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author | Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org> | 2004-05-13 07:24:49 +0000 |
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committer | Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org> | 2004-05-13 07:24:49 +0000 |
commit | ef561c0e42dcd33a2ca8ee29a582dd68da32f3be (patch) | |
tree | deb933ba547882bf8a0300674745c8f4c4922757 /src/or/circuitbuild.c | |
parent | 6c68187e9f7e86a6a5d0e49a2bc99b0994df7ae0 (diff) | |
download | tor-ef561c0e42dcd33a2ca8ee29a582dd68da32f3be.tar.gz tor-ef561c0e42dcd33a2ca8ee29a582dd68da32f3be.zip |
Break files apart into more modules
* \file circuitbuild.c
* \brief The actual details of building circuits.
* \file circuitlist.c
* \brief Manage the global circuit list.
* \file circuituse.c
* \brief Launch the right sort of circuits, attach streams to them.
* \file connection_edge.c
* \brief Handle edge streams.
* \file onion.c
* \brief Functions to queue create cells, and handle onionskin
* parsing and creation.
* \file relay.c
* \brief Handle relay cell encryption/decryption, plus packaging and
* receiving from circuits.
svn:r1863
Diffstat (limited to 'src/or/circuitbuild.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/or/circuitbuild.c | 1099 |
1 files changed, 1099 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5556fd8e41 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -0,0 +1,1099 @@ +/* Copyright 2001 Matej Pfajfar, 2001-2004 Roger Dingledine. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/* $Id$ */ + +/** + * \file circuitbuild.c + * \brief The actual details of building circuits. + **/ + +#include "or.h" + +extern or_options_t options; /* command-line and config-file options */ + +/********* START VARIABLES **********/ + +/** A global list of all circuits at this hop. */ +extern circuit_t *global_circuitlist; + +/********* END VARIABLES ************/ + +static cpath_build_state_t * +onion_new_cpath_build_state(uint8_t purpose, const char *exit_nickname); +static int +onion_extend_cpath(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, cpath_build_state_t + *state, routerinfo_t **router_out); +static int decide_circ_id_type(char *local_nick, char *remote_nick); +static int count_acceptable_routers(smartlist_t *routers); + +/** Iterate over values of circ_id, starting from conn-\>next_circ_id, + * and with the high bit specified by circ_id_type (see + * decide_circ_id_type()), until we get a circ_id that is not in use + * by any other circuit on that conn. + * + * Return it, or 0 if can't get a unique circ_id. + */ +static uint16_t get_unique_circ_id_by_conn(connection_t *conn, int circ_id_type) { + uint16_t test_circ_id; + int attempts=0; + uint16_t high_bit; + + tor_assert(conn && conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR); + high_bit = (circ_id_type == CIRC_ID_TYPE_HIGHER) ? 1<<15 : 0; + do { + /* Sequentially iterate over test_circ_id=1...1<<15-1 until we find a + * circID such that (high_bit|test_circ_id) is not already used. */ + test_circ_id = conn->next_circ_id++; + if (test_circ_id == 0 || test_circ_id >= 1<<15) { + test_circ_id = 1; + conn->next_circ_id = 2; + } + if(++attempts > 1<<15) { + /* Make sure we don't loop forever if all circ_id's are used. This + * matters because it's an external DoS vulnerability. + */ + log_fn(LOG_WARN,"No unused circ IDs. Failing."); + return 0; + } + test_circ_id |= high_bit; + } while(circuit_get_by_circ_id_conn(test_circ_id, conn)); + return test_circ_id; +} + +/** Log, at severity <b>severity</b>, the nicknames of each router in + * circ's cpath. Also log the length of the cpath, and the intended + * exit point. + */ +void circuit_log_path(int severity, circuit_t *circ) { + char buf[1024]; + char *s = buf; + struct crypt_path_t *hop; + char *states[] = {"closed", "waiting for keys", "open"}; + routerinfo_t *router; + tor_assert(CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) && circ->cpath); + + snprintf(s, sizeof(buf)-1, "circ (length %d, exit %s): ", + circ->build_state->desired_path_len, circ->build_state->chosen_exit); + hop=circ->cpath; + do { + s = buf + strlen(buf); + router = router_get_by_addr_port(hop->addr,hop->port); + if(router) { + snprintf(s, sizeof(buf) - (s - buf), "%s(%s) ", + router->nickname, states[hop->state]); + } else { + if(circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED) { + snprintf(s, sizeof(buf) - (s - buf), "(rendjoin hop)"); + } else { + snprintf(s, sizeof(buf) - (s - buf), "UNKNOWN "); + } + } + hop=hop->next; + } while(hop!