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author | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2019-04-30 14:45:58 -0400 |
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committer | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2019-04-30 14:45:58 -0400 |
commit | 0034f1095680e2b05c19ec13368ddc936a53058a (patch) | |
tree | e6859977e9ac95876925307f68d342f47d081b66 /src/feature/relay | |
parent | 309467c64e007ea6841c07fdee35eaff0146d541 (diff) | |
download | tor-0034f1095680e2b05c19ec13368ddc936a53058a.tar.gz tor-0034f1095680e2b05c19ec13368ddc936a53058a.zip |
Use safe_mem_is_zero in a few more places.
I don't believe any of these represent a real timing vulnerability
(remote timing against memcmp() on a modern CPU is not easy), but
these are the ones where I believe we should be more careful.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/feature/relay')
-rw-r--r-- | src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c b/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c index 5db7ed7268..a9190b2e13 100644 --- a/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c +++ b/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c @@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ load_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, time_t now) tor_free(fname); } } - if (tor_mem_is_zero((char*)id->seckey.seckey, sizeof(id->seckey))) + if (safe_mem_is_zero((char*)id->seckey.seckey, sizeof(id->seckey))) sign_signing_key_with_id = NULL; else sign_signing_key_with_id = id; |