Rename blacklist and whitelist wording

Closes #40033

Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>

6 files changed, 9 insertions, 9 deletions

diff --git a/src/feature/client/entrynodes.c b/src/feature/client/entrynodes.c
index 6e8259142d..9b20684bf7 100644
--- a/src/feature/client/entrynodes.c
+++ b/src/feature/client/entrynodes.c
@@ -1576,12 +1576,12 @@ guard_create_exit_restriction(const uint8_t *exit_id)
 }
 
 /** If we have fewer than this many possible usable guards, don't set
- * MD-availability-based restrictions: we might blacklist all of them. */
+ * MD-availability-based restrictions: we might denylist all of them. */
 #define MIN_GUARDS_FOR_MD_RESTRICTION 10
 
 /** Return true if we should set md dirserver restrictions. We might not want
  *  to set those if our guard options are too restricted, since we don't want
- *  to blacklist all of them. */
+ *  to denylist all of them. */
 static int
 should_set_md_dirserver_restriction(void)
 {
diff --git a/src/feature/dirparse/ns_parse.c b/src/feature/dirparse/ns_parse.c
index ac9325a608..f89c1b91cf 100644
--- a/src/feature/dirparse/ns_parse.c
+++ b/src/feature/dirparse/ns_parse.c
@@ -1354,8 +1354,8 @@ networkstatus_parse_vote_from_string(const char *s,
         goto err;
       }
       if (ns->type != NS_TYPE_CONSENSUS) {
-        if (authority_cert_is_blacklisted(ns->cert)) {
-          log_warn(LD_DIR, "Rejecting vote signature made with blacklisted "
+        if (authority_cert_is_denylisted(ns->cert)) {
+          log_warn(LD_DIR, "Rejecting vote signature made with denylisted "
                    "signing key %s",
                    hex_str(ns->cert->signing_key_digest, DIGEST_LEN));
           goto err;
diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c
index 995c1ca78b..b56b7f4368 100644
--- a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c
+++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c
@@ -3904,7 +3904,7 @@ hs_service_exports_circuit_id(const ed25519_public_key_t *pk)
 
 /** Add to file_list every filename used by a configured hidden service, and to
  * dir_list every directory path used by a configured hidden service. This is
- * used by the sandbox subsystem to whitelist those. */
+ * used by the sandbox subsystem to allowlist those. */
 void
 hs_service_lists_fnames_for_sandbox(smartlist_t *file_list,
                                     smartlist_t *dir_list)
diff --git a/src/feature/nodelist/authcert.c b/src/feature/nodelist/authcert.c
index 97e44d53e3..8ca22f818e 100644
--- a/src/feature/nodelist/authcert.c
+++ b/src/feature/nodelist/authcert.c
@@ -745,7 +745,7 @@ static const char *BAD_SIGNING_KEYS[] = {
  * which, because of the old openssl heartbleed vulnerability, should
  * never be trusted. */
 int
-authority_cert_is_blacklisted(const authority_cert_t *cert)
+authority_cert_is_denylisted(const authority_cert_t *cert)
 {
   char hex_digest[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
   int i;
diff --git a/src/feature/nodelist/authcert.h b/src/feature/nodelist/authcert.h
index 33065589ba..4c3d79ceed 100644
--- a/src/feature/nodelist/authcert.h
+++ b/src/feature/nodelist/authcert.h
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ void authority_cert_dl_failed(const char *id_digest,
 void authority_certs_fetch_missing(networkstatus_t *status, time_t now,
                                    const char *dir_hint);
 int authority_cert_dl_looks_uncertain(const char *id_digest);
-int authority_cert_is_blacklisted(const authority_cert_t *cert);
+int authority_cert_is_denylisted(const authority_cert_t *cert);
 
 void authority_cert_free_(authority_cert_t *cert);
 #define authority_cert_free(cert) \
diff --git a/src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus.c b/src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus.c
index f63d598ef7..dfff1f704b 100644
--- a/src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus.c
+++ b/src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus.c
@@ -471,8 +471,8 @@ networkstatus_check_document_signature(const networkstatus_t *consensus,
                  DIGEST_LEN))
     return -1;
 
-  if (authority_cert_is_blacklisted(cert)) {
-    /* We implement blacklisting for authority signing keys by treating
+  if (authority_cert_is_denylisted(cert)) {
+    /* We implement denylisting for authority signing keys by treating
      * all their signatures as always bad. That way we don't get into
      * crazy loops of dropping and re-fetching signatures. */
     log_warn(LD_DIR, "Ignoring a consensus signature made with deprecated"