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authorNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2016-07-28 10:22:10 -0400
committerNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2016-07-28 10:22:10 -0400
commit9fe6fea1cceb39fc415ad813020bbd863121e0c9 (patch)
tree0437c4df402c6b7128d67e8c34d981bdd656b400 /src/or/connection_edge.c
parent0390e1a60cb91fa581ec568879bf300224db6322 (diff)
downloadtor-9fe6fea1cceb39fc415ad813020bbd863121e0c9.tar.gz
tor-9fe6fea1cceb39fc415ad813020bbd863121e0c9.zip
Fix a huge pile of -Wshadow warnings.
These appeared on some of the Jenkins platforms. Apparently some GCCs care when you shadow globals, and some don't.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/or/connection_edge.c')
-rw-r--r--src/or/connection_edge.c16
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c
index cb79de65d9..0ef5310134 100644
--- a/src/or/connection_edge.c
+++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c
@@ -3333,19 +3333,20 @@ connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(edge_connection_t *conn)
return 0;
}
-/** Return 1 if router <b>exit</b> is likely to allow stream <b>conn</b>
+/** Return 1 if router <b>exit_node</b> is likely to allow stream <b>conn</b>
* to exit from it, or 0 if it probably will not allow it.
* (We might be uncertain if conn's destination address has not yet been
* resolved.)
*/
int
-connection_ap_can_use_exit(const entry_connection_t *conn, const node_t *exit)
+connection_ap_can_use_exit(const entry_connection_t *conn,
+ const node_t *exit_node)
{
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
tor_assert(conn);
tor_assert(conn->socks_request);
- tor_assert(exit);
+ tor_assert(exit_node);
/* If a particular exit node has been requested for the new connection,
* make sure the exit node of the existing circuit matches exactly.
@@ -3354,7 +3355,7 @@ connection_ap_can_use_exit(const entry_connection_t *conn, const node_t *exit)
const node_t *chosen_exit =
node_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1);
if (!chosen_exit || tor_memneq(chosen_exit->identity,
- exit->identity, DIGEST_LEN)) {
+ exit_node->identity, DIGEST_LEN)) {
/* doesn't match */
// log_debug(LD_APP,"Requested node '%s', considering node '%s'. No.",
// conn->chosen_exit_name, exit->nickname);
@@ -3379,7 +3380,8 @@ connection_ap_can_use_exit(const entry_connection_t *conn, const node_t *exit)
tor_addr_make_null(&addr, AF_INET);
addrp = &addr;
}
- r = compare_tor_addr_to_node_policy(addrp, conn->socks_request->port,exit);
+ r = compare_tor_addr_to_node_policy(addrp, conn->socks_request->port,
+ exit_node);
if (r == ADDR_POLICY_REJECTED)
return 0; /* We know the address, and the exit policy rejects it. */
if (r == ADDR_POLICY_PROBABLY_REJECTED && !conn->chosen_exit_name)
@@ -3388,10 +3390,10 @@ connection_ap_can_use_exit(const entry_connection_t *conn, const node_t *exit)
* this node, err on the side of caution. */
} else if (SOCKS_COMMAND_IS_RESOLVE(conn->socks_request->command)) {
/* Don't send DNS requests to non-exit servers by default. */
- if (!conn->chosen_exit_name && node_exit_policy_rejects_all(exit))
+ if (!conn->chosen_exit_name && node_exit_policy_rejects_all(exit_node))
return 0;
}
- if (routerset_contains_node(options->ExcludeExitNodesUnion_, exit)) {
+ if (routerset_contains_node(options->ExcludeExitNodesUnion_, exit_node)) {
/* Not a suitable exit. Refuse it. */
return 0;
}