Split tls modules and their tests into openssl and generic.

Also, add a stubbed-out nss version of the modules.  The tests won't
pass with NSS yet since the NSS modules don't do anything.

This is a good patch to read with --color-moved.

10 files changed, 3182 insertions, 2572 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/tls/include.am b/src/lib/tls/include.am
index 1fd25a0b33..1731049032 100644
--- a/src/lib/tls/include.am
+++ b/src/lib/tls/include.am
@@ -10,6 +10,16 @@ src_lib_libtor_tls_a_SOURCES =			\
 	src/lib/tls/tortls.c			\
 	src/lib/tls/x509.c
 
+if USE_NSS
+src_lib_libtor_tls_a_SOURCES +=			\
+	src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c		\
+	src/lib/tls/x509_nss.c
+else
+src_lib_libtor_tls_a_SOURCES +=			\
+	src/lib/tls/tortls_openssl.c		\
+	src/lib/tls/x509_openssl.c
+endif
+
 src_lib_libtor_tls_a_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) $(TOR_CFLAGS_CRYPTLIB)
 
 src_lib_libtor_tls_testing_a_SOURCES = \
@@ -22,4 +32,6 @@ noinst_HEADERS +=				\
 	src/lib/tls/ciphers.inc			\
 	src/lib/tls/buffers_tls.h		\
 	src/lib/tls/tortls.h			\
+	src/lib/tls/tortls_internal.h		\
+	src/lib/tls/tortls_st.h			\
 	src/lib/tls/x509.h
diff --git a/src/lib/tls/tortls.c b/src/lib/tls/tortls.c
index 4c5dedb573..4b35177df9 100644
--- a/src/lib/tls/tortls.c
+++ b/src/lib/tls/tortls.c
@@ -3,146 +3,13 @@
  * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
 /* See LICENSE for licensing information */
 
-/**
- * \file tortls.c
- * \brief Wrapper functions to present a consistent interface to
- * TLS, SSL, and X.509 functions from OpenSSL.
- **/
-
-/* (Unlike other tor functions, these
- * are prefixed with tor_ in order to avoid conflicting with OpenSSL
- * functions and variables.)
- */
-
-#include "orconfig.h"
-
 #define TORTLS_PRIVATE
-#define TORTLS_OPENSSL_PRIVATE
-
-#ifdef _WIN32 /*wrkard for dtls1.h >= 0.9.8m of "#include <winsock.h>"*/
-  #include <winsock2.h>
-  #include <ws2tcpip.h>
-#endif
-
-#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_cipher.h"
-#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
-#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh.h"
-#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
-#include "lib/crypt_ops/compat_openssl.h"
 #include "lib/tls/x509.h"
-
-/* Some versions of OpenSSL declare SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile twice in
- * srtp.h. Suppress the GCC warning so we can build with -Wredundant-decl. */
-DISABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls)
-
-#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-#error "We require OpenSSL with ECC support"
-#endif
-
-#include <openssl/ssl.h>
-#include <openssl/ssl3.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/tls1.h>
-#include <openssl/asn1.h>
-#include <openssl/bio.h>
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-
-ENABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls)
-
 #include "lib/tls/tortls.h"
 #include "lib/tls/tortls_st.h"
-#include "lib/log/log.h"
+#include "lib/tls/tortls_internal.h"
 #include "lib/log/util_bug.h"
-#include "lib/container/smartlist.h"
-#include "lib/string/compat_string.h"
-#include "lib/string/printf.h"
-#include "lib/net/socket.h"
 #include "lib/intmath/cmp.h"
-#include "lib/ctime/di_ops.h"
-#include "lib/encoding/time_fmt.h"
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "lib/arch/bytes.h"
-
-/* Copied from or.h */
-#define LEGAL_NICKNAME_CHARACTERS \
-  "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789"
-
-/** How long do identity certificates live? (sec) */
-#define IDENTITY_CERT_LIFETIME  (365*24*60*60)
-
-#define ADDR(tls) (((tls) && (tls)->address) ? tls->address : "peer")
-
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER <  OPENSSL_V(1,0,0,'f')
-/* This is a version of OpenSSL before 1.0.0f. It does not have
- * the CVE-2011-4576 fix, and as such it can't use RELEASE_BUFFERS and
- * SSL3 safely at the same time.
- */
-#define DISABLE_SSL3_HANDSHAKE
-#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER <  OPENSSL_V(1,0,0,'f') */
-
-/* We redefine these so that we can run correctly even if the vendor gives us
- * a version of OpenSSL that does not match its header files.  (Apple: I am
- * looking at you.)
- */
-#ifndef SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
-#define SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0x00040000L
-#endif
-#ifndef SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
-#define SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0x0010
-#endif
-
-/** Return values for tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers.
- *
- * @{
- */
-/** An error occurred when examining the client ciphers */
-#define CIPHERS_ERR -1
-/** The client cipher list indicates that a v1 handshake was in use. */
-#define CIPHERS_V1 1
-/** The client cipher list indicates that the client is using the v2 or the
- * v3 handshake, but that it is (probably!) lying about what ciphers it
- * supports */
-#define CIPHERS_V2 2
-/** The client cipher list indicates that the client is using the v2 or the
- * v3 handshake, and that it is telling the truth about what ciphers it
- * supports */
-#define CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED 3
-/** @} */
-
-/** The ex_data index in which we store a pointer to an SSL object's
- * corresponding tor_tls_t object. */
-STATIC int tor_tls_object_ex_data_index = -1;
-
-/** Helper: Allocate tor_tls_object_ex_data_index. */
-STATIC void
-tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(void)
-{
-  if (tor_tls_object_ex_data_index == -1) {
-    tor_tls_object_ex_data_index =
-      SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
-    tor_assert(tor_tls_object_ex_data_index != -1);
-  }
-}
-
-/** Helper: given a SSL* pointer, return the tor_tls_t object using that
- * pointer. */
-STATIC tor_tls_t *
-tor_tls_get_by_ssl(const SSL *ssl)
-{
-  tor_tls_t *result = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index);
-  if (result)
-    tor_assert(result->magic == TOR_TLS_MAGIC);
-  return result;
-}
-
-static void tor_tls_context_decref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx);
-static void tor_tls_context_incref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx);
 
 /** Global TLS contexts. We keep them here because nobody else needs
  * to touch them.
@@ -152,126 +19,37 @@ STATIC tor_tls_context_t *server_tls_context = NULL;
 STATIC tor_tls_context_t *client_tls_context = NULL;
 /**@}*/
 
-/** True iff tor_tls_init() has been called. */
-static int tls_library_is_initialized = 0;
-
-/* Module-internal error codes. */
-#define TOR_TLS_SYSCALL_    (MIN_TOR_TLS_ERROR_VAL_ - 2)
-#define TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_ (MIN_TOR_TLS_ERROR_VAL_ - 1)
-
-/** Write a description of the current state of <b>tls</b> into the
- * <b>sz</b>-byte buffer at <b>buf</b>. */
-void
-tor_tls_get_state_description(tor_tls_t *tls, char *buf, size_t sz)
+/**
+ * Return the appropriate TLS context.
+ */
+tor_tls_context_t *
+tor_tls_context_get(int is_server)
 {
-  const char *ssl_state;
-  const char *tortls_state;
-
-  if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(!tls || !tls->ssl)) {
-    strlcpy(buf, "(No SSL object)", sz);
-    return;
-  }
-
-  ssl_state = SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl);
-  switch (tls->state) {
-#define CASE(st) case TOR_TLS_ST_##st: tortls_state = " in "#st ; break
-    CASE(HANDSHAKE);
-    CASE(OPEN);
-    CASE(GOTCLOSE);
-    CASE(SENTCLOSE);
-    CASE(CLOSED);
-    CASE(RENEGOTIATE);
-#undef CASE
-  case TOR_TLS_ST_BUFFEREVENT:
-    tortls_state = "";
-    break;
-  default:
-    tortls_state = " in unknown TLS state";
-    break;
-  }
-
-  tor_snprintf(buf, sz, "%s%s", ssl_state, tortls_state);
+  return is_server ? server_tls_context : client_tls_context;
 }
 
-/** Log a single error <b>err</b> as returned by ERR_get_error(), which was
- * received while performing an operation <b>doing</b> on <b>tls</b>.  Log
- * the message at <b>severity</b>, in log domain <b>domain</b>. */
+/** Increase the reference count of <b>ctx</b>. */
 void
-tor_tls_log_one_error(tor_tls_t *tls, unsigned long err,
-                  int severity, int domain, const char *doing)
+tor_tls_context_incref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx)
 {
-  const char *state = NULL, *addr;
-  const char *msg, *lib, *func;
-
-  state = (tls && tls->ssl)?SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl):"---";
-
-  addr = tls ? tls->address : NULL;
-
-  /* Some errors are known-benign, meaning they are the fault of the other
-   * side of the connection. The caller doesn't know this, so override the
-   * priority for those cases. */
-  switch (ERR_GET_REASON(err)) {
-    case SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST:
-    case SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST:
-    case SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_1_1_API
-    case SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE:
-#endif
-    case SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL:
-    case SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL:
-      severity = LOG_INFO;
-      break;
-    default:
-      break;
-  }
-
-  msg = (const char*)ERR_reason_error_string(err);
-  lib = (const char*)ERR_lib_error_string(err);
-  func = (const char*)ERR_func_error_string(err);
-  if (!msg) msg = "(null)";
-  if (!lib) lib = "(null)";
-  if (!func) func = "(null)";
-  if (doing) {
-    tor_log(severity, domain, "TLS error while %s%s%s: %s (in %s:%s:%s)",
-        doing, addr?" with ":"", addr?addr:"",
-        msg, lib, func, state);
-  } else {
-    tor_log(severity, domain, "TLS error%s%s: %s (in %s:%s:%s)",
-        addr?" with ":"", addr?addr:"",
-        msg, lib, func, state);
-  }
+  ++ctx->refcnt;
 }
 
-/** Log all pending tls errors at level <b>severity</b> in log domain
- * <b>domain</b>.  Use <b>doing</b> to describe our current activities.
- */
+/** Free all global TLS structures. */
 void
-tls_log_errors(tor_tls_t *tls, int severity, int domain, const char *doing)
+tor_tls_free_all(void)
 {
-  unsigned long err;
+  check_no_tls_errors();
 
-  while ((err = ERR_get_error()) != 0) {
-    tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, err, severity, domain, doing);
+  if (server_tls_context) {
+    tor_tls_context_t *ctx = server_tls_context;
+    server_tls_context = NULL;
+    tor_tls_context_decref(ctx);
   }
-}
-
-/** Convert an errno (or a WSAerrno on windows) into a TOR_TLS_* error
- * code. */
-STATIC int
-tor_errno_to_tls_error(int e)
-{
-  switch (e) {
-    case SOCK_ERRNO(ECONNRESET): // most common
-      return TOR_TLS_ERROR_CONNRESET;
-    case SOCK_ERRNO(ETIMEDOUT):
-      return TOR_TLS_ERROR_TIMEOUT;
-    case SOCK_ERRNO(EHOSTUNREACH):
-    case SOCK_ERRNO(ENETUNREACH):
-      return TOR_TLS_ERROR_NO_ROUTE;
-    case SOCK_ERRNO(ECONNREFUSED):
-      return TOR_TLS_ERROR_CONNREFUSED; // least common
-    default:
-      return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
+  if (client_tls_context) {
+    tor_tls_context_t *ctx = client_tls_context;
+    client_tls_context = NULL;
+    tor_tls_context_decref(ctx);
   }
 }
 
@@ -295,331 +73,6 @@ tor_tls_err_to_string(int err)
   }
 }
 
-#define CATCH_SYSCALL 1
-#define CATCH_ZERO    2
-
-/** Given a TLS object and the result of an SSL_* call, use
- * SSL_get_error to determine whether an error has occurred, and if so
- * which one.  Return one of TOR_TLS_{DONE|WANTREAD|WANTWRITE|ERROR}.
- * If extra&CATCH_SYSCALL is true, return TOR_TLS_SYSCALL_ instead of
- * reporting syscall errors.  If extra&CATCH_ZERO is true, return
- * TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_ instead of reporting zero-return errors.
- *
- * If an error has occurred, log it at level <b>severity</b> and describe the
- * current action as <b>doing</b>.
- */
-STATIC int
-tor_tls_get_error(tor_tls_t *tls, int r, int extra,
-                  const char *doing, int severity, int domain)
-{
-  int err = SSL_get_error(tls->ssl, r);
-  int tor_error = TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
-  switch (err) {
-    case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
-      return TOR_TLS_DONE;
-    case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
-      return TOR_TLS_WANTREAD;
-    case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
-      return TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE;
-    case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
-      if (extra&CATCH_SYSCALL)
-        return TOR_TLS_SYSCALL_;
-      if (r == 0) {
-        tor_log(severity, LD_NET, "TLS error: unexpected close while %s (%s)",
-            doing, SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
-        tor_error = TOR_TLS_ERROR_IO;
-      } else {
-        int e = tor_socket_errno(tls->socket);
-        tor_log(severity, LD_NET,
-            "TLS error: <syscall error while %s> (errno=%d: %s; state=%s)",
-            doing, e, tor_socket_strerror(e),
-            SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
-        tor_error = tor_errno_to_tls_error(e);
-      }
-      tls_log_errors(tls, severity, domain, doing);
-      return tor_error;
-    case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
-      if (extra&CATCH_ZERO)
-        return TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_;
-      tor_log(severity, LD_NET, "TLS connection closed while %s in state %s",
-          doing, SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
-      tls_log_errors(tls, severity, domain, doing);
-      return TOR_TLS_CLOSE;
-    default:
-      tls_log_errors(tls, severity, domain, doing);
-      return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
-  }
-}
-
-/** Initialize OpenSSL, unless it has already been initialized.
- */
-void
-tor_tls_init(void)
-{
-  check_no_tls_errors();
-
-  if (!tls_library_is_initialized) {
-#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
-    OPENSSL_init_ssl(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS, NULL);
-#else
-    SSL_library_init();
-    SSL_load_error_strings();
-#endif
-
-#if (SIZEOF_VOID_P >= 8 &&                              \
-     OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,1))
-    long version = OpenSSL_version_num();
-
-    /* LCOV_EXCL_START : we can't test these lines on the same machine */
-    if (version >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,1)) {
-      /* Warn if we could *almost* be running with much faster ECDH.
-         If we're built for a 64-bit target, using OpenSSL 1.0.1, but we
-         don't have one of the built-in __uint128-based speedups, we are
-         just one build operation away from an accelerated handshake.
-
-         (We could be looking at OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 instead of
-          doing this test, but that gives compile-time options, not runtime
-          behavior.)
-      */
-      EC_KEY *key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
-      const EC_GROUP *g = key ? EC_KEY_get0_group(key) : NULL;
-      const EC_METHOD *m = g ? EC_GROUP_method_of(g) : NULL;
-      const int warn = (m == EC_GFp_simple_method() ||
-                        m == EC_GFp_mont_method() ||
-                        m == EC_GFp_nist_method());
-      EC_KEY_free(key);
-
-      if (warn)
-        log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "We were built to run on a 64-bit CPU, with "
-                   "OpenSSL 1.0.1 or later, but with a version of OpenSSL "
-                   "that apparently lacks accelerated support for the NIST "
-                   "P-224 and P-256 groups. Building openssl with such "
-                   "support (using the enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 option "
-                   "when configuring it) would make ECDH much faster.");
-    }
-    /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
-#endif /* (SIZEOF_VOID_P >= 8 &&                              ... */
-
-    tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index();
-
-    tls_library_is_initialized = 1;
-  }
-}
-
-/** Free all global TLS structures. */
-void
-tor_tls_free_all(void)
-{
-  check_no_tls_errors();
-
-  if (server_tls_context) {
-    tor_tls_context_t *ctx = server_tls_context;
-    server_tls_context = NULL;
-    tor_tls_context_decref(ctx);
-  }
-  if (client_tls_context) {
-    tor_tls_context_t *ctx = client_tls_context;
-    client_tls_context = NULL;
-    tor_tls_context_decref(ctx);
-  }
-}
-
-/** We need to give OpenSSL a callback to verify certificates. This is
- * it: We always accept peer certs and complete the handshake.  We
- * don't validate them until later.
- */
-STATIC int
-always_accept_verify_cb(int preverify_ok,
-                        X509_STORE_CTX *x509_ctx)
-{
-  (void) preverify_ok;
-  (void) x509_ctx;
-  return 1;
-}
-
-/** List of ciphers that servers should select from when the client might be
- * claiming extra unsupported ciphers in order to avoid fingerprinting.  */
-static const char SERVER_CIPHER_LIST[] =
-#ifdef  TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
-  /* This one can never actually get selected, since if the client lists it,
-   * we will assume that the client is honest, and not use this list.
-   * Nonetheless we list it if it's available, so that the server doesn't
-   * conclude that it has no valid ciphers if it's running with TLS1.3.
-   */
-  TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ":"
-#endif
-  TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA ":"
-  TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA;
-
-/** List of ciphers that servers should select from when we actually have
- * our choice of what cipher to use. */
-static const char UNRESTRICTED_SERVER_CIPHER_LIST[] =
-  /* Here are the TLS 1.3 ciphers we like, in the order we prefer. */
-#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
-  TLS1_3_TXT_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ":"
-#endif
-#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
-  TLS1_3_TXT_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 ":"
-#endif
-#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
-  TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ":"
-#endif
-#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_CCM_SHA256
-  TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 ":"
-#endif
-
-  /* This list is autogenerated with the gen_server_ciphers.py script;
-   * don't hand-edit it. */
-#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
-       TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ":"
-#endif
-#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
-       TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ":"
-#endif
-#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384
-       TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 ":"
-#endif
-#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256
-       TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 ":"
-#endif
-#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
-       TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ":"
-#endif
-#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
-       TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ":"
-#endif
-#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
-       TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ":"
-#endif
-#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
-       TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ":"
-#endif
-#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
-       TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM ":"
-#endif
-#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM
-       TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM ":"
-#endif
-#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256
-       TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 ":"
-#endif
-#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256
-       TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 ":"
-#endif
-       /* Required */
-       TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA ":"
-       /* Required */
-       TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA ":"
-#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305
-       TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ":"
-#endif
-#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305
-       TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305
-#endif
-  ;
-
-/* Note: to set up your own private testing network with link crypto
- * disabled, set your Tors' cipher list to
- * (SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_SHA).  If you do this, you won't be able to communicate
- * with any of the "real" Tors, though. */
-
-#define CIPHER(id, name) name ":"
-#define XCIPHER(id, name)
-/** List of ciphers that clients should advertise, omitting items that
- * our OpenSSL doesn't know about. */
-static const char CLIENT_CIPHER_LIST[] =
-#include "ciphers.inc"
-  /* Tell it not to use SSLv2 ciphers, so that it can select an SSLv3 version
-   * of any cipher we say. */
-  "!SSLv2"
-  ;
-#undef CIPHER
-#undef XCIPHER
-
-/** Remove a reference to <b>ctx</b>, and free it if it has no more
- * references. */
-static void
-tor_tls_context_decref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx)
-{
-  tor_assert(ctx);
-  if (--ctx->refcnt == 0) {
-    SSL_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
-    tor_x509_cert_free(ctx->my_link_cert);
-    tor_x509_cert_free(ctx->my_id_cert);
-    tor_x509_cert_free(ctx->my_auth_cert);
-    crypto_pk_free(ctx->link_key);
-    crypto_pk_free(ctx->auth_key);
-    /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_START since ctx will never be NULL here */
-    tor_free(ctx);
-    /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_STOP */
-  }
-}
-
-/** Set *<b>link_cert_out</b> and *<b>id_cert_out</b> to the link certificate
- * and ID certificate that we're currently using for our V3 in-protocol
- * handshake's certificate chain.  If <b>server</b> is true, provide the certs
- * that we use in server mode (auth, ID); otherwise, provide the certs that we
- * use in client mode. (link, ID) */
-int
-tor_tls_get_my_certs(int server,
-                     const tor_x509_cert_t **link_cert_out,
-                     const tor_x509_cert_t **id_cert_out)
-{
-  tor_tls_context_t *ctx = server ? server_tls_context : client_tls_context;
-  if (! ctx)
-    return -1;
-  if (link_cert_out)
-    *link_cert_out = server ? ctx->my_link_cert : ctx->my_auth_cert;
-  if (id_cert_out)
-    *id_cert_out = ctx->my_id_cert;
-  return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * Return the authentication key that we use to authenticate ourselves as a
- * client in the V3 in-protocol handshake.
- */
-crypto_pk_t *
-tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key(void)
-{
-  if (! client_tls_context)
-    return NULL;
-  return client_tls_context->auth_key;
-}
-
-/** Return true iff the other side of <b>tls</b> has authenticated to us, and
- * the key certified in <b>cert</b> is the same as the key they used to do it.
- */
-MOCK_IMPL(int,
-tor_tls_cert_matches_key,(const tor_tls_t *tls, const tor_x509_cert_t *cert))
-{
-  X509 *peercert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl);
-  EVP_PKEY *link_key = NULL, *cert_key = NULL;
-  int result;
-
-  if (!peercert)
-    return 0;
-  link_key = X509_get_pubkey(peercert);
-  cert_key = X509_get_pubkey((X509 *)tor_x509_cert_get_impl(cert));
-
-  result = link_key && cert_key && EVP_PKEY_cmp(cert_key, link_key) == 1;
-
-  X509_free(peercert);
-  if (link_key)
-    EVP_PKEY_free(link_key);
-  if (cert_key)
-    EVP_PKEY_free(cert_key);
-
-  return result;
-}
-
-/** Increase the reference count of <b>ctx</b>. */
-static void
-tor_tls_context_incref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx)
-{
-  ++ctx->refcnt;
-}
-
 /** Create new global client and server TLS contexts.
  *
  * If <b>server_identity</b> is NULL, this will not generate a server
@@ -686,687 +139,6 @@ tor_tls_context_init(unsigned flags,
   return MIN(rv1, rv2);
 }
 