=circ->cpath); + log_fn(severity,"%s",buf); +} + +/** Tell the rep(utation)hist(ory) module about the status of the links + * in circ. Hops that have become OPEN are marked as successfully + * extended; the _first_ hop that isn't open (if any) is marked as + * unable to extend. + */ +void circuit_rep_hist_note_result(circuit_t *circ) { + struct crypt_path_t *hop; + char *prev_nickname = NULL; + routerinfo_t *router; + hop = circ->cpath; + if(!hop) { + /* XXX + * if !hop, then we're not the beginning of this circuit. + * for now, just forget about it. later, we should remember when + * extends-through-us failed, too. + */ + return; + } + if (options.ORPort) { + prev_nickname = options.Nickname; + } + do { + router = router_get_by_addr_port(hop->addr,hop->port); + if (router) { + if (prev_nickname) { + if (hop->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN) + rep_hist_note_extend_succeeded(prev_nickname, router->nickname); + else { + rep_hist_note_extend_failed(prev_nickname, router->nickname); + break; + } + } + prev_nickname = router->nickname; + } else { + prev_nickname = NULL; + } + hop=hop->next; + } while (hop!=circ->cpath); +} + +/** A helper function for circuit_dump_by_conn() below. Log a bunch + * of information about circuit <b>circ</b>. + */ +static void +circuit_dump_details(int severity, circuit_t *circ, int poll_index, + char *type, int this_circid, int other_circid) { + struct crypt_path_t *hop; + log(severity,"Conn %d has %s circuit: circID %d (other side %d), state %d (%s), born %d", + poll_index, type, this_circid, other_circid, circ->state, + circuit_state_to_string[circ->state], (int)circ->timestamp_created); + if(CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { /* circ starts at this node */ + if(circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING) + log(severity,"Building: desired len %d, planned exit node %s.", + circ->build_state->desired_path_len, circ->build_state->chosen_exit); + for(hop=circ->cpath;hop->next != circ->cpath; hop=hop->next) + log(severity,"hop: state %d, addr 0x%.8x, port %d", hop->state, + (unsigned int)hop->addr, + (int)hop->port); + } +} + +/** Log, at severity <b>severity</b>, information about each circuit + * that is connected to <b>conn</b>. + */ +void circuit_dump_by_conn(connection_t *conn, int severity) { + circuit_t *circ; + connection_t *tmpconn; + + for(circ=global_circuitlist;circ;circ = circ->next) { + if(circ->p_conn == conn) + circuit_dump_details(severity, circ, conn->poll_index, "App-ward", + circ->p_circ_id, circ->n_circ_id); + for(tmpconn=circ->p_streams; tmpconn; tmpconn=tmpconn->next_stream) { + if(tmpconn == conn) { + circuit_dump_details(severity, circ, conn->poll_index, "App-ward", + circ->p_circ_id, circ->n_circ_id); + } + } + if(circ->n_conn == conn) + circuit_dump_details(severity, circ, conn->poll_index, "Exit-ward", + circ->n_circ_id, circ->p_circ_id); + for(tmpconn=circ->n_streams; tmpconn; tmpconn=tmpconn->next_stream) { + if(tmpconn == conn) { + circuit_dump_details(severity, circ, conn->poll_index, "Exit-ward", + circ->n_circ_id, circ->p_circ_id); + } + } + } +} + +/** Build a new circuit for <b>purpose</b>. If <b>exit_nickname</b> + * is defined, then use that as your exit router, else choose a suitable + * exit node. + * + * Also launch a connection to the first OR in the chosen path, if + * it's not open already. + */ +circuit_t *circuit_establish_circuit(uint8_t purpose, + const char *exit_nickname) { + routerinfo_t *firsthop; + connection_t *n_conn; + circuit_t *circ; + + circ = circuit_new(0, NULL); /* sets circ->p_circ_id and circ->p_conn */ + circ->state = CIRCUIT_STATE_OR_WAIT; + circ->build_state = onion_new_cpath_build_state(purpose, exit_nickname); + circ->purpose = purpose; + + if (! circ->build_state) { + log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Generating cpath failed."); + circuit_mark_for_close(circ); + return NULL; + } + + onion_extend_cpath(&circ->cpath, circ->build_state, &firsthop); + if(!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { + log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Generating first cpath hop failed."); + circuit_mark_for_close(circ); + return NULL; + } + + /* now see if we're already connected to the first OR in 'route' */ + + log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Looking for firsthop '%s:%u'", + firsthop->address,firsthop->or_port); + n_conn = connection_twin_get_by_addr_port(firsthop->addr,firsthop->or_port); + if(!n_conn || n_conn->state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) { /* not currently connected */ + circ->n_addr = firsthop->addr; + circ->n_port = firsthop->or_port; + + if(!n_conn) { /* launch the connection */ + n_conn = connection_or_connect(firsthop); + if(!n_conn) { /* connect failed, forget the whole thing */ + log_fn(LOG_INFO,"connect to firsthop failed. Closing."); + circuit_mark_for_close(circ); + return NULL; + } + } + + log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"connecting in progress (or finished). Good."); + /* return success. The onion/circuit/etc will be taken care of automatically + * (may already have been) whenever n_conn reaches OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN. + */ + return circ; + } else { /* it (or a twin) is already open. use it. */ + circ->n_addr = n_conn->addr; + circ->n_port = n_conn->port; + circ->n_conn = n_conn; + log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Conn open. Delivering