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authorNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2018-09-19 14:10:15 -0400
committerNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2018-09-19 17:08:57 -0400
commit08e3b88f0774fedb41a6b1c170a710dd12a7cb90 (patch)
tree856a7f9ce528021c1d0c9d09b631d09aeec2356c /src/feature/nodelist/authcert.c
parent119159677be14351ebcae647d3988f4f2fd9eb72 (diff)
downloadtor-08e3b88f0774fedb41a6b1c170a710dd12a7cb90.tar.gz
tor-08e3b88f0774fedb41a6b1c170a710dd12a7cb90.zip
Split routerlist.c into 4 separate modules
There are now separate modules for: * the list of router descriptors * the list of authorities and fallbacks * managing authority certificates * selecting random nodes
Diffstat (limited to 'src/feature/nodelist/authcert.c')
-rw-r--r--src/feature/nodelist/authcert.c1205
1 files changed, 1205 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/feature/nodelist/authcert.c b/src/feature/nodelist/authcert.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c4a0375909
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/feature/nodelist/authcert.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1205 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file authcert.c
+ * \brief Code to maintain directory authorities' certificates.
+ *
+ * Authority certificates are signed with authority identity keys; they
+ * are used to authenticate shorter-term authority signing keys. We
+ * fetch them when we find a consensus or a vote that has been signed
+ * with a signing key we don't recognize. We cache them on disk and
+ * load them on startup. Authority operators generate them with the
+ * "tor-gencert" utility.
+ */
+
+#include "core/or/or.h"
+
+#include "app/config/config.h"
+#include "core/mainloop/connection.h"
+#include "core/mainloop/main.h"
+#include "core/or/policies.h"
+#include "feature/client/bridges.h"
+#include "feature/dircache/directory.h"
+#include "feature/dircommon/fp_pair.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/authcert.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/dirlist.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/node_select.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/routerlist.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/routerparse.h"
+#include "feature/relay/router.h"
+
+#include "core/or/connection_st.h"
+#include "feature/dirclient/dir_server_st.h"
+#include "feature/dircommon/dir_connection_st.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/authority_cert_st.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/document_signature_st.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus_st.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus_voter_info_st.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/node_st.h"
+
+DECLARE_TYPED_DIGESTMAP_FNS(dsmap_, digest_ds_map_t, download_status_t)
+#define DSMAP_FOREACH(map, keyvar, valvar) \
+ DIGESTMAP_FOREACH(dsmap_to_digestmap(map), keyvar, download_status_t *, \
+ valvar)
+#define dsmap_free(map, fn) MAP_FREE_AND_NULL(dsmap, (map), (fn))
+
+/* Forward declaration for cert_list_t */
+typedef struct cert_list_t cert_list_t;
+
+static void download_status_reset_by_sk_in_cl(cert_list_t *cl,
+ const char *digest);
+static int download_status_is_ready_by_sk_in_cl(cert_list_t *cl,
+ const char *digest,
+ time_t now);
+static void list_pending_fpsk_downloads(fp_pair_map_t *result);
+
+/** List of certificates for a single authority, and download status for
+ * latest certificate.
+ */
+struct cert_list_t {
+ /*
+ * The keys of download status map are cert->signing_key_digest for pending
+ * downloads by (identity digest/signing key digest) pair; functions such
+ * as authority_cert_get_by_digest() already assume these are unique.
+ */
+ struct digest_ds_map_t *dl_status_map;
+ /* There is also a dlstatus for the download by identity key only */
+ download_status_t dl_status_by_id;
+ smartlist_t *certs;
+};
+/** Map from v3 identity key digest to cert_list_t. */
+static digestmap_t *trusted_dir_certs = NULL;
+
+/** True iff any key certificate in at least one member of
+ * <b>trusted_dir_certs</b> has changed since we last flushed the
+ * certificates to disk. */
+static int trusted_dir_servers_certs_changed = 0;
+
+/** Initialise schedule, want_authority, and increment_on in the download
+ * status dlstatus, then call download_status_reset() on it.
+ * It is safe to call this function or download_status_reset() multiple times
+ * on a new dlstatus. But it should *not* be called after a dlstatus has been
+ * used to count download attempts or failures. */
+static void
+download_status_cert_init(download_status_t *dlstatus)
+{
+ dlstatus->schedule = DL_SCHED_CONSENSUS;
+ dlstatus->want_authority = DL_WANT_ANY_DIRSERVER;
+ dlstatus->increment_on = DL_SCHED_INCREMENT_FAILURE;
+ dlstatus->last_backoff_position = 0;
+ dlstatus->last_delay_used = 0;
+
+ /* Use the new schedule to set next_attempt_at */
+ download_status_reset(dlstatus);
+}
+
+/** Reset the download status of a specified element in a dsmap */
+static void
+download_status_reset_by_sk_in_cl(cert_list_t *cl, const char *digest)
+{
+ download_status_t *dlstatus = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(cl);
+ tor_assert(digest);
+
+ /* Make sure we have a dsmap */
+ if (!(cl->dl_status_map)) {
+ cl->dl_status_map = dsmap_new();
+ }
+ /* Look for a download_status_t in the map with this digest */
+ dlstatus = dsmap_get(cl->dl_status_map, digest);
+ /* Got one? */
+ if (!dlstatus) {
+ /* Insert before we reset */
+ dlstatus = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*dlstatus));
+ dsmap_set(cl->dl_status_map, digest, dlstatus);
+ download_status_cert_init(dlstatus);
+ }
+ tor_assert(dlstatus);
+ /* Go ahead and reset it */
+ download_status_reset(dlstatus);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Return true if the download for this signing key digest in cl is ready
+ * to be re-attempted.