-/** Create a new global TLS context.
- *
- * You can call this function multiple times.  Each time you call it,
- * it generates new certificates; all new connections will use
- * the new SSL context.
- */
-STATIC int
-tor_tls_context_init_one(tor_tls_context_t **ppcontext,
-                         crypto_pk_t *identity,
-                         unsigned int key_lifetime,
-                         unsigned int flags,
-                         int is_client)
-{
-  tor_tls_context_t *new_ctx = tor_tls_context_new(identity,
-                                                   key_lifetime,
-                                                   flags,
-                                                   is_client);
-  tor_tls_context_t *old_ctx = *ppcontext;
-
-  if (new_ctx != NULL) {
-    *ppcontext = new_ctx;
-
-    /* Free the old context if one existed. */
-    if (old_ctx != NULL) {
-      /* This is safe even if there are open connections: we reference-
-       * count tor_tls_context_t objects. */
-      tor_tls_context_decref(old_ctx);
-    }
-  }
-
-  return ((new_ctx != NULL) ? 0 : -1);
-}
-
-/** The group we should use for ecdhe when none was selected. */
-#define  NID_tor_default_ecdhe_group NID_X9_62_prime256v1
-
-#define RSA_LINK_KEY_BITS 2048
-
-/** Create a new TLS context for use with Tor TLS handshakes.
- * <b>identity</b> should be set to the identity key used to sign the
- * certificate.
- */
-STATIC tor_tls_context_t *
-tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime,
-                    unsigned flags, int is_client)
-{
-  crypto_pk_t *rsa = NULL, *rsa_auth = NULL;
-  EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-  tor_tls_context_t *result = NULL;
-  X509 *cert = NULL, *idcert = NULL, *authcert = NULL;
-  char *nickname = NULL, *nn2 = NULL;
-
-  tor_tls_init();
-  nickname = crypto_random_hostname(8, 20, "www.", ".net");
-#ifdef DISABLE_V3_LINKPROTO_SERVERSIDE
-  nn2 = crypto_random_hostname(8, 20, "www.", ".net");
-#else
-  nn2 = crypto_random_hostname(8, 20, "www.", ".com");
-#endif
-
-  /* Generate short-term RSA key for use with TLS. */
-  if (!(rsa = crypto_pk_new()))
-    goto error;
-  if (crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits(rsa, RSA_LINK_KEY_BITS)<0)
-    goto error;
-  if (!is_client) {
-    /* Generate short-term RSA key for use in the in-protocol ("v3")
-     * authentication handshake. */
-    if (!(rsa_auth = crypto_pk_new()))
-      goto error;
-    if (crypto_pk_generate_key(rsa_auth)<0)
-      goto error;
-    /* Create a link certificate signed by identity key. */
-    cert = tor_tls_create_certificate(rsa, identity, nickname, nn2,
-                                      key_lifetime);
-    /* Create self-signed certificate for identity key. */
-    idcert = tor_tls_create_certificate(identity, identity, nn2, nn2,
-                                        IDENTITY_CERT_LIFETIME);
-    /* Create an authentication certificate signed by identity key. */
-    authcert = tor_tls_create_certificate(rsa_auth, identity, nickname, nn2,
-                                          key_lifetime);
-    if (!cert || !idcert || !authcert) {
-      log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Error creating certificate");
-      goto error;
-    }
-  }
-
-  result = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_context_t));
-  result->refcnt = 1;
-  if (!is_client) {
-    result->my_link_cert = tor_x509_cert_new(X509_dup(cert));
-    result->my_id_cert = tor_x509_cert_new(X509_dup(idcert));
-    result->my_auth_cert = tor_x509_cert_new(X509_dup(authcert));
-    if (!result->my_link_cert || !result->my_id_cert || !result->my_auth_cert)
-      goto error;
-    result->link_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(rsa);
-    result->auth_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(rsa_auth);
-  }
-
-#if 0
-  /* Tell OpenSSL to only use TLS1.  This may have subtly different results
-   * from SSLv23_method() with SSLv2 and SSLv3 disabled, so we need to do some
-   * investigation before we consider adjusting it. It should be compatible
-   * with existing Tors. */
-  if (!(result->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_method())))
-    goto error;
-#endif /* 0 */
-
-  /* Tell OpenSSL to use TLS 1.0 or later but not SSL2 or SSL3. */
-#ifdef HAVE_TLS_METHOD
-  if (!(result->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_method())))
-    goto error;
-#else
-  if (!(result->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method())))
-    goto error;
-#endif /* defined(HAVE_TLS_METHOD) */
-  SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
-  SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3);
-
-  /* Prefer the server's ordering of ciphers: the client's ordering has
-  * historically been chosen for fingerprinting resistance. */
-  SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE);
-
-  /* Disable TLS tickets if they're supported.  We never want to use them;
-   * using them can make our perfect forward secrecy a little worse, *and*
-   * create an opportunity to fingerprint us (since it's unusual to use them
-   * with TLS sessions turned off).
-   *
-   * In 0.2.4, clients advertise support for them though, to avoid a TLS
-   * distinguishability vector.  This can give us worse PFS, though, if we
-   * get a server that doesn't set SSL_OP_NO_TICKET.  With luck, there will
-   * be few such servers by the time 0.2.4 is more stable.
-   */
-#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
-  if (! is_client) {
-    SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_TICKET);
-  }
-#endif
-
-  SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
-  SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE);
-
-#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
-  SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx,
-                      SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION);
-#endif
-  /* Yes, we know what we are doing here.  No, we do not treat a renegotiation
-   * as authenticating any earlier-received data.
-   */
-  {
-    SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx,
-                        SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION);
-  }
-
-  /* Don't actually allow compression; it uses RAM and time, it makes TLS
-   * vulnerable to CRIME-style attacks, and most of the data we transmit over
-   * TLS is encrypted (and therefore uncompressible) anyway. */
-#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
-  SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION);
-#endif
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0)
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-  if (result->ctx->comp_methods)
-    result->ctx->comp_methods = NULL;
-#endif
-#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) */
-
-#ifdef SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
-  SSL_CTX_set_mode(result->ctx, SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS);
-#endif
-  if (! is_client) {
-    if (cert && !SSL_CTX_use_certificate(result->ctx,cert))
-      goto error;
-    X509_free(cert); /* We just added a reference to cert. */
-    cert=NULL;
-    if (idcert) {
-      X509_STORE *s = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(result->ctx);
-      tor_assert(s);
-      X509_STORE_add_cert(s, idcert);
-      X509_free(idcert); /* The context now owns the reference to idcert */
-      idcert = NULL;
-    }
-  }
-  SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(result->ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF);
-  if (!is_client) {
-    tor_assert(rsa);
-    if (!(pkey = crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_(rsa,1)))
-      goto error;
-    if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(result->ctx, pkey))
-      goto error;
-    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-    pkey = NULL;
-    if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(result->ctx))
-      goto error;
-  }
-  {
-    DH *dh = crypto_dh_new_openssl_tls();
-    tor_assert(dh);
-    SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(result->ctx, dh);
-    DH_free(dh);
-  }
-  if (! is_client) {
-    int nid;
-    EC_KEY *ec_key;
-    if (flags & TOR_TLS_CTX_USE_ECDHE_P224)
-      nid = NID_secp224r1;
-    else if (flags & TOR_TLS_CTX_USE_ECDHE_P256)
-      nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
-    else
-      nid = NID_tor_default_ecdhe_group;
-    /* Use P-256 for ECDHE. */
-    ec_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
-    if (ec_key != NULL) /*XXXX Handle errors? */
-      SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(result->ctx, ec_key);
-    EC_KEY_free(ec_key);
-  }
-  SSL_CTX_set_verify(result->ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER,
-                     always_accept_verify_cb);
-  /* let us realloc bufs that we're writing from */
-  SSL_CTX_set_mode(result->ctx, SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER);
-
-  if (rsa)
-    crypto_pk_free(rsa);
-  if (rsa_auth)
-    crypto_pk_free(rsa_auth);
-  X509_free(authcert);
-  tor_free(nickname);
-  tor_free(nn2);
-  return result;
-
- error:
-  tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "creating TLS context");
-  tor_free(nickname);
-  tor_free(nn2);
-  if (pkey)
-    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-  if (rsa)
-    crypto_pk_free(rsa);
-  if (rsa_auth)
-    crypto_pk_free(rsa_auth);
-  if (result)
-    tor_tls_context_decref(result);
-  if (cert)
-    X509_free(cert);
-  if (idcert)
-    X509_free(idcert);
-  if (authcert)
-    X509_free(authcert);
-  return NULL;
-}
-
-/** Invoked when a TLS state changes: log the change at severity 'debug' */
-STATIC void
-tor_tls_debug_state_callback(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)
-{
-  /* LCOV_EXCL_START since this depends on whether debug is captured or not */
-  log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "SSL %p is now in state %s [type=%d,val=%d].",
-            ssl, SSL_state_string_long(ssl), type, val);
-  /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
-}
-
-/* Return the name of the negotiated ciphersuite in use on <b>tls</b> */
-const char *
-tor_tls_get_ciphersuite_name(tor_tls_t *tls)
-{
-  return SSL_get_cipher(tls->ssl);
-}
-
-/* Here's the old V2 cipher list we sent from 0.2.1.1-alpha up to
- * 0.2.3.17-beta. If a client is using this list, we can't believe the ciphers
- * that it claims to support.  We'll prune this list to remove the ciphers
- * *we* don't recognize. */
-STATIC uint16_t v2_cipher_list[] = {
-  0xc00a, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
-  0xc014, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
-  0x0039, /* TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA */
-  0x0038, /* TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA */
-  0xc00f, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
-  0xc005, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
-  0x0035, /* TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA */
-  0xc007, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
-  0xc009, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
-  0xc011, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
-  0xc013, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
-  0x0033, /* TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA */
-  0x0032, /* TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA */
-  0xc00c, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
-  0xc00e, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
-  0xc002, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
-  0xc004, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
-  0x0004, /* SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_MD5 */
-  0x0005, /* SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_SHA */
-  0x002f, /* TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA */
-  0xc008, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
-  0xc012, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
-  0x0016, /* SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
-  0x0013, /* SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
-  0xc00d, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
-  0xc003, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
-  0xfeff, /* SSL3_TXT_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
-  0x000a, /* SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
-  0
-};
-/** Have we removed the unrecognized ciphers from v2_cipher_list yet? */
-static int v2_cipher_list_pruned = 0;
-
-/** Return 0 if <b>m</b> does not support the cipher with ID <b>cipher</b>;
- * return 1 if it does support it, or if we have no way to tell. */
-STATIC int
-find_cipher_by_id(const SSL *ssl, const SSL_METHOD *m, uint16_t cipher)
-{
-  const SSL_CIPHER *c;
-#ifdef HAVE_SSL_CIPHER_FIND
-  (void) m;
-  {
-    unsigned char cipherid[3];
-    tor_assert(ssl);
-    set_uint16(cipherid, tor_htons(cipher));
-    cipherid[2] = 0; /* If ssl23_get_cipher_by_char finds no cipher starting
-                      * with a two-byte 'cipherid', it may look for a v2
-                      * cipher with the appropriate 3 bytes. */
-    c = SSL_CIPHER_find((SSL*)ssl, cipherid);
-    if (c)
-      tor_assert((SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) & 0xffff) == cipher);
-    return c != NULL;
-  }
-#else /* !(defined(HAVE_SSL_CIPHER_FIND)) */
-
-# if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SSL_METHOD_ST_GET_CIPHER_BY_CHAR)
-  if (m && m->get_cipher_by_char) {
-    unsigned char cipherid[3];
-    set_uint16(cipherid, tor_htons(cipher));
-    cipherid[2] = 0; /* If ssl23_get_cipher_by_char finds no cipher starting
-                      * with a two-byte 'cipherid', it may look for a v2
-                      * cipher with the appropriate 3 bytes. */
-    c = m->get_cipher_by_char(cipherid);
-    if (c)
-      tor_assert((c->id & 0xffff) == cipher);
-    return c != NULL;
-  }
-#endif /* defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SSL_METHOD_ST_GET_CIPHER_BY_CHAR) */
-# ifndef OPENSSL_1_1_API
-  if (m && m->get_cipher && m->num_ciphers) {
-    /* It would seem that some of the "let's-clean-up-openssl" forks have
-     * removed the get_cipher_by_char function.  Okay, so now you get a
-     * quadratic search.
-     */
-    int i;
-    for (i = 0; i < m->num_ciphers(); ++i) {
-      c = m->get_cipher(i);
-      if (c && (c->id & 0xffff) == cipher) {
-        return 1;
-      }
-    }
-    return 0;
-  }
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) */
-  (void) ssl;
-  (void) m;
-  (void) cipher;
-  return 1; /* No way to search */
-#endif /* defined(HAVE_SSL_CIPHER_FIND) */
-}
-
-/** Remove from v2_cipher_list every cipher that we don't support, so that
- * comparing v2_cipher_list to a client's cipher list will give a sensible
- * result. */
-static void
-prune_v2_cipher_list(const SSL *ssl)
-{
-  uint16_t *inp, *outp;
-#ifdef HAVE_TLS_METHOD
-  const SSL_METHOD *m = TLS_method();
-#else
-  const SSL_METHOD *m = SSLv23_method();
-#endif
-
-  inp = outp = v2_cipher_list;
-  while (*inp) {
-    if (find_cipher_by_id(ssl, m, *inp)) {
-      *outp++ = *inp++;
-    } else {
-      inp++;
-    }
-  }
-  *outp = 0;
-
-  v2_cipher_list_pruned = 1;
-}
-
-/** Examine the client cipher list in <b>ssl</b>, and determine what kind of
- * client it is.  Return one of CIPHERS_ERR, CIPHERS_V1, CIPHERS_V2,
- * CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED.
- **/
-STATIC int
-tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(const SSL *ssl,
-                                STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers)
-{
-  int i, res;
-  tor_tls_t *tor_tls;
-  if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(!v2_cipher_list_pruned))
-    prune_v2_cipher_list(ssl);
-
-  tor_tls = tor_tls_get_by_ssl(ssl);
-  if (tor_tls && tor_tls->client_cipher_list_type)
-    return tor_tls->client_cipher_list_type;
-
-  /* If we reached this point, we just got a client hello.  See if there is
-   * a cipher list. */
-  if (!peer_ciphers) {
-    log_info(LD_NET, "No ciphers on session");
-    res = CIPHERS_ERR;
-    goto done;
-  }
-  /* Now we need to see if there are any ciphers whose presence means we're
-   * dealing with an updated Tor. */
-  for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(peer_ciphers); ++i) {
-    const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(peer_ciphers, i);
-    const char *ciphername = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher);
-    if (strcmp(ciphername, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA) &&
-        strcmp(ciphername, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA) &&
-        strcmp(ciphername, SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA) &&
-        strcmp(ciphername, "(NONE)")) {
-      log_debug(LD_NET, "Got a non-version-1 cipher called '%s'", ciphername);
-      // return 1;
-      goto v2_or_higher;
-    }
-  }
-  res = CIPHERS_V1;
-  goto done;
- v2_or_higher:
-  {
-    const uint16_t *v2_cipher = v2_cipher_list;
-    for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(peer_ciphers); ++i) {
-      const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(peer_ciphers, i);
-      uint16_t id = SSL_CIPHER_get_id(cipher) & 0xffff;
-      if (id == 0x00ff) /* extended renegotiation indicator. */
-        continue;
-      if (!id || id != *v2_cipher) {
-        res = CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED;
-        goto dump_ciphers;
-      }
-      ++v2_cipher;
-    }
-    if (*v2_cipher != 0) {
-      res = CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED;
-      goto dump_ciphers;
-    }
-    res = CIPHERS_V2;
-  }
-
- dump_ciphers:
-  {
-    smartlist_t *elts = smartlist_new();
-    char *s;
-    for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(peer_ciphers); ++i) {
-      const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(peer_ciphers, i);
-      const char *ciphername = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher);
-      smartlist_add(elts, (char*)ciphername);
-    }
-    s = smartlist_join_strings(elts, ":", 0, NULL);
-    log_debug(LD_NET, "Got a %s V2/V3 cipher list from %s.  It is: '%s'",
-              (res == CIPHERS_V2) ? "fictitious" : "real", ADDR(tor_tls), s);
-    tor_free(s);
-    smartlist_free(elts);
-  }
- done:
-  if (tor_tls)
-    return tor_tls->client_cipher_list_type = res;
-
-  return res;
-}
-
-/** Return true iff the cipher list suggested by the client for <b>ssl</b> is
- * a list that indicates that the client knows how to do the v2 TLS connection
- * handshake. */
-STATIC int
-tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(const SSL *ssl)
-{
-  STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers;
-#ifdef HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_CIPHERS
-  ciphers = SSL_get_client_ciphers(ssl);
-#else
-  SSL_SESSION *session;
-  if (!(session = SSL_get_session((SSL *)ssl))) {
-    log_info(LD_NET, "No session on TLS?");
-    return CIPHERS_ERR;
-  }
-  ciphers = session->ciphers;
-#endif /* defined(HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_CIPHERS) */
-
-  return tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, ciphers) >= CIPHERS_V2;
-}
-
-/** Invoked when we're accepting a connection on <b>ssl</b>, and the connection
- * changes state. We use this:
- * <ul><li>To alter the state of the handshake partway through, so we
- *         do not send or request extra certificates in v2 handshakes.</li>
- * <li>To detect renegotiation</li></ul>
- */
-STATIC void
-tor_tls_server_info_callback(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)
-{
-  tor_tls_t *tls;
-  (void) val;
-
-  IF_BUG_ONCE(ssl == NULL) {
-    return; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
-  }
-
-  tor_tls_debug_state_callback(ssl, type, val);
-
-  if (type != SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP)
-    return;
-
-  OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE ssl_state = SSL_get_state(ssl);
-  if (! STATE_IS_SW_SERVER_HELLO(ssl_state))
-    return;
-  tls = tor_tls_get_by_ssl(ssl);
-  if (tls) {
-    /* Check whether we're watching for renegotiates.  If so, this is one! */
-    if (tls->negotiated_callback)
-      tls->got_renegotiate = 1;
-    if (tls->server_handshake_count < 127) /*avoid any overflow possibility*/
-      ++tls->server_handshake_count;
-  } else {
-    log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't look up the tls for an SSL*. How odd!");
-    return;
-  }
-
-  /* Now check the cipher list. */
-  if (tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(ssl)) {
-    if (tls->wasV2Handshake)
-      return; /* We already turned this stuff off for the first handshake;
-               * This is a renegotiation. */
-
-    /* Yes, we're casting away the const from ssl.  This is very naughty of us.
-     * Let's hope openssl doesn't notice! */
-
-    /* Set SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN to keep from sending back any extra certs. */
-    SSL_set_mode((SSL*) ssl, SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN);
-    /* Don't send a hello request. */
-    SSL_set_verify((SSL*) ssl, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL);
-
-    if (tls) {
-      tls->wasV2Handshake = 1;
-    } else {
-      /* LCOV_EXCL_START this line is not reachable */
-      log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't look up the tls for an SSL*. How odd!");
-      /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
-    }
-  }
-}
-
-/** Callback to get invoked on a server after we've read the list of ciphers
- * the client supports, but before we pick our own ciphersuite.
- *
- * We can't abuse an info_cb for this, since by the time one of the
- * client_hello info_cbs is called, we've already picked which ciphersuite to
- * use.
- *
- * Technically, this function is an abuse of this callback, since the point of
- * a session_secret_cb is to try to set up and/or verify a shared-secret for
- * authentication on the fly.  But as long as we return 0, we won't actually be
- * setting up a shared secret, and all will be fine.
- */
-STATIC int
-tor_tls_session_secret_cb(SSL *ssl, void *secret, int *secret_len,
-                          STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers,
-                          CONST_IF_OPENSSL_1_1_API SSL_CIPHER **cipher,
-                          void *arg)
-{
-  (void) secret;
-  (void) secret_len;
-  (void) peer_ciphers;
-  (void) cipher;
-  (void) arg;
-
-  if (tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, peer_ciphers) ==
-       CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED) {
-    SSL_set_cipher_list(ssl, UNRESTRICTED_SERVER_CIPHER_LIST);
-  }
-
-  SSL_set_session_secret_cb(ssl, NULL, NULL);
-
-  return 0;
-}
-static void
-tor_tls_setup_session_secret_cb(tor_tls_t *tls)
-{
-  SSL_set_session_secret_cb(tls->ssl, tor_tls_session_secret_cb, NULL);
-}
-
-/** Create a new TLS object from a file descriptor, and a flag to
- * determine whether it is functioning as a server.
- */
-tor_tls_t *
-tor_tls_new(int sock, int isServer)
-{
-  BIO *bio = NULL;
-  tor_tls_t *result = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
-  tor_tls_context_t *context = isServer ? server_tls_context :
-    client_tls_context;
-  result->magic = TOR_TLS_MAGIC;
-
-  check_no_tls_errors();
-  tor_assert(context); /* make sure somebody made it first */
-  if (!(result->ssl = SSL_new(context->ctx))) {
-    tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "creating SSL object");
-    tor_free(result);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_host_name
-  /* Browsers use the TLS hostname extension, so we should too. */
-  if (!isServer) {
-    char *fake_hostname = crypto_random_hostname(4,25, "www.",".com");
-    SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(result->ssl, fake_hostname);
-    tor_free(fake_hostname);
-  }
-#endif /* defined(SSL_set_tlsext_host_name) */
-
-  if (!SSL_set_cipher_list(result->ssl,
-                     isServer ? SERVER_CIPHER_LIST : CLIENT_CIPHER_LIST)) {
-    tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "setting ciphers");
-#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_host_name
-    SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(result->ssl, NULL);
-#endif
-    SSL_free(result->ssl);
-    tor_free(result);
-    goto err;
-  }
-  result->socket = sock;
-  bio = BIO_new_socket(sock, BIO_NOCLOSE);
-  if (! bio) {
-    tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "opening BIO");
-#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_host_name
-    SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(result->ssl, NULL);
-#endif
-    SSL_free(result->ssl);
-    tor_free(result);
-    goto err;
-  }
-  {
-    int set_worked =
-      SSL_set_ex_data(result->ssl, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index, result);
-    if (!set_worked) {
-      log_warn(LD_BUG,
-               "Couldn't set the tls for an SSL*; connection will fail");
-    }
-  }
-  SSL_set_bio(result->ssl, bio, bio);
-  tor_tls_context_incref(context);
-  result->context = context;
-  result->state = TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE;
-  result->isServer = isServer;
-  result->wantwrite_n = 0;
-  result->last_write_count = (unsigned long) BIO_number_written(bio);
-  result->last_read_count = (unsigned long) BIO_number_read(bio);
-  if (result->last_write_count || result->last_read_count) {
-    log_warn(LD_NET, "Newly created BIO has read count %lu, write count %lu",
-             result->last_read_count, result->last_write_count);
-  }
-  if (isServer) {
-    SSL_set_info_callback(result->ssl, tor_tls_server_info_callback);
-  } else {
-    SSL_set_info_callback(result->ssl, tor_tls_debug_state_callback);
-  }
-
-  if (isServer)
-    tor_tls_setup_session_secret_cb(result);
-
-  goto done;
- err:
-  result = NULL;
- done:
-  /* Not expected to get called. */
-  tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "creating tor_tls_t object");
-  return result;
-}
-
 /** Make future log messages about <b>tls</b> display the address
  * <b>address</b>.
  */
@@ -1378,64 +150,6 @@ tor_tls_set_logged_address(tor_tls_t *tls, const char *address)
   tls->address = tor_strdup(address);
 }
 
