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authorNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2017-02-14 19:10:20 -0500
committerNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2017-02-14 19:10:20 -0500
commit7e469c10020f92b6aa19cb3f4316fb040d837819 (patch)
treece6a0f2f2fb22c78ed09a1ed838d13f7967c92e6 /src/or/buffers.c
parentdca8ae5cfa8b081230d033158c980d50840b072a (diff)
parent4c1ecd75830cbf43bc39b9c77ee01b3ce138e40c (diff)
downloadtor-7e469c10020f92b6aa19cb3f4316fb040d837819.tar.gz
tor-7e469c10020f92b6aa19cb3f4316fb040d837819.zip
Merge branch 'bug20894_029_v3'
Diffstat (limited to 'src/or/buffers.c')
-rw-r--r--src/or/buffers.c72
1 files changed, 59 insertions, 13 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/buffers.c b/src/or/buffers.c
index 58ce5733eb..6111820701 100644
--- a/src/or/buffers.c
+++ b/src/or/buffers.c
@@ -1138,6 +1138,52 @@ buf_find_string_offset(const buf_t *buf, const char *s, size_t n)
return -1;
}
+/**
+ * Scan the HTTP headers in the <b>headerlen</b>-byte memory range at
+ * <b>headers</b>, looking for a "Content-Length" header. Try to set
+ * *<b>result_out</b> to the numeric value of that header if possible.
+ * Return -1 if the header was malformed, 0 if it was missing, and 1 if
+ * it was present and well-formed.
+ */
+STATIC int
+buf_http_find_content_length(const char *headers, size_t headerlen,
+ size_t *result_out)
+{
+ const char *p, *newline;
+ char *len_str, *eos=NULL;
+ size_t remaining, result;
+ int ok;
+ *result_out = 0; /* The caller shouldn't look at this unless the
+ * return value is 1, but let's prevent confusion */
+
+#define CONTENT_LENGTH "\r\nContent-Length: "
+ p = (char*) tor_memstr(headers, headerlen, CONTENT_LENGTH);
+ if (p == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ tor_assert(p >= headers && p < headers+headerlen);
+ remaining = (headers+headerlen)-p;
+ p += strlen(CONTENT_LENGTH);
+ remaining -= strlen(CONTENT_LENGTH);
+
+ newline = memchr(p, '\n', remaining);
+ if (newline == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ len_str = tor_memdup_nulterm(p, newline-p);
+ /* We limit the size to INT_MAX because other parts of the buffer.c
+ * code don't like buffers to be any bigger than that. */
+ result = (size_t) tor_parse_uint64(len_str, 10, 0, INT_MAX, &ok, &eos);
+ if (eos && !tor_strisspace(eos)) {
+ ok = 0;
+ } else {
+ *result_out = result;
+ }
+ tor_free(len_str);
+
+ return ok ? 1 : -1;
+}
+
/** There is a (possibly incomplete) http statement on <b>buf</b>, of the
* form "\%s\\r\\n\\r\\n\%s", headers, body. (body may contain NULs.)
* If a) the headers include a Content-Length field and all bytes in
@@ -1163,9 +1209,10 @@ fetch_from_buf_http(buf_t *buf,
char **body_out, size_t *body_used, size_t max_bodylen,
int force_complete)
{
- char *headers, *p;
- size_t headerlen, bodylen, contentlen;
+ char *headers;
+ size_t headerlen, bodylen, contentlen=0;
int crlf_offset;
+ int r;
check();
if (!buf->head)
@@ -1201,17 +1248,12 @@ fetch_from_buf_http(buf_t *buf,
return -1;
}
-#define CONTENT_LENGTH "\r\nContent-Length: "
- p = (char*) tor_memstr(headers, headerlen, CONTENT_LENGTH);
- if (p) {
- int i;
- i = atoi(p+strlen(CONTENT_LENGTH));
- if (i < 0) {
- log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Content-Length is less than zero; it looks like "
- "someone is trying to crash us.");
- return -1;
- }
- contentlen = i;
+ r = buf_http_find_content_length(headers, headerlen, &contentlen);
+ if (r == -1) {
+ log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Content-Length is bogus; maybe "
+ "someone is trying to crash us.");
+ return -1;
+ } else if (r == 1) {
/* if content-length is malformed, then our body length is 0. fine. */
log_debug(LD_HTTP,"Got a contentlen of %d.",(int)contentlen);
if (bodylen < contentlen) {
@@ -1224,7 +1266,11 @@ fetch_from_buf_http(buf_t *buf,
bodylen = contentlen;
log_debug(LD_HTTP,"bodylen reduced to %d.",(int)bodylen);
}
+ } else {
+ tor_assert(r == 0);
+ /* Leave bodylen alone */
}
+
/* all happy. copy into the appropriate places, and return 1 */
if (headers_out) {
*headers_out = tor_malloc(headerlen+1);