS_FLUSHLEN) { int extra = conn->outbuf_flushlen - MIN_TLS_FLUSHLEN; conn->outbuf_flushlen = MIN_TLS_FLUSHLEN; - if(connection_handle_write(conn) < 0) { + if (connection_handle_write(conn) < 0) { log_fn(LOG_WARN,"flushing failed."); return; } - if(extra) { + if (extra) { conn->outbuf_flushlen += extra; connection_start_writing(conn); } @@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ static int connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(connection_t *conn) { loop: log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"%d: starting, inbuf_datalen %d (%d pending in tls object).", conn->s,(int)buf_datalen(conn->inbuf),tor_tls_get_pending_bytes(conn->tls)); - if(buf_datalen(conn->inbuf) < CELL_NETWORK_SIZE) /* entire response available? */ + if (buf_datalen(conn->inbuf) < CELL_NETWORK_SIZE) /* entire response available? */ return 0; /* not yet */ connection_fetch_from_buf(buf, CELL_NETWORK_SIZE, conn); |