-/** Set <b>cb</b> to be called with argument <b>arg</b> whenever <b>tls</b>
- * next gets a client-side renegotiate in the middle of a read.  Do not
- * invoke this function until <em>after</em> initial handshaking is done!
- */
-void
-tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(tor_tls_t *tls,
-                                 void (*cb)(tor_tls_t *, void *arg),
-                                 void *arg)
-{
-  tls->negotiated_callback = cb;
-  tls->callback_arg = arg;
-  tls->got_renegotiate = 0;
-  if (cb) {
-    SSL_set_info_callback(tls->ssl, tor_tls_server_info_callback);
-  } else {
-    SSL_set_info_callback(tls->ssl, tor_tls_debug_state_callback);
-  }
-}
-
-/** If this version of openssl requires it, turn on renegotiation on
- * <b>tls</b>.
- */
-void
-tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tor_tls_t *tls)
-{
-  /* Yes, we know what we are doing here.  No, we do not treat a renegotiation
-   * as authenticating any earlier-received data. */
-  SSL_set_options(tls->ssl,
-                  SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION);
-}
-
-/** If this version of openssl supports it, turn off renegotiation on
- * <b>tls</b>.  (Our protocol never requires this for security, but it's nice
- * to use belt-and-suspenders here.)
- */
-void
-tor_tls_block_renegotiation(tor_tls_t *tls)
-{
-#ifdef SUPPORT_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION_FLAG
-  tls->ssl->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION;
-#else
-  (void) tls;
-#endif
-}
-
-/** Assert that the flags that allow legacy renegotiation are still set */
-void
-tor_tls_assert_renegotiation_unblocked(tor_tls_t *tls)
-{
-#if defined(SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) && \
-  SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION != 0
-  long options = SSL_get_options(tls->ssl);
-  tor_assert(0 != (options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION));
-#else
-  (void) tls;
-#endif /* defined(SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) && ... */
-}
-
 /** Return whether this tls initiated the connect (client) or
  * received it (server). */
 int
@@ -1444,730 +158,3 @@ tor_tls_is_server(tor_tls_t *tls)
   tor_assert(tls);
   return tls->isServer;
 }
-
-/** Release resources associated with a TLS object.  Does not close the
- * underlying file descriptor.
- */
-void
-tor_tls_free_(tor_tls_t *tls)
-{
-  if (!tls)
-    return;
-  tor_assert(tls->ssl);
-  {
-    size_t r,w;
-    tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes(tls,&r,&w); /* ensure written_by_tls is updated */
-  }
-#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_host_name
-  SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(tls->ssl, NULL);
-#endif
-  SSL_free(tls->ssl);
-  tls->ssl = NULL;
-  tls->negotiated_callback = NULL;
-  if (tls->context)
-    tor_tls_context_decref(tls->context);
-  tor_free(tls->address);
-  tls->magic = 0x99999999;
-  tor_free(tls);
-}
-
-/** Underlying function for TLS reading.  Reads up to <b>len</b>
- * characters from <b>tls</b> into <b>cp</b>.  On success, returns the
- * number of characters read.  On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR,
- * TOR_TLS_CLOSE, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD, or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE.
- */
-MOCK_IMPL(int,
-tor_tls_read,(tor_tls_t *tls, char *cp, size_t len))
-{
-  int r, err;
-  tor_assert(tls);
-  tor_assert(tls->ssl);
-  tor_assert(tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN);
-  tor_assert(len<INT_MAX);
-  r = SSL_read(tls->ssl, cp, (int)len);
-  if (r > 0) {
-    if (tls->got_renegotiate) {
-      /* Renegotiation happened! */
-      log_info(LD_NET, "Got a TLS renegotiation from %s", ADDR(tls));
-      if (tls->negotiated_callback)
-        tls->negotiated_callback(tls, tls->callback_arg);
-      tls->got_renegotiate = 0;
-    }
-    return r;
-  }
-  err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, CATCH_ZERO, "reading", LOG_DEBUG, LD_NET);
-  if (err == TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_ || err == TOR_TLS_CLOSE) {
-    log_debug(LD_NET,"read returned r=%d; TLS is closed",r);
-    tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED;
-    return TOR_TLS_CLOSE;
-  } else {
-    tor_assert(err != TOR_TLS_DONE);
-    log_debug(LD_NET,"read returned r=%d, err=%d",r,err);
-    return err;
-  }
-}
-
-/** Total number of bytes that we've used TLS to send.  Used to track TLS
- * overhead. */
-STATIC uint64_t total_bytes_written_over_tls = 0;
-/** Total number of bytes that TLS has put on the network for us. Used to
- * track TLS overhead. */
-STATIC uint64_t total_bytes_written_by_tls = 0;
-
-/** Underlying function for TLS writing.  Write up to <b>n</b>
- * characters from <b>cp</b> onto <b>tls</b>.  On success, returns the
- * number of characters written.  On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR,
- * TOR_TLS_WANTREAD, or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE.
- */
-int
-tor_tls_write(tor_tls_t *tls, const char *cp, size_t n)
-{
-  int r, err;
-  tor_assert(tls);
-  tor_assert(tls->ssl);
-  tor_assert(tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN);
-  tor_assert(n < INT_MAX);
-  if (n == 0)
-    return 0;
-  if (tls->wantwrite_n) {
-    /* if WANTWRITE last time, we must use the _same_ n as before */
-    tor_assert(n >= tls->wantwrite_n);
-    log_debug(LD_NET,"resuming pending-write, (%d to flush, reusing %d)",
-              (int)n, (int)tls->wantwrite_n);
-    n = tls->wantwrite_n;
-    tls->wantwrite_n = 0;
-  }
-  r = SSL_write(tls->ssl, cp, (int)n);
-  err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, 0, "writing", LOG_INFO, LD_NET);
-  if (err == TOR_TLS_DONE) {
-    total_bytes_written_over_tls += r;
-    return r;
-  }
-  if (err == TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE || err == TOR_TLS_WANTREAD) {
-    tls->wantwrite_n = n;
-  }
-  return err;
-}
-
-/** Perform initial handshake on <b>tls</b>.  When finished, returns
- * TOR_TLS_DONE.  On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD,
- * or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE.
- */
-int
-tor_tls_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
-{
-  int r;
-  tor_assert(tls);
-  tor_assert(tls->ssl);
-  tor_assert(tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE);
-
-  check_no_tls_errors();
-
-  OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE oldstate = SSL_get_state(tls->ssl);
-
-  if (tls->isServer) {
-    log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "About to call SSL_accept on %p (%s)", tls,
-              SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
-    r = SSL_accept(tls->ssl);
-  } else {
-    log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "About to call SSL_connect on %p (%s)", tls,
-              SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
-    r = SSL_connect(tls->ssl);
-  }
-
-  OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE newstate = SSL_get_state(tls->ssl);
-
-  if (oldstate != newstate)
-    log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "After call, %p was in state %s",
-              tls, SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
-  /* We need to call this here and not earlier, since OpenSSL has a penchant
-   * for clearing its flags when you say accept or connect. */
-  tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tls);
-  r = tor_tls_get_error(tls,r,0, "handshaking", LOG_INFO, LD_HANDSHAKE);
-  if (ERR_peek_error() != 0) {
-    tls_log_errors(tls, tls->isServer ? LOG_INFO : LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE,
-                   "handshaking");
-    return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
-  }
-  if (r == TOR_TLS_DONE) {
-    tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN;
-    return tor_tls_finish_handshake(tls);
-  }
-  return r;
-}
-
-/** Perform the final part of the initial TLS handshake on <b>tls</b>.  This
- * should be called for the first handshake only: it determines whether the v1
- * or the v2 handshake was used, and adjusts things for the renegotiation
- * handshake as appropriate.
- *
- * tor_tls_handshake() calls this on its own; you only need to call this if
- * bufferevent is doing the handshake for you.
- */
-int
-tor_tls_finish_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
-{
-  int r = TOR_TLS_DONE;
-  check_no_tls_errors();
-  if (tls->isServer) {
-    SSL_set_info_callback(tls->ssl, NULL);
-    SSL_set_verify(tls->ssl, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, always_accept_verify_cb);
-    SSL_clear_mode(tls->ssl, SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN);
-    if (tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(tls->ssl)) {
-      /* This check is redundant, but back when we did it in the callback,
-       * we might have not been able to look up the tor_tls_t if the code
-       * was buggy.  Fixing that. */
-      if (!tls->wasV2Handshake) {
-        log_warn(LD_BUG, "For some reason, wasV2Handshake didn't"
-                 " get set. Fixing that.");
-      }
-      tls->wasV2Handshake = 1;
-      log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "Completed V2 TLS handshake with client; waiting"
-                " for renegotiation.");
-    } else {
-      tls->wasV2Handshake = 0;
-    }
-  } else {
-    /* Client-side */
-    tls->wasV2Handshake = 1;
-    /* XXXX this can move, probably? -NM */
-    if (SSL_set_cipher_list(tls->ssl, SERVER_CIPHER_LIST) == 0) {
-      tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, "re-setting ciphers");
-      r = TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
-    }
-  }
-  tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "finishing the handshake");
-  return r;
-}
-
-/** Shut down an open tls connection <b>tls</b>.  When finished, returns
- * TOR_TLS_DONE.  On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD,
- * or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE.
- */
-int
-tor_tls_shutdown(tor_tls_t *tls)
-{
-  int r, err;
-  char buf[128];
-  tor_assert(tls);
-  tor_assert(tls->ssl);
-  check_no_tls_errors();
-
-  while (1) {
-    if (tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE) {
-      /* If we've already called shutdown once to send a close message,
-       * we read until the other side has closed too.
-       */
-      do {
-        r = SSL_read(tls->ssl, buf, 128);
-      } while (r>0);
-      err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, CATCH_ZERO, "reading to shut down",
-                              LOG_INFO, LD_NET);
-      if (err == TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_) {
-        tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_GOTCLOSE;
-        /* fall through... */
-      } else {
-        return err;
-      }
-    }
-
-    r = SSL_shutdown(tls->ssl);
-    if (r == 1) {
-      /* If shutdown returns 1, the connection is entirely closed. */
-      tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED;
-      return TOR_TLS_DONE;
-    }
-    err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, CATCH_SYSCALL|CATCH_ZERO, "shutting down",
-                            LOG_INFO, LD_NET);
-    if (err == TOR_TLS_SYSCALL_) {
-      /* The underlying TCP connection closed while we were shutting down. */
-      tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED;
-      return TOR_TLS_DONE;
-    } else if (err == TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_) {
-      /* The TLS connection says that it sent a shutdown record, but
-       * isn't done shutting down yet.  Make sure that this hasn't
-       * happened before, then go back to the start of the function
-       * and try to read.
-       */
-      if (tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_GOTCLOSE ||
-         tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE) {
-        log_warn(LD_NET,
-            "TLS returned \"half-closed\" value while already half-closed");
-        return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
-      }
-      tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE;
-      /* fall through ... */
-    } else {
-      return err;
-    }
-  } /* end loop */
-}
-
-/** Return true iff this TLS connection is authenticated.
- */
-int
-tor_tls_peer_has_cert(tor_tls_t *tls)
-{
-  X509 *cert;
-  cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl);
-  tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, "getting peer certificate");
-  if (!cert)
-    return 0;
-  X509_free(cert);
-  return 1;
-}
-
-/** Return a newly allocated copy of the peer certificate, or NULL if there
- * isn't one. */
-MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_t *,
-tor_tls_get_peer_cert,(tor_tls_t *tls))
-{
-  X509 *cert;
-  cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl);
-  tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, "getting peer certificate");
-  if (!cert)
-    return NULL;
-  return tor_x509_cert_new(cert);
-}
-
-/** Return a newly allocated copy of the cerficate we used on the connection,
- * or NULL if somehow we didn't use one. */
-MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_t *,
-tor_tls_get_own_cert,(tor_tls_t *tls))
-{
-  X509 *cert = SSL_get_certificate(tls->ssl);
-  tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE,
-                 "getting own-connection certificate");
-  if (!cert)
-    return NULL;
-  /* Fun inconsistency: SSL_get_peer_certificate increments the reference
-   * count, but SSL_get_certificate does not. */
-  X509 *duplicate = X509_dup(cert);
-  if (BUG(duplicate == NULL))
-    return NULL;
-  return tor_x509_cert_new(duplicate);
-}
-
-/** Helper function: try to extract a link certificate and an identity
- * certificate from <b>tls</b>, and store them in *<b>cert_out</b> and
- * *<b>id_cert_out</b> respectively.  Log all messages at level
- * <b>severity</b>.
- *
- * Note that a reference is added to cert_out, so it needs to be
- * freed. id_cert_out doesn't. */
-MOCK_IMPL(STATIC void,
-try_to_extract_certs_from_tls,(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls,
-                               X509 **cert_out, X509 **id_cert_out))
-{
-  X509 *cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL;
-  STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
-  int num_in_chain, i;
-  *cert_out = *id_cert_out = NULL;
-  if (!(cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl)))
-    return;
-  *cert_out = cert;
-  if (!(chain = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(tls->ssl)))
-    return;
-  num_in_chain = sk_X509_num(chain);
-  /* 1 means we're receiving (server-side), and it's just the id_cert.
-   * 2 means we're connecting (client-side), and it's both the link
-   * cert and the id_cert.
-   */
-  if (num_in_chain < 1) {
-    log_fn(severity,LD_PROTOCOL,
-           "Unexpected number of certificates in chain (%d)",
-           num_in_chain);
-    return;
-  }
-  for (i=0; i<num_in_chain; ++i) {
-    id_cert = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
-    if (X509_cmp(id_cert, cert) != 0)
-      break;
-  }
-  *id_cert_out = id_cert;
-}
-
-/** If the provided tls connection is authenticated and has a
- * certificate chain that is currently valid and signed, then set
- * *<b>identity_key</b> to the identity certificate's key and return
- * 0.  Else, return -1 and log complaints with log-level <b>severity</b>.
- */
-int
-tor_tls_verify(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_t **identity_key)
-{
-  X509 *cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL;
-  EVP_PKEY *id_pkey = NULL;
-  RSA *rsa;
-  int r = -1;
-
-  check_no_tls_errors();
-  *identity_key = NULL;
-
-  try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(severity, tls, &cert, &id_cert);
-  if (!cert)
-    goto done;
-  if (!id_cert) {
-    log_fn(severity,LD_PROTOCOL,"No distinct identity certificate found");
-    goto done;
-  }
-  tls_log_errors(tls, severity, LD_HANDSHAKE, "before verifying certificate");
-
-  if (!(id_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(id_cert)) ||
-      X509_verify(cert, id_pkey) <= 0) {
-    log_fn(severity,LD_PROTOCOL,"X509_verify on cert and pkey returned <= 0");
-    tls_log_errors(tls, severity, LD_HANDSHAKE, "verifying certificate");
-    goto done;
-  }
-
-  rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(id_pkey);
-  if (!rsa)
-    goto done;
-  *identity_key = crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(rsa);
-
-  r = 0;
-
- done:
-  if (cert)
-    X509_free(cert);
-  if (id_pkey)
-    EVP_PKEY_free(id_pkey);
-
-  /* This should never get invoked, but let's make sure in case OpenSSL
-   * acts unexpectedly. */
-  tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, "finishing tor_tls_verify");
-
-  return r;
-}
-
-/** Check whether the certificate set on the connection <b>tls</b> is expired
- * give or take <b>past_tolerance</b> seconds, or not-yet-valid give or take
- * <b>future_tolerance</b> seconds. Return 0 for valid, -1 for failure.
- *
- * NOTE: you should call tor_tls_verify before tor_tls_check_lifetime.
- */
-int
-tor_tls_check_lifetime(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls,
-                       time_t now,
-                       int past_tolerance, int future_tolerance)
-{
-  X509 *cert;
-  int r = -1;
-
-  if (!(cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl)))
-    goto done;
-
-  if (tor_x509_check_cert_lifetime_internal(severity, cert, now,
-                                            past_tolerance,
-                                            future_tolerance) < 0)
-    goto done;
-
-  r = 0;
- done:
-  if (cert)
-    X509_free(cert);
-  /* Not expected to get invoked */
-  tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "checking certificate lifetime");
-
-  return r;
-}
-
-/** Return the number of bytes available for reading from <b>tls</b>.
- */
-int
-tor_tls_get_pending_bytes(tor_tls_t *tls)
-{
-  tor_assert(tls);
-  return SSL_pending(tls->ssl);
-}
-
-/** If <b>tls</b> requires that the next write be of a particular size,
- * return that size.  Otherwise, return 0. */
-size_t
-tor_tls_get_forced_write_size(tor_tls_t *tls)
-{
-  return tls->wantwrite_n;
-}
-
-/** Sets n_read and n_written to the number of bytes read and written,
- * respectively, on the raw socket used by <b>tls</b> since the last time this
- * function was called on <b>tls</b>. */
-void
-tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes(tor_tls_t *tls, size_t *n_read, size_t *n_written)
-{
-  BIO *wbio, *tmpbio;
-  unsigned long r, w;
-  r = (unsigned long) BIO_number_read(SSL_get_rbio(tls->ssl));
-  /* We want the number of bytes actually for real written.  Unfortunately,
-   * sometimes OpenSSL replaces the wbio on tls->ssl with a buffering bio,
-   * which makes the answer turn out wrong.  Let's cope with that.  Note
-   * that this approach will fail if we ever replace tls->ssl's BIOs with
-   * buffering bios for reasons of our own.  As an alternative, we could
-   * save the original BIO for  tls->ssl in the tor_tls_t structure, but
-   * that would be tempting fate. */
-  wbio = SSL_get_wbio(tls->ssl);
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_VER(1,1,0,0,5)
-  /* BIO structure is opaque as of OpenSSL 1.1.0-pre5-dev.  Again, not
-   * supposed to use this form of the version macro, but the OpenSSL developers
-   * introduced major API changes in the pre-release stage.
-   */
-  if (BIO_method_type(wbio) == BIO_TYPE_BUFFER &&
-        (tmpbio = BIO_next(wbio)) != NULL)
-    wbio = tmpbio;
-#else /* !(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_VER(1,1,0,0,5)) */
-  if (wbio->method == BIO_f_buffer() && (tmpbio = BIO_next(wbio)) != NULL)
-    wbio = tmpbio;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_VER(1,1,0,0,5) */
-  w = (unsigned long) BIO_number_written(wbio);
-
-  /* We are ok with letting these unsigned ints go "negative" here:
-   * If we wrapped around, this should still give us the right answer, unless
-   * we wrapped around by more than ULONG_MAX since the last time we called
-   * this function.
-   */
-  *n_read = (size_t)(r - tls->last_read_count);
-  *n_written = (size_t)(w - tls->last_write_count);
-  if (*n_read > INT_MAX || *n_written > INT_MAX) {
-    log_warn(LD_BUG, "Preposterously large value in tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes. "
-             "r=%lu, last_read=%lu, w=%lu, last_written=%lu",
-             r, tls->last_read_count, w, tls->last_write_count);
-  }
-  total_bytes_written_by_tls += *n_written;
-  tls->last_read_count = r;
-  tls->last_write_count = w;
-}
-
-/** Return a ratio of the bytes that TLS has sent to the bytes that we've told
- * it to send. Used to track whether our TLS records are getting too tiny. */
-MOCK_IMPL(double,
-tls_get_write_overhead_ratio,(void))
-{
-  if (total_bytes_written_over_tls == 0)
-    return 1.0;
-
-  return ((double)total_bytes_written_by_tls) /
-    ((double)total_bytes_written_over_tls);
-}
-
-/** Implement check_no_tls_errors: If there are any pending OpenSSL
- * errors, log an error message. */
-void
-check_no_tls_errors_(const char *fname, int line)
-{
-  if (ERR_peek_error() == 0)
-    return;
-  log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Unhandled OpenSSL errors found at %s:%d: ",
-      tor_fix_source_file(fname), line);
-  tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, NULL);
-}
-
-/** Return true iff the initial TLS connection at <b>tls</b> did not use a v2
- * TLS handshake. Output is undefined if the handshake isn't finished. */
-int
-tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
-{
-  return ! tls->wasV2Handshake;
-}
-
-/** Return the number of server handshakes that we've noticed doing on
- * <b>tls</b>. */
-int
-tor_tls_get_num_server_handshakes(tor_tls_t *tls)
-{
-  return tls->server_handshake_count;
-}
-
-/** Return true iff the server TLS connection <b>tls</b> got the renegotiation
- * request it was waiting for. */
-int
-tor_tls_server_got_renegotiate(tor_tls_t *tls)
-{
-  return tls->got_renegotiate;
-}
-
-#ifndef HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_RANDOM
-static size_t
-SSL_get_client_random(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t len)
-{
-  if (len == 0)
-    return SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-  tor_assert(len == SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-  tor_assert(s->s3);
-  memcpy(out, s->s3->client_random, len);
-  return len;
-}
-#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_RANDOM) */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_SSL_GET_SERVER_RANDOM
-static size_t
-SSL_get_server_random(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t len)
-{
-  if (len == 0)
-    return SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-  tor_assert(len == SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-  tor_assert(s->s3);
-  memcpy(out, s->s3->server_random, len);
-  return len;
-}
-#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_GET_SERVER_RANDOM) */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_SSL_SESSION_GET_MASTER_KEY
-STATIC size_t
-SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(SSL_SESSION *s, uint8_t *out, size_t len)
-{
-  tor_assert(s);
-  if (len == 0)
-    return s->master_key_length;
-  tor_assert(len == (size_t)s->master_key_length);
-  tor_assert(out);
-  memcpy(out, s->master_key, len);
-  return len;
-}
-#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_SESSION_GET_MASTER_KEY) */
-
-/** Set the DIGEST256_LEN buffer at <b>secrets_out</b> to the value used in
- * the v3 handshake to prove that the client knows the TLS secrets for the
- * connection <b>tls</b>.  Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.
- */
-MOCK_IMPL(int,
-tor_tls_get_tlssecrets,(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out))
-{
-#define TLSSECRET_MAGIC "Tor V3 handshake TLS cross-certification"
-  uint8_t buf[128];
-  size_t len;
-  tor_assert(tls);
-
-  SSL *const ssl = tls->ssl;
-  SSL_SESSION *const session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
-
-  tor_assert(ssl);
-  tor_assert(session);
-
-  const size_t server_random_len = SSL_get_server_random(ssl, NULL, 0);
-  const size_t client_random_len = SSL_get_client_random(ssl, NULL, 0);
-  const size_t master_key_len = SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(session, NULL, 0);
-
-  tor_assert(server_random_len);
-  tor_assert(client_random_len);
-  tor_assert(master_key_len);
-
-  len = client_random_len + server_random_len + strlen(TLSSECRET_MAGIC) + 1;
-  tor_assert(len <= sizeof(buf));
-
-  {
-    size_t r = SSL_get_client_random(ssl, buf, client_random_len);
-    tor_assert(r == client_random_len);
-  }
-
-  {
-    size_t r = SSL_get_server_random(ssl,
-                                     buf+client_random_len,
-                                     server_random_len);
-    tor_assert(r == server_random_len);
-  }
-
-  uint8_t *master_key = tor_malloc_zero(master_key_len);
-  {
-    size_t r = SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(session, master_key, master_key_len);
-    tor_assert(r == master_key_len);
-  }
-
-  uint8_t *nextbuf = buf + client_random_len + server_random_len;
-  memcpy(nextbuf, TLSSECRET_MAGIC, strlen(TLSSECRET_MAGIC) + 1);
-
-  /*
-    The value is an HMAC, using the TLS master key as the HMAC key, of
-    client_random | server_random | TLSSECRET_MAGIC
-  */
-  crypto_hmac_sha256((char*)secrets_out,
-                     (char*)master_key,
-                     master_key_len,
-                     (char*)buf, len);
-  memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
-  memwipe(master_key, 0, master_key_len);
-  tor_free(master_key);
-
-  return 0;
-}
-
-/** Using the RFC5705 key material exporting construction, and the
- * provided <b>context</b> (<b>context_len</b> bytes long) and
- * <b>label</b> (a NUL-terminated string), compute a 32-byte secret in
- * <b>secrets_out</b> that only the parties to this TLS session can
- * compute.  Return 0 on success and -1 on failure.
- */
-MOCK_IMPL(int,
-tor_tls_export_key_material,(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out,
-                             const uint8_t *context,
-                             size_t context_len,
-                             const char *label))
-{
-  tor_assert(tls);
-  tor_assert(tls->ssl);
-
-  int r = SSL_export_keying_material(tls->ssl,
-                                     secrets_out, DIGEST256_LEN,
-                                     label, strlen(label),
-                                     context, context_len, 1);
-  return (r == 1) ? 0 : -1;
-}
-
-/** Examine the amount of memory used and available for buffers in <b>tls</b>.
- * Set *<b>rbuf_capacity</b> to the amount of storage allocated for the read
- * buffer and *<b>rbuf_bytes</b> to the amount actually used.
- * Set *<b>wbuf_capacity</b> to the amount of storage allocated for the write
- * buffer and *<b>wbuf_bytes</b> to the amount actually used.
- *
- * Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.*/
-int
-tor_tls_get_buffer_sizes(tor_tls_t *tls,
-                         size_t *rbuf_capacity, size_t *rbuf_bytes,
-                         size_t *wbuf_capacity, size_t *wbuf_bytes)
-{
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0)
-  (void)tls;
-  (void)rbuf_capacity;
-  (void)rbuf_bytes;
-  (void)wbuf_capacity;
-  (void)wbuf_bytes;
-
-  return -1;
-#else /* !(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0)) */
-  if (tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.buf)
-    *rbuf_capacity = tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.len;
-  else
-    *rbuf_capacity = 0;
-  if (tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.buf)
-    *wbuf_capacity = tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.len;
-  else
-    *wbuf_capacity = 0;
-  *rbuf_bytes = tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.left;
-  *wbuf_bytes = tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.left;
-  return 0;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) */
-}
-
-/** Check whether the ECC group requested is supported by the current OpenSSL
- * library instance.  Return 1 if the group is supported, and 0 if not.
- */
-int
-evaluate_ecgroup_for_tls(const char *ecgroup)
-{
-  EC_KEY *ec_key;
-  int nid;
-  int ret;
-
-  if (!ecgroup)
-    nid = NID_tor_default_ecdhe_group;
-  else if (!strcasecmp(ecgroup, "P256"))
-    nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
-  else if (!strcasecmp(ecgroup, "P224"))
-    nid = NID_secp224r1;
-  else
-    return 0;
-
-  ec_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
-  ret = (ec_key != NULL);
-  EC_KEY_free(ec_key);
-
-  return ret;
-}
diff --git a/src/lib/tls/tortls.h b/src/lib/tls/tortls.h
index f46e732679..306d321cd4 100644
--- a/src/lib/tls/tortls.h
+++ b/src/lib/tls/tortls.h
@@ -50,74 +50,13 @@ struct tor_x509_cert_t;
 
