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| author | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2007-08-27 15:33:58 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2007-08-27 15:33:58 +0000 |
| commit | d3224bad42957bf2e1751c7a1731c8956e003530 (patch) | |
| tree | 02b92176af96af5ce487d47adfffe5d3fefba5f3 /src/or/connection_edge.c | |
| parent | 0608ec71fdbd25da4195fd0e40ccd1bec7f3a0a5 (diff) | |
| download | tor-d3224bad42957bf2e1751c7a1731c8956e003530.tar.gz tor-d3224bad42957bf2e1751c7a1731c8956e003530.zip | |
r14227@Kushana: nickm | 2007-08-27 11:33:28 -0400
Add a new ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses option (default: on) to refuse to believe that any address can map to or from an internal address. This blocks some kinds of potential browser-based attacks, especially on hosts using DNSPort. Also clarify behavior in some comments. Backport candiate?
svn:r11287
Diffstat (limited to 'src/or/connection_edge.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/connection_edge.c | 13 |
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index 77a95f6764..f4431bacf2 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -1247,6 +1247,19 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(edge_connection_t *conn, END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_ALREADY_SOCKS_REPLIED); return 0; } + if (options->ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses) { + /* Don't let people try to do a reverse lookup on 10.0.0.1. */ + tor_addr_t addr; + if (tor_addr_from_str(&addr, socks->address) >= 0 && + tor_addr_is_internal(&addr, 0)) { + connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved(conn, RESOLVED_TYPE_ERROR, + 0, NULL, -1, TIME_MAX); + connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, + END_STREAM_REASON_SOCKSPROTOCOL | + END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_ALREADY_SOCKS_REPLIED); + return -1; + } + } } else if (!automap) { /* For address map controls, remap the address. */ if (addressmap_rewrite(socks->address, sizeof(socks->address), |