first onion skin."); + if(circuit_send_next_onion_skin(circ) < 0) { + log_fn(LOG_INFO,"circuit_send_next_onion_skin failed."); + circuit_mark_for_close(circ); + return NULL; + } + } + return circ; +} + +/** Find circuits that are waiting on <b>or_conn</b> to become open, + * if any, and get them to send their create cells forward. + */ +void circuit_n_conn_open(connection_t *or_conn) { + circuit_t *circ; + + for(circ=global_circuitlist;circ;circ = circ->next) { + if (circ->marked_for_close) + continue; + if(CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) && circ->n_addr == or_conn->addr && circ->n_port == or_conn->port) { + tor_assert(circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OR_WAIT); + log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Found circ %d, sending onion skin.", circ->n_circ_id); + circ->n_conn = or_conn; + if(circuit_send_next_onion_skin(circ) < 0) { + log_fn(LOG_INFO,"send_next_onion_skin failed; circuit marked for closing."); + circuit_mark_for_close(circ); + continue; + /* XXX could this be bad, eg if next_onion_skin failed because conn died? */ + } + } + } +} + +extern int has_completed_circuit; + +/** This is the backbone function for building circuits. + * + * If circ's first hop is closed, then we need to build a create + * cell and send it forward. + * + * Otherwise, we need to build a relay extend cell and send it + * forward. + * + * Return -1 if we want to tear down circ, else return 0. + */ +int circuit_send_next_onion_skin(circuit_t *circ) { + cell_t cell; + crypt_path_t *hop; + routerinfo_t *router; + int r; + int circ_id_type; + char payload[2+4+ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN]; + + tor_assert(circ && CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)); + + if(circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_CLOSED) { + tor_assert(circ->n_conn && circ->n_conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR); + + log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"First skin; sending create cell."); + circ_id_type = decide_circ_id_type(options.Nickname, + circ->n_conn->nickname); + circ->n_circ_id = get_unique_circ_id_by_conn(circ->n_conn, circ_id_type); + + memset(&cell, 0, sizeof(cell_t)); + cell.command = CELL_CREATE; + cell.circ_id = circ->n_circ_id; + + router = router_get_by_nickname(circ->n_conn->nickname); + if (!router) { + log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Couldn't find routerinfo for %s", + circ->n_conn->nickname); + return -1; + } + + if(onion_skin_create(router->onion_pkey, + &(circ->cpath->handshake_state), + cell.payload) < 0) { + log_fn(LOG_WARN,"onion_skin_create (first hop) failed."); + return -1; + } + + connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(&cell, circ->n_conn); + + circ->cpath->state = CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS; + circ->state = CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING; + log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"first skin; finished sending create cell."); + } else { + tor_assert(circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN); + tor_assert(circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING); + log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"starting to send subsequent skin."); + r = onion_extend_cpath(&circ->cpath, circ->build_state, &router); + if (r==1) { + /* done building the circuit. whew. */ + circ->state = CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN; + log_fn(LOG_INFO,"circuit built!"); + circuit_reset_failure_count(); + if(!has_completed_circuit) { + has_completed_circuit=1; + log_fn(LOG_NOTICE,"Tor has successfully opened a circuit. Looks like it's working."); + } + circuit_rep_hist_note_result(circ); + circuit_has_opened(circ); /* do other actions as necessary */ + return 0; + } else if (r<0) { + log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Unable to extend circuit path."); + return -1; + } + hop = circ->cpath->prev; + + *(uint32_t*)payload = htonl(hop->addr); + *(uint16_t*)(payload+4) = htons(hop->port); + if(onion_skin_create(router->onion_pkey, &(hop->handshake_state), payload+6) < 0) { + log_fn(LOG_WARN,"onion_skin_create failed."); + return -1; + } + + log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Sending extend relay cell."); + /* send it to hop->prev, because it will transfer + * it to a create cell and then send to hop */ + if(connection_edge_send_command(NULL, circ, RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND, + payload, sizeof(payload), hop->prev) < 0) + return 0; /* circuit is closed */ + + hop->state = CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS; + } + return 0; +} + +/** Take the 'extend' cell, pull out addr/port plus the onion skin. Make + * sure we're connected to the next hop, and pass it the onion skin in + * a create cell. + */ +int circuit_extend(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ) { + connection_t *n_conn; + int circ_id_type; + cell_t