 #define TOR_TLS_IS_ERROR(rv) ((rv) < TOR_TLS_CLOSE)
 
-#ifdef TORTLS_PRIVATE
-
-#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL
-struct ssl_st;
-struct ssl_ctx_st;
-struct ssl_session_st;
-#endif
-
 /** Holds a SSL_CTX object and related state used to configure TLS
  * connections.
  */
 typedef struct tor_tls_context_t tor_tls_context_t;
 
-STATIC int tor_errno_to_tls_error(int e);
-STATIC int tor_tls_get_error(tor_tls_t *tls, int r, int extra,
-                  const char *doing, int severity, int domain);
-STATIC tor_tls_t *tor_tls_get_by_ssl(const struct ssl_st *ssl);
-STATIC void tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(void);
-MOCK_DECL(STATIC void, try_to_extract_certs_from_tls,
-          (int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, struct x509_st **cert_out,
-           struct x509_st **id_cert_out));
-#ifdef TORTLS_OPENSSL_PRIVATE
-STATIC int always_accept_verify_cb(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *x509_ctx);
-STATIC int tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(const struct ssl_st *ssl,
-                                           STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers);
-#endif
-STATIC int tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(const struct ssl_st *ssl);
-#ifndef HAVE_SSL_SESSION_GET_MASTER_KEY
-STATIC size_t SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(struct ssl_session_st *s,
-                                         uint8_t *out,
-                                         size_t len);
-#endif
-STATIC void tor_tls_debug_state_callback(const struct ssl_st *ssl,
-                                         int type, int val);
-STATIC void tor_tls_server_info_callback(const struct ssl_st *ssl,
-                                         int type, int val);
-#ifdef TORTLS_OPENSSL_PRIVATE
-STATIC int tor_tls_session_secret_cb(struct ssl_st *ssl, void *secret,
-                            int *secret_len,
-                            STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers,
-                            CONST_IF_OPENSSL_1_1_API SSL_CIPHER **cipher,
-                            void *arg);
-STATIC int find_cipher_by_id(const SSL *ssl, const SSL_METHOD *m,
-                             uint16_t cipher);
-#endif /* defined(TORTLS_OPENSSL_PRIVATE) */
-STATIC tor_tls_context_t *tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity,
-                   unsigned int key_lifetime, unsigned flags, int is_client);
-STATIC int tor_tls_context_init_one(tor_tls_context_t **ppcontext,
-                                    crypto_pk_t *identity,
-                                    unsigned int key_lifetime,
-                                    unsigned int flags,
-                                    int is_client);
-
-#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
-extern int tor_tls_object_ex_data_index;
-extern tor_tls_context_t *server_tls_context;
-extern tor_tls_context_t *client_tls_context;
-extern uint16_t v2_cipher_list[];
-extern uint64_t total_bytes_written_over_tls;
-extern uint64_t total_bytes_written_by_tls;
-
-#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */
-
-#endif /* defined(TORTLS_PRIVATE) */
-
 const char *tor_tls_err_to_string(int err);
 void tor_tls_get_state_description(tor_tls_t *tls, char *buf, size_t sz);
-
 void tor_tls_free_all(void);
 