+ */
+static int
+download_status_is_ready_by_sk_in_cl(cert_list_t *cl,
+ const char *digest,
+ time_t now)
+{
+ int rv = 0;
+ download_status_t *dlstatus = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(cl);
+ tor_assert(digest);
+
+ /* Make sure we have a dsmap */
+ if (!(cl->dl_status_map)) {
+ cl->dl_status_map = dsmap_new();
+ }
+ /* Look for a download_status_t in the map with this digest */
+ dlstatus = dsmap_get(cl->dl_status_map, digest);
+ /* Got one? */
+ if (dlstatus) {
+ /* Use download_status_is_ready() */
+ rv = download_status_is_ready(dlstatus, now);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * If we don't know anything about it, return 1, since we haven't
+ * tried this one before. We need to create a new entry here,
+ * too.
+ */
+ dlstatus = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*dlstatus));
+ download_status_cert_init(dlstatus);
+ dsmap_set(cl->dl_status_map, digest, dlstatus);
+ rv = 1;
+ }
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/** Helper: Return the cert_list_t for an authority whose authority ID is
+ * <b>id_digest</b>, allocating a new list if necessary. */
+static cert_list_t *
+get_cert_list(const char *id_digest)
+{
+ cert_list_t *cl;
+ if (!trusted_dir_certs)
+ trusted_dir_certs = digestmap_new();
+ cl = digestmap_get(trusted_dir_certs, id_digest);
+ if (!cl) {
+ cl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(cert_list_t));
+ download_status_cert_init(&cl->dl_status_by_id);
+ cl->certs = smartlist_new();
+ cl->dl_status_map = dsmap_new();
+ digestmap_set(trusted_dir_certs, id_digest, cl);
+ }
+ return cl;
+}
+
+/** Return a list of authority ID digests with potentially enumerable lists
+ * of download_status_t objects; used by controller GETINFO queries.
+ */
+
+MOCK_IMPL(smartlist_t *,
+list_authority_ids_with_downloads, (void))
+{
+ smartlist_t *ids = smartlist_new();
+ digestmap_iter_t *i;
+ const char *digest;
+ char *tmp;
+ void *cl;
+
+ if (trusted_dir_certs) {
+ for (i = digestmap_iter_init(trusted_dir_certs);
+ !(digestmap_iter_done(i));
+ i = digestmap_iter_next(trusted_dir_certs, i)) {
+ /*
+ * We always have at least dl_status_by_id to query, so no need to
+ * probe deeper than the existence of a cert_list_t.
+ */
+ digestmap_iter_get(i, &digest, &cl);
+ tmp = tor_malloc(DIGEST_LEN);
+ memcpy(tmp, digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+ smartlist_add(ids, tmp);
+ }
+ }
+ /* else definitely no downloads going since nothing even has a cert list */
+
+ return ids;
+}
+
+/** Given an authority ID digest, return a pointer to the default download
+ * status, or NULL if there is no such entry in trusted_dir_certs */
+
+MOCK_IMPL(download_status_t *,
+id_only_download_status_for_authority_id, (const char *digest))
+{
+ download_status_t *dl = NULL;
+ cert_list_t *cl;
+
+ if (trusted_dir_certs) {
+ cl = digestmap_get(trusted_dir_certs, digest);
+ if (cl) {
+ dl = &(cl->dl_status_by_id);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return dl;
+}
+
+/** Given an authority ID digest, return a smartlist of signing key digests
+ * for which download_status_t is potentially queryable, or NULL if no such
+ * authority ID digest is known. */
+
+MOCK_IMPL(smartlist_t *,
+list_sk_digests_for_authority_id, (const char *digest))
+{
+ smartlist_t *sks = NULL;
+ cert_list_t *cl;
+ dsmap_iter_t *i;
+ const char *sk_digest;
+ char *tmp;
+ download_status_t *dl;
+
+ if (trusted_dir_certs) {
+ cl = digestmap_get(trusted_dir_certs, digest);
+ if (cl) {
+ sks = smartlist_new();
+ if (cl->dl_status_map) {
+ for (i = dsmap_iter_init(cl->dl_status_map);
+ !(dsmap_iter_done(i));
+ i = dsmap_iter_next(cl->dl_status_map, i)) {
+ /* Pull the digest out and add it to the list */
+ dsmap_iter_get(i, &sk_digest, &dl);
+ tmp = tor_malloc(DIGEST_LEN);
+ memcpy(tmp, sk_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+ smartlist_add(sks, tmp);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return sks;
+}
+
+/** Given an authority ID digest and a signing key digest, return the
+ * download_status_t or NULL if none exists. */
+
+MOCK_IMPL(download_status_t *,
+download_status_for_authority_id_and_sk,(const char *id_digest,
+ const char *sk_digest))
+{
+ download_status_t *dl = NULL;
+ cert_list_t *cl = NULL;
+
+ if (trusted_dir_certs) {
+ cl = digestmap_get(trusted_dir_certs, id_digest);
+ if (cl && cl->dl_status_map) {
+ dl = dsmap_get(cl->dl_status_map, sk_digest);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return dl;
+}
+
+#define cert_list_free(val) \
+ FREE_AND_NULL(cert_list_t, cert_list_free_, (val))
+
+/** Release all space held by a cert_list_t */
+static void
+cert_list_free_(cert_list_t *cl)
+{
+ if (!cl)
+ return;
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(cl->certs, authority_cert_t *, cert,
+ authority_cert_free(cert));
+ smartlist_free(cl->certs);
+ dsmap_free(cl->dl_status_map, tor_free_);
+ tor_free(cl);
+}
+
+/** Wrapper for cert_list_free so we can pass it to digestmap_free */
+static void
+cert_list_free_void(void *cl)
+{
+ cert_list_free_(cl);
+}
+
+/** Reload the cached v3 key certificates from the cached-certs file in
+ * the data directory. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */
+int
+trusted_dirs_reload_certs(void)
+{
+ char *filename;
+ char *contents;
+ int r;
+
+ filename = get_cachedir_fname("cached-certs");
+ contents = read_file_to_str(filename, RFTS_IGNORE_MISSING, NULL);
+ tor_free(filename);
+ if (!contents)
+ return 0;
+ r = trusted_dirs_load_certs_from_string(