newcell; + + if(circ->n_conn) { + log_fn(LOG_WARN,"n_conn already set. Bug/attack. Closing."); + return -1; + } + + circ->n_addr = ntohl(get_uint32(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE)); + circ->n_port = ntohs(get_uint16(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+4)); + + n_conn = connection_twin_get_by_addr_port(circ->n_addr,circ->n_port); + if(!n_conn || n_conn->type != CONN_TYPE_OR) { + /* I've disabled making connections through OPs, but it's definitely + * possible here. I'm not sure if it would be a bug or a feature. + * + * Note also that this will close circuits where the onion has the same + * router twice in a row in the path. I think that's ok. + */ + struct in_addr in; + in.s_addr = htonl(circ->n_addr); + log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Next router (%s:%d) not connected. Closing.", inet_ntoa(in), circ->n_port); +#if 0 /* if we do truncateds, no need to kill circ */ + connection_edge_send_command(NULL, circ, RELAY_COMMAND_TRUNCATED, + NULL, 0, NULL); + return 0; +#endif + circuit_mark_for_close(circ); + return 0; + } + + circ->n_addr = n_conn->addr; /* these are different if we found a twin instead */ + circ->n_port = n_conn->port; + + circ->n_conn = n_conn; + log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"n_conn is %s:%u",n_conn->address,n_conn->port); + + circ_id_type = decide_circ_id_type(options.Nickname, n_conn->nickname); + +// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"circ_id_type = %u.",circ_id_type); + circ->n_circ_id = get_unique_circ_id_by_conn(circ->n_conn, circ_id_type); + if(!circ->n_circ_id) { + log_fn(LOG_WARN,"failed to get unique circID."); + return -1; + } + log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Chosen circID %u.",circ->n_circ_id); + + memset(&newcell, 0, sizeof(cell_t)); + newcell.command = CELL_CREATE; + newcell.circ_id = circ->n_circ_id; + + memcpy(newcell.payload, cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+2+4, + ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN); + + connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(&newcell, circ->n_conn); + return 0; +} + +/** Initialize cpath-\>{f|b}_{crypto|digest} from the key material in + * key_data. key_data must contain CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL bytes, which are + * used as follows: + * - 20 to initialize f_digest + * - 20 to initialize b_digest + * - 16 to key f_crypto + * - 16 to key b_crypto + * + * (If 'reverse' is true, then f_XX and b_XX are swapped.) + */ +int circuit_init_cpath_crypto(crypt_path_t *cpath, char *key_data, int reverse) +{ + crypto_digest_env_t *tmp_digest; + crypto_cipher_env_t *tmp_crypto; + + tor_assert(cpath && key_data); + tor_assert(!(cpath->f_crypto || cpath->b_crypto || + cpath->f_digest || cpath->b_digest)); + + log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"hop init digest forward 0x%.8x, backward 0x%.8x.", + (unsigned int)*(uint32_t*)key_data, (unsigned int)*(uint32_t*)(key_data+20)); + cpath->f_digest = crypto_new_digest_env(); + crypto_digest_add_bytes(cpath->f_digest, key_data, DIGEST_LEN); + cpath->b_digest = crypto_new_digest_env(); + crypto_digest_add_bytes(cpath->b_digest, key_data+DIGEST_LEN, DIGEST_LEN); + + log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"hop init cipher forward 0x%.8x, backward 0x%.8x.", + (unsigned int)*(uint32_t*)(key_data+40), (unsigned int)*(uint32_t*)(key_data+40+16)); + if (!(cpath->f_crypto = + crypto_create_init_cipher(key_data+(2*DIGEST_LEN),1))) { + log(LOG_WARN,"forward cipher initialization failed."); + return -1; + } + if (!(cpath->b_crypto = + crypto_create_init_cipher(key_data+(2*DIGEST_LEN)+CIPHER_KEY_LEN,0))) { + log(LOG_WARN,"backward cipher initialization failed."); + return -1; + } + + if (reverse) { + tmp_digest = cpath->f_digest; + cpath->f_digest = cpath->b_digest; + cpath->b_digest = tmp_digest; + tmp_crypto = cpath->f_crypto; + cpath->f_crypto = cpath->b_crypto; + cpath->b_crypto = tmp_crypto; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** A created or extended cell came back to us on the circuit, + * and it included <b>reply</b> (the second DH key, plus KH). + * + * Calculate the appropriate keys and digests, make sure KH is + * correct, and initialize this hop of the cpath. + * + * Return -1 if we want to mark circ for close, else return 0. + */ +int circuit_finish_handshake(circuit_t *circ, char *reply) { + unsigned char keys[CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN]; + crypt_path_t *hop; + + tor_assert(CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)); + if(circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS) + hop = circ->cpath; + else { + for(hop=circ->cpath->next; + hop != circ->cpath && hop->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN; + hop=hop->next) ; + if(hop == circ->cpath) { /* got an extended when we're all done? */ + log_fn(LOG_WARN,"got extended when circ already built? Closing."); + return -1; + } + } + tor_assert(hop->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS); + + if(onion_skin_client_handshake(hop->handshake_state, reply, keys, + DIGEST_LEN*2+CIPHER_KEY_LEN*2) < 0) { + log_fn(LOG_WARN,"onion_skin_client_handshake failed."); + return -1; + } + + crypto_dh_free(hop->handshake_state); /* don't need it anymore */ + hop->handshake_state = NULL; + /* Remember hash of g^xy */ + memcpy(hop->handshake_digest, reply+DH_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN); + + if (circuit_init_cpath_crypto(hop, keys, 0)<0) { + return -1; + } + + hop->state = CPATH_STATE_OPEN; + log_fn(LOG_INFO,"finished"); + circuit_log_path(LOG_INFO,circ); + return 0; +} + +/** We received a relay truncated cell on circ. + * + * Since we don't ask for truncates currently, getting a truncated + * means that a connection broke or an extend failed. For now, + * just give up: for circ to close, and return 0. + */ +int circuit_truncated(circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *layer) { + crypt_path_t *victim; + connection_t *stream; + + tor_assert(circ && CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)); + tor_assert(layer); + + /* XXX Since we don't ask for truncates currently, getting a truncated + * means that a connection broke or an extend failed. For now, + * just give up. + */ + circuit_mark_for_close(circ); + return 0; + + while(layer->next != circ->cpath) { + /* we need to clear out layer->next */ + victim = layer->next; + log_fn(LOG_DEBUG, "Killing a layer of the cpath."); + + for(stream = circ->p_streams; stream; stream=stream->next_stream) { + if(stream->cpath_layer == victim) { + log_fn(LOG_INFO, "Marking stream %d for close.", stream->stream_id); + /* no need to send 'end' relay cells, + * because the other side's already dead + */ + stream->has_sent_end = 1; + connection_mark_for_close(stream); + } + } + + layer->next = victim->next; + circuit_free_cpath_node(victim); + } + + log_fn(LOG_INFO, "finished"); + return 0; +} + +/** Decide whether the first bit of the circuit ID will be + * 0 or 1, to avoid conflicts where each side randomly chooses + * the same circuit ID. + * + * Return CIRC_ID_TYPE_LOWER if local_nick is NULL, or if + * local_nick is lexographically smaller than remote_nick. + * Else return CIRC_ID_TYPE_HIGHER. + */ +static int decide_circ_id_type(char *local_nick, char *remote_nick) { + int result; + + tor_assert(remote_nick); + if(!local_nick) + return CIRC_ID_TYPE_LOWER; + result = strcasecmp(local_nick, remote_nick); + tor_assert(result); + if(result < 0) + return CIRC_ID_TYPE_LOWER; + return CIRC_ID_TYPE_HIGHER; +} + +/** Given a response payload and keys, initialize, then send a created + * cell back. + */ +int onionskin_answer(circuit_t *circ, unsigned char *payload, unsigned char *keys) { + cell_t cell; + crypt_path_t *tmp_cpath; + + tmp_cpath = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypt_path_t)); + + memset(&cell, 0, sizeof(cell_t)); + cell.command = CELL_CREATED; + cell.circ_id = circ->p_circ_id; + + circ->state = CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN; + + log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Entering."); + + memcpy(cell.payload, payload, ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN); + + log_fn(LOG_INFO,"init digest forward 0x%.8x, backward 0x%.8x.", + (unsigned int)*(uint32_t*)(keys), (unsigned int)*(uint32_t*)(keys+20)); + if (circuit_init_cpath_crypto(tmp_cpath, keys, 0)<0) { + log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Circuit initialization failed"); + tor_free(tmp_cpath); + return -1; + } + circ->n_digest = tmp_cpath->f_digest; + circ->n_crypto = tmp_cpath->f_crypto; + circ->p_digest = tmp_cpath->b_digest; + circ->p_crypto = tmp_cpath->b_crypto; + tor_free(tmp_cpath); + + memcpy(circ->handshake_digest, cell.payload+DH_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN); + + connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(&cell, circ->p_conn); + log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Finished sending 'created' cell."); + + return 0; +} + +extern int has_fetched_directory; /* from main.c */ + +/** Choose a length for a circuit of purpose <b>purpose</b>. + * Default length is 3 + the number of endpoints that would give something + * away. If the routerlist <b>routers</b> doesn't have enough routers + * to handle the desired path length, return as large a path length as + * is feasible, except if it's less than 2, in which case return -1. + */ +static int new_route_len(double cw, uint8_t purpose, smartlist_t *routers) { + int num_acceptable_routers; + int routelen; + + tor_assert((cw >= 0) && (cw < 1) && routers); /* valid parameters */ + +#ifdef TOR_PERF + routelen = 2; +#else + if(purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL) + routelen = 3; + else if(purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING) + routelen = 4; + else if(purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND) + routelen = 3; + else if(purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO) + routelen = 3; + else