 #define TOR_TLS_CTX_IS_PUBLIC_SERVER (1u<<0)
@@ -131,6 +70,9 @@ int tor_tls_context_init(unsigned flags,
                          crypto_pk_t *client_identity,
                          crypto_pk_t *server_identity,
                          unsigned int key_lifetime);
+void tor_tls_context_incref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx);
+void tor_tls_context_decref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx);
+tor_tls_context_t *tor_tls_context_get(int is_server);
 tor_tls_t *tor_tls_new(int sock, int is_server);
 void tor_tls_set_logged_address(tor_tls_t *tls, const char *address);
 void tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(tor_tls_t *tls,
diff --git a/src/lib/tls/tortls_internal.h b/src/lib/tls/tortls_internal.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f6afb348ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/tls/tortls_internal.h
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2003, Roger Dingledine
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+#ifndef TORTLS_INTERNAL_H
+#define TORTLS_INTERNAL_H
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL
+struct ssl_st;
+struct ssl_ctx_st;
+struct ssl_session_st;
+#endif
+
+int tor_errno_to_tls_error(int e);
+int tor_tls_get_error(tor_tls_t *tls, int r, int extra,
+                  const char *doing, int severity, int domain);
+tor_tls_t *tor_tls_get_by_ssl(const struct ssl_st *ssl);
+void tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(void);
+MOCK_DECL(void, try_to_extract_certs_from_tls,
+          (int severity, tor_tls_t *tls,
+           tor_x509_cert_impl_t **cert_out,
+           tor_x509_cert_impl_t **id_cert_out));
+#ifdef TORTLS_OPENSSL_PRIVATE
+int always_accept_verify_cb(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *x509_ctx);
+int tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(const struct ssl_st *ssl,
+                                           STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers);
+#endif
+int tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(const struct ssl_st *ssl);
+#ifndef HAVE_SSL_SESSION_GET_MASTER_KEY
+size_t SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(struct ssl_session_st *s,
+                                  uint8_t *out,
+                                  size_t len);
+#endif
+void tor_tls_debug_state_callback(const struct ssl_st *ssl,
+                                         int type, int val);
+void tor_tls_server_info_callback(const struct ssl_st *ssl,
+                                         int type, int val);
+#ifdef TORTLS_OPENSSL_PRIVATE
+STATIC int tor_tls_session_secret_cb(struct ssl_st *ssl, void *secret,
+                            int *secret_len,
+                            STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers,
+                            CONST_IF_OPENSSL_1_1_API SSL_CIPHER **cipher,
+                            void *arg);
+STATIC int find_cipher_by_id(const SSL *ssl, const SSL_METHOD *m,
+                             uint16_t cipher);
+#endif /* defined(TORTLS_OPENSSL_PRIVATE) */
+tor_tls_context_t *tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity,
+                   unsigned int key_lifetime, unsigned flags, int is_client);
+int tor_tls_context_init_one(tor_tls_context_t **ppcontext,
+                             crypto_pk_t *identity,
+                             unsigned int key_lifetime,
+                             unsigned int flags,
+                             int is_client);
+
+#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
+extern int tor_tls_object_ex_data_index;
+extern tor_tls_context_t *server_tls_context;
+extern tor_tls_context_t *client_tls_context;
+extern uint16_t v2_cipher_list[];
+extern uint64_t total_bytes_written_over_tls;
+extern uint64_t total_bytes_written_by_tls;
+#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */
+
+#endif /* defined(TORTLS_INTERNAL_H) */
diff --git a/src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c b/src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..078196ac5f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,432 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2003, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file tortls_nss.c
+ * \brief Wrapper functions to present a consistent interface to
+ * TLS and SSL X.509 functions from NSS.
+ **/
+
+#include "orconfig.h"
+
+#define TORTLS_PRIVATE
+
+#ifdef _WIN32 /*wrkard for dtls1.h >= 0.9.8m of "#include <winsock.h>"*/
+  #include <winsock2.h>
+  #include <ws2tcpip.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_cipher.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
+#include "lib/tls/x509.h"
+#include "lib/tls/tortls.h"
+#include "lib/tls/tortls_internal.h"
+#include "lib/log/util_bug.h"
+
+int
+tor_errno_to_tls_error(int e)
+{
+  (void)e;
+  // XXXX
+  return -1;
+}
+int
+tor_tls_get_error(tor_tls_t *tls, int r, int extra,
+                  const char *doing, int severity, int domain)
+{
+  (void)tls;
+  (void)r;
+  (void)extra;
+  (void)doing;
+  (void)severity;
+  (void)domain;
+  // XXXX
+  return -1;
+}
+tor_tls_t *
+tor_tls_get_by_ssl(const struct ssl_st *ssl)
+{
+  (void) ssl;
+  // XXXX
+  // XXXX refers to ssl_st.
+  return NULL;
+}
+void
+tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(void)
+{
+  // XXXX openssl only.
+}
+MOCK_IMPL(void,
+try_to_extract_certs_from_tls,(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls,
+                               tor_x509_cert_impl_t **cert_out,
+                               tor_x509_cert_impl_t **id_cert_out))
+{
+  tor_assert(tls);
+  tor_assert(cert_out);
+  tor_assert(id_cert_out);
+  (void)severity;
+  // XXXX
+}
+int
+tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(const struct ssl_st *ssl)
+{
+  (void) ssl;
+  // XXXX
+  // XXXX refers to ssl_st.
+  return 0;
+}
+
+void
+tor_tls_debug_state_callback(const struct ssl_st *ssl,
+                             int type, int val)
+{
+  (void) ssl;
+  (void)type;
+  (void)val;
+  // XXXX
+  // XXXX refers to ssl_st.
+}
+
+void
+tor_tls_server_info_callback(const struct ssl_st *ssl,
+                             int type, int val)
+{
+  (void)ssl;
+  (void)type;
+  (void)val;
+  // XXXX
+  // XXXX refers to ssl_st.
+}
+tor_tls_context_t *
+tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity,
+                    unsigned int key_lifetime, unsigned flags, int is_client)
+{
+  tor_assert(identity);
+  tor_assert(key_lifetime);
+  (void)flags;
+  (void)is_client;
+  // XXXX
+  return NULL;
+}
+int
+tor_tls_context_init_one(tor_tls_context_t **ppcontext,
+                         crypto_pk_t *identity,
+                         unsigned int key_lifetime,
+                         unsigned int flags,
+                         int is_client)
+{
+  tor_assert(ppcontext);
+  tor_assert(identity);
+  tor_assert(key_lifetime);
+  (void)flags;
+  (void)is_client;
+  // XXXX
+  return -1;
+}
+
+void
+tor_tls_get_state_description(tor_tls_t *tls, char *buf, size_t sz)
+{
+  (void)tls;
+  (void)buf;
+  (void)sz;
+  // XXXX
+}
+
+void
+tor_tls_init(void)
+{
+  // XXXX
+}
+void
+tls_log_errors(tor_tls_t *tls, int severity, int domain,
+               const char *doing)
+{
+  (void)tls;
+  (void)severity;
+  (void)domain;
+  (void)doing;
+  // XXXX
+}
+
+tor_tls_t *
+tor_tls_new(int sock, int is_server)
+{
+  (void)sock;
+  (void)is_server;
+  // XXXX
+  return NULL;
+}
+void
+tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(tor_tls_t *tls,
+                                 void (*cb)(tor_tls_t *, void *arg),
+                                 void *arg)
+{
+  tor_assert(tls);
+  (void)cb;
+  (void)arg;
+  // XXXX;
+}
+
+void
+tor_tls_free_(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+  (void)tls;
+  // XXXX
+}
+
+int
+tor_tls_peer_has_cert(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+  (void)tls;
+  // XXXX
+  return -1;
+}
+MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_t *,
+tor_tls_get_peer_cert,(tor_tls_t *tls))
+{
+  tor_assert(tls);
+  // XXXX
+  return NULL;
+}
+MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_t *,
+tor_tls_get_own_cert,(tor_tls_t *tls))
+{
+  tor_assert(tls);
+  // XXXX
+  return NULL;
+}
+int
+tor_tls_verify(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_t **identity)
+{
+  tor_assert(tls);
+  tor_assert(identity);
+  (void)severity;
+  // XXXX
+  return -1;
+}
+int
+tor_tls_check_lifetime(int severity,
+                       tor_tls_t *tls, time_t now,
+                       int past_tolerance,
+                       int future_tolerance)
+{
+  tor_assert(tls);
+  (void)severity;
+  (void)now;
+  (void)past_tolerance;
+  (void)future_tolerance;
+  // XXXX
+  return -1;
+}
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+tor_tls_read, (tor_tls_t *tls, char *cp, size_t len))
+{
+  tor_assert(tls);
+  tor_assert(cp);
+  (void)len;
+  // XXXX
+  return -1;
+}
+int
+tor_tls_write(tor_tls_t *tls, const char *cp, size_t n)
+{
+  tor_assert(tls);
+  tor_assert(cp);
+  (void)n;
+  // XXXX
+  return -1;
+}
+int
+tor_tls_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+  tor_assert(tls);
+  // XXXX
+  return -1;
+}
+int
+tor_tls_finish_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+  tor_assert(tls);
+  // XXXX
+  return -1;
+}
+void
+tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+  tor_assert(tls);
+  // XXXX
+}
+void
+tor_tls_block_renegotiation(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+  tor_assert(tls);
+  // XXXX
+}
+void
+tor_tls_assert_renegotiation_unblocked(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+  tor_assert(tls);
+  // XXXX
+}
+int
+tor_tls_shutdown(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+  tor_assert(tls);
+  // XXXX
+  return -1;
+}
+int
+tor_tls_get_pending_bytes(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+  tor_assert(tls);
+  // XXXX
+  return -1;
+}
+size_t
+tor_tls_get_forced_write_size(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+  tor_assert(tls);
+  // XXXX
+  return 0;
+}
+void
+tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes(tor_tls_t *tls,
+                        size_t *n_read, size_t *n_written)
+{
+  tor_assert(tls);
+  tor_assert(n_read);
+  tor_assert(n_written);
+  // XXXX
+}
+
+int
+tor_tls_get_buffer_sizes(tor_tls_t *tls,
+                         size_t *rbuf_capacity, size_t *rbuf_bytes,
+                         size_t *wbuf_capacity, size_t *wbuf_bytes)
+{
+  tor_assert(tls);
+  tor_assert(rbuf_capacity);
+  tor_assert(rbuf_bytes);
+  tor_assert(wbuf_capacity);
+  tor_assert(wbuf_bytes);
+  // XXXX
+  return -1;
+}
+MOCK_IMPL(double,
+tls_get_write_overhead_ratio, (void))
+{
+  // XXXX
+  return 0.0;
+}
+
+int
+tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+  tor_assert(tls);
+  // XXXX
+  return -1;
+}
+int
+tor_tls_get_num_server_handshakes(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+  tor_assert(tls);
+  // XXXX
+  return -1;
+}
+int
+tor_tls_server_got_renegotiate(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+  tor_assert(tls);
+  // XXXX
+  return -1;
+}
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+tor_tls_cert_matches_key,(const tor_tls_t *tls,
+                          const struct tor_x509_cert_t *cert))
+{
+  tor_assert(tls);
+  tor_assert(cert);
+  // XXXX
+  return 0;
+}
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+tor_tls_get_tlssecrets,(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out))
+{
+  tor_assert(tls);
+  tor_assert(secrets_out);
+  // XXXX
+  return -1;
+}
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+tor_tls_export_key_material,(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out,
+                             const uint8_t *context,
+                             size_t context_len,
+                             const char *label))
+{
+  tor_assert(tls);
+  tor_assert(secrets_out);
+  tor_assert(context);
+  tor_assert(label);
+  (void)context_len;
+  // XXXX
+  return -1;
+}
+
+void
+check_no_tls_errors_(const char *fname, int line)
+{
+  (void)fname;
+  (void)line;
+  // XXXX
+}
+void
+tor_tls_log_one_error(tor_tls_t *tls, unsigned long err,
+                      int severity, int domain, const char *doing)
+{
+  tor_assert(tls);
+  (void)err;
+  (void)severity;
+  (void)domain;
+  (void)doing;
+  // XXXX
+}
+
+int
+tor_tls_get_my_certs(int server,
+                     const struct tor_x509_cert_t **link_cert_out,
+                     const struct tor_x509_cert_t **id_cert_out)
+{
+  tor_assert(link_cert_out);
+  tor_assert(id_cert_out);
+  (void)server;
+  // XXXX
+  return -1;
+}
+
+crypto_pk_t *
+tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key(void)
+{
+  // XXXX
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *
+tor_tls_get_ciphersuite_name(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+  tor_assert(tls);
+  // XXXX
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+int
+evaluate_ecgroup_for_tls(const char *ecgroup)
+{
+  (void)ecgroup;
+  // XXXX
+  return -1;
+}
diff --git a/src/lib/tls/tortls_openssl.c b/src/lib/tls/tortls_openssl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..333b86481e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/tls/tortls_openssl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2032 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2003, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file tortls.c
+ * \brief Wrapper functions to present a consistent interface to
+ * TLS, SSL, and X.509 functions from OpenSSL.
+ **/
+
+/* (Unlike other tor functions, these
+ * are prefixed with tor_ in order to avoid conflicting with OpenSSL
+ * functions and variables.)
+ */
+
+#include "orconfig.h"
+
+#define TORTLS_PRIVATE
+#define TORTLS_OPENSSL_PRIVATE
+
+#ifdef _WIN32 /*wrkard for dtls1.h >= 0.9.8m of "#include <winsock.h>"*/
+  #include <winsock2.h>
+  #include <ws2tcpip.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_cipher.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/compat_openssl.h"
+#include "lib/tls/x509.h"
+
+/* Some versions of OpenSSL declare SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile twice in
+ * srtp.h. Suppress the GCC warning so we can build with -Wredundant-decl. */
+DISABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls)
+
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+#error "We require OpenSSL with ECC support"
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl3.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/tls1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+ENABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls)
+
+#include "lib/tls/tortls.h"
+#include "lib/tls/tortls_st.h"
+#include "lib/tls/tortls_internal.h"
+#include "lib/log/log.h"
+#include "lib/log/util_bug.h"
+#include "lib/container/smartlist.h"
+#include "lib/string/compat_string.h"
+#include "lib/string/printf.h"
+#include "lib/net/socket.h"
+#include "lib/intmath/cmp.h"
+#include "lib/ctime/di_ops.h"
+#include "lib/encoding/time_fmt.h"
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "lib/arch/bytes.h"
+
+/* Copied from or.h */
+#define LEGAL_NICKNAME_CHARACTERS \
+  "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789"
+
+/** How long do identity certificates live? (sec) */
+#define IDENTITY_CERT_LIFETIME  (365*24*60*60)
+
+#define ADDR(tls) (((tls) && (tls)->address) ? tls->address : "peer")
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER <  OPENSSL_V(1,0,0,'f')
+/* This is a version of OpenSSL before 1.0.0f. It does not have
+ * the CVE-2011-4576 fix, and as such it can't use RELEASE_BUFFERS and
+ * SSL3 safely at the same time.
+ */
+#define DISABLE_SSL3_HANDSHAKE
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER <  OPENSSL_V(1,0,0,'f') */
+
+/* We redefine these so that we can run correctly even if the vendor gives us
+ * a version of OpenSSL that does not match its header files.  (Apple: I am
+ * looking at you.)
+ */
+#ifndef SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
+#define SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0x00040000L
+#endif
+#ifndef SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
+#define SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0x0010
+#endif
+
+/** Return values for tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers.
+ *
+ * @{
+ */
+/** An error occurred when examining the client ciphers */
+#define CIPHERS_ERR -1
+/** The client cipher list indicates that a v1 handshake was in use. */
+#define CIPHERS_V1 1
+/** The client cipher list indicates that the client is using the v2 or the
+ * v3 handshake, but that it is (probably!) lying about what ciphers it
+ * supports */
+#define CIPHERS_V2 2
+/** The client cipher list indicates that the client is using the v2 or the
+ * v3 handshake, and that it is telling the truth about what ciphers it
+ * supports */
+#define CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED 3
+/** @} */
+
+/** The ex_data index in which we store a pointer to an SSL object's
+ * corresponding tor_tls_t object. */
+STATIC int tor_tls_object_ex_data_index = -1;
+
+/** Helper: Allocate tor_tls_object_ex_data_index. */
+void
+tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(void)
+{
+  if (tor_tls_object_ex_data_index == -1) {
+    tor_tls_object_ex_data_index =
+      SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    tor_assert(tor_tls_object_ex_data_index != -1);
+  }
+}
+
+/** Helper: given a SSL* pointer, return the tor_tls_t object using that
+ * pointer. */
+tor_tls_t *
+tor_tls_get_by_ssl(const SSL *ssl)
+{
+  tor_tls_t *result = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index);
+  if (result)
+    tor_assert(result->magic == TOR_TLS_MAGIC);
+  return result;
+}
+
+/** True iff tor_tls_init() has been called. */
+static int tls_library_is_initialized = 0;
+
+/* Module-internal error codes. */
+#define TOR_TLS_SYSCALL_    (MIN_TOR_TLS_ERROR_VAL_ - 2)
+#define TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_ (MIN_TOR_TLS_ERROR_VAL_ - 1)
+
+/** Write a description of the current state of <b>tls</b> into the
+ * <b>sz</b>-byte buffer at <b>buf</b>. */
+void
+tor_tls_get_state_description(tor_tls_t *tls, char *buf, size_t sz)
+{
+  const char *ssl_state;
+  const char *tortls_state;
+
+  if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(!tls || !tls->ssl)) {
+    strlcpy(buf, "(No SSL object)", sz);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  ssl_state = SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl);
+  switch (tls->state) {
+#define CASE(st) case TOR_TLS_ST_##st: tortls_state = " in "#st ; break
+    CASE(HANDSHAKE);
+    CASE(OPEN);
+    CASE(GOTCLOSE);
+    CASE(SENTCLOSE);
+    CASE(CLOSED);
+    CASE(RENEGOTIATE);
+#undef CASE
+  case TOR_TLS_ST_BUFFEREVENT:
+    tortls_state = "";
+    break;
+  default:
+    tortls_state = " in unknown TLS state";
+    break;
+  }
+
+  tor_snprintf(buf, sz, "%s%s", ssl_state, tortls_state);
+}
+
+/** Log a single error <b>err</b> as returned by ERR_get_error(), which was
+ * received while performing an operation <b>doing</b> on <b>tls</b>.  Log
+ * the message at <b>severity</b>, in log domain <b>domain</b>. */
+void
+tor_tls_log_one_error(tor_tls_t *tls, unsigned long err,
+                  int severity, int domain, const char *doing)
+{
+  const char *state = NULL, *addr;
+  const char *msg, *lib, *func;
+
+  state = (tls && tls->ssl)?SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl):"---";
+
+  addr = tls ? tls->address : NULL;
+
+  /* Some errors are known-benign, meaning they are the fault of the other
+   * side of the connection. The caller doesn't know this, so override the
+   * priority for those cases. */
+  switch (ERR_GET_REASON(err)) {
+    case SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST:
+    case SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST:
+    case SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_1_1_API
+    case SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE:
+#endif
+    case SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL:
+    case SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL:
+      severity = LOG_INFO;
+      break;
+    default:
+      break;
+  }
+
+  msg = (const char*)ERR_reason_error_string(err);
+  lib = (const char*)ERR_lib_error_string(err);
+  func = (const char*)ERR_func_error_string(err);
+  if (!msg) msg = "(null)";
+  if (!lib) lib = "(null)";
+  if (!func) func = "(null)";
+  if (doing) {
+    tor_log(severity, domain, "TLS error while %s%s%s: %s (in %s:%s:%s)",
+        doing, addr?" with ":"", addr?addr:"",
+        msg, lib, func, state);
+  } else {
+    tor_log(severity, domain, "TLS error%s%s: %s (in %s:%s:%s)",
+        addr?" with ":"", addr?addr:"",
+        msg, lib, func, state);
+  }
+}
+
+/** Log all pending tls errors at level <b>severity</b> in log domain
+ * <b>domain</b>.  Use <b>doing</b> to describe our current activities.
+ */
+void
+tls_log_errors(tor_tls_t *tls, int severity, int domain, const char *doing)
+{
+  unsigned long err;
+
+  while ((err = ERR_get_error()) != 0) {
+    tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, err, severity, domain, doing);
+  }
+}
+
+/** Convert an errno (or a WSAerrno on windows) into a TOR_TLS_* error
+ * code. */
+int
+tor_errno_to_tls_error(int e)
+{
+  switch (e) {
+    case SOCK_ERRNO(ECONNRESET): // most common
+      return TOR_TLS_ERROR_CONNRESET;
+    case SOCK_ERRNO(ETIMEDOUT):
+      return TOR_TLS_ERROR_TIMEOUT;
+    case SOCK_ERRNO(EHOSTUNREACH):
+    case SOCK_ERRNO(ENETUNREACH):
+      return TOR_TLS_ERROR_NO_ROUTE;
+    case SOCK_ERRNO(ECONNREFUSED):
+      return TOR_TLS_ERROR_CONNREFUSED; // least common
+    default:
+      return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
+  }
+}
+
+#define CATCH_SYSCALL 1
+#define CATCH_ZERO    2
+
+/** Given a TLS object and the result of an SSL_* call, use
+ * SSL_get_error to determine whether an error has occurred, and if so
+ * which one.  Return one of TOR_TLS_{DONE|WANTREAD|WANTWRITE|ERROR}.
+ * If extra&CATCH_SYSCALL is true, return TOR_TLS_SYSCALL_ instead of
+ * reporting syscall errors.  If extra&CATCH_ZERO is true, return
+ * TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_ instead of reporting zero-return errors.
+ *
+ * If an error has occurred, log it at level <b>severity</b> and describe the
+ * current action as <b>doing</b>.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_get_error(tor_tls_t *tls, int r, int extra,
+                  const char *doing, int severity, int domain)
+{
+  int err = SSL_get_error(tls->ssl, r);
+  int tor_error = TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
+  switch (err) {
+    case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
+      return TOR_TLS_DONE;
+    case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+      return TOR_TLS_WANTREAD;
+    case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+      return TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE;
+    case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+      if (extra&CATCH_SYSCALL)
+        return TOR_TLS_SYSCALL_;
+      if (r == 0) {
+        tor_log(severity, LD_NET, "TLS error: unexpected close while %s (%s)",
+            doing, SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
+        tor_error = TOR_TLS_ERROR_IO;
+      } else {
+        int e = tor_socket_errno(tls->socket);
+        tor_log(severity, LD_NET,
+            "TLS error: <syscall error while %s> (errno=%d: %s; state=%s)",
+            doing, e, tor_socket_strerror(e),
+            SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
+        tor_error = tor_errno_to_tls_error(e);
+      }
+      tls_log_errors(tls, severity, domain, doing);
+      return tor_error;
+    case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
+      if (extra&CATCH_ZERO)
+        return TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_;
+      tor_log(severity, LD_NET, "TLS connection closed while %s in state %s",
+          doing, SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
+      tls_log_errors(tls, severity, domain, doing);
+      return TOR_TLS_CLOSE;
+    default:
+      tls_log_errors(tls, severity, domain, doing);
+      return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
+  }
+}
+
+/** Initialize OpenSSL, unless it has already been initialized.
+ */
+void
+tor_tls_init(void)
+{
+  check_no_tls_errors();
+
+  if (!tls_library_is_initialized) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
+    OPENSSL_init_ssl(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS, NULL);
+#else
+    SSL_library_init();
+    SSL_load_error_strings();
+#endif
+
+#if (SIZEOF_VOID_P >= 8 &&                              \
+     OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,1))
+    long version = OpenSSL_version_num();
+
+    /* LCOV_EXCL_START : we can't test these lines on the same machine */
+    if (version >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,1)) {
+      /* Warn if we could *almost* be running with much faster ECDH.
+         If we're built for a 64-bit target, using OpenSSL 1.0.1, but we
+         don't have one of the built-in __uint128-based speedups, we are
+         just one build operation away from an accelerated handshake.
+
+         (We could be looking at OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 instead of
+          doing this test, but that gives compile-time options, not runtime
+          behavior.)
+      */
+      EC_KEY *key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
+      const EC_GROUP *g = key ? EC_KEY_get0_group(key) : NULL;
+      const EC_METHOD *m = g ? EC_GROUP_method_of(g) : NULL;
+      const int warn = (m == EC_GFp_simple_method() ||
+                        m == EC_GFp_mont_method() ||
+                        m == EC_GFp_nist_method());
+      EC_KEY_free(key);
+
+      if (warn)
+        log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "We were built to run on a 64-bit CPU, with "
+                   "OpenSSL 1.0.1 or later, but with a version of OpenSSL "
+                   "that apparently lacks accelerated support for the NIST "
+                   "P-224 and P-256 groups. Building openssl with such "
+                   "support (using the enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 option "
+                   "when configuring it) would make ECDH much faster.");
+    }
+    /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
+#endif /* (SIZEOF_VOID_P >= 8 &&                              ... */
+
+    tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index();
+
+    tls_library_is_initialized = 1;
+  }
+}
+
+/** We need to give OpenSSL a callback to verify certificates. This is
+ * it: We always accept peer certs and complete the handshake.  We
+ * don't validate them until later.
+ */
+int
+always_accept_verify_cb(int preverify_ok,
+                        X509_STORE_CTX *x509_ctx)
+{
+  (void) preverify_ok;
+  (void) x509_ctx;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+/** List of ciphers that servers should select from when the client might be
+ * claiming extra unsupported ciphers in order to avoid fingerprinting.  */
+static const char SERVER_CIPHER_LIST[] =
+#ifdef  TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+  /* This one can never actually get selected, since if the client lists it,
+   * we will assume that the client is honest, and not use this list.
+   * Nonetheless we list it if it's available, so that the server doesn't
+   * conclude that it has no valid ciphers if it's running with TLS1.3.
+   */
+  TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ":"
+#endif
+  TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA ":"
+  TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA;
+
+/** List of ciphers that servers should select from when we actually have
+ * our choice of what cipher to use. */
+static const char UNRESTRICTED_SERVER_CIPHER_LIST[] =
+  /* Here are the TLS 1.3 ciphers we like, in the order we prefer. */
+#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+  TLS1_3_TXT_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
+  TLS1_3_TXT_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+  TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_CCM_SHA256
+  TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 ":"
+#endif
+
+  /* This list is autogenerated with the gen_server_ciphers.py script;
+   * don't hand-edit it. */
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+       TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+       TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384
+       TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256
+       TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
+       TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+       TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+       TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+       TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
+       TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM
+       TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256
+       TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256
+       TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 ":"
+#endif
+       /* Required */
+       TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA ":"
+       /* Required */
+       TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA ":"
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305
+       TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305
+       TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305
+#endif
+  ;
+
+/* Note: to set up your own private testing network with link crypto
+ * disabled, set your Tors' cipher list to
+ * (SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_SHA).  If you do this, you won't be able to communicate
+ * with any of the "real" Tors, though. */
+
+#define CIPHER(id, name) name ":"
+#define XCIPHER(id, name)
+/** List of ciphers that clients should advertise, omitting items that
+ * our OpenSSL doesn't know about. */
+static const char CLIENT_CIPHER_LIST[] =
+#include "ciphers.inc"
+  /* Tell it not to use SSLv2 ciphers, so that it can select an SSLv3 version
+   * of any cipher we say. */
+  "!SSLv2"
+  ;
+#undef CIPHER
+#undef XCIPHER
+
+/** Remove a reference to <b>ctx</b>, and free it if it has no more
+ * references. */
+void
+tor_tls_context_decref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx)
+{
+  tor_assert(ctx);
+  if (--ctx->refcnt == 0) {
+    SSL_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
+    tor_x509_cert_free(ctx->my_link_cert);
+    tor_x509_cert_free(ctx->my_id_cert);
+    tor_x509_cert_free(ctx->my_auth_cert);
+    crypto_pk_free(ctx->link_key);
+    crypto_pk_free(ctx->auth_key);
+    /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_START since ctx will never be NULL here */
+    tor_free(ctx);
+    /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_STOP */
+  }
+}
+
+/** Set *<b>link_cert_out</b> and *<b>id_cert_out</b> to the link certificate
+ * and ID certificate that we're currently using for our V3 in-protocol
+ * handshake's certificate chain.  If <b>server</b> is true, provide the certs
+ * that we use in server mode (auth, ID); otherwise, provide the certs that we
+ * use in client mode. (link, ID) */
+int
+tor_tls_get_my_certs(int server,
+                     const tor_x509_cert_t **link_cert_out,
+                     const tor_x509_cert_t **id_cert_out)
+{
+  tor_tls_context_t *ctx = tor_tls_context_get(server);
+  if (! ctx)
+    return -1;
+  if (link_cert_out)
+    *link_cert_out = server ? ctx->my_link_cert : ctx->my_auth_cert;
+  if (id_cert_out)
+    *id_cert_out = ctx->my_id_cert;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Return the authentication key that we use to authenticate ourselves as a
+ * client in the V3 in-protocol handshake.
+ */
+crypto_pk_t *
+tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key(void)
+{
+  tor_tls_context_t *context = tor_tls_context_get(0);
+  if (! context)
+    return NULL;
+  return context->auth_key;
+}
+
+/** Return true iff the other side of <b>tls</b> has authenticated to us, and
+ * the key certified in <b>cert</b> is the same as the key they used to do it.
+ */
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+tor_tls_cert_matches_key,(const tor_tls_t *tls, const tor_x509_cert_t *cert))
+{
+  X509 *peercert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl);
+  EVP_PKEY *link_key = NULL, *cert_key = NULL;
+  int result;
+
+  if (!peercert)
+    return 0;
+  link_key = X509_get_pubkey(peercert);
+  cert_key = X509_get_pubkey((X509 *)tor_x509_cert_get_impl(cert));
+
+  result = link_key && cert_key && EVP_PKEY_cmp(cert_key, link_key) == 1;
+
+  X509_free(peercert);
+  if (link_key)
+    EVP_PKEY_free(link_key);
+  if (cert_key)
+    EVP_PKEY_free(cert_key);
+
+  return result;
+}
+
+/** Create a new global TLS context.
+ *
+ * You can call this function multiple times.  Each time you call it,
+ * it generates new certificates; all new connections will use
+ * the new SSL context.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_context_init_one(tor_tls_context_t **ppcontext,
+                         crypto_pk_t *identity,
+                         unsigned int key_lifetime,
+                         unsigned int flags,
+                         int is_client)
+{
+  tor_tls_context_t *new_ctx = tor_tls_context_new(identity,
+                                                   key_lifetime,
+                                                   flags,
+                                                   is_client);
+  tor_tls_context_t *old_ctx = *ppcontext;
+
+  if (new_ctx != NULL) {
+    *ppcontext = new_ctx;
+
+    /* Free the old context if one existed. */
+    if (old_ctx != NULL) {
+      /* This is safe even if there are open connections: we reference-
+       * count tor_tls_context_t objects. */
+      tor_tls_context_decref(old_ctx);
+    }
+  }
+
+  return ((new_ctx != NULL) ? 0 : -1);
+}
+
+/** The group we should use for ecdhe when none was selected. */
+#define  NID_tor_default_ecdhe_group NID_X9_62_prime256v1
+
+#define RSA_LINK_KEY_BITS 2048
+
+/** Create a new TLS context for use with Tor TLS handshakes.
+ * <b>identity</b> should be set to the identity key used to sign the
+ * certificate.
+ */
+tor_tls_context_t *
+tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime,
+                    unsigned flags, int is_client)
+{
+  crypto_pk_t *rsa = NULL, *rsa_auth = NULL;
+  EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+  tor_tls_context_t *result = NULL;
+  X509 *cert = NULL, *idcert = NULL, *authcert = NULL;
+  char *nickname = NULL, *nn2 = NULL;
+
+  tor_tls_init();
+  nickname = crypto_random_hostname(8, 20, "www.", ".net");
+#ifdef DISABLE_V3_LINKPROTO_SERVERSIDE
+  nn2 = crypto_random_hostname(8, 20, "www.", ".net");
+#else
+  nn2 = crypto_random_hostname(8, 20, "www.", ".com");
+#endif
+
+  /* Generate short-term RSA key for use with TLS. */
+  if (!(rsa = crypto_pk_new()))
+    goto error;
+  if (crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits(rsa, RSA_LINK_KEY_BITS)<0)
+    goto error;
+  if (!is_client) {
+    /* Generate short-term RSA key for use in the in-protocol ("v3")
+     * authentication handshake. */
+    if (!(rsa_auth = crypto_pk_new()))
+      goto error;
+    if (crypto_pk_generate_key(rsa_auth)<0)
+      goto error;
+    /* Create a link certificate signed by identity key. */
+    cert = tor_tls_create_certificate(rsa, identity, nickname, nn2,
+                                      key_lifetime);
+    /* Create self-signed certificate for identity key. */
+    idcert = tor_tls_create_certificate(identity, identity, nn2, nn2,
+                                        IDENTITY_CERT_LIFETIME);
+    /* Create an authentication certificate signed by identity key. */
+    authcert = tor_tls_create_certificate(rsa_auth, identity, nickname, nn2,
+                                          key_lifetime);
+    if (!cert || !idcert || !authcert) {
+      log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Error creating certificate");
+      goto error;
+    }
+  }
+
+  result = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_context_t));
+  result->refcnt = 1;
+  if (!is_client) {
+    result->my_link_cert = tor_x509_cert_new(X509_dup(cert));
+    result->my_id_cert = tor_x509_cert_new(X509_dup(idcert));
+    result->my_auth_cert = tor_x509_cert_new(X509_dup(authcert));
+    if (!result->my_link_cert || !result->my_id_cert || !result->my_auth_cert)
+      goto error;
+    result->link_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(rsa);
+    result->auth_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(rsa_auth);
+  }
+
+#if 0
+  /* Tell OpenSSL to only use TLS1.  This may have subtly different results
+   * from SSLv23_method() with SSLv2 and SSLv3 disabled, so we need to do some
+   * investigation before we consider adjusting it. It should be compatible
+   * with existing Tors. */
+  if (!(result->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_method())))
+    goto error;
+#endif /* 0 */
+
+  /* Tell OpenSSL to use TLS 1.0 or later but not SSL2 or SSL3. */
+#ifdef HAVE_TLS_METHOD
+  if (!(result->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_method())))
+    goto error;
+#else
+  if (!(result->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method())))
+    goto error;
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_TLS_METHOD) */
+  SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
+  SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3);
+
+  /* Prefer the server's ordering of ciphers: the client's ordering has
+  * historically been chosen for fingerprinting resistance. */
+  SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE);
+
+  /* Disable TLS tickets if they're supported.  We never want to use them;
+   * using them can make our perfect forward secrecy a little worse, *and*
+   * create an opportunity to fingerprint us (since it's unusual to use them
+   * with TLS sessions turned off).
+   *
+   * In 0.2.4, clients advertise support for them though, to avoid a TLS
+   * distinguishability vector.  This can give us worse PFS, though, if we
+   * get a server that doesn't set SSL_OP_NO_TICKET.  With luck, there will
+   * be few such servers by the time 0.2.4 is more stable.
+   */
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
+  if (! is_client) {
+    SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_TICKET);
+  }
+#endif
+
+  SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
+  SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
+  SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx,
+                      SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION);
+#endif
+  /* Yes, we know what we are doing here.  No, we do not treat a renegotiation
+   * as authenticating any earlier-received data.
+   */
+  {
+    SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx,
+                        SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION);
+  }
+
+  /* Don't actually allow compression; it uses RAM and time, it makes TLS
+   * vulnerable to CRIME-style attacks, and most of the data we transmit over
+   * TLS is encrypted (and therefore uncompressible) anyway. */
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
+  SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION);
+#endif
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+  if (result->ctx->comp_methods)
+    result->ctx->comp_methods = NULL;
+#endif
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) */
+
+#ifdef SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
+  SSL_CTX_set_mode(result->ctx, SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS);
+#endif
+  if (! is_client) {
+    if (cert && !SSL_CTX_use_certificate(result->ctx,cert))
+      goto error;
+    X509_free(cert); /* We just added a reference to cert. */
+    cert=NULL;
+    if (idcert) {
+      X509_STORE *s = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(result->ctx);
+      tor_assert(s);
+      X509_STORE_add_cert(s, idcert);
+      X509_free(idcert); /* The context now owns the reference to idcert */
+      idcert = NULL;
+    }
+  }
+  SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(result->ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF);
+  if (!is_client) {
+    tor_assert(rsa);
+    if (!(pkey = crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_(rsa,1)))
+      goto error;
+    if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(result->ctx, pkey))
+      goto error;
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    pkey = NULL;
+    if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(result->ctx))
+      goto error;
+  }
+  {
+    DH *dh = crypto_dh_new_openssl_tls();
+    tor_assert(dh);
+    SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(result->ctx, dh);
+    DH_free(dh);
+  }
+  if (! is_client) {
+    int nid;
+    EC_KEY *ec_key;
+    if (flags & TOR_TLS_CTX_USE_ECDHE_P224)
+      nid = NID_secp224r1;
+    else if (flags & TOR_TLS_CTX_USE_ECDHE_P256)
+      nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
+    else
+      nid = NID_tor_default_ecdhe_group;
+    /* Use P-256 for ECDHE. */
+    ec_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
+    if (ec_key != NULL) /*XXXX Handle errors? */
+      SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(result->ctx, ec_key);
+    EC_KEY_free(ec_key);
+  }
+  SSL_CTX_set_verify(result->ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER,
+                     always_accept_verify_cb);
+  /* let us realloc bufs that we're writing from */
+  SSL_CTX_set_mode(result->ctx, SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER);
+
+  if (rsa)
+    crypto_pk_free(rsa);
+  if (rsa_auth)
+    crypto_pk_free(rsa_auth);
+  X509_free(authcert);
+  tor_free(nickname);
+  tor_free(nn2);
+  return result;
+
+ error:
+  tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "creating TLS context");
+  tor_free(nickname);
+  tor_free(nn2);
+  if (pkey)
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+  if (rsa)
+    crypto_pk_free(rsa);
+  if (rsa_auth)
+    crypto_pk_free(rsa_auth);
+  if (result)
+    tor_tls_context_decref(result);
+  if (cert)
+    X509_free(cert);
+  if (idcert)
+    X509_free(idcert);
+  if (authcert)
+    X509_free(authcert);
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+/** Invoked when a TLS state changes: log the change at severity 'debug' */
+void
+tor_tls_debug_state_callback(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)
+{
+  /* LCOV_EXCL_START since this depends on whether debug is captured or not */
+  log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "SSL %p is now in state %s [type=%d,val=%d].",
+            ssl, SSL_state_string_long(ssl), type, val);
+  /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
+}
+
+/* Return the name of the negotiated ciphersuite in use on <b>tls</b> */
+const char *
+tor_tls_get_ciphersuite_name(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+  return SSL_get_cipher(tls->ssl);
+}
+
+/* Here's the old V2 cipher list we sent from 0.2.1.1-alpha up to
+ * 0.2.3.17-beta. If a client is using this list, we can't believe the ciphers
+ * that it claims to support.  We'll prune this list to remove the ciphers
+ * *we* don't recognize. */
+STATIC uint16_t v2_cipher_list[] = {
+  0xc00a, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
+  0xc014, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
+  0x0039, /* TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA */
+  0x0038, /* TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA */
+  0xc00f, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
+  0xc005, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
+  0x0035, /* TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA */
+  0xc007, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
+  0xc009, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
+  0xc011, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
