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author | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2014-04-18 13:00:45 -0400 |
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committer | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2014-04-18 13:00:45 -0400 |
commit | bd169aa9a512857fe95fa0cbe44e4e6dbc2c800f (patch) | |
tree | 3b864e4cd291c2bd240dd7fbbf0d7e200f40dd92 /src/or/circuitbuild.c | |
parent | eb896d5e6f09902a760af010326b79ce82492da1 (diff) | |
parent | 0d75344b0e0eafc89db89a974e87b16564cd8f0a (diff) | |
download | tor-bd169aa9a512857fe95fa0cbe44e4e6dbc2c800f.tar.gz tor-bd169aa9a512857fe95fa0cbe44e4e6dbc2c800f.zip |
Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/bug11553_024' into bug11553_025
Conflicts:
src/or/channel.h
Diffstat (limited to 'src/or/circuitbuild.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/or/circuitbuild.c | 52 |
1 files changed, 36 insertions, 16 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 98fef4c142..e1d57ad6eb 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -77,18 +77,21 @@ channel_connect_for_circuit(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, return chan; } -/** Iterate over values of circ_id, starting from conn-\>next_circ_id, - * and with the high bit specified by conn-\>circ_id_type, until we get - * a circ_id that is not in use by any other circuit on that conn. + +/** Search for a value for circ_id that we can use on <b>chan</b> for an + * outbound circuit, until we get a circ_id that is not in use by any other + * circuit on that conn. * * Return it, or 0 if can't get a unique circ_id. */ static circid_t get_unique_circ_id_by_chan(channel_t *chan) { +#define MAX_CIRCID_ATTEMPTS 64 + circid_t test_circ_id; circid_t attempts=0; - circid_t high_bit, max_range; + circid_t high_bit, max_range, mask; tor_assert(chan); @@ -98,23 +101,40 @@ get_unique_circ_id_by_chan(channel_t *chan) "a client with no identity."); return 0; } - max_range = (chan->wide_circ_ids) ? (1u<<31) : (1u<<15); + max_range = (chan->wide_circ_ids) ? (1u<<31) : (1u<<15); + mask = max_range - 1; high_bit = (chan->circ_id_type == CIRC_ID_TYPE_HIGHER) ? max_range : 0; do { - /* Sequentially iterate over test_circ_id=1...max_range until we find a - * circID such that (high_bit|test_circ_id) is not already used. */ - test_circ_id = chan->next_circ_id++; - if (test_circ_id == 0 || test_circ_id >= max_range) { - test_circ_id = 1; - chan->next_circ_id = 2; - } - if (++attempts > max_range) { - /* Make sure we don't loop forever if all circ_id's are used. This - * matters because it's an external DoS opportunity. + if (++attempts > MAX_CIRCID_ATTEMPTS) { + /* Make sure we don't loop forever because all circuit IDs are used. + * + * Once, we would try until we had tried every possible circuit ID. But + * that's quite expensive. Instead, we try MAX_CIRCID_ATTEMPTS random + * circuit IDs, and then give up. + * + * This potentially causes us to give up early if our circuit ID space + * is nearly full. If we have N circuit IDs in use, then we will reject + * a new circuit with probability (N / max_range) ^ MAX_CIRCID_ATTEMPTS. + * This means that in practice, a few percent of our circuit ID capacity + * will go unused. + * + * The alternative here, though, is to do a linear search over the + * whole circuit ID space every time we extend a circuit, which is + * not so great either. */ - log_warn(LD_CIRC,"No unused circ IDs. Failing."); + if (! chan->warned_circ_ids_exhausted) { + chan->warned_circ_ids_exhausted = 1; + log_warn(LD_CIRC,"No unused circIDs found on channel %s wide " + "circID support, with %u inbound and %u outbound circuits. " + "Failing a circuit.", + chan->wide_circ_ids ? "with" : "without", + chan->num_p_circuits, chan->num_n_circuits); + } return 0; } + + crypto_rand((char*) &test_circ_id, sizeof(test_circ_id)); + test_circ_id &= mask; test_circ_id |= high_bit; } while (circuit_id_in_use_on_channel(test_circ_id, chan)); return test_circ_id; |