+ contents,
+ TRUSTED_DIRS_CERTS_SRC_FROM_STORE, 1, NULL);
+ tor_free(contents);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/** Helper: return true iff we already have loaded the exact cert
+ * <b>cert</b>. */
+static inline int
+already_have_cert(authority_cert_t *cert)
+{
+ cert_list_t *cl = get_cert_list(cert->cache_info.identity_digest);
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(cl->certs, authority_cert_t *, c,
+ {
+ if (tor_memeq(c->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest,
+ cert->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest,
+ DIGEST_LEN))
+ return 1;
+ });
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Load a bunch of new key certificates from the string <b>contents</b>. If
+ * <b>source</b> is TRUSTED_DIRS_CERTS_SRC_FROM_STORE, the certificates are
+ * from the cache, and we don't need to flush them to disk. If we are a
+ * dirauth loading our own cert, source is TRUSTED_DIRS_CERTS_SRC_SELF.
+ * Otherwise, source is download type: TRUSTED_DIRS_CERTS_SRC_DL_BY_ID_DIGEST
+ * or TRUSTED_DIRS_CERTS_SRC_DL_BY_ID_SK_DIGEST. If <b>flush</b> is true, we
+ * need to flush any changed certificates to disk now. Return 0 on success,
+ * -1 if any certs fail to parse.
+ *
+ * If source_dir is non-NULL, it's the identity digest for a directory that
+ * we've just successfully retrieved certificates from, so try it first to
+ * fetch any missing certificates.
+ */
+int
+trusted_dirs_load_certs_from_string(const char *contents, int source,
+ int flush, const char *source_dir)
+{
+ dir_server_t *ds;
+ const char *s, *eos;
+ int failure_code = 0;
+ int from_store = (source == TRUSTED_DIRS_CERTS_SRC_FROM_STORE);
+ int added_trusted_cert = 0;
+
+ for (s = contents; *s; s = eos) {
+ authority_cert_t *cert = authority_cert_parse_from_string(s, &eos);
+ cert_list_t *cl;
+ if (!cert) {
+ failure_code = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ ds = trusteddirserver_get_by_v3_auth_digest(
+ cert->cache_info.identity_digest);
+ log_debug(LD_DIR, "Parsed certificate for %s",
+ ds ? ds->nickname : "unknown authority");
+
+ if (already_have_cert(cert)) {
+ /* we already have this one. continue. */
+ log_info(LD_DIR, "Skipping %s certificate for %s that we "
+ "already have.",
+ from_store ? "cached" : "downloaded",
+ ds ? ds->nickname : "an old or new authority");
+
+ /*
+ * A duplicate on download should be treated as a failure, so we call
+ * authority_cert_dl_failed() to reset the download status to make sure
+ * we can't try again. Since we've implemented the fp-sk mechanism
+ * to download certs by signing key, this should be much rarer than it
+ * was and is perhaps cause for concern.
+ */
+ if (!from_store) {
+ if (authdir_mode(get_options())) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR,
+ "Got a certificate for %s, but we already have it. "
+ "Maybe they haven't updated it. Waiting for a while.",
+ ds ? ds->nickname : "an old or new authority");
+ } else {
+ log_info(LD_DIR,
+ "Got a certificate for %s, but we already have it. "
+ "Maybe they haven't updated it. Waiting for a while.",
+ ds ? ds->nickname : "an old or new authority");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * This is where we care about the source; authority_cert_dl_failed()
+ * needs to know whether the download was by fp or (fp,sk) pair to
+ * twiddle the right bit in the download map.
+ */
+ if (source == TRUSTED_DIRS_CERTS_SRC_DL_BY_ID_DIGEST) {
+ authority_cert_dl_failed(cert->cache_info.identity_digest,
+ NULL, 404);
+ } else if (source == TRUSTED_DIRS_CERTS_SRC_DL_BY_ID_SK_DIGEST) {
+ authority_cert_dl_failed(cert->cache_info.identity_digest,
+ cert->signing_key_digest, 404);
+ }
+ }
+
+ authority_cert_free(cert);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (ds) {
+ added_trusted_cert = 1;
+ log_info(LD_DIR, "Adding %s certificate for directory authority %s with "
+ "signing key %s", from_store ? "cached" : "downloaded",
+ ds->nickname, hex_str(cert->signing_key_digest,DIGEST_LEN));
+ } else {
+ int adding = we_want_to_fetch_unknown_auth_certs(get_options());
+ log_info(LD_DIR, "%s %s certificate for unrecognized directory "
+ "authority with signing key %s",
+ adding ? "Adding" : "Not adding",
+ from_store ? "cached" : "downloaded",
+ hex_str(cert->signing_key_digest,DIGEST_LEN));
+ if (!adding) {
+ authority_cert_free(cert);
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+
+ cl = get_cert_list(cert->cache_info.identity_digest);
+ smartlist_add(cl->certs, cert);
+ if (ds && cert->cache_info.published_on > ds->addr_current_at) {
+ /* Check to see whether we should update our view of the authority's
+ * address. */
+ if (cert->addr && cert->dir_port &&
+ (ds->addr != cert->addr ||
+ ds->dir_port != cert->dir_port)) {
+ char *a = tor_dup_ip(cert->addr);
+ log_notice(LD_DIR, "Updating address for directory authority %s "
+ "from %s:%d to %s:%d based on certificate.",
+ ds->nickname, ds->address, (int)ds->dir_port,
+ a, cert->dir_port);
+ tor_free(a);
+ ds->addr = cert->addr;
+ ds->dir_port = cert->dir_port;
+ }
+ ds->addr_current_at = cert->cache_info.published_on;
+ }
+
+ if (!from_store)
+ trusted_dir_servers_certs_changed = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (flush)
+ trusted_dirs_flush_certs_to_disk();
+
+ /* call this even if failure_code is <0, since some certs might have
+ * succeeded, but only pass source_dir if there were no failures,
+ * and at least one more authority certificate was added to the store.
+ * This avoids retrying a directory that's serving bad or entirely duplicate
+ * certificates. */
+ if (failure_code == 0 && added_trusted_cert) {
+ networkstatus_note_certs_arrived(source_dir);
+ } else {
+ networkstatus_note_certs_arrived(NULL);
+ }
+
+ return failure_code;
+}
+
+/** Save all v3 key certificates to the cached-certs file. */
+void
+trusted_dirs_flush_certs_to_disk(void)
+{
+ char *filename;
+ smartlist_t *chunks;
+
+ if (!trusted_dir_servers_certs_changed || !trusted_dir_certs)
+ return;
+
+ chunks = smartlist_new();
+ DIGESTMAP_FOREACH(trusted_dir_certs, key, cert_list_t *, cl) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(cl->certs, authority_cert_t *, cert,
+ {
+ sized_chunk_t *c = tor_malloc(sizeof(sized_chunk_t));
+ c->bytes = cert->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body;
+ c->len = cert->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len;
+ smartlist_add(chunks, c);
+ });
+ } DIGESTMAP_FOREACH_END;
+
+ filename = get_cachedir_fname("cached-certs");
+ if (write_chunks_to_file(filename, chunks, 0, 0)) {
+ log_warn(LD_FS, "Error writing certificates to disk.");
+ }
+ tor_free(filename);
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(chunks, sized_chunk_t *, c, tor_free(c));
+ smartlist_free(chunks);
+
+ trusted_dir_servers_certs_changed = 0;
+}
+
+static int
+compare_certs_by_pubdates(const void **_a, const void **_b)
+{
+ const authority_cert_t *cert1 = *_a, *cert2=*_b;
+
+ if (cert1->cache_info.published_on < cert2->cache_info.published_on)
+ return -1;
+ else if (cert1->cache_info.published_on > cert2->cache_info.published_on)
+ return 1;
+ else
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Remove all expired v3 authority certificates that have been superseded for
+ * more than 48 hours or, if not expired, that were published more than 7 days
+ * before being superseded. (If the most recent cert was published more than 48
+ * hours ago, then we aren't going to get any consensuses signed with older
+ * keys.) */
+void
+trusted_dirs_remove_old_certs(void)
+{
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+#define DEAD_CERT_LIFETIME (2*24*60*60)
+#define SUPERSEDED_CERT_LIFETIME (2*24*60*60)
+ if (!trusted_dir_certs)
+ return;
+
+ DIGESTMAP_FOREACH(trusted_dir_certs, key, cert_list_t *, cl) {
+ /* Sort the list from first-published to last-published */
+ smartlist_sort(cl->certs, compare_certs_by_pubdates);
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(cl->certs, authority_cert_t *, cert) {
+ if (cert_sl_idx == smartlist_len(cl->certs) - 1) {
+ /* This is the most recently published cert. Keep it. */
+ continue;
+ }
+ authority_cert_t *next_cert = smartlist_get(cl->certs, cert_sl_idx+1);
+ const time_t next_cert_published = next_cert->cache_info.published_on;
+ if (next_cert_published > now) {
+ /* All later certs are published in the future. Keep everything
+ * we didn't discard. */
+ break;
+ }
+ int should_remove = 0;
+ if (cert->expires + DEAD_CERT_LIFETIME < now) {
+ /* Certificate has been expired for at least DEAD_CERT_LIFETIME.
+ * Remove it. */
+ should_remove = 1;
+ } else if (next_cert_published + SUPERSEDED_CERT_LIFETIME < now) {
+ /* Certificate has been superseded for OLD_CERT_LIFETIME.
+ * Remove it.
+ */
+ should_remove = 1;
+ }
+ if (should_remove) {
+ SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT_KEEPORDER(cl->certs, cert);
+ authority_cert_free(cert);
+ trusted_dir_servers_certs_changed = 1;
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(cert);
+
+ } DIGESTMAP_FOREACH_END;
+#undef DEAD_CERT_LIFETIME
+#undef OLD_CERT_LIFETIME
+
+ trusted_dirs_flush_certs_to_disk();
+}
+
+/** Return the newest v3 authority certificate whose v3 authority identity key
+ * has digest <b>id_digest</b>. Return NULL if no such authority is known,
+ * or it has no certificate. */
+authority_cert_t *
+authority_cert_get_newest_by_id(const char *id_digest)
+{
+ cert_list_t *cl;
+ authority_cert_t *best = NULL;
+ if (!trusted_dir_certs ||
+ !(cl = digestmap_get(trusted_dir_certs, id_digest)))
+ return NULL;
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(cl->certs, authority_cert_t *, cert,
+ {
+ if (!best || cert->cache_info.published_on > best->cache_info.published_on)
+ best = cert;
+ });
+ return best;
+}
+
+/** Return the newest v3 authority certificate whose directory signing key has
+ * digest <b>sk_digest</b>. Return NULL if no such certificate is known.
+ */
+authority_cert_t *
+authority_cert_get_by_sk_digest(const char *sk_digest)
+{
+ authority_cert_t *c;
+ if (!trusted_dir_certs)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if ((c = get_my_v3_authority_cert()) &&
+ tor_memeq(c->signing_key_digest, sk_digest, DIGEST_LEN))
+ return c;
+ if ((c = get_my_v3_legacy_cert()) &&
+ tor_memeq(c->signing_key_digest, sk_digest, DIGEST_LEN))
+ return c;
+
+ DIGESTMAP_FOREACH(trusted_dir_certs, key, cert_list_t *, cl) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(cl->certs, authority_cert_t *, cert,
+ {
+ if (tor_memeq(cert->signing_key_digest, sk_digest, DIGEST_LEN))
+ return cert;
+ });
+ } DIGESTMAP_FOREACH_END;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/** Return the v3 authority certificate with signing key matching
+ * <b>sk_digest</b>, for the authority with identity digest <b>id_digest</b>.
+ * Return NULL if no such authority is known. */
+authority_cert_t *
+authority_cert_get_by_digests(const char *id_digest,
+ const char *sk_digest)
+{
+ cert_list_t *cl;
+ if (!trusted_dir_certs ||
+ !(cl = digestmap_get(trusted_dir_certs, id_digest)))
+ return NULL;
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(cl->certs, authority_cert_t *, cert,
+ if (tor_memeq(cert->signing_key_digest, sk_digest, DIGEST_LEN))
+ return cert; );
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/** Add every known authority_cert_t to <b>certs_out</b>. */
+void
+authority_cert_get_all(smartlist_t *certs_out)
+{
+ tor_assert(certs_out);
+ if (!trusted_dir_certs)
+ return;
+
+ DIGESTMAP_FOREACH(trusted_dir_certs, key, cert_list_t *, cl) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(cl->certs, authority_cert_t *, c,
+ smartlist_add(certs_out, c));
+ } DIGESTMAP_FOREACH_END;
+}
+
+/** Called when an attempt to download a certificate with the authority with
+ * ID <b>id_digest</b> and, if not NULL, signed with key signing_key_digest
+ * fails with HTTP response code <b>status</b>: remember the failure, so we
+ * don't try again immediately. */
+void
+authority_cert_dl_failed(const char *id_digest,
+ const char *signing_key_digest, int status)
+{
+ cert_list_t *cl;
+ download_status_t *dlstatus = NULL;
+ char id_digest_str[2*DIGEST_LEN+1];
+ char sk_digest_str[2*DIGEST_LEN+1];
+
+ if (!trusted_dir_certs ||
+ !(cl = digestmap_get(trusted_dir_certs, id_digest)))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Are we noting a failed download of the latest cert for the id digest,
+ * or of a download by (id, signing key) digest pair?
+ */
+ if (!signing_key_digest) {
+ /* Just by id digest */
+ download_status_failed(&cl->dl_status_by_id, status);
+ } else {
+ /* Reset by (id, signing key) digest pair
+ *
+ * Look for a download_status_t in the map with this digest
+ */
+ dlstatus = dsmap_get(cl->dl_status_map, signing_key_digest);
+ /* Got one? */
+ if (dlstatus) {
+ download_status_failed(dlstatus, status);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Do this rather than hex_str(), since hex_str clobbers
+ * old results and we call twice in the param list.
+ */
+ base16_encode(id_digest_str, sizeof(id_digest_str),
+ id_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+ base16_encode(sk_digest_str, sizeof(sk_digest_str),
+ signing_key_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,
+ "Got failure for cert fetch with (fp,sk) = (%s,%s), with "
+ "status %d, but knew nothing about the download.",
+ id_digest_str, sk_digest_str, status);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static const char *BAD_SIGNING_KEYS[] = {
+ "09CD84F751FD6E955E0F8ADB497D5401470D697E", // Expires 2015-01-11 16:26:31
+ "0E7E9C07F0969D0468AD741E172A6109DC289F3C", // Expires 2014-08-12 10:18:26
+ "57B85409891D3FB32137F642FDEDF8B7F8CDFDCD", // Expires 2015-02-11 17:19:09
+ "87326329007AF781F587AF5B594E540B2B6C7630", // Expires 2014-07-17 11:10:09
+ "98CC82342DE8D298CF99D3F1A396475901E0D38E", // Expires 2014-11-10 13:18:56
+ "9904B52336713A5ADCB13E4FB14DC919E0D45571", // Expires 2014-04-20 20:01:01
+ "9DCD8E3F1DD1597E2AD476BBA28A1A89F3095227", // Expires 2015-01-16 03:52:30
+ "A61682F34B9BB9694AC98491FE1ABBFE61923941", // Expires 2014-06-11 09:25:09
+ "B59F6E99C575113650C99F1C425BA7B20A8C071D", // Expires 2014-07-31 13:22:10
+ "D27178388FA75B96D37FA36E0B015227DDDBDA51", // Expires 2014-08-04 04:01:57
+ NULL,
+};
+
+/** Return true iff <b>cert</b> authenticates some atuhority signing key
+ * which, because of the old openssl heartbleed vulnerability, should
+ * never be trusted. */
+int
+authority_cert_is_blacklisted(const authority_cert_t *cert)
+{
+ char hex_digest[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
+ int i;
+ base16_encode(hex_digest, sizeof(hex_digest),
+ cert->signing_key_digest, sizeof(cert->signing_key_digest));
+
+ for (i = 0; BAD_SIGNING_KEYS[i]; ++i) {
+ if (!strcasecmp(hex_digest, BAD_SIGNING_KEYS[i])) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Return true iff when we've been getting enough failures when trying to
+ * download the certificate with ID digest <b>id_digest</b> that we're willing
+ * to start bugging the user about it. */
+int
+authority_cert_dl_looks_uncertain(const char *id_digest)
+{
+#define N_AUTH_CERT_DL_FAILURES_TO_BUG_USER 2
+ cert_list_t *cl;
+ int n_failures;
+ if (!trusted_dir_certs ||
+ !(cl = digestmap_get(trusted_dir_certs, id_digest)))
+ return 0;
+
+ n_failures = download_status_get_n_failures(&cl->dl_status_by_id);
+ return n_failures >= N_AUTH_CERT_DL_FAILURES_TO_BUG_USER;
+}
+
+/* Fetch the authority certificates specified in resource.