+  0xc013, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
+  0x0033, /* TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA */
+  0x0032, /* TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA */
+  0xc00c, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
+  0xc00e, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
+  0xc002, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
+  0xc004, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
+  0x0004, /* SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_MD5 */
+  0x0005, /* SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_SHA */
+  0x002f, /* TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA */
+  0xc008, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
+  0xc012, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
+  0x0016, /* SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
+  0x0013, /* SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
+  0xc00d, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
+  0xc003, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
+  0xfeff, /* SSL3_TXT_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
+  0x000a, /* SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
+  0
+};
+/** Have we removed the unrecognized ciphers from v2_cipher_list yet? */
+static int v2_cipher_list_pruned = 0;
+
+/** Return 0 if <b>m</b> does not support the cipher with ID <b>cipher</b>;
+ * return 1 if it does support it, or if we have no way to tell. */
+int
+find_cipher_by_id(const SSL *ssl, const SSL_METHOD *m, uint16_t cipher)
+{
+  const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+#ifdef HAVE_SSL_CIPHER_FIND
+  (void) m;
+  {
+    unsigned char cipherid[3];
+    tor_assert(ssl);
+    set_uint16(cipherid, tor_htons(cipher));
+    cipherid[2] = 0; /* If ssl23_get_cipher_by_char finds no cipher starting
+                      * with a two-byte 'cipherid', it may look for a v2
+                      * cipher with the appropriate 3 bytes. */
+    c = SSL_CIPHER_find((SSL*)ssl, cipherid);
+    if (c)
+      tor_assert((SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) & 0xffff) == cipher);
+    return c != NULL;
+  }
+#else /* !(defined(HAVE_SSL_CIPHER_FIND)) */
+
+# if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SSL_METHOD_ST_GET_CIPHER_BY_CHAR)
+  if (m && m->get_cipher_by_char) {
+    unsigned char cipherid[3];
+    set_uint16(cipherid, tor_htons(cipher));
+    cipherid[2] = 0; /* If ssl23_get_cipher_by_char finds no cipher starting
+                      * with a two-byte 'cipherid', it may look for a v2
+                      * cipher with the appropriate 3 bytes. */
+    c = m->get_cipher_by_char(cipherid);
+    if (c)
+      tor_assert((c->id & 0xffff) == cipher);
+    return c != NULL;
+  }
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SSL_METHOD_ST_GET_CIPHER_BY_CHAR) */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_1_1_API
+  if (m && m->get_cipher && m->num_ciphers) {
+    /* It would seem that some of the "let's-clean-up-openssl" forks have
+     * removed the get_cipher_by_char function.  Okay, so now you get a
+     * quadratic search.
+     */
+    int i;
+    for (i = 0; i < m->num_ciphers(); ++i) {
+      c = m->get_cipher(i);
+      if (c && (c->id & 0xffff) == cipher) {
+        return 1;
+      }
+    }
+    return 0;
+  }
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) */
+  (void) ssl;
+  (void) m;
+  (void) cipher;
+  return 1; /* No way to search */
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_SSL_CIPHER_FIND) */
+}
+
+/** Remove from v2_cipher_list every cipher that we don't support, so that
+ * comparing v2_cipher_list to a client's cipher list will give a sensible
+ * result. */
+static void
+prune_v2_cipher_list(const SSL *ssl)
+{
+  uint16_t *inp, *outp;
+#ifdef HAVE_TLS_METHOD
+  const SSL_METHOD *m = TLS_method();
+#else
+  const SSL_METHOD *m = SSLv23_method();
+#endif
+
+  inp = outp = v2_cipher_list;
+  while (*inp) {
+    if (find_cipher_by_id(ssl, m, *inp)) {
+      *outp++ = *inp++;
+    } else {
+      inp++;
+    }
+  }
+  *outp = 0;
+
+  v2_cipher_list_pruned = 1;
+}
+
+/** Examine the client cipher list in <b>ssl</b>, and determine what kind of
+ * client it is.  Return one of CIPHERS_ERR, CIPHERS_V1, CIPHERS_V2,
+ * CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED.
+ **/
+int
+tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(const SSL *ssl,
+                                STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers)
+{
+  int i, res;
+  tor_tls_t *tor_tls;
+  if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(!v2_cipher_list_pruned))
+    prune_v2_cipher_list(ssl);
+
+  tor_tls = tor_tls_get_by_ssl(ssl);
+  if (tor_tls && tor_tls->client_cipher_list_type)
+    return tor_tls->client_cipher_list_type;
+
+  /* If we reached this point, we just got a client hello.  See if there is
+   * a cipher list. */
+  if (!peer_ciphers) {
+    log_info(LD_NET, "No ciphers on session");
+    res = CIPHERS_ERR;
+    goto done;
+  }
+  /* Now we need to see if there are any ciphers whose presence means we're
+   * dealing with an updated Tor. */
+  for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(peer_ciphers); ++i) {
+    const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(peer_ciphers, i);
+    const char *ciphername = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher);
+    if (strcmp(ciphername, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA) &&
+        strcmp(ciphername, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA) &&
+        strcmp(ciphername, SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA) &&
+        strcmp(ciphername, "(NONE)")) {
+      log_debug(LD_NET, "Got a non-version-1 cipher called '%s'", ciphername);
+      // return 1;
+      goto v2_or_higher;
+    }
+  }
+  res = CIPHERS_V1;
+  goto done;
+ v2_or_higher:
+  {
+    const uint16_t *v2_cipher = v2_cipher_list;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(peer_ciphers); ++i) {
+      const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(peer_ciphers, i);
+      uint16_t id = SSL_CIPHER_get_id(cipher) & 0xffff;
+      if (id == 0x00ff) /* extended renegotiation indicator. */
+        continue;
+      if (!id || id != *v2_cipher) {
+        res = CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED;
+        goto dump_ciphers;
+      }
+      ++v2_cipher;
+    }
+    if (*v2_cipher != 0) {
+      res = CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED;
+      goto dump_ciphers;
+    }
+    res = CIPHERS_V2;
+  }
+
+ dump_ciphers:
+  {
+    smartlist_t *elts = smartlist_new();
+    char *s;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(peer_ciphers); ++i) {
+      const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(peer_ciphers, i);
+      const char *ciphername = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher);
+      smartlist_add(elts, (char*)ciphername);
+    }
+    s = smartlist_join_strings(elts, ":", 0, NULL);
+    log_debug(LD_NET, "Got a %s V2/V3 cipher list from %s.  It is: '%s'",
+              (res == CIPHERS_V2) ? "fictitious" : "real", ADDR(tor_tls), s);
+    tor_free(s);
+    smartlist_free(elts);
+  }
+ done:
+  if (tor_tls)
+    return tor_tls->client_cipher_list_type = res;
+
+  return res;
+}
+
+/** Return true iff the cipher list suggested by the client for <b>ssl</b> is
+ * a list that indicates that the client knows how to do the v2 TLS connection
+ * handshake. */
+int
+tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(const SSL *ssl)
+{
+  STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers;
+#ifdef HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_CIPHERS
+  ciphers = SSL_get_client_ciphers(ssl);
+#else
+  SSL_SESSION *session;
+  if (!(session = SSL_get_session((SSL *)ssl))) {
+    log_info(LD_NET, "No session on TLS?");
+    return CIPHERS_ERR;
+  }
+  ciphers = session->ciphers;
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_CIPHERS) */
+
+  return tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, ciphers) >= CIPHERS_V2;
+}
+
+/** Invoked when we're accepting a connection on <b>ssl</b>, and the connection
+ * changes state. We use this:
+ * <ul><li>To alter the state of the handshake partway through, so we
+ *         do not send or request extra certificates in v2 handshakes.</li>
+ * <li>To detect renegotiation</li></ul>
+ */
+void
+tor_tls_server_info_callback(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)
+{
+  tor_tls_t *tls;
+  (void) val;
+
+  IF_BUG_ONCE(ssl == NULL) {
+    return; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
+  }
+
+  tor_tls_debug_state_callback(ssl, type, val);
+
+  if (type != SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP)
+    return;
+
+  OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE ssl_state = SSL_get_state(ssl);
+  if (! STATE_IS_SW_SERVER_HELLO(ssl_state))
+    return;
+  tls = tor_tls_get_by_ssl(ssl);
+  if (tls) {
+    /* Check whether we're watching for renegotiates.  If so, this is one! */
+    if (tls->negotiated_callback)
+      tls->got_renegotiate = 1;
+    if (tls->server_handshake_count < 127) /*avoid any overflow possibility*/
+      ++tls->server_handshake_count;
+  } else {
+    log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't look up the tls for an SSL*. How odd!");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  /* Now check the cipher list. */
+  if (tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(ssl)) {
+    if (tls->wasV2Handshake)
+      return; /* We already turned this stuff off for the first handshake;
+               * This is a renegotiation. */
+
+    /* Yes, we're casting away the const from ssl.  This is very naughty of us.
+     * Let's hope openssl doesn't notice! */
+
+    /* Set SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN to keep from sending back any extra certs. */
+    SSL_set_mode((SSL*) ssl, SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN);
+    /* Don't send a hello request. */
+    SSL_set_verify((SSL*) ssl, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL);
+
+    if (tls) {
+      tls->wasV2Handshake = 1;
+    } else {
+      /* LCOV_EXCL_START this line is not reachable */
+      log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't look up the tls for an SSL*. How odd!");
+      /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+/** Callback to get invoked on a server after we've read the list of ciphers
+ * the client supports, but before we pick our own ciphersuite.
+ *
+ * We can't abuse an info_cb for this, since by the time one of the
+ * client_hello info_cbs is called, we've already picked which ciphersuite to
+ * use.
+ *
+ * Technically, this function is an abuse of this callback, since the point of
+ * a session_secret_cb is to try to set up and/or verify a shared-secret for
+ * authentication on the fly.  But as long as we return 0, we won't actually be
+ * setting up a shared secret, and all will be fine.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_session_secret_cb(SSL *ssl, void *secret, int *secret_len,
+                          STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers,
+                          CONST_IF_OPENSSL_1_1_API SSL_CIPHER **cipher,
+                          void *arg)
+{
+  (void) secret;
+  (void) secret_len;
+  (void) peer_ciphers;
+  (void) cipher;
+  (void) arg;
+
+  if (tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, peer_ciphers) ==
+       CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED) {
+    SSL_set_cipher_list(ssl, UNRESTRICTED_SERVER_CIPHER_LIST);
+  }
+
+  SSL_set_session_secret_cb(ssl, NULL, NULL);
+
+  return 0;
+}
+static void
+tor_tls_setup_session_secret_cb(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+  SSL_set_session_secret_cb(tls->ssl, tor_tls_session_secret_cb, NULL);
+}
+
+/** Create a new TLS object from a file descriptor, and a flag to
+ * determine whether it is functioning as a server.
+ */
+tor_tls_t *
+tor_tls_new(int sock, int isServer)
+{
+  BIO *bio = NULL;
+  tor_tls_t *result = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
+  tor_tls_context_t *context = tor_tls_context_get(isServer);
+  result->magic = TOR_TLS_MAGIC;
+
+  check_no_tls_errors();
+  tor_assert(context); /* make sure somebody made it first */
+  if (!(result->ssl = SSL_new(context->ctx))) {
+    tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "creating SSL object");
+    tor_free(result);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_host_name
+  /* Browsers use the TLS hostname extension, so we should too. */
+  if (!isServer) {
+    char *fake_hostname = crypto_random_hostname(4,25, "www.",".com");
+    SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(result->ssl, fake_hostname);
+    tor_free(fake_hostname);
+  }
+#endif /* defined(SSL_set_tlsext_host_name) */
+
+  if (!SSL_set_cipher_list(result->ssl,
+                     isServer ? SERVER_CIPHER_LIST : CLIENT_CIPHER_LIST)) {
+    tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "setting ciphers");
+#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_host_name
+    SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(result->ssl, NULL);
+#endif
+    SSL_free(result->ssl);
+    tor_free(result);
+    goto err;
+  }
+  result->socket = sock;
+  bio = BIO_new_socket(sock, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+  if (! bio) {
+    tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "opening BIO");
+#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_host_name
+    SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(result->ssl, NULL);
+#endif
+    SSL_free(result->ssl);
+    tor_free(result);
+    goto err;
+  }
+  {
+    int set_worked =
+      SSL_set_ex_data(result->ssl, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index, result);
+    if (!set_worked) {
+      log_warn(LD_BUG,
+               "Couldn't set the tls for an SSL*; connection will fail");
+    }
+  }
+  SSL_set_bio(result->ssl, bio, bio);
+  tor_tls_context_incref(context);
+  result->context = context;
+  result->state = TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE;
+  result->isServer = isServer;
+  result->wantwrite_n = 0;
+  result->last_write_count = (unsigned long) BIO_number_written(bio);
+  result->last_read_count = (unsigned long) BIO_number_read(bio);
+  if (result->last_write_count || result->last_read_count) {
+    log_warn(LD_NET, "Newly created BIO has read count %lu, write count %lu",
+             result->last_read_count, result->last_write_count);
+  }
+  if (isServer) {
+    SSL_set_info_callback(result->ssl, tor_tls_server_info_callback);
+  } else {
+    SSL_set_info_callback(result->ssl, tor_tls_debug_state_callback);
+  }
+
+  if (isServer)
+    tor_tls_setup_session_secret_cb(result);
+
+  goto done;
+ err:
+  result = NULL;
+ done:
+  /* Not expected to get called. */
+  tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "creating tor_tls_t object");
+  return result;
+}
+
+/** Set <b>cb</b> to be called with argument <b>arg</b> whenever <b>tls</b>
+ * next gets a client-side renegotiate in the middle of a read.  Do not
+ * invoke this function until <em>after</em> initial handshaking is done!
+ */
+void
+tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(tor_tls_t *tls,
+                                 void (*cb)(tor_tls_t *, void *arg),
+                                 void *arg)
+{
+  tls->negotiated_callback = cb;
+  tls->callback_arg = arg;
+  tls->got_renegotiate = 0;
+  if (cb) {
+    SSL_set_info_callback(tls->ssl, tor_tls_server_info_callback);
+  } else {
+    SSL_set_info_callback(tls->ssl, tor_tls_debug_state_callback);
+  }
+}
+
+/** If this version of openssl requires it, turn on renegotiation on
+ * <b>tls</b>.
+ */
+void
+tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+  /* Yes, we know what we are doing here.  No, we do not treat a renegotiation
+   * as authenticating any earlier-received data. */
+  SSL_set_options(tls->ssl,
+                  SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION);
+}
+
+/** If this version of openssl supports it, turn off renegotiation on
+ * <b>tls</b>.  (Our protocol never requires this for security, but it's nice
+ * to use belt-and-suspenders here.)
+ */
+void
+tor_tls_block_renegotiation(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+#ifdef SUPPORT_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION_FLAG
+  tls->ssl->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION;
+#else
+  (void) tls;
+#endif
+}
+
+/** Assert that the flags that allow legacy renegotiation are still set */
+void
+tor_tls_assert_renegotiation_unblocked(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+#if defined(SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) && \
+  SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION != 0
+  long options = SSL_get_options(tls->ssl);
+  tor_assert(0 != (options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION));
+#else
+  (void) tls;
+#endif /* defined(SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) && ... */
+}
+
+/** Release resources associated with a TLS object.  Does not close the
+ * underlying file descriptor.
+ */
+void
+tor_tls_free_(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+  if (!tls)
+    return;
+  tor_assert(tls->ssl);
+  {
+    size_t r,w;
+    tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes(tls,&r,&w); /* ensure written_by_tls is updated */
+  }
+#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_host_name
+  SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(tls->ssl, NULL);
+#endif
+  SSL_free(tls->ssl);
+  tls->ssl = NULL;
+  tls->negotiated_callback = NULL;
+  if (tls->context)
+    tor_tls_context_decref(tls->context);
+  tor_free(tls->address);
+  tls->magic = 0x99999999;
+  tor_free(tls);
+}
+
+/** Underlying function for TLS reading.  Reads up to <b>len</b>
+ * characters from <b>tls</b> into <b>cp</b>.  On success, returns the
+ * number of characters read.  On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR,
+ * TOR_TLS_CLOSE, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD, or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE.
+ */
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+tor_tls_read,(tor_tls_t *tls, char *cp, size_t len))
+{
+  int r, err;
+  tor_assert(tls);
+  tor_assert(tls->ssl);
+  tor_assert(tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN);
+  tor_assert(len<INT_MAX);
+  r = SSL_read(tls->ssl, cp, (int)len);
+  if (r > 0) {
+    if (tls->got_renegotiate) {
+      /* Renegotiation happened! */
+      log_info(LD_NET, "Got a TLS renegotiation from %s", ADDR(tls));
+      if (tls->negotiated_callback)
+        tls->negotiated_callback(tls, tls->callback_arg);
+      tls->got_renegotiate = 0;
+    }
+    return r;
+  }
+  err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, CATCH_ZERO, "reading", LOG_DEBUG, LD_NET);
+  if (err == TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_ || err == TOR_TLS_CLOSE) {
+    log_debug(LD_NET,"read returned r=%d; TLS is closed",r);
+    tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED;
+    return TOR_TLS_CLOSE;
+  } else {
+    tor_assert(err != TOR_TLS_DONE);
+    log_debug(LD_NET,"read returned r=%d, err=%d",r,err);
+    return err;
+  }
+}
+
+/** Total number of bytes that we've used TLS to send.  Used to track TLS
+ * overhead. */
+STATIC uint64_t total_bytes_written_over_tls = 0;
+/** Total number of bytes that TLS has put on the network for us. Used to
+ * track TLS overhead. */
+STATIC uint64_t total_bytes_written_by_tls = 0;
+
+/** Underlying function for TLS writing.  Write up to <b>n</b>
+ * characters from <b>cp</b> onto <b>tls</b>.  On success, returns the
+ * number of characters written.  On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR,
+ * TOR_TLS_WANTREAD, or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_write(tor_tls_t *tls, const char *cp, size_t n)
+{
+  int r, err;
+  tor_assert(tls);
+  tor_assert(tls->ssl);
+  tor_assert(tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN);
+  tor_assert(n < INT_MAX);
+  if (n == 0)
+    return 0;
+  if (tls->wantwrite_n) {
+    /* if WANTWRITE last time, we must use the _same_ n as before */
+    tor_assert(n >= tls->wantwrite_n);
+    log_debug(LD_NET,"resuming pending-write, (%d to flush, reusing %d)",
+              (int)n, (int)tls->wantwrite_n);
+    n = tls->wantwrite_n;
+    tls->wantwrite_n = 0;
+  }
+  r = SSL_write(tls->ssl, cp, (int)n);
+  err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, 0, "writing", LOG_INFO, LD_NET);
+  if (err == TOR_TLS_DONE) {
+    total_bytes_written_over_tls += r;
+    return r;
+  }
+  if (err == TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE || err == TOR_TLS_WANTREAD) {
+    tls->wantwrite_n = n;
+  }
+  return err;
+}
+
+/** Perform initial handshake on <b>tls</b>.  When finished, returns
+ * TOR_TLS_DONE.  On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD,
+ * or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+  int r;
+  tor_assert(tls);
+  tor_assert(tls->ssl);
+  tor_assert(tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE);
+
+  check_no_tls_errors();
+
+  OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE oldstate = SSL_get_state(tls->ssl);
+
+  if (tls->isServer) {
+    log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "About to call SSL_accept on %p (%s)", tls,
+              SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
+    r = SSL_accept(tls->ssl);
+  } else {
+    log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "About to call SSL_connect on %p (%s)", tls,
+              SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
+    r = SSL_connect(tls->ssl);
+  }
+
+  OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE newstate = SSL_get_state(tls->ssl);
+
+  if (oldstate != newstate)
+    log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "After call, %p was in state %s",
+              tls, SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
+  /* We need to call this here and not earlier, since OpenSSL has a penchant
+   * for clearing its flags when you say accept or connect. */
+  tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tls);
+  r = tor_tls_get_error(tls,r,0, "handshaking", LOG_INFO, LD_HANDSHAKE);
+  if (ERR_peek_error() != 0) {
+    tls_log_errors(tls, tls->isServer ? LOG_INFO : LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE,
+                   "handshaking");
+    return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
+  }
+  if (r == TOR_TLS_DONE) {
+    tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN;
+    return tor_tls_finish_handshake(tls);
+  }
+  return r;
+}
+
+/** Perform the final part of the initial TLS handshake on <b>tls</b>.  This
+ * should be called for the first handshake only: it determines whether the v1
+ * or the v2 handshake was used, and adjusts things for the renegotiation
+ * handshake as appropriate.
+ *
+ * tor_tls_handshake() calls this on its own; you only need to call this if
+ * bufferevent is doing the handshake for you.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_finish_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+  int r = TOR_TLS_DONE;
+  check_no_tls_errors();
+  if (tls->isServer) {
+    SSL_set_info_callback(tls->ssl, NULL);
+    SSL_set_verify(tls->ssl, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, always_accept_verify_cb);
+    SSL_clear_mode(tls->ssl, SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN);
+    if (tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(tls->ssl)) {
+      /* This check is redundant, but back when we did it in the callback,
+       * we might have not been able to look up the tor_tls_t if the code
+       * was buggy.  Fixing that. */
+      if (!tls->wasV2Handshake) {
+        log_warn(LD_BUG, "For some reason, wasV2Handshake didn't"
+                 " get set. Fixing that.");
+      }
+      tls->wasV2Handshake = 1;
+      log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "Completed V2 TLS handshake with client; waiting"
+                " for renegotiation.");
+    } else {
+      tls->wasV2Handshake = 0;
+    }
+  } else {
+    /* Client-side */
+    tls->wasV2Handshake = 1;
+    /* XXXX this can move, probably? -NM */
+    if (SSL_set_cipher_list(tls->ssl, SERVER_CIPHER_LIST) == 0) {
+      tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, "re-setting ciphers");
+      r = TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
+    }
+  }
+  tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "finishing the handshake");
+  return r;
+}
+
+/** Shut down an open tls connection <b>tls</b>.  When finished, returns
+ * TOR_TLS_DONE.  On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD,
+ * or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_shutdown(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+  int r, err;
+  char buf[128];
+  tor_assert(tls);
+  tor_assert(tls->ssl);
+  check_no_tls_errors();
+
+  while (1) {
+    if (tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE) {
+      /* If we've already called shutdown once to send a close message,
+       * we read until the other side has closed too.
+       */
+      do {
+        r = SSL_read(tls->ssl, buf, 128);
+      } while (r>0);
+      err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, CATCH_ZERO, "reading to shut down",
+                              LOG_INFO, LD_NET);
+      if (err == TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_) {
+        tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_GOTCLOSE;
+        /* fall through... */
+      } else {
+        return err;
+      }
+    }
+
+    r = SSL_shutdown(tls->ssl);
+    if (r == 1) {
+      /* If shutdown returns 1, the connection is entirely closed. */
+      tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED;
+      return TOR_TLS_DONE;
+    }
+    err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, CATCH_SYSCALL|CATCH_ZERO, "shutting down",
+                            LOG_INFO, LD_NET);
+    if (err == TOR_TLS_SYSCALL_) {
+      /* The underlying TCP connection closed while we were shutting down. */
+      tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED;
+      return TOR_TLS_DONE;
+    } else if (err == TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_) {
+      /* The TLS connection says that it sent a shutdown record, but
+       * isn't done shutting down yet.  Make sure that this hasn't
+       * happened before, then go back to the start of the function
+       * and try to read.
+       */
+      if (tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_GOTCLOSE ||
+         tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE) {
+        log_warn(LD_NET,
+            "TLS returned \"half-closed\" value while already half-closed");
+        return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
+      }
+      tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE;
+      /* fall through ... */
+    } else {
+      return err;
+    }
+  } /* end loop */
+}
+
+/** Return true iff this TLS connection is authenticated.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_peer_has_cert(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+  X509 *cert;
+  cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl);
+  tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, "getting peer certificate");
+  if (!cert)
+    return 0;
+  X509_free(cert);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+/** Return a newly allocated copy of the peer certificate, or NULL if there
+ * isn't one. */
+MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_t *,
+tor_tls_get_peer_cert,(tor_tls_t *tls))
+{
+  X509 *cert;
+  cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl);
+  tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, "getting peer certificate");
+  if (!cert)
+    return NULL;
+  return tor_x509_cert_new(cert);
+}
+
+/** Return a newly allocated copy of the cerficate we used on the connection,
+ * or NULL if somehow we didn't use one. */
+MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_t *,
+tor_tls_get_own_cert,(tor_tls_t *tls))
+{
+  X509 *cert = SSL_get_certificate(tls->ssl);
+  tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE,
+                 "getting own-connection certificate");
+  if (!cert)
+    return NULL;
+  /* Fun inconsistency: SSL_get_peer_certificate increments the reference
+   * count, but SSL_get_certificate does not. */
+  X509 *duplicate = X509_dup(cert);
+  if (BUG(duplicate == NULL))
+    return NULL;
+  return tor_x509_cert_new(duplicate);
+}
+
+/** Helper function: try to extract a link certificate and an identity
+ * certificate from <b>tls</b>, and store them in *<b>cert_out</b> and
+ * *<b>id_cert_out</b> respectively.  Log all messages at level
+ * <b>severity</b>.
+ *
+ * Note that a reference is added to cert_out, so it needs to be
+ * freed. id_cert_out doesn't. */
+MOCK_IMPL(void,
+try_to_extract_certs_from_tls,(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls,
+                               X509 **cert_out, X509 **id_cert_out))
+{
+  X509 *cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL;
+  STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
+  int num_in_chain, i;
+  *cert_out = *id_cert_out = NULL;
+  if (!(cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl)))
+    return;
+  *cert_out = cert;
+  if (!(chain = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(tls->ssl)))
+    return;
+  num_in_chain = sk_X509_num(chain);
+  /* 1 means we're receiving (server-side), and it's just the id_cert.
+   * 2 means we're connecting (client-side), and it's both the link
+   * cert and the id_cert.
+   */
+  if (num_in_chain < 1) {
+    log_fn(severity,LD_PROTOCOL,
+           "Unexpected number of certificates in chain (%d)",
+           num_in_chain);
+    return;
+  }
+  for (i=0; i<num_in_chain; ++i) {
+    id_cert = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+    if (X509_cmp(id_cert, cert) != 0)
+      break;
+  }
+  *id_cert_out = id_cert;
+}
+
+/** If the provided tls connection is authenticated and has a
+ * certificate chain that is currently valid and signed, then set
+ * *<b>identity_key</b> to the identity certificate's key and return
+ * 0.  Else, return -1 and log complaints with log-level <b>severity</b>.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_verify(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_t **identity_key)
+{
+  X509 *cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL;
+  EVP_PKEY *id_pkey = NULL;
+  RSA *rsa;
+  int r = -1;
+
+  check_no_tls_errors();
+  *identity_key = NULL;
+
+  try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(severity, tls, &cert, &id_cert);
+  if (!cert)
+    goto done;
+  if (!id_cert) {
+    log_fn(severity,LD_PROTOCOL,"No distinct identity certificate found");
+    goto done;
+  }
+  tls_log_errors(tls, severity, LD_HANDSHAKE, "before verifying certificate");
+
+  if (!(id_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(id_cert)) ||
+      X509_verify(cert, id_pkey) <= 0) {
+    log_fn(severity,LD_PROTOCOL,"X509_verify on cert and pkey returned <= 0");
+    tls_log_errors(tls, severity, LD_HANDSHAKE, "verifying certificate");
+    goto done;
+  }
+
+  rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(id_pkey);
+  if (!rsa)
+    goto done;
+  *identity_key = crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(rsa);
+
+  r = 0;
+
+ done:
+  if (cert)
+    X509_free(cert);
+  if (id_pkey)
+    EVP_PKEY_free(id_pkey);
+
+  /* This should never get invoked, but let's make sure in case OpenSSL
+   * acts unexpectedly. */
+  tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, "finishing tor_tls_verify");
+
+  return r;
+}
+
+/** Check whether the certificate set on the connection <b>tls</b> is expired
+ * give or take <b>past_tolerance</b> seconds, or not-yet-valid give or take
+ * <b>future_tolerance</b> seconds. Return 0 for valid, -1 for failure.
+ *
+ * NOTE: you should call tor_tls_verify before tor_tls_check_lifetime.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_check_lifetime(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls,
+                       time_t now,
+                       int past_tolerance, int future_tolerance)
+{
+  X509 *cert;
+  int r = -1;
+
+  if (!(cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl)))
+    goto done;
+
+  if (tor_x509_check_cert_lifetime_internal(severity, cert, now,
+                                            past_tolerance,
+                                            future_tolerance) < 0)
+    goto done;
+
+  r = 0;
+ done:
+  if (cert)
+    X509_free(cert);
+  /* Not expected to get invoked */
+  tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "checking certificate lifetime");
+
+  return r;
+}
+
+/** Return the number of bytes available for reading from <b>tls</b>.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_get_pending_bytes(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+  tor_assert(tls);
+  return SSL_pending(tls->ssl);
+}
+
+/** If <b>tls</b> requires that the next write be of a particular size,
+ * return that size.  Otherwise, return 0. */
+size_t
+tor_tls_get_forced_write_size(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+  return tls->wantwrite_n;
+}
+
+/** Sets n_read and n_written to the number of bytes read and written,
+ * respectively, on the raw socket used by <b>tls</b> since the last time this
+ * function was called on <b>tls</b>. */
+void
+tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes(tor_tls_t *tls, size_t *n_read, size_t *n_written)
+{
+  BIO *wbio, *tmpbio;
+  unsigned long r, w;
+  r = (unsigned long) BIO_number_read(SSL_get_rbio(tls->ssl));
+  /* We want the number of bytes actually for real written.  Unfortunately,
+   * sometimes OpenSSL replaces the wbio on tls->ssl with a buffering bio,
+   * which makes the answer turn out wrong.  Let's cope with that.  Note
+   * that this approach will fail if we ever replace tls->ssl's BIOs with
+   * buffering bios for reasons of our own.  As an alternative, we could
+   * save the original BIO for  tls->ssl in the tor_tls_t structure, but
+   * that would be tempting fate. */
+  wbio = SSL_get_wbio(tls->ssl);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_VER(1,1,0,0,5)
+  /* BIO structure is opaque as of OpenSSL 1.1.0-pre5-dev.  Again, not
+   * supposed to use this form of the version macro, but the OpenSSL developers
+   * introduced major API changes in the pre-release stage.
+   */
+  if (BIO_method_type(wbio) == BIO_TYPE_BUFFER &&
+        (tmpbio = BIO_next(wbio)) != NULL)
+    wbio = tmpbio;
+#else /* !(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_VER(1,1,0,0,5)) */
+  if (wbio->method == BIO_f_buffer() && (tmpbio = BIO_next(wbio)) != NULL)
+    wbio = tmpbio;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_VER(1,1,0,0,5) */
+  w = (unsigned long) BIO_number_written(wbio);
+
+  /* We are ok with letting these unsigned ints go "negative" here:
+   * If we wrapped around, this should still give us the right answer, unless
+   * we wrapped around by more than ULONG_MAX since the last time we called
+   * this function.
+   */
+  *n_read = (size_t)(r - tls->last_read_count);
+  *n_written = (size_t)(w - tls->last_write_count);
+  if (*n_read > INT_MAX || *n_written > INT_MAX) {
+    log_warn(LD_BUG, "Preposterously large value in tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes. "
+             "r=%lu, last_read=%lu, w=%lu, last_written=%lu",
+             r, tls->last_read_count, w, tls->last_write_count);
+  }
+  total_bytes_written_by_tls += *n_written;
+  tls->last_read_count = r;
+  tls->last_write_count = w;
+}
+
+/** Return a ratio of the bytes that TLS has sent to the bytes that we've told
+ * it to send. Used to track whether our TLS records are getting too tiny. */
+MOCK_IMPL(double,
+tls_get_write_overhead_ratio,(void))
+{
+  if (total_bytes_written_over_tls == 0)
+    return 1.0;
+
+  return ((double)total_bytes_written_by_tls) /
+    ((double)total_bytes_written_over_tls);
+}
+
+/** Implement check_no_tls_errors: If there are any pending OpenSSL
+ * errors, log an error message. */
+void
+check_no_tls_errors_(const char *fname, int line)
+{
+  if (ERR_peek_error() == 0)
+    return;
+  log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Unhandled OpenSSL errors found at %s:%d: ",
+      tor_fix_source_file(fname), line);
+  tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, NULL);
+}
+
+/** Return true iff the initial TLS connection at <b>tls</b> did not use a v2
+ * TLS handshake. Output is undefined if the handshake isn't finished. */
+int
+tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+  return ! tls->wasV2Handshake;
+}
+
+/** Return the number of server handshakes that we've noticed doing on
+ * <b>tls</b>. */
+int
+tor_tls_get_num_server_handshakes(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+  return tls->server_handshake_count;
+}
+
+/** Return true iff the server TLS connection <b>tls</b> got the renegotiation
+ * request it was waiting for. */
+int
+tor_tls_server_got_renegotiate(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+  return tls->got_renegotiate;
+}
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_RANDOM
+static size_t
+SSL_get_client_random(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t len)
+{
+  if (len == 0)
+    return SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+  tor_assert(len == SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+  tor_assert(s->s3);
+  memcpy(out, s->s3->client_random, len);
+  return len;
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_RANDOM) */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SSL_GET_SERVER_RANDOM
+static size_t
+SSL_get_server_random(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t len)
+{
+  if (len == 0)
+    return SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+  tor_assert(len == SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+  tor_assert(s->s3);
+  memcpy(out, s->s3->server_random, len);
+  return len;
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_GET_SERVER_RANDOM) */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SSL_SESSION_GET_MASTER_KEY
+size_t
+SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(SSL_SESSION *s, uint8_t *out, size_t len)
+{
+  tor_assert(s);
+  if (len == 0)
+    return s->master_key_length;
+  tor_assert(len == (size_t)s->master_key_length);
+  tor_assert(out);
+  memcpy(out, s->master_key, len);
+  return len;
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_SESSION_GET_MASTER_KEY) */
+
+/** Set the DIGEST256_LEN buffer at <b>secrets_out</b> to the value used in
+ * the v3 handshake to prove that the client knows the TLS secrets for the
+ * connection <b>tls</b>.  Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+tor_tls_get_tlssecrets,(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out))
+{
+#define TLSSECRET_MAGIC "Tor V3 handshake TLS cross-certification"
+  uint8_t buf[128];
+  size_t len;
+  tor_assert(tls);
+
+  SSL *const ssl = tls->ssl;
+  SSL_SESSION *const session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+
+  tor_assert(ssl);
+  tor_assert(session);
+
+  const size_t server_random_len = SSL_get_server_random(ssl, NULL, 0);
+  const size_t client_random_len = SSL_get_client_random(ssl, NULL, 0);
+  const size_t master_key_len = SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(session, NULL, 0);
+
+  tor_assert(server_random_len);
+  tor_assert(client_random_len);
+  tor_assert(master_key_len);
+
+  len = client_random_len + server_random_len + strlen(TLSSECRET_MAGIC) + 1;
+  tor_assert(len <= sizeof(buf));
+
+  {
+    size_t r = SSL_get_client_random(ssl, buf, client_random_len);
+    tor_assert(r == client_random_len);
+  }
+
+  {
+    size_t r = SSL_get_server_random(ssl,
+                                     buf+client_random_len,
+                                     server_random_len);
+    tor_assert(r == server_random_len);
+  }
+
+  uint8_t *master_key = tor_malloc_zero(master_key_len);
+  {
+    size_t r = SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(session, master_key, master_key_len);
+    tor_assert(r == master_key_len);
+  }
+
+  uint8_t *nextbuf = buf + client_random_len + server_random_len;
+  memcpy(nextbuf, TLSSECRET_MAGIC, strlen(TLSSECRET_MAGIC) + 1);
+
+  /*
+    The value is an HMAC, using the TLS master key as the HMAC key, of
+    client_random | server_random | TLSSECRET_MAGIC
+  */
+  crypto_hmac_sha256((char*)secrets_out,
+                     (char*)master_key,
+                     master_key_len,
+                     (char*)buf, len);
+  memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+  memwipe(master_key, 0, master_key_len);
+  tor_free(master_key);
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/** Using the RFC5705 key material exporting construction, and the
+ * provided <b>context</b> (<b>context_len</b> bytes long) and
+ * <b>label</b> (a NUL-terminated string), compute a 32-byte secret in
+ * <b>secrets_out</b> that only the parties to this TLS session can
+ * compute.  Return 0 on success and -1 on failure.
+ */
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+tor_tls_export_key_material,(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out,
+                             const uint8_t *context,
+                             size_t context_len,
+                             const char *label))
+{
+  tor_assert(tls);
+  tor_assert(tls->ssl);
+
+  int r = SSL_export_keying_material(tls->ssl,
+                                     secrets_out, DIGEST256_LEN,
+                                     label, strlen(label),
+                                     context, context_len, 1);
+  return (r == 1) ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+/** Examine the amount of memory used and available for buffers in <b>tls</b>.
+ * Set *<b>rbuf_capacity</b> to the amount of storage allocated for the read
+ * buffer and *<b>rbuf_bytes</b> to the amount actually used.
+ * Set *<b>wbuf_capacity</b> to the amount of storage allocated for the write
+ * buffer and *<b>wbuf_bytes</b> to the amount actually used.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.*/
+int
+tor_tls_get_buffer_sizes(tor_tls_t *tls,
+                         size_t *rbuf_capacity, size_t *rbuf_bytes,
+                         size_t *wbuf_capacity, size_t *wbuf_bytes)
+{
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0)
+  (void)tls;
+  (void)rbuf_capacity;
+  (void)rbuf_bytes;
+  (void)wbuf_capacity;
+  (void)wbuf_bytes;
+
+  return -1;
+#else /* !(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0)) */
+  if (tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.buf)
+    *rbuf_capacity = tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.len;
+  else
+    *rbuf_capacity = 0;
+  if (tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.buf)
+    *wbuf_capacity = tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.len;
+  else
+    *wbuf_capacity = 0;
+  *rbuf_bytes = tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.left;
+  *wbuf_bytes = tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.left;
+  return 0;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) */
+}
+
+/** Check whether the ECC group requested is supported by the current OpenSSL
+ * library instance.  Return 1 if the group is supported, and 0 if not.
+ */
+int
+evaluate_ecgroup_for_tls(const char *ecgroup)
+{
+  EC_KEY *ec_key;
+  int nid;
+  int ret;
+
+  if (!ecgroup)
+    nid = NID_tor_default_ecdhe_group;
+  else if (!strcasecmp(ecgroup, "P256"))
+    nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
+  else if (!strcasecmp(ecgroup, "P224"))
+    nid = NID_secp224r1;
+  else
+    return 0;
+
+  ec_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
+  ret = (ec_key != NULL);
+  EC_KEY_free(ec_key);
+
+  return ret;
+}
diff --git a/src/lib/tls/x509.c b/src/lib/tls/x509.c
index 8bed6f5a19..dbf1dd927c 100644
--- a/src/lib/tls/x509.c
+++ b/src/lib/tls/x509.c
@@ -4,86 +4,15 @@
 /* See LICENSE for licensing information */
 
