hs-v3: Keep descriptor in cache if client auth is missing or bad

We now keep the descriptor in the cache, obviously not decoded, if it can't be
decrypted for which we believe client authorization is missing or unusable
(bad).

This way, it can be used later once the client authorization are added or
updated.

Part of #30382

Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>

1 files changed, 5 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c
index 056dc81a61..65a6f94802 100644
--- a/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c
+++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c
@@ -2277,12 +2277,14 @@ desc_decode_encrypted_v3(const hs_descriptor_t *desc,
        * authorization is failing. */
       log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization for requested onion address "
                         "is invalid. Can't decrypt the descriptor.");
+      ret = HS_DESC_DECODE_BAD_CLIENT_AUTH;
     } else {
       /* Inform at notice level that the onion address requested can't be
        * reached without client authorization most likely. */
       log_notice(LD_REND, "Fail to decrypt descriptor for requested onion "
                         "address. It is likely requiring client "
                         "authorization.");
+      ret = HS_DESC_DECODE_NEED_CLIENT_AUTH;
     }
     goto err;
   }
@@ -2810,7 +2812,9 @@ hs_desc_encrypted_obj_size(const hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *data)
   size_t
 hs_desc_obj_size(const hs_descriptor_t *data)
 {
-  tor_assert(data);
+  if (data == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
   return (hs_desc_plaintext_obj_size(&data->plaintext_data) +
           hs_desc_encrypted_obj_size(&data->encrypted_data) +
           sizeof(data->subcredential));