+ * If we are a bridge client, and node is a configured bridge, fetch from node
+ * using dir_hint as the fingerprint. Otherwise, if rs is not NULL, fetch from
+ * rs. Otherwise, fetch from a random directory mirror. */
+static void
+authority_certs_fetch_resource_impl(const char *resource,
+ const char *dir_hint,
+ const node_t *node,
+ const routerstatus_t *rs)
+{
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ int get_via_tor = purpose_needs_anonymity(DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_CERTIFICATE, 0,
+ resource);
+
+ /* Make sure bridge clients never connect to anything but a bridge */
+ if (options->UseBridges) {
+ if (node && !node_is_a_configured_bridge(node)) {
+ /* If we're using bridges, and node is not a bridge, use a 3-hop path. */
+ get_via_tor = 1;
+ } else if (!node) {
+ /* If we're using bridges, and there's no node, use a 3-hop path. */
+ get_via_tor = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ const dir_indirection_t indirection = get_via_tor ? DIRIND_ANONYMOUS
+ : DIRIND_ONEHOP;
+
+ directory_request_t *req = NULL;
+ /* If we've just downloaded a consensus from a bridge, re-use that
+ * bridge */
+ if (options->UseBridges && node && node->ri && !get_via_tor) {
+ /* clients always make OR connections to bridges */
+ tor_addr_port_t or_ap;
+ /* we are willing to use a non-preferred address if we need to */
+ fascist_firewall_choose_address_node(node, FIREWALL_OR_CONNECTION, 0,
+ &or_ap);
+
+ req = directory_request_new(DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_CERTIFICATE);
+ directory_request_set_or_addr_port(req, &or_ap);
+ if (dir_hint)
+ directory_request_set_directory_id_digest(req, dir_hint);
+ } else if (rs) {
+ /* And if we've just downloaded a consensus from a directory, re-use that
+ * directory */
+ req = directory_request_new(DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_CERTIFICATE);
+ directory_request_set_routerstatus(req, rs);
+ }
+
+ if (req) {
+ /* We've set up a request object -- fill in the other request fields, and
+ * send the request. */
+ directory_request_set_indirection(req, indirection);
+ directory_request_set_resource(req, resource);
+ directory_initiate_request(req);
+ directory_request_free(req);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Otherwise, we want certs from a random fallback or directory
+ * mirror, because they will almost always succeed. */
+ directory_get_from_dirserver(DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_CERTIFICATE, 0,
+ resource, PDS_RETRY_IF_NO_SERVERS,
+ DL_WANT_ANY_DIRSERVER);
+}
+
+/** Try to download any v3 authority certificates that we may be missing. If
+ * <b>status</b> is provided, try to get all the ones that were used to sign
+ * <b>status</b>. Additionally, try to have a non-expired certificate for
+ * every V3 authority in trusted_dir_servers. Don't fetch certificates we
+ * already have.
+ *
+ * If dir_hint is non-NULL, it's the identity digest for a directory that
+ * we've just successfully retrieved a consensus or certificates from, so try
+ * it first to fetch any missing certificates.
+ **/
+void
+authority_certs_fetch_missing(networkstatus_t *status, time_t now,
+ const char *dir_hint)
+{
+ /*
+ * The pending_id digestmap tracks pending certificate downloads by
+ * identity digest; the pending_cert digestmap tracks pending downloads
+ * by (identity digest, signing key digest) pairs.
+ */
+ digestmap_t *pending_id;
+ fp_pair_map_t *pending_cert;
+ /*
+ * The missing_id_digests smartlist will hold a list of id digests
+ * we want to fetch the newest cert for; the missing_cert_digests
+ * smartlist will hold a list of fp_pair_t with an identity and
+ * signing key digest.
+ */
+ smartlist_t *missing_cert_digests, *missing_id_digests;
+ char *resource = NULL;
+ cert_list_t *cl;
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ const int keep_unknown = we_want_to_fetch_unknown_auth_certs(options);
+ fp_pair_t *fp_tmp = NULL;
+ char id_digest_str[2*DIGEST_LEN+1];
+ char sk_digest_str[2*DIGEST_LEN+1];
+
+ if (should_delay_dir_fetches(options, NULL))
+ return;
+
+ pending_cert = fp_pair_map_new();
+ pending_id = digestmap_new();
+ missing_cert_digests = smartlist_new();
+ missing_id_digests = smartlist_new();
+
+ /*
+ * First, we get the lists of already pending downloads so we don't
+ * duplicate effort.
+ */
+ list_pending_downloads(pending_id, NULL,
+ DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_CERTIFICATE, "fp/");
+ list_pending_fpsk_downloads(pending_cert);
+
+ /*
+ * Now, we download any trusted authority certs we don't have by
+ * identity digest only. This gets the latest cert for that authority.
+ */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(router_get_trusted_dir_servers(),
+ dir_server_t *, ds) {
+ int found = 0;
+ if (!(ds->type & V3_DIRINFO))
+ continue;
+ if (smartlist_contains_digest(missing_id_digests,
+ ds->v3_identity_digest))
+ continue;
+ cl = get_cert_list(ds->v3_identity_digest);
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(cl->certs, authority_cert_t *, cert) {
+ if (now < cert->expires) {
+ /* It's not expired, and we weren't looking for something to
+ * verify a consensus with. Call it done. */
+ download_status_reset(&(cl->dl_status_by_id));
+ /* No sense trying to download it specifically by signing key hash */
+ download_status_reset_by_sk_in_cl(cl, cert->signing_key_digest);
+ found = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(cert);
+ if (!found &&
+ download_status_is_ready(&(cl->dl_status_by_id), now) &&
+ !digestmap_get(pending_id, ds->v3_identity_digest)) {
+ log_info(LD_DIR,
+ "No current certificate known for authority %s "
+ "(ID digest %s); launching request.",
+ ds->nickname, hex_str(ds->v3_identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN));
+ smartlist_add(missing_id_digests, ds->v3_identity_digest);
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ds);
+
+ /*
+ * Next, if we have a consensus, scan through it and look for anything
+ * signed with a key from a cert we don't have. Those get downloaded
+ * by (fp,sk) pair, but if we don't know any certs at all for the fp
+ * (identity digest), and it's one of the trusted dir server certs
+ * we started off above or a pending download in pending_id, don't
+ * try to get it yet. Most likely, the one we'll get for that will
+ * have the right signing key too, and we'd just be downloading
+ * redundantly.
+ */
+ if (status) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(status->voters, networkstatus_voter_info_t *,
+ voter) {
+ if (!smartlist_len(voter->sigs))
+ continue; /* This authority never signed this consensus, so don't
+ * go looking for a cert with key digest 0000000000. */
+ if (!keep_unknown &&
+ !trusteddirserver_get_by_v3_auth_digest(voter->identity_digest))
+ continue; /* We don't want unknown certs, and we don't know this
+ * authority.*/
+
+ /*
+ * If we don't know *any* cert for this authority, and a download by ID
+ * is pending or we added it to missing_id_digests above, skip this
+ * one for now to avoid duplicate downloads.
+ */
+ cl = get_cert_list(voter->identity_digest);
+ if (smartlist_len(cl->certs) == 0) {
+ /* We have no certs at all for this one */
+
+ /* Do we have a download of one pending? */
+ if (digestmap_get(pending_id, voter->identity_digest))
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * Are we about to launch a download of one due to the trusted
+ * dir server check above?
+ */
+ if (smartlist_contains_digest(missing_id_digests,
+ voter->identity_digest))
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(voter->sigs, document_signature_t *, sig) {
+ authority_cert_t *cert =
+ authority_cert_get_by_digests(voter->identity_digest,
+ sig->signing_key_digest);
+ if (cert) {
+ if (now < cert->expires)
+ download_status_reset_by_sk_in_cl(cl, sig->signing_key_digest);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (download_status_is_ready_by_sk_in_cl(
+ cl, sig->signing_key_digest, now) &&
+ !fp_pair_map_get_by_digests(pending_cert,
+ voter->identity_digest,
+ sig->signing_key_digest)) {
+ /*
+ * Do this rather than hex_str(), since hex_str clobbers
+ * old results and we call twice in the param list.
+ */
+ base16_encode(id_digest_str, sizeof(id_digest_str),
+ voter->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+ base16_encode(sk_digest_str, sizeof(sk_digest_str),
+ sig->signing_key_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+
+ if (voter->nickname) {
+ log_info(LD_DIR,
+ "We're missing a certificate from authority %s "
+ "(ID digest %s) with signing key %s: "
+ "launching request.",
+ voter->nickname, id_digest_str, sk_digest_str);
+ } else {
+ log_info(LD_DIR,
+ "We're missing a certificate from authority ID digest "
+ "%s with signing key %s: launching request.",
+ id_digest_str, sk_digest_str);
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate a new fp_pair_t to append */
+ fp_tmp = tor_malloc(sizeof(*fp_tmp));
+ memcpy(fp_tmp->first, voter->identity_digest, sizeof(fp_tmp->first));
+ memcpy(fp_tmp->second, sig->signing_key_digest,
+ sizeof(fp_tmp->second));
+ smartlist_add(missing_cert_digests, fp_tmp);
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(sig);
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(voter);
+ }
+
+ /* Bridge clients look up the node for the dir_hint */
+ const node_t *node = NULL;
+ /* All clients, including bridge clients, look up the routerstatus for the
+ * dir_hint */
+ const routerstatus_t *rs = NULL;
+
+ /* If we still need certificates, try the directory that just successfully
+ * served us a consensus or certificates.
+ * As soon as the directory fails to provide additional certificates, we try
+ * another, randomly selected directory. This avoids continual retries.
+ * (We only ever have one outstanding request per certificate.)
+ */
+ if (dir_hint) {
+ if (options->UseBridges) {
+ /* Bridge clients try the nodelist. If the dir_hint is from an authority,
+ * or something else fetched over tor, we won't find the node here, but
+ * we will find the rs. */
+ node = node_get_by_id(dir_hint);
+ }
+
+ /* All clients try the consensus routerstatus, then the fallback
+ * routerstatus */
+ rs = router_get_consensus_status_by_id(dir_hint);
+ if (!rs) {
+ /* This will also find authorities */
+ const dir_server_t *ds = router_get_fallback_dirserver_by_digest(
+ dir_hint);
+ if (ds) {
+ rs = &ds->fake_status;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!node && !rs) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Directory %s delivered a consensus, but %s"
+ "no routerstatus could be found for it.",
+ options->UseBridges ? "no node and " : "",
+ hex_str(dir_hint, DIGEST_LEN));
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Do downloads by identity digest */
+ if (smartlist_len(missing_id_digests) > 0) {
+ int need_plus = 0;
+ smartlist_t *fps = smartlist_new();
+
+ smartlist_add_strdup(fps, "fp/");
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(missing_id_digests, const char *, d) {
+ char *fp = NULL;
+
+ if (digestmap_get(pending_id, d))
+ continue;
+
+ base16_encode(id_digest_str, sizeof(id_digest_str),
+ d, DIGEST_LEN);
+
+ if (need_plus) {
+ tor_asprintf(&fp, "+%s", id_digest_str);
+ } else {
+ /* No need for tor_asprintf() in this case; first one gets no '+' */
+ fp = tor_strdup(id_digest_str);
+ need_plus = 1;
+ }
+
+ smartlist_add(fps, fp);
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(d);
+
+ if (smartlist_len(fps) > 1) {
+ resource = smartlist_join_strings(fps, "", 0, NULL);
+ /* node and rs are directories that just gave us a consensus or
+ * certificates */
+ authority_certs_fetch_resource_impl(resource, dir_hint, node, rs);
+ tor_free(resource);
+ }
+ /* else we didn't add any: they were all pending */
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(fps, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
+ smartlist_free(fps);
+ }
+
+ /* Do downloads by identity digest/signing key pair */
+ if (smartlist_len(missing_cert_digests) > 0) {
+ int need_plus = 0;
+ smartlist_t *fp_pairs = smartlist_new();
+
+ smartlist_add_strdup(fp_pairs, "fp-sk/");
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(missing_cert_digests, const fp_pair_t *, d) {
+ char *fp_pair = NULL;
+
+ if (fp_pair_map_get(pending_cert, d))
+ continue;
+
+ /* Construct string encodings of the digests */
+ base16_encode(id_digest_str, sizeof(id_digest_str),
+ d->first, DIGEST_LEN);
+ base16_encode(sk_digest_str, sizeof(sk_digest_str),
+ d->second, DIGEST_LEN);
+
+ /* Now tor_asprintf() */
+ if (need_plus) {
+ tor_asprintf(&fp_pair, "+%s-%s", id_digest_str, sk_digest_str);
+ } else {
+ /* First one in the list doesn't get a '+' */
+ tor_asprintf(&fp_pair, "%s-%s", id_digest_str, sk_digest_str);
+ need_plus = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Add it to the list of pairs to request */
+ smartlist_add(fp_pairs, fp_pair);
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(d);
+
+ if (smartlist_len(fp_pairs) > 1) {
+ resource = smartlist_join_strings(fp_pairs, "", 0, NULL);
+ /* node and rs are directories that just gave us a consensus or
+ * certificates */
+ authority_certs_fetch_resource_impl(resource, dir_hint, node, rs);
+ tor_free(resource);
+ }
+ /* else they were all pending */
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(fp_pairs, char *, p, tor_free(p));
+ smartlist_free(fp_pairs);
+ }
+
+ smartlist_free(missing_id_digests);
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(missing_cert_digests, fp_pair_t *, p, tor_free(p));
+ smartlist_free(missing_cert_digests);
+ digestmap_free(pending_id, NULL);
+ fp_pair_map_free(pending_cert, NULL);
+}
+
+void
+authcert_free_all(void)
+{
+ if (trusted_dir_certs) {
+ digestmap_free(trusted_dir_certs, cert_list_free_void);
+ trusted_dir_certs = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/** Free storage held in <b>cert</b>. */
+void
+authority_cert_free_(authority_cert_t *cert)
+{
+ if (!cert)
+ return;
+
+ tor_free(cert->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body);
+ crypto_pk_free(cert->signing_key);
+ crypto_pk_free(cert->identity_key);
+
+ tor_free(cert);
+}
+
+/** For every certificate we are currently downloading by (identity digest,
+ * signing key digest) pair, set result[fp_pair] to (void *1).
+ */
+static void
+list_pending_fpsk_downloads(fp_pair_map_t *result)
+{
+ const char *pfx = "fp-sk/";
+ smartlist_t *tmp;
+ smartlist_t *conns;
+ const char *resource;
+
+ tor_assert(result);
+
+ tmp = smartlist_new();
+ conns = get_connection_array();
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(conns, connection_t *, conn) {
+ if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_DIR &&
+ conn->purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_CERTIFICATE &&
+ !conn->marked_for_close) {
+ resource = TO_DIR_CONN(conn)->requested_resource;
+ if (!strcmpstart(resource, pfx))
+ dir_split_resource_into_fingerprint_pairs(resource + strlen(pfx),
+ tmp);
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn);
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(tmp, fp_pair_t *, fp) {
+ fp_pair_map_set(result, fp, (void*)1);
+ tor_free(fp);
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(fp);
+
+ smartlist_free(tmp);
+}