if(purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND) + routelen = 4; + else { + log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Unhandled purpose %d", purpose); + return -1; + } +#endif +#if 0 + for(routelen = 3; ; routelen++) { /* 3, increment until coinflip says we're done */ + if (crypto_pseudo_rand_int(255) >= cw*255) /* don't extend */ + break; + } +#endif + log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Chosen route length %d (%d routers available).",routelen, + smartlist_len(routers)); + + num_acceptable_routers = count_acceptable_routers(routers); + + if(num_acceptable_routers < 2) { + log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Not enough acceptable routers (%d). Discarding this circuit.", + num_acceptable_routers); + return -1; + } + + if(num_acceptable_routers < routelen) { + log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Not enough routers: cutting routelen from %d to %d.", + routelen, num_acceptable_routers); + routelen = num_acceptable_routers; + } + + return routelen; +} + +/** Return a pointer to a suitable router to be the exit node for the + * general-purpose circuit we're about to build. + * + * Look through the connection array, and choose a router that maximizes + * the number of pending streams that can exit from this router. + * + * Return NULL if we can't find any suitable routers. + */ +static routerinfo_t *choose_good_exit_server_general(routerlist_t *dir) +{ + int *n_supported; + int i, j; + int n_pending_connections = 0; + connection_t **carray; + int n_connections; + int best_support = -1; + int n_best_support=0; + smartlist_t *sl, *preferredexits, *excludedexits; + routerinfo_t *router; + + get_connection_array(&carray, &n_connections); + + /* Count how many connections are waiting for a circuit to be built. + * We use this for log messages now, but in the future we may depend on it. + */ + for (i = 0; i < n_connections; ++i) { + if (carray[i]->type == CONN_TYPE_AP && + carray[i]->state == AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT && + !carray[i]->marked_for_close && + !circuit_stream_is_being_handled(carray[i])) + ++n_pending_connections; + } + log_fn(LOG_DEBUG, "Choosing exit node; %d connections are pending", + n_pending_connections); + /* Now we count, for each of the routers in the directory, how many + * of the pending connections could possibly exit from that + * router (n_supported[i]). (We can't be sure about cases where we + * don't know the IP address of the pending connection.) + */ + n_supported = tor_malloc(sizeof(int)*smartlist_len(dir->routers)); + for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(dir->routers); ++i) { /* iterate over routers */ + router = smartlist_get(dir->routers, i); + if(router_is_me(router)) { + n_supported[i] = -1; + log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Skipping node %s -- it's me.", router->nickname); + /* XXX there's probably a reverse predecessor attack here, but + * it's slow. should we take this out? -RD + */ + continue; + } + if(!router->is_running) { + n_supported[i] = -1; + log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Skipping node %s (index %d) -- directory says it's not running.", + router->nickname, i); + continue; /* skip routers that are known to be down */ + } + if(router_exit_policy_rejects_all(router)) { + n_supported[i] = -1; + log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Skipping node %s (index %d) -- it rejects all.", + router->nickname, i); + continue; /* skip routers that reject all */ + } + n_supported[i] = 0; + for (j = 0; j < n_connections; ++j) { /* iterate over connections */ + if (carray[j]->type != CONN_TYPE_AP || + carray[j]->state != AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT || + carray[j]->marked_for_close || + circuit_stream_is_being_handled(carray[j])) + continue; /* Skip everything but APs in CIRCUIT_WAIT */ + switch (connection_ap_can_use_exit(carray[j], router)) + { + case ADDR_POLICY_REJECTED: + log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"%s (index %d) would reject this stream.", + router->nickname, i); + break; /* would be rejected; try next connection */ + case ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPTED: + case ADDR_POLICY_UNKNOWN: + ++n_supported[i]; + log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"%s is supported. n_supported[%d] now %d.", + router->nickname, i, n_supported[i]); + } + } /* End looping over connections. */ + if (n_supported[i] > best_support) { + /* If this router is better than previous ones, remember its index + * and goodness, and start counting how many routers are this good. */ + best_support = n_supported[i]; n_best_support=1; + log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"%s is new best supported option so far.", + router->nickname); + } else if (n_supported[i] == best_support) { + /* If this router is _as good_ as the best one, just increment the + * count of equally good routers.