 /**
- * \file x509.c
+ * \file x509_openssl.c
  * \brief Wrapper functions to present a consistent interface to
- * X.509 functions from OpenSSL.
+ * X.509 functions.
  **/
 
 #define TOR_X509_PRIVATE
 #include "lib/tls/x509.h"
-#include "lib/tls/tortls.h"
-#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
-#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
-#include "lib/crypt_ops/compat_openssl.h"
-
-/* Some versions of OpenSSL declare SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile twice in
- * srtp.h. Suppress the GCC warning so we can build with -Wredundant-decl. */
-DISABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls)
-
-#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-#error "We require OpenSSL with ECC support"
-#endif
-
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/asn1.h>
-#include <openssl/bio.h>
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-
-ENABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls)
-
-#include "lib/log/log.h"
 #include "lib/log/util_bug.h"
-#include "lib/ctime/di_ops.h"
-#include "lib/encoding/time_fmt.h"
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
-#define X509_get_notBefore_const(cert) \
-    X509_get0_notBefore(cert)
-#define X509_get_notAfter_const(cert) \
-    X509_get0_notAfter(cert)
-#ifndef X509_get_notBefore
-#define X509_get_notBefore(cert) \
-    X509_getm_notBefore(cert)
-#endif
-#ifndef X509_get_notAfter
-#define X509_get_notAfter(cert) \
-    X509_getm_notAfter(cert)
-#endif
-#else /* ! OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) */
-#define X509_get_notBefore_const(cert) \
-  ((const ASN1_TIME*) X509_get_notBefore((X509 *)cert))
-#define X509_get_notAfter_const(cert) \
-  ((const ASN1_TIME*) X509_get_notAfter((X509 *)cert))
-#endif
-
-/** Return a newly allocated X509 name with commonName <b>cname</b>. */
-static X509_NAME *
-tor_x509_name_new(const char *cname)
-{
-  int nid;
-  X509_NAME *name;
-  /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_START : these branches will only fail on OOM errors */
-  if (!(name = X509_NAME_new()))
-    return NULL;
-  if ((nid = OBJ_txt2nid("commonName")) == NID_undef) goto error;
-  if (!(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(name, nid, MBSTRING_ASC,
-                                   (unsigned char*)cname, -1, -1, 0)))
-    goto error;
-  /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_STOP */
-  return name;
-
-  /* LCOV_EXCL_START : these lines will only execute on out of memory errors*/
- error:
-  X509_NAME_free(name);
-  return NULL;
-  /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
-}
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
 
 /** Choose the start and end times for a certificate */
 void
@@ -121,221 +50,6 @@ tor_tls_pick_certificate_lifetime(time_t now,
   *end_time_out = end_time;
 }
 
-/** Generate and sign an X509 certificate with the public key <b>rsa</b>,
- * signed by the private key <b>rsa_sign</b>.  The commonName of the
- * certificate will be <b>cname</b>; the commonName of the issuer will be
- * <b>cname_sign</b>. The cert will be valid for <b>cert_lifetime</b>
- * seconds, starting from some time in the past.
- *
- * Return a certificate on success, NULL on failure.
- */
-MOCK_IMPL(X509 *,
-tor_tls_create_certificate,(crypto_pk_t *rsa,
-                            crypto_pk_t *rsa_sign,
-                            const char *cname,
-                            const char *cname_sign,
-                            unsigned int cert_lifetime))
-{
-  /* OpenSSL generates self-signed certificates with random 64-bit serial
-   * numbers, so let's do that too. */
-#define SERIAL_NUMBER_SIZE 8
-
-  time_t start_time, end_time;
-  BIGNUM *serial_number = NULL;
-  unsigned char serial_tmp[SERIAL_NUMBER_SIZE];
-  EVP_PKEY *sign_pkey = NULL, *pkey=NULL;
-  X509 *x509 = NULL;
-  X509_NAME *name = NULL, *name_issuer=NULL;
-
-  tor_tls_init();
-
-  time_t now = time(NULL);
-
-  tor_tls_pick_certificate_lifetime(now, cert_lifetime,
-                                    &start_time, &end_time);
-
-  tor_assert(rsa);
-  tor_assert(cname);
-  tor_assert(rsa_sign);
-  tor_assert(cname_sign);
-  if (!(sign_pkey = crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_(rsa_sign,1)))
-    goto error;
-  if (!(pkey = crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_(rsa,0)))
-    goto error;
-  if (!(x509 = X509_new()))
-    goto error;
-  if (!(X509_set_version(x509, 2)))
-    goto error;
-
-  { /* our serial number is 8 random bytes. */
-    crypto_rand((char *)serial_tmp, sizeof(serial_tmp));
-    if (!(serial_number = BN_bin2bn(serial_tmp, sizeof(serial_tmp), NULL)))
-      goto error;
-    if (!(BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(serial_number, X509_get_serialNumber(x509))))
-      goto error;
-  }
-
-  if (!(name = tor_x509_name_new(cname)))
-    goto error;
-  if (!(X509_set_subject_name(x509, name)))
-    goto error;
-  if (!(name_issuer = tor_x509_name_new(cname_sign)))
-    goto error;
-  if (!(X509_set_issuer_name(x509, name_issuer)))
-    goto error;
-
-  if (!X509_time_adj(X509_get_notBefore(x509),0,&start_time))
-    goto error;
-  if (!X509_time_adj(X509_get_notAfter(x509),0,&end_time))
-    goto error;
-  if (!X509_set_pubkey(x509, pkey))
-    goto error;
-
-  if (!X509_sign(x509, sign_pkey, EVP_sha256()))
-    goto error;
-
-  goto done;
- error:
-  if (x509) {
-    X509_free(x509);
-    x509 = NULL;
-  }
- done:
-  tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "generating certificate");
-  if (sign_pkey)
-    EVP_PKEY_free(sign_pkey);
-  if (pkey)
-    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-  if (serial_number)
-    BN_clear_free(serial_number);
-  if (name)
-    X509_NAME_free(name);
-  if (name_issuer)
-    X509_NAME_free(name_issuer);
-  return x509;
-
-#undef SERIAL_NUMBER_SIZE
-}
-
-/** Free all storage held in <b>cert</b> */
-void
-tor_x509_cert_free_(tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
-{
-  if (! cert)
-    return;
-  if (cert->cert)
-    X509_free(cert->cert);
-  tor_free(cert->encoded);
-  memwipe(cert, 0x03, sizeof(*cert));
-  /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_START since cert will never be NULL here */
-  tor_free(cert);
-  /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_STOP */
-}
-
-/**
- * Allocate a new tor_x509_cert_t to hold the certificate "x509_cert".
- *
- * Steals a reference to x509_cert.
- */
-MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_t *,
-tor_x509_cert_new,(X509 *x509_cert))
-{
-  tor_x509_cert_t *cert;
-  EVP_PKEY *pkey;
-  RSA *rsa;
-  int length;
-  unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-
-  if (!x509_cert)
-    return NULL;
-
-  length = i2d_X509(x509_cert, &buf);
-  cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t));
-  if (length <= 0 || buf == NULL) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  cert->encoded_len = (size_t) length;
-  cert->encoded = tor_malloc(length);
-  memcpy(cert->encoded, buf, length);
-  OPENSSL_free(buf);
-
-  cert->cert = x509_cert;
-
-  crypto_common_digests(&cert->cert_digests,
-                    (char*)cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len);
-
-  if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x509_cert)) &&
-      (rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey))) {
-    crypto_pk_t *pk = crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(rsa);
-    if (crypto_pk_get_common_digests(pk, &cert->pkey_digests) < 0) {
-      crypto_pk_free(pk);
-      EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-      goto err;
-    }
-
-    cert->pkey_digests_set = 1;
-    crypto_pk_free(pk);
-    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-  }
-
-  return cert;
- err:
-  /* LCOV_EXCL_START for the same reason as the exclusion above */
-  tor_free(cert);
-  log_err(LD_CRYPTO, "Couldn't wrap encoded X509 certificate.");
-  X509_free(x509_cert);
-  return NULL;
-  /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
-}
-
-/** Return a new copy of <b>cert</b>. */
-tor_x509_cert_t *
-tor_x509_cert_dup(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
-{
-  tor_assert(cert);
-  X509 *x509 = cert->cert;
-  return tor_x509_cert_new(X509_dup(x509));
-}
-
-/** Read a DER-encoded X509 cert, of length exactly <b>certificate_len</b>,
- * from a <b>certificate</b>.  Return a newly allocated tor_x509_cert_t on
- * success and NULL on failure. */
-tor_x509_cert_t *
-tor_x509_cert_decode(const uint8_t *certificate, size_t certificate_len)
-{
-  X509 *x509;
-  const unsigned char *cp = (const unsigned char *)certificate;
-  tor_x509_cert_t *newcert;
-  tor_assert(certificate);
-  check_no_tls_errors();
-
-  if (certificate_len > INT_MAX)
-    goto err;
-
-  x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, (int)certificate_len);
-
-  if (!x509)
-    goto err; /* Couldn't decode */
-  if (cp - certificate != (int)certificate_len) {
-    X509_free(x509);
-    goto err; /* Didn't use all the bytes */
-  }
-  newcert = tor_x509_cert_new(x509);
-  if (!newcert) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  if (newcert->encoded_len != certificate_len ||
-      fast_memneq(newcert->encoded, certificate, certificate_len)) {
-    /* Cert wasn't in DER */
-    tor_x509_cert_free(newcert);
-    goto err;
-  }
-  return newcert;
- err:
-  tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_INFO, LD_CRYPTO, "decoding a certificate");
-  return NULL;
-}
-
 /** Set *<b>encoded_out</b> and *<b>size_out</b> to <b>cert</b>'s encoded DER
  * representation and length, respectively. */
 void
@@ -375,190 +89,3 @@ tor_x509_cert_get_cert_digests(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
   return &cert->cert_digests;
 }
 