*/ + ++n_best_support; + } + } + log_fn(LOG_INFO, "Found %d servers that might support %d/%d pending connections.", + n_best_support, best_support, n_pending_connections); + + preferredexits = smartlist_create(); + add_nickname_list_to_smartlist(preferredexits,options.ExitNodes); + + excludedexits = smartlist_create(); + add_nickname_list_to_smartlist(excludedexits,options.ExcludeNodes); + + sl = smartlist_create(); + + /* If any routers definitely support any pending connections, choose one + * at random. */ + if (best_support > 0) { + for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(dir->routers); i++) + if (n_supported[i] == best_support) + smartlist_add(sl, smartlist_get(dir->routers, i)); + + smartlist_subtract(sl,excludedexits); + if (smartlist_overlap(sl,preferredexits)) + smartlist_intersect(sl,preferredexits); + router = smartlist_choose(sl); + } else { + /* Either there are no pending connections, or no routers even seem to + * possibly support any of them. Choose a router at random. */ + if (best_support == -1) { + log(LOG_WARN, "All routers are down or middleman -- choosing a doomed exit at random."); + } + for(i = 0; i < smartlist_len(dir->routers); i++) + if(n_supported[i] != -1) + smartlist_add(sl, smartlist_get(dir->routers, i)); + + smartlist_subtract(sl,excludedexits); + if (smartlist_overlap(sl,preferredexits)) + smartlist_intersect(sl,preferredexits); + router = smartlist_choose(sl); + } + + smartlist_free(preferredexits); + smartlist_free(excludedexits); + smartlist_free(sl); + tor_free(n_supported); + if(router) { + log_fn(LOG_INFO, "Chose exit server '%s'", router->nickname); + return router; + } + log_fn(LOG_WARN, "No exit routers seem to be running; can't choose an exit."); + return NULL; +} + +/** Return a pointer to a suitable router to be the exit node for the + * circuit of purpose <b>purpose</b> that we're about to build (or NULL + * if no router is suitable). + * + * For general-purpose circuits, pass it off to + * choose_good_exit_server_general() + * + * For client-side rendezvous circuits, choose a random node, weighted + * toward the preferences in 'options'. + */ +static routerinfo_t *choose_good_exit_server(uint8_t purpose, routerlist_t *dir) +{ + routerinfo_t *r; + switch(purpose) { + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL: + return choose_good_exit_server_general(dir); + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND: + r = router_choose_random_node(dir, options.RendNodes, options.RendExcludeNodes, NULL); + return r; + default: + log_fn(LOG_WARN,"unhandled purpose %d", purpose); + tor_assert(0); + } + return NULL; /* never reached */ +} + +/** Allocate a cpath_build_state_t, populate it based on + * <b>purpose</b> and <b>exit_nickname</b> (if specified), and + * return it. + */ +static cpath_build_state_t * +onion_new_cpath_build_state(uint8_t purpose, const char *exit_nickname) +{ + routerlist_t *rl; + int r; + cpath_build_state_t *info; + routerinfo_t *exit; + + router_get_routerlist(&rl); + r = new_route_len(options.PathlenCoinWeight, purpose, rl->routers); + if (r < 0) + return NULL; + info = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(cpath_build_state_t)); + info->desired_path_len = r; + if(exit_nickname) { /* the circuit-builder pre-requested one */ + log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Using requested exit node '%s'", exit_nickname); + info->chosen_exit = tor_strdup(exit_nickname); + } else { /* we have to decide one */ + exit = choose_good_exit_server(purpose, rl); + if(!exit) { + log_fn(LOG_WARN,"failed to choose an exit server"); + tor_free(info); + return NULL; + } + info->chosen_exit = tor_strdup(exit->nickname); + } + return info; +} + +/** Return the number of routers in <b>routers</b> that are currently up + * and available for building circuits through. Count sets of twins only + * once. + */ +static int count_acceptable_routers(smartlist_t *routers) { + int i, j, n; + int num=0; + connection_t *conn; + routerinfo_t *r, *r2; + + n = smartlist_len(routers); + for(i=0;i<n;i++) { + r = smartlist_get(routers, i); + log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Contemplating whether router %d (%s) is a new option...", + i, r->nickname); + if(r->is_running == 0) { + log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Nope, the directory says %d is not running.",i); + goto next_i_loop; + } + if(options.ORPort) { + conn = connection_exact_get_by_addr_port(r->addr, r->or_port); + if(!conn || conn->type != CONN_TYPE_OR || conn->state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) { + log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Nope, %d is not connected.",i); + goto next_i_loop; + } + } + for(j=0;j<i;j++) { + r2 = smartlist_get(routers, j); + if(!crypto_pk_cmp_keys(r->onion_pkey, r2->onion_pkey)) { + /* these guys are twins. so we've already counted him. */ + log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Nope, %d is a twin of %d.",i,j); + goto next_i_loop; + } + } + num++; + log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"I like %d. num_acceptable_routers now %d.",i, num); + next_i_loop: + ; /* C requires an explicit statement after the label */ + } + + return num; +} + +/** Go through smartlist <b>sl</b> of routers, and remove all elements that + * have the same onion key as twin. + */ +static void remove_twins_from_smartlist(smartlist_t *sl, routerinfo_t *twin) { + int i; + routerinfo_t *r; + + if(twin == NULL) + return; + + for(i=0; i < smartlist_len(sl); i++) { + r = smartlist_get(sl,i); + if (!crypto_pk_cmp_keys(r->onion_pkey, twin->onion_pkey)) { + smartlist_del(sl,i--); + } + } +} + +/** Add <b>new_hop</b> to the end of the doubly-linked-list <b>head_ptr</b>. + * + * This function is used to extend cpath by another hop. + */ +void onion_append_to_cpath(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, crypt_path_t *new_hop) +{ + if (*head_ptr) { + new_hop->next = (*head_ptr); + new_hop->prev = (*head_ptr)->prev; + (*head_ptr)->prev->next = new_hop; + (*head_ptr)->prev = new_hop; + } else { + *head_ptr = new_hop; + new_hop->prev = new_hop->next = new_hop; + } +} + +/** Choose a suitable next hop in the cpath <b>head_ptr</b>, + * based on <b>state</b>. Add the hop info to head_ptr, and return a + * pointer to the chosen router in <b>router_out</b>. + */ +static int +onion_extend_cpath(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, cpath_build_state_t + *state, routerinfo_t **router_out) +{ + int cur_len; + crypt_path_t *cpath, *hop; + routerinfo_t *r; + routerinfo_t *choice; + int i; + smartlist_t *sl, *excludednodes; + + tor_assert(head_ptr); + tor_assert(router_out); + + if (!*head_ptr) { + cur_len = 0; + } else { + cur_len = 1; + for (cpath = *head_ptr; cpath->next != *head_ptr; cpath = cpath->next) { + ++cur_len; + } + } + if (cur_len >= state->desired_path_len) { + log_fn(LOG_DEBUG, "Path is complete: %d steps long", + state->desired_path_len); + return 1; + } + log_fn(LOG_DEBUG, "Path is %d long; we want %d", cur_len, + state->desired_path_len); + + excludednodes = smartlist_create(); + add_nickname_list_to_smartlist(excludednodes,options.ExcludeNodes); + + if(cur_len == state->desired_path_len - 1) { /* Picking last node */ + log_fn(LOG_DEBUG, "Contemplating last hop: choice already made: %s", + state->chosen_exit); + choice = router_get_by_nickname(state->chosen_exit); + smartlist_free(excludednodes); + if(!choice) { + log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Our chosen exit %s is no longer in the directory? Discarding this circuit.", + state->chosen_exit); + return -1; + } + } else if(cur_len == 0) { /* picking first node */ + /* try the nodes in EntryNodes first */ + sl = smartlist_create(); + add_nickname_list_to_smartlist(sl,options.EntryNodes); + /* XXX one day, consider picking chosen_exit knowing what's in EntryNodes */ + remove_twins_from_smartlist(sl,router_get_by_nickname(state->chosen_exit)); + remove_twins_from_smartlist(sl,router_get_my_routerinfo()); + smartlist_subtract(sl,excludednodes); + choice = smartlist_choose(sl); + smartlist_free(sl); + if(!choice) { + sl = smartlist_create(); + router_add_running_routers_to_smartlist(sl); + remove_twins_from_smartlist(sl,router_get_by_nickname(state->chosen_exit)); + remove_twins_from_smartlist(sl,router_get_my_routerinfo()); + smartlist_subtract(sl,excludednodes); + choice = smartlist_choose(sl); + smartlist_free(sl); + } + smartlist_free(excludednodes); + if(!choice) { + log_fn(LOG_WARN,"No acceptable routers while picking entry node. Discarding this circuit."); + return -1; + } + } else { + log_fn(LOG_DEBUG, "Contemplating intermediate hop: random choice."); + sl = smartlist_create(); + router_add_running_routers_to_smartlist(sl); + remove_twins_from_smartlist(sl,router_get_by_nickname(state->chosen_exit)); + remove_twins_from_smartlist(sl,router_get_my_routerinfo()); + for (i = 0, cpath = *head_ptr; i < cur_len; ++i, cpath=cpath->next) { + r = router_get_by_addr_port(cpath->addr, cpath->port); + tor_assert(r); + remove_twins_from_smartlist(sl,r); + } + smartlist_subtract(sl,excludednodes); + choice = smartlist_choose(sl); + smartlist_free(sl); + smartlist_free(excludednodes); + if(!choice) { + log_fn(LOG_WARN,"No acceptable routers while picking intermediate node. Discarding this circuit."); + return -1; + } + } + + log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Chose router %s for hop %d (exit is %s)", + choice->nickname, cur_len, state->chosen_exit); + + hop = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypt_path_t)); + + /* link hop into the cpath, at the end. */ + onion_append_to_cpath(head_ptr, hop); + + hop->state = CPATH_STATE_CLOSED; + + hop->port = choice->or_port; + hop->addr = choice->addr; + + hop->package_window = CIRCWINDOW_START; + hop->deliver_window = CIRCWINDOW_START; + + log_fn(LOG_DEBUG, "Extended circuit path with %s for hop %d", + choice->nickname, cur_len); + + *router_out = choice; + return 0; +} + +/* + Local Variables: + mode:c + indent-tabs-mode:nil + c-basic-offset:2 + End: +*/ |