-/**
- * Return a newly allocated copy of the public key that a certificate
- * certifies. Watch out! This returns NULL if the cert's key is not RSA.
- */
-crypto_pk_t *
-tor_tls_cert_get_key(tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
-{
-  crypto_pk_t *result = NULL;
-  EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert);
-  RSA *rsa;
-  if (!pkey)
-    return NULL;
-  rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
-  if (!rsa) {
-    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-    return NULL;
-  }
-  result = crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(rsa);
-  EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-  return result;
-}
-
-/** Check whether <b>cert</b> is well-formed, currently live, and correctly
- * signed by the public key in <b>signing_cert</b>.  If <b>check_rsa_1024</b>,
- * make sure that it has an RSA key with 1024 bits; otherwise, just check that
- * the key is long enough. Return 1 if the cert is good, and 0 if it's bad or
- * we couldn't check it. */
-int
-tor_tls_cert_is_valid(int severity,
-                      const tor_x509_cert_t *cert,
-                      const tor_x509_cert_t *signing_cert,
-                      time_t now,
-                      int check_rsa_1024)
-{
-  check_no_tls_errors();
-  EVP_PKEY *cert_key;
-  int r, key_ok = 0;
-
-  if (!signing_cert || !cert)
-    goto bad;
-
-  EVP_PKEY *signing_key = X509_get_pubkey(signing_cert->cert);
-  if (!signing_key)
-    goto bad;
-  r = X509_verify(cert->cert, signing_key);
-  EVP_PKEY_free(signing_key);
-  if (r <= 0)
-    goto bad;
-
-  /* okay, the signature checked out right.  Now let's check the check the
-   * lifetime. */
-  if (tor_x509_check_cert_lifetime_internal(severity, cert->cert, now,
-                                   48*60*60, 30*24*60*60) < 0)
-    goto bad;
-
-  cert_key = X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert);
-  if (check_rsa_1024 && cert_key) {
-    RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(cert_key);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
-    if (rsa && RSA_bits(rsa) == 1024)
-#else
-    if (rsa && BN_num_bits(rsa->n) == 1024)
-#endif
-      key_ok = 1;
-    if (rsa)
-      RSA_free(rsa);
-  } else if (cert_key) {
-    int min_bits = 1024;
-#ifdef EVP_PKEY_EC
-    if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(cert_key) == EVP_PKEY_EC)
-      min_bits = 128;
-#endif
-    if (EVP_PKEY_bits(cert_key) >= min_bits)
-      key_ok = 1;
-  }
-  EVP_PKEY_free(cert_key);
-  if (!key_ok)
-    goto bad;
-
-  /* XXXX compare DNs or anything? */
-
-  return 1;
- bad:
-  tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_INFO, LD_CRYPTO, "checking a certificate");
-  return 0;
-}
-
-/** Warn that a certificate lifetime extends through a certain range. */
-static void
-log_cert_lifetime(int severity, const X509 *cert, const char *problem,
-                  time_t now)
-{
-  BIO *bio = NULL;
-  BUF_MEM *buf;
-  char *s1=NULL, *s2=NULL;
-  char mytime[33];
-  struct tm tm;
-  size_t n;
-
-  if (problem)
-    tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,
-        "Certificate %s. Either their clock is set wrong, or your clock "
-        "is wrong.",
-           problem);
-
-  if (!(bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()))) {
-    log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't allocate BIO!"); goto end;
-  }
-  if (!(ASN1_TIME_print(bio, X509_get_notBefore_const(cert)))) {
-    tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "printing certificate lifetime");
-    goto end;
-  }
-  BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio, &buf);
-  s1 = tor_strndup(buf->data, buf->length);
-
-  (void)BIO_reset(bio);
-  if (!(ASN1_TIME_print(bio, X509_get_notAfter_const(cert)))) {
-    tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "printing certificate lifetime");
-    goto end;
-  }
-  BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio, &buf);
-  s2 = tor_strndup(buf->data, buf->length);
-
-  n = strftime(mytime, 32, "%b %d %H:%M:%S %Y UTC", tor_gmtime_r(&now, &tm));
-  if (n > 0) {
-    tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,
-        "(certificate lifetime runs from %s through %s. Your time is %s.)",
-        s1,s2,mytime);
-  } else {
-    tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,
-        "(certificate lifetime runs from %s through %s. "
-        "Couldn't get your time.)",
-        s1, s2);
-  }
-
- end:
-  /* Not expected to get invoked */
-  tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "getting certificate lifetime");
-  if (bio)
-    BIO_free(bio);
-  tor_free(s1);
-  tor_free(s2);
-}
-
-/** Helper: check whether <b>cert</b> is expired give or take
- * <b>past_tolerance</b> seconds, or not-yet-valid give or take
- * <b>future_tolerance</b> seconds.  (Relative to the current time
- * <b>now</b>.)  If it is live, return 0.  If it is not live, log a message
- * and return -1. */
-int
-tor_x509_check_cert_lifetime_internal(int severity, const X509 *cert,
-                                      time_t now,
-                                      int past_tolerance, int future_tolerance)
-{
-  time_t t;
-
-  t = now + future_tolerance;
-  if (X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore_const(cert), &t) > 0) {
-    log_cert_lifetime(severity, cert, "not yet valid", now);
-    return -1;
-  }
-  t = now - past_tolerance;
-  if (X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter_const(cert), &t) < 0) {
-    log_cert_lifetime(severity, cert, "already expired", now);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  return 0;
-}
-
-#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
-/* Testing only: return a new x509 cert with the same contents as <b>inp</b>,
-   but with the expiration time <b>new_expiration_time</b>, signed with
-   <b>signing_key</b>. */
-STATIC tor_x509_cert_t *
-tor_x509_cert_replace_expiration(const tor_x509_cert_t *inp,
-                                 time_t new_expiration_time,
-                                 crypto_pk_t *signing_key)
-{
-  X509 *newc = X509_dup(inp->cert);
-  X509_time_adj(X509_get_notAfter(newc), 0, &new_expiration_time);
-  EVP_PKEY *pk = crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_(signing_key, 1);
-  tor_assert(X509_sign(newc, pk, EVP_sha256()));
-  EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
-  return tor_x509_cert_new(newc);
-}
-#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */
diff --git a/src/lib/tls/x509.h b/src/lib/tls/x509.h
index e3dfcf3934..f75d15d7e9 100644
--- a/src/lib/tls/x509.h
+++ b/src/lib/tls/x509.h
@@ -17,7 +17,9 @@
 /* Opaque structure to hold an X509 certificate. */
 typedef struct tor_x509_cert_t tor_x509_cert_t;
 
-#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL
+#ifdef ENABLE_NSS
+typedef struct CERTCertificateStr tor_x509_cert_impl_t;
+#elif defined(ENABLE_OPENSSL)
 typedef struct x509_st tor_x509_cert_impl_t;
 #endif
 
diff --git a/src/lib/tls/x509_nss.c b/src/lib/tls/x509_nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e856c95187
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/tls/x509_nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2003, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file x509_nss.c
+ * \brief Wrapper functions to present a consistent interface to
+ * X.509 functions from NSS.
+ **/
+
+#define TOR_X509_PRIVATE
+#include "lib/tls/x509.h"
+#include "lib/tls/tortls.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
+#include "lib/log/util_bug.h"
+
+MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_impl_t *,
+tor_tls_create_certificate,(crypto_pk_t *rsa,
+                            crypto_pk_t *rsa_sign,
+                            const char *cname,
+                            const char *cname_sign,
+                            unsigned int cert_lifetime))
+{
+  tor_assert(rsa);
+  tor_assert(rsa_sign);
+  tor_assert(cname);
+  tor_assert(cname_sign);
+  (void) cert_lifetime;
+  // XXXX
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_t *,
+tor_x509_cert_new,(tor_x509_cert_impl_t *x509_cert))
+{
+  tor_assert(x509_cert);
+  // XXXX
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+tor_x509_cert_t *
+tor_x509_cert_dup(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
+{
+  tor_assert(cert);
+  // XXXX
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+tor_x509_cert_free_(tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
+{
+  (void)cert;
+  // XXXX
+}
+
+tor_x509_cert_t *
+tor_x509_cert_decode(const uint8_t *certificate,
+                     size_t certificate_len)
+{
+  tor_assert(certificate);
+  (void) certificate_len;
+  // XXXX
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+crypto_pk_t *
+tor_tls_cert_get_key(tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
+{
+  tor_assert(cert);
+  // XXXXX
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+int
+tor_tls_cert_is_valid(int severity,
+                      const tor_x509_cert_t *cert,
+                      const tor_x509_cert_t *signing_cert,
+                      time_t now,
+                      int check_rsa_1024)
+{
+  tor_assert(cert);
+  tor_assert(signing_cert);
+  (void)severity;
+  (void)now;
+  (void)check_rsa_1024;
+  // XXXXX
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+int
+tor_x509_check_cert_lifetime_internal(int severity,
+                                      const tor_x509_cert_impl_t *cert,
+                                      time_t now,
+                                      int past_tolerance,
+                                      int future_tolerance)
+{
+  tor_assert(cert);
+  (void)severity;
+  (void)now;
+  (void)past_tolerance;
+  (void)future_tolerance;
+  // XXXX
+  return -1;
+}
+
+#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
+tor_x509_cert_t *
+tor_x509_cert_replace_expiration(const tor_x509_cert_t *inp,
+                                 time_t new_expiration_time,
+                                 crypto_pk_t *signing_key)
+{
+  tor_assert(inp);
+  tor_assert(signing_key);
+  (void)new_expiration_time;
+
+  // XXXX
+  return NULL;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/src/lib/tls/x509_openssl.c b/src/lib/tls/x509_openssl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c003d4704b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/tls/x509_openssl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,489 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2003, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file x509_openssl.c
+ * \brief Wrapper functions to present a consistent interface to
+ * X.509 functions from OpenSSL.
+ **/
+
+#define TOR_X509_PRIVATE
+#include "lib/tls/x509.h"
+#include "lib/tls/tortls.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/compat_openssl.h"
+
+/* Some versions of OpenSSL declare SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile twice in
+ * srtp.h. Suppress the GCC warning so we can build with -Wredundant-decl. */
+DISABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls)
+
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+#error "We require OpenSSL with ECC support"
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+ENABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls)
+
+#include "lib/log/log.h"
+#include "lib/log/util_bug.h"
+#include "lib/ctime/di_ops.h"
+#include "lib/encoding/time_fmt.h"
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
+#define X509_get_notBefore_const(cert) \
+    X509_get0_notBefore(cert)
+#define X509_get_notAfter_const(cert) \
+    X509_get0_notAfter(cert)
+#ifndef X509_get_notBefore
+#define X509_get_notBefore(cert) \
+    X509_getm_notBefore(cert)
+#endif
+#ifndef X509_get_notAfter
+#define X509_get_notAfter(cert) \
+    X509_getm_notAfter(cert)
+#endif
+#else /* ! OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) */
+#define X509_get_notBefore_const(cert) \
+  ((const ASN1_TIME*) X509_get_notBefore((X509 *)cert))
+#define X509_get_notAfter_const(cert) \
+  ((const ASN1_TIME*) X509_get_notAfter((X509 *)cert))
+#endif
+
+/** Return a newly allocated X509 name with commonName <b>cname</b>. */
+static X509_NAME *
+tor_x509_name_new(const char *cname)
+{
+  int nid;
+  X509_NAME *name;
+  /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_START : these branches will only fail on OOM errors */
+  if (!(name = X509_NAME_new()))
+    return NULL;
+  if ((nid = OBJ_txt2nid("commonName")) == NID_undef) goto error;
+  if (!(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(name, nid, MBSTRING_ASC,
+                                   (unsigned char*)cname, -1, -1, 0)))
+    goto error;
+  /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_STOP */
+  return name;
+
+  /* LCOV_EXCL_START : these lines will only execute on out of memory errors*/
+ error:
+  X509_NAME_free(name);
+  return NULL;
+  /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
+}
+
+/** Generate and sign an X509 certificate with the public key <b>rsa</b>,
+ * signed by the private key <b>rsa_sign</b>.  The commonName of the
+ * certificate will be <b>cname</b>; the commonName of the issuer will be
+ * <b>cname_sign</b>. The cert will be valid for <b>cert_lifetime</b>
+ * seconds, starting from some time in the past.
+ *
+ * Return a certificate on success, NULL on failure.
+ */
+MOCK_IMPL(X509 *,
+tor_tls_create_certificate,(crypto_pk_t *rsa,
+                            crypto_pk_t *rsa_sign,
+                            const char *cname,
+                            const char *cname_sign,
+                            unsigned int cert_lifetime))
+{
+  /* OpenSSL generates self-signed certificates with random 64-bit serial
+   * numbers, so let's do that too. */
+#define SERIAL_NUMBER_SIZE 8
+
+  time_t start_time, end_time;
+  BIGNUM *serial_number = NULL;
+  unsigned char serial_tmp[SERIAL_NUMBER_SIZE];
+  EVP_PKEY *sign_pkey = NULL, *pkey=NULL;
+  X509 *x509 = NULL;
+  X509_NAME *name = NULL, *name_issuer=NULL;
+
+  tor_tls_init();
+
+  time_t now = time(NULL);
+
+  tor_tls_pick_certificate_lifetime(now, cert_lifetime,
+                                    &start_time, &end_time);
+
+  tor_assert(rsa);
+  tor_assert(cname);
+  tor_assert(rsa_sign);
+  tor_assert(cname_sign);
+  if (!(sign_pkey = crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_(rsa_sign,1)))
+    goto error;
+  if (!(pkey = crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_(rsa,0)))
+    goto error;
+  if (!(x509 = X509_new()))
+    goto error;
+  if (!(X509_set_version(x509, 2)))
+    goto error;
+
+  { /* our serial number is 8 random bytes. */
+    crypto_rand((char *)serial_tmp, sizeof(serial_tmp));
+    if (!(serial_number = BN_bin2bn(serial_tmp, sizeof(serial_tmp), NULL)))
+      goto error;
+    if (!(BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(serial_number, X509_get_serialNumber(x509))))
+      goto error;
+  }
+
+  if (!(name = tor_x509_name_new(cname)))
+    goto error;
+  if (!(X509_set_subject_name(x509, name)))
+    goto error;
+  if (!(name_issuer = tor_x509_name_new(cname_sign)))
+    goto error;
+  if (!(X509_set_issuer_name(x509, name_issuer)))
+    goto error;
+
+  if (!X509_time_adj(X509_get_notBefore(x509),0,&start_time))
+    goto error;
+  if (!X509_time_adj(X509_get_notAfter(x509),0,&end_time))
+    goto error;
+  if (!X509_set_pubkey(x509, pkey))
+    goto error;
+
+  if (!X509_sign(x509, sign_pkey, EVP_sha256()))
+    goto error;
+
+  goto done;
+ error:
+  if (x509) {
+    X509_free(x509);
+    x509 = NULL;
+  }
+ done:
+  tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "generating certificate");
+  if (sign_pkey)
+    EVP_PKEY_free(sign_pkey);
+  if (pkey)
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+  if (serial_number)
+    BN_clear_free(serial_number);
+  if (name)
+    X509_NAME_free(name);
+  if (name_issuer)
+    X509_NAME_free(name_issuer);
+  return x509;
+
+#undef SERIAL_NUMBER_SIZE
+}
+
+/** Free all storage held in <b>cert</b> */
+void
+tor_x509_cert_free_(tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
+{
+  if (! cert)
+    return;
+  if (cert->cert)
+    X509_free(cert->cert);
+  tor_free(cert->encoded);
+  memwipe(cert, 0x03, sizeof(*cert));
+  /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_START since cert will never be NULL here */
+  tor_free(cert);
+  /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_STOP */
+}
+
+/**
+ * Allocate a new tor_x509_cert_t to hold the certificate "x509_cert".
+ *
+ * Steals a reference to x509_cert.
+ */
+MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_t *,
+tor_x509_cert_new,(X509 *x509_cert))
+{
+  tor_x509_cert_t *cert;
+  EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+  RSA *rsa;
+  int length;
+  unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+
+  if (!x509_cert)
+    return NULL;
+
+  length = i2d_X509(x509_cert, &buf);
+  cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t));
+  if (length <= 0 || buf == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  cert->encoded_len = (size_t) length;
+  cert->encoded = tor_malloc(length);
+  memcpy(cert->encoded, buf, length);
+  OPENSSL_free(buf);
+
+  cert->cert = x509_cert;
+
+  crypto_common_digests(&cert->cert_digests,
+                    (char*)cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len);
+
+  if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x509_cert)) &&
+      (rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey))) {
+    crypto_pk_t *pk = crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(rsa);
+    if (crypto_pk_get_common_digests(pk, &cert->pkey_digests) < 0) {
+      crypto_pk_free(pk);
+      EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    cert->pkey_digests_set = 1;
+    crypto_pk_free(pk);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+  }
+
+  return cert;
+ err:
+  /* LCOV_EXCL_START for the same reason as the exclusion above */
+  tor_free(cert);
+  log_err(LD_CRYPTO, "Couldn't wrap encoded X509 certificate.");
+  X509_free(x509_cert);
+  return NULL;
+  /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
+}
+
+/** Return a new copy of <b>cert</b>. */
+tor_x509_cert_t *
+tor_x509_cert_dup(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
+{
+  tor_assert(cert);
+  X509 *x509 = cert->cert;
+  return tor_x509_cert_new(X509_dup(x509));
+}
+
+/** Read a DER-encoded X509 cert, of length exactly <b>certificate_len</b>,
+ * from a <b>certificate</b>.  Return a newly allocated tor_x509_cert_t on
+ * success and NULL on failure. */
+tor_x509_cert_t *
+tor_x509_cert_decode(const uint8_t *certificate, size_t certificate_len)
+{
+  X509 *x509;
+  const unsigned char *cp = (const unsigned char *)certificate;
+  tor_x509_cert_t *newcert;
+  tor_assert(certificate);
+  check_no_tls_errors();
+
+  if (certificate_len > INT_MAX)
+    goto err;
+
+  x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, (int)certificate_len);
+
+  if (!x509)
+    goto err; /* Couldn't decode */
+  if (cp - certificate != (int)certificate_len) {
+    X509_free(x509);
+    goto err; /* Didn't use all the bytes */
+  }
+  newcert = tor_x509_cert_new(x509);
+  if (!newcert) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (newcert->encoded_len != certificate_len ||
+      fast_memneq(newcert->encoded, certificate, certificate_len)) {
+    /* Cert wasn't in DER */
+    tor_x509_cert_free(newcert);
+    goto err;
+  }
+  return newcert;
+ err:
+  tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_INFO, LD_CRYPTO, "decoding a certificate");
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Return a newly allocated copy of the public key that a certificate
+ * certifies. Watch out! This returns NULL if the cert's key is not RSA.
+ */
+crypto_pk_t *
+tor_tls_cert_get_key(tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
+{
+  crypto_pk_t *result = NULL;
+  EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert);
+  RSA *rsa;
+  if (!pkey)
+    return NULL;
+  rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
+  if (!rsa) {
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  result = crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(rsa);
+  EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+  return result;
+}
+
+/** Check whether <b>cert</b> is well-formed, currently live, and correctly
+ * signed by the public key in <b>signing_cert</b>.  If <b>check_rsa_1024</b>,
+ * make sure that it has an RSA key with 1024 bits; otherwise, just check that
+ * the key is long enough. Return 1 if the cert is good, and 0 if it's bad or
+ * we couldn't check it. */
+int
+tor_tls_cert_is_valid(int severity,
+                      const tor_x509_cert_t *cert,
+                      const tor_x509_cert_t *signing_cert,
+                      time_t now,
+                      int check_rsa_1024)
+{
+  check_no_tls_errors();
+  EVP_PKEY *cert_key;
+  int r, key_ok = 0;
+
+  if (!signing_cert || !cert)
+    goto bad;
+
+  EVP_PKEY *signing_key = X509_get_pubkey(signing_cert->cert);
+  if (!signing_key)
+    goto bad;
+  r = X509_verify(cert->cert, signing_key);
+  EVP_PKEY_free(signing_key);
+  if (r <= 0)
+    goto bad;
+
+  /* okay, the signature checked out right.  Now let's check the check the
+   * lifetime. */
+  if (tor_x509_check_cert_lifetime_internal(severity, cert->cert, now,
+                                   48*60*60, 30*24*60*60) < 0)
+    goto bad;
+
+  cert_key = X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert);
+  if (check_rsa_1024 && cert_key) {
+    RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(cert_key);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
+    if (rsa && RSA_bits(rsa) == 1024)
+#else
+    if (rsa && BN_num_bits(rsa->n) == 1024)
+#endif
+      key_ok = 1;
+    if (rsa)
+      RSA_free(rsa);
+  } else if (cert_key) {
+    int min_bits = 1024;
+#ifdef EVP_PKEY_EC
+    if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(cert_key) == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+      min_bits = 128;
+#endif
+    if (EVP_PKEY_bits(cert_key) >= min_bits)
+      key_ok = 1;
+  }
+  EVP_PKEY_free(cert_key);
+  if (!key_ok)
+    goto bad;
+
+  /* XXXX compare DNs or anything? */
+
+  return 1;
+ bad:
+  tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_INFO, LD_CRYPTO, "checking a certificate");
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/** Warn that a certificate lifetime extends through a certain range. */
+static void
+log_cert_lifetime(int severity, const X509 *cert, const char *problem,
+                  time_t now)
+{
+  BIO *bio = NULL;
+  BUF_MEM *buf;
+  char *s1=NULL, *s2=NULL;
+  char mytime[33];
+  struct tm tm;
+  size_t n;
+
+  if (problem)
+    tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,
+        "Certificate %s. Either their clock is set wrong, or your clock "
+        "is wrong.",
+           problem);
+
+  if (!(bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()))) {
+    log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't allocate BIO!"); goto end;
+  }
+  if (!(ASN1_TIME_print(bio, X509_get_notBefore_const(cert)))) {
+    tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "printing certificate lifetime");
+    goto end;
+  }
+  BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio, &buf);
+  s1 = tor_strndup(buf->data, buf->length);
+
+  (void)BIO_reset(bio);
+  if (!(ASN1_TIME_print(bio, X509_get_notAfter_const(cert)))) {
+    tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "printing certificate lifetime");
+    goto end;
+  }
+  BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio, &buf);
+  s2 = tor_strndup(buf->data, buf->length);
+
+  n = strftime(mytime, 32, "%b %d %H:%M:%S %Y UTC", tor_gmtime_r(&now, &tm));
+  if (n > 0) {
+    tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,
+        "(certificate lifetime runs from %s through %s. Your time is %s.)",
+        s1,s2,mytime);
+  } else {
+    tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,
+        "(certificate lifetime runs from %s through %s. "
+        "Couldn't get your time.)",
+        s1, s2);
+  }
+
+ end:
+  /* Not expected to get invoked */
+  tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "getting certificate lifetime");
+  if (bio)
+    BIO_free(bio);
+  tor_free(s1);
+  tor_free(s2);
+}
+
+/** Helper: check whether <b>cert</b> is expired give or take
+ * <b>past_tolerance</b> seconds, or not-yet-valid give or take
+ * <b>future_tolerance</b> seconds.  (Relative to the current time
+ * <b>now</b>.)  If it is live, return 0.  If it is not live, log a message
+ * and return -1. */
+int
+tor_x509_check_cert_lifetime_internal(int severity, const X509 *cert,
+                                      time_t now,
+                                      int past_tolerance, int future_tolerance)
+{
+  time_t t;
+
+  t = now + future_tolerance;
+  if (X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore_const(cert), &t) > 0) {
+    log_cert_lifetime(severity, cert, "not yet valid", now);
+    return -1;
+  }
+  t = now - past_tolerance;
+  if (X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter_const(cert), &t) < 0) {
+    log_cert_lifetime(severity, cert, "already expired", now);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
+/* Testing only: return a new x509 cert with the same contents as <b>inp</b>,
+   but with the expiration time <b>new_expiration_time</b>, signed with
+   <b>signing_key</b>. */
+STATIC tor_x509_cert_t *
+tor_x509_cert_replace_expiration(const tor_x509_cert_t *inp,
+                                 time_t new_expiration_time,
+                                 crypto_pk_t *signing_key)
+{
+  X509 *newc = X509_dup(inp->cert);
+  X509_time_adj(X509_get_notAfter(newc), 0, &new_expiration_time);
+  EVP_PKEY *pk = crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_(signing_key, 1);
+  tor_assert(X509_sign(newc, pk, EVP_sha256()));
+  EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+  return tor_x509_cert_new(newc);
+}
+#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */