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authorNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2018-09-20 08:09:35 -0400
committerNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2018-09-20 11:07:42 -0400
commitb54a5e704ff4d3585bdd8459b83d4c522d070fba (patch)
treef0b6b54b67438528f5adecf2cc16cc6e435891af /src/feature/dirauth
parent08e3b88f0774fedb41a6b1c170a710dd12a7cb90 (diff)
downloadtor-b54a5e704ff4d3585bdd8459b83d4c522d070fba.tar.gz
tor-b54a5e704ff4d3585bdd8459b83d4c522d070fba.zip
Split most of dirserv.c into several new modules
In dirauth: * bwauth.c reads and uses bandwidth files * guardfraction.c reads and uses the guardfraction file * reachability.c tests relay reachability * recommend_pkg.c handles the recommended-packages lines. * recv_descs.c handles fingerprint files and processing incoming routerinfos that relays upload to us * voteflag.c computes flag thresholds and sets those thresholds on routerstatuses when computing votes In control: * fmt_serverstatus.c generates the ancient "v1 server status" format that controllers expect. In nodelist: * routerstatus_fmt.c formats routerstatus entries for a consensus, a vote, or for the controller.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/feature/dirauth')
-rw-r--r--src/feature/dirauth/bwauth.c453
-rw-r--r--src/feature/dirauth/bwauth.h58
-rw-r--r--src/feature/dirauth/dirvote.c5
-rw-r--r--src/feature/dirauth/dirvote.h8
-rw-r--r--src/feature/dirauth/guardfraction.c333
-rw-r--r--src/feature/dirauth/guardfraction.h24
-rw-r--r--src/feature/dirauth/process_descs.c835
-rw-r--r--src/feature/dirauth/process_descs.h38
-rw-r--r--src/feature/dirauth/reachability.c205
-rw-r--r--src/feature/dirauth/reachability.h36
-rw-r--r--src/feature/dirauth/recommend_pkg.c90
-rw-r--r--src/feature/dirauth/recommend_pkg.h17
-rw-r--r--src/feature/dirauth/voteflags.c644
-rw-r--r--src/feature/dirauth/voteflags.h31
14 files changed, 2773 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/src/feature/dirauth/bwauth.c b/src/feature/dirauth/bwauth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..90497a3b7c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/feature/dirauth/bwauth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,453 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file bwauth.c
+ * \brief Code to read and apply bandwidth authority data.
+ **/
+
+#define BWAUTH_PRIVATE
+#include "core/or/or.h"
+#include "feature/dirauth/bwauth.h"
+
+#include "app/config/config.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/routerlist.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/routerparse.h"
+
+#include "feature/nodelist/routerinfo_st.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/vote_routerstatus_st.h"
+
+#include "lib/encoding/keyval.h"
+
+/** Total number of routers with measured bandwidth; this is set by
+ * dirserv_count_measured_bs() before the loop in
+ * dirserv_generate_networkstatus_vote_obj() and checked by
+ * dirserv_get_credible_bandwidth() and
+ * dirserv_compute_performance_thresholds() */
+static int routers_with_measured_bw = 0;
+
+/** Look through the routerlist, and using the measured bandwidth cache count
+ * how many measured bandwidths we know. This is used to decide whether we
+ * ever trust advertised bandwidths for purposes of assigning flags. */
+void
+dirserv_count_measured_bws(const smartlist_t *routers)
+{
+ /* Initialize this first */
+ routers_with_measured_bw = 0;
+
+ /* Iterate over the routerlist and count measured bandwidths */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(routers, const routerinfo_t *, ri) {
+ /* Check if we know a measured bandwidth for this one */
+ if (dirserv_has_measured_bw(ri->cache_info.identity_digest)) {
+ ++routers_with_measured_bw;
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ri);
+}
+
+/** Return the last-computed result from dirserv_count_mesured_bws(). */
+int
+dirserv_get_last_n_measured_bws(void)
+{
+ return routers_with_measured_bw;
+}
+
+/** Measured bandwidth cache entry */
+typedef struct mbw_cache_entry_s {
+ long mbw_kb;
+ time_t as_of;
+} mbw_cache_entry_t;
+
+/** Measured bandwidth cache - keys are identity_digests, values are
+ * mbw_cache_entry_t *. */
+static digestmap_t *mbw_cache = NULL;
+
+/** Store a measured bandwidth cache entry when reading the measured
+ * bandwidths file. */
+STATIC void
+dirserv_cache_measured_bw(const measured_bw_line_t *parsed_line,
+ time_t as_of)
+{
+ mbw_cache_entry_t *e = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(parsed_line);
+
+ /* Allocate a cache if we need */
+ if (!mbw_cache) mbw_cache = digestmap_new();
+
+ /* Check if we have an existing entry */
+ e = digestmap_get(mbw_cache, parsed_line->node_id);
+ /* If we do, we can re-use it */
+ if (e) {
+ /* Check that we really are newer, and update */
+ if (as_of > e->as_of) {
+ e->mbw_kb = parsed_line->bw_kb;
+ e->as_of = as_of;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* We'll have to insert a new entry */
+ e = tor_malloc(sizeof(*e));
+ e->mbw_kb = parsed_line->bw_kb;
+ e->as_of = as_of;
+ digestmap_set(mbw_cache, parsed_line->node_id, e);
+ }
+}
+
+/** Clear and free the measured bandwidth cache */
+void
+dirserv_clear_measured_bw_cache(void)
+{
+ if (mbw_cache) {
+ /* Free the map and all entries */
+ digestmap_free(mbw_cache, tor_free_);
+ mbw_cache = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/** Scan the measured bandwidth cache and remove expired entries */
+STATIC void
+dirserv_expire_measured_bw_cache(time_t now)
+{
+
+ if (mbw_cache) {
+ /* Iterate through the cache and check each entry */
+ DIGESTMAP_FOREACH_MODIFY(mbw_cache, k, mbw_cache_entry_t *, e) {
+ if (now > e->as_of + MAX_MEASUREMENT_AGE) {
+ tor_free(e);
+ MAP_DEL_CURRENT(k);
+ }
+ } DIGESTMAP_FOREACH_END;
+
+ /* Check if we cleared the whole thing and free if so */
+ if (digestmap_size(mbw_cache) == 0) {
+ digestmap_free(mbw_cache, tor_free_);
+ mbw_cache = 0;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/** Query the cache by identity digest, return value indicates whether
+ * we found it. The bw_out and as_of_out pointers receive the cached
+ * bandwidth value and the time it was cached if not NULL. */
+int
+dirserv_query_measured_bw_cache_kb(const char *node_id, long *bw_kb_out,
+ time_t *as_of_out)
+{
+ mbw_cache_entry_t *v = NULL;
+ int rv = 0;
+
+ if (mbw_cache && node_id) {
+ v = digestmap_get(mbw_cache, node_id);
+ if (v) {
+ /* Found something */
+ rv = 1;
+ if (bw_kb_out) *bw_kb_out = v->mbw_kb;
+ if (as_of_out) *as_of_out = v->as_of;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/** Predicate wrapper for dirserv_query_measured_bw_cache() */
+int
+dirserv_has_measured_bw(const char *node_id)
+{
+ return dirserv_query_measured_bw_cache_kb(node_id, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+/** Get the current size of the measured bandwidth cache */
+int
+dirserv_get_measured_bw_cache_size(void)
+{
+ if (mbw_cache) return digestmap_size(mbw_cache);
+ else return 0;
+}
+
+/** Return the bandwidth we believe for assigning flags; prefer measured
+ * over advertised, and if we have above a threshold quantity of measured
+ * bandwidths, we don't want to ever give flags to unmeasured routers, so
+ * return 0. */
+uint32_t
+dirserv_get_credible_bandwidth_kb(const routerinfo_t *ri)
+{
+ int threshold;
+ uint32_t bw_kb = 0;
+ long mbw_kb;
+
+ tor_assert(ri);
+ /* Check if we have a measured bandwidth, and check the threshold if not */
+ if (!(dirserv_query_measured_bw_cache_kb(ri->cache_info.identity_digest,
+ &mbw_kb, NULL))) {
+ threshold = get_options()->MinMeasuredBWsForAuthToIgnoreAdvertised;
+ if (routers_with_measured_bw > threshold) {
+ /* Return zero for unmeasured bandwidth if we are above threshold */
+ bw_kb = 0;
+ } else {
+ /* Return an advertised bandwidth otherwise */
+ bw_kb = router_get_advertised_bandwidth_capped(ri) / 1000;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* We have the measured bandwidth in mbw */
+ bw_kb = (uint32_t)mbw_kb;
+ }
+
+ return bw_kb;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read the measured bandwidth list file, apply it to the list of
+ * vote_routerstatus_t and store all the headers in <b>bw_file_headers</b>.
+ * Returns -1 on error, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int
+dirserv_read_measured_bandwidths(const char *from_file,
+ smartlist_t *routerstatuses,
+ smartlist_t *bw_file_headers)
+{
+ FILE *fp = tor_fopen_cloexec(from_file, "r");
+ int applied_lines = 0;
+ time_t file_time, now;
+ int ok;
+ /* This flag will be 1 only when the first successful bw measurement line
+ * has been encountered, so that measured_bw_line_parse don't give warnings
+ * if there are additional header lines, as introduced in Bandwidth List spec
+ * version 1.1.0 */
+ int line_is_after_headers = 0;
+ int rv = -1;
+ char *line = NULL;
+ size_t n = 0;
+
+ /* Initialise line, so that we can't possibly run off the end. */
+
+ if (fp == NULL) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Can't open bandwidth file at configured location: %s",
+ from_file);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* If fgets fails, line is either unmodified, or indeterminate. */
+ if (tor_getline(&line,&n,fp) <= 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIRSERV, "Empty bandwidth file");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!strlen(line) || line[strlen(line)-1] != '\n') {
+ log_warn(LD_DIRSERV, "Long or truncated time in bandwidth file: %s",
+ escaped(line));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ line[strlen(line)-1] = '\0';
+ file_time = (time_t)tor_parse_ulong(line, 10, 0, ULONG_MAX, &ok, NULL);
+ if (!ok) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIRSERV, "Non-integer time in bandwidth file: %s",
+ escaped(line));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ now = time(NULL);
+ if ((now - file_time) > MAX_MEASUREMENT_AGE) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIRSERV, "Bandwidth measurement file stale. Age: %u",
+ (unsigned)(time(NULL) - file_time));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* If timestamp was correct and bw_file_headers is not NULL,
+ * add timestamp to bw_file_headers */
+ if (bw_file_headers)
+ smartlist_add_asprintf(bw_file_headers, "timestamp=%lu",
+ (unsigned long)file_time);
+
+ if (routerstatuses)
+ smartlist_sort(routerstatuses, compare_vote_routerstatus_entries);
+
+ while (!feof(fp)) {
+ measured_bw_line_t parsed_line;
+ if (tor_getline(&line, &n, fp) >= 0) {
+ if (measured_bw_line_parse(&parsed_line, line,
+ line_is_after_headers) != -1) {
+ /* This condition will be true when the first complete valid bw line
+ * has been encountered, which means the end of the header lines. */
+ line_is_after_headers = 1;
+ /* Also cache the line for dirserv_get_bandwidth_for_router() */
+ dirserv_cache_measured_bw(&parsed_line, file_time);
+ if (measured_bw_line_apply(&parsed_line, routerstatuses) > 0)
+ applied_lines++;
+ /* if the terminator is found, it is the end of header lines, set the
+ * flag but do not store anything */
+ } else if (strcmp(line, BW_FILE_HEADERS_TERMINATOR) == 0) {
+ line_is_after_headers = 1;
+ /* if the line was not a correct relay line nor the terminator and
+ * the end of the header lines has not been detected yet
+ * and it is key_value and bw_file_headers did not reach the maximum
+ * number of headers,
+ * then assume this line is a header and add it to bw_file_headers */
+ } else if (bw_file_headers &&
+ (line_is_after_headers == 0) &&
+ string_is_key_value(LOG_DEBUG, line) &&
+ !strchr(line, ' ') &&
+ (smartlist_len(bw_file_headers)
+ < MAX_BW_FILE_HEADER_COUNT_IN_VOTE)) {
+ line[strlen(line)-1] = '\0';
+ smartlist_add_strdup(bw_file_headers, line);
+ };
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Now would be a nice time to clean the cache, too */
+ dirserv_expire_measured_bw_cache(now);
+
+ log_info(LD_DIRSERV,
+ "Bandwidth measurement file successfully read. "
+ "Applied %d measurements.", applied_lines);
+ rv = 0;
+
+ err:
+ if (line) {
+ // we need to raw_free this buffer because we got it from tor_getdelim()
+ raw_free(line);
+ }
+ if (fp)
+ fclose(fp);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Helper function to parse out a line in the measured bandwidth file
+ * into a measured_bw_line_t output structure.
+ *
+ * If <b>line_is_after_headers</b> is true, then if we encounter an incomplete
+ * bw line, return -1 and warn, since we are after the headers and we should
+ * only parse bw lines. Return 0 otherwise.
+ *
+ * If <b>line_is_after_headers</b> is false then it means that we are not past
+ * the header block yet. If we encounter an incomplete bw line, return -1 but
+ * don't warn since there could be additional header lines coming. If we
+ * encounter a proper bw line, return 0 (and we got past the headers).
+ */
+STATIC int
+measured_bw_line_parse(measured_bw_line_t *out, const char *orig_line,
+ int line_is_after_headers)
+{
+ char *line = tor_strdup(orig_line);
+ char *cp = line;
+ int got_bw = 0;
+ int got_node_id = 0;
+ char *strtok_state; /* lame sauce d'jour */
+
+ if (strlen(line) == 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIRSERV, "Empty line in bandwidth file");
+ tor_free(line);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Remove end of line character, so that is not part of the token */
+ if (line[strlen(line) - 1] == '\n') {
+ line[strlen(line) - 1] = '\0';
+ }
+
+ cp = tor_strtok_r(cp, " \t", &strtok_state);
+
+ if (!cp) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIRSERV, "Invalid line in bandwidth file: %s",
+ escaped(orig_line));
+ tor_free(line);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (orig_line[strlen(orig_line)-1] != '\n') {
+ log_warn(LD_DIRSERV, "Incomplete line in bandwidth file: %s",
+ escaped(orig_line));
+ tor_free(line);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ do {
+ if (strcmpstart(cp, "bw=") == 0) {
+ int parse_ok = 0;
+ char *endptr;
+ if (got_bw) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIRSERV, "Double bw= in bandwidth file line: %s",
+ escaped(orig_line));
+ tor_free(line);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ cp+=strlen("bw=");
+
+ out->bw_kb = tor_parse_long(cp, 10, 0, LONG_MAX, &parse_ok, &endptr);
+ if (!parse_ok || (*endptr && !TOR_ISSPACE(*endptr))) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIRSERV, "Invalid bandwidth in bandwidth file line: %s",
+ escaped(orig_line));
+ tor_free(line);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ got_bw=1;
+ } else if (strcmpstart(cp, "node_id=$") == 0) {
+ if (got_node_id) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIRSERV, "Double node_id= in bandwidth file line: %s",
+ escaped(orig_line));
+ tor_free(line);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ cp+=strlen("node_id=$");
+
+ if (strlen(cp) != HEX_DIGEST_LEN ||
+ base16_decode(out->node_id, DIGEST_LEN,
+ cp, HEX_DIGEST_LEN) != DIGEST_LEN) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIRSERV, "Invalid node_id in bandwidth file line: %s",
+ escaped(orig_line));
+ tor_free(line);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ strlcpy(out->node_hex, cp, sizeof(out->node_hex));
+ got_node_id=1;
+ }
+ } while ((cp = tor_strtok_r(NULL, " \t", &strtok_state)));
+
+ if (got_bw && got_node_id) {
+ tor_free(line);
+ return 0;
+ } else if (line_is_after_headers == 0) {
+ /* There could be additional header lines, therefore do not give warnings
+ * but returns -1 since it's not a complete bw line. */
+ log_debug(LD_DIRSERV, "Missing bw or node_id in bandwidth file line: %s",
+ escaped(orig_line));
+ tor_free(line);
+ return -1;
+ } else {
+ log_warn(LD_DIRSERV, "Incomplete line in bandwidth file: %s",
+ escaped(orig_line));
+ tor_free(line);
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Helper function to apply a parsed measurement line to a list
+ * of bandwidth statuses. Returns true if a line is found,
+ * false otherwise.
+ */
+STATIC int
+measured_bw_line_apply(measured_bw_line_t *parsed_line,
+ smartlist_t *routerstatuses)
+{
+ vote_routerstatus_t *rs = NULL;
+ if (!routerstatuses)
+ return 0;
+
+ rs = smartlist_bsearch(routerstatuses, parsed_line->node_id,
+ compare_digest_to_vote_routerstatus_entry);
+
+ if (rs) {
+ rs->has_measured_bw = 1;
+ rs->measured_bw_kb = (uint32_t)parsed_line->bw_kb;
+ } else {
+ log_info(LD_DIRSERV, "Node ID %s not found in routerstatus list",
+ parsed_line->node_hex);
+ }
+
+ return rs != NULL;
+}
diff --git a/src/feature/dirauth/bwauth.h b/src/feature/dirauth/bwauth.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f10f8227af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/feature/dirauth/bwauth.h
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file bwauth.h
+ * \brief Header file for bwauth.c
+ **/
+
+#ifndef TOR_BWAUTH_H
+#define TOR_BWAUTH_H
+
+/** Maximum allowable length of bandwidth headers in a bandwidth file */
+#define MAX_BW_FILE_HEADER_COUNT_IN_VOTE 50
+
+/** Terminatore that separates bandwidth file headers from bandwidth file
+ * relay lines */
+#define BW_FILE_HEADERS_TERMINATOR "=====\n"
+
+int dirserv_read_measured_bandwidths(const char *from_file,
+ smartlist_t *routerstatuses,
+ smartlist_t *bw_file_headers);
+
+int dirserv_query_measured_bw_cache_kb(const char *node_id,
+ long *bw_out,
+ time_t *as_of_out);
+void dirserv_clear_measured_bw_cache(void);
+int dirserv_has_measured_bw(const char *node_id);
+int dirserv_get_measured_bw_cache_size(void);
+void dirserv_count_measured_bws(const smartlist_t *routers);
+int dirserv_get_last_n_measured_bws(void);
+
+uint32_t dirserv_get_credible_bandwidth_kb(const routerinfo_t *ri);
+
+#ifdef BWAUTH_PRIVATE
+typedef struct measured_bw_line_t {
+ char node_id[DIGEST_LEN];
+ char node_hex[MAX_HEX_NICKNAME_LEN+1];
+ long int bw_kb;
+} measured_bw_line_t;
+
+/* Put the MAX_MEASUREMENT_AGE #define here so unit tests can see it */
+#define MAX_MEASUREMENT_AGE (3*24*60*60) /* 3 days */
+
+STATIC int measured_bw_line_parse(measured_bw_line_t *out, const char *line,
+ int line_is_after_headers);
+
+STATIC int measured_bw_line_apply(measured_bw_line_t *parsed_line,
+ smartlist_t *routerstatuses);
+
+STATIC void dirserv_cache_measured_bw(const measured_bw_line_t *parsed_line,
+ time_t as_of);
+STATIC void dirserv_expire_measured_bw_cache(time_t now);
+#endif /* defined(BWAUTH_PRIVATE) */
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/feature/dirauth/dirvote.c b/src/feature/dirauth/dirvote.c
index 76877490b2..5ca9ed4a4a 100644
--- a/src/feature/dirauth/dirvote.c
+++ b/src/feature/dirauth/dirvote.c
@@ -7,8 +7,12 @@
#include "core/or/or.h"
#include "app/config/config.h"
#include "feature/dirauth/dircollate.h"
+#include "feature/dirauth/recommend_pkg.h"
+#include "feature/dirauth/voteflags.h"
#include "feature/dircache/directory.h"
+#include "feature/dirauth/bwauth.h"
#include "feature/dircache/dirserv.h"
+#include "feature/dirauth/guardfraction.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/microdesc.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h"
@@ -23,6 +27,7 @@
#include "feature/nodelist/dirlist.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/routerlist.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/routerparse.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/fmt_routerstatus.h"
#include "feature/client/entrynodes.h" /* needed for guardfraction methods */
#include "feature/nodelist/torcert.h"
#include "feature/dircommon/voting_schedule.h"
diff --git a/src/feature/dirauth/dirvote.h b/src/feature/dirauth/dirvote.h
index 979a2be8a6..a21e9f3455 100644
--- a/src/feature/dirauth/dirvote.h
+++ b/src/feature/dirauth/dirvote.h
@@ -115,6 +115,10 @@ int dirvote_add_signatures(const char *detached_signatures_body,
const char *source,
const char **msg_out);
+struct config_line_t;
+char *format_recommended_version_list(const struct config_line_t *line,
+ int warn);
+
#else /* HAVE_MODULE_DIRAUTH */
static inline time_t
@@ -192,10 +196,6 @@ const cached_dir_t *dirvote_get_vote(const char *fp, int flags);
* API used _only_ by the dirauth subsystem.
*/
-void set_routerstatus_from_routerinfo(routerstatus_t *rs,
- node_t *node,
- routerinfo_t *ri, time_t now,
- int listbadexits);
networkstatus_t *
dirserv_generate_networkstatus_vote_obj(crypto_pk_t *private_key,
authority_cert_t *cert);
diff --git a/src/feature/dirauth/guardfraction.c b/src/feature/dirauth/guardfraction.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..60ba316cfe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/feature/dirauth/guardfraction.c
@@ -0,0 +1,333 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file bwauth.c
+ * \brief Code to read and apply guard fraction data.
+ **/
+
+#define GUARDFRACTION_PRIVATE
+#include "core/or/or.h"
+#include "feature/dirauth/guardfraction.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/routerparse.h"
+
+#include "feature/nodelist/vote_routerstatus_st.h"
+
+#include "lib/encoding/confline.h"
+
+/** The guardfraction of the guard with identity fingerprint <b>guard_id</b>
+ * is <b>guardfraction_percentage</b>. See if we have a vote routerstatus for
+ * this guard in <b>vote_routerstatuses</b>, and if we do, register the
+ * information to it.
+ *
+ * Return 1 if we applied the information and 0 if we couldn't find a
+ * matching guard.
+ *
+ * Requires that <b>vote_routerstatuses</b> be sorted.
+ */
+static int
+guardfraction_line_apply(const char *guard_id,
+ uint32_t guardfraction_percentage,
+ smartlist_t *vote_routerstatuses)
+{
+ vote_routerstatus_t *vrs = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(vote_routerstatuses);
+
+ vrs = smartlist_bsearch(vote_routerstatuses, guard_id,
+ compare_digest_to_vote_routerstatus_entry);
+
+ if (!vrs) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ vrs->status.has_guardfraction = 1;
+ vrs->status.guardfraction_percentage = guardfraction_percentage;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Given a guard line from a guardfraction file, parse it and register
+ * its information to <b>vote_routerstatuses</b>.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * 1 if the line was proper and its information got registered.
+ * * 0 if the line was proper but no currently active guard was found
+ * to register the guardfraction information to.
+ * * -1 if the line could not be parsed and set <b>err_msg</b> to a
+ newly allocated string containing the error message.
+ */
+static int
+guardfraction_file_parse_guard_line(const char *guard_line,
+ smartlist_t *vote_routerstatuses,
+ char **err_msg)
+{
+ char guard_id[DIGEST_LEN];
+ uint32_t guardfraction;
+ char *inputs_tmp = NULL;
+ int num_ok = 1;
+
+ smartlist_t *sl = smartlist_new();
+ int retval = -1;
+
+ tor_assert(err_msg);
+
+ /* guard_line should contain something like this:
+ <hex digest> <guardfraction> <appearances> */
+ smartlist_split_string(sl, guard_line, " ",
+ SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 3);
+ if (smartlist_len(sl) < 3) {
+ tor_asprintf(err_msg, "bad line '%s'", guard_line);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ inputs_tmp = smartlist_get(sl, 0);
+ if (strlen(inputs_tmp) != HEX_DIGEST_LEN ||
+ base16_decode(guard_id, DIGEST_LEN,
+ inputs_tmp, HEX_DIGEST_LEN) != DIGEST_LEN) {
+ tor_asprintf(err_msg, "bad digest '%s'", inputs_tmp);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ inputs_tmp = smartlist_get(sl, 1);
+ /* Guardfraction is an integer in [0, 100]. */
+ guardfraction =
+ (uint32_t) tor_parse_long(inputs_tmp, 10, 0, 100, &num_ok, NULL);
+ if (!num_ok) {
+ tor_asprintf(err_msg, "wrong percentage '%s'", inputs_tmp);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* If routerstatuses were provided, apply this info to actual routers. */
+ if (vote_routerstatuses) {
+ retval = guardfraction_line_apply(guard_id, guardfraction,
+ vote_routerstatuses);
+ } else {
+ retval = 0; /* If we got this far, line was correctly formatted. */
+ }
+
+ done:
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
+ smartlist_free(sl);
+
+ return retval;
+}
+
+/** Given an inputs line from a guardfraction file, parse it and
+ * register its information to <b>total_consensuses</b> and
+ * <b>total_days</b>.
+ *
+ * Return 0 if it parsed well. Return -1 if there was an error, and
+ * set <b>err_msg</b> to a newly allocated string containing the
+ * error message.
+ */
+static int
+guardfraction_file_parse_inputs_line(const char *inputs_line,
+ int *total_consensuses,
+ int *total_days,
+ char **err_msg)
+{
+ int retval = -1;
+ char *inputs_tmp = NULL;
+ int num_ok = 1;
+ smartlist_t *sl = smartlist_new();
+
+ tor_assert(err_msg);
+
+ /* Second line is inputs information:
+ * n-inputs <total_consensuses> <total_days>. */
+ smartlist_split_string(sl, inputs_line, " ",
+ SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 3);
+ if (smartlist_len(sl) < 2) {
+ tor_asprintf(err_msg, "incomplete line '%s'", inputs_line);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ inputs_tmp = smartlist_get(sl, 0);
+ *total_consensuses =
+ (int) tor_parse_long(inputs_tmp, 10, 0, INT_MAX, &num_ok, NULL);
+ if (!num_ok) {
+ tor_asprintf(err_msg, "unparseable consensus '%s'", inputs_tmp);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ inputs_tmp = smartlist_get(sl, 1);
+ *total_days =
+ (int) tor_parse_long(inputs_tmp, 10, 0, INT_MAX, &num_ok, NULL);
+ if (!num_ok) {
+ tor_asprintf(err_msg, "unparseable days '%s'", inputs_tmp);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ retval = 0;
+
+ done:
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
+ smartlist_free(sl);
+
+ return retval;
+}
+
+/* Maximum age of a guardfraction file that we are willing to accept. */
+#define MAX_GUARDFRACTION_FILE_AGE (7*24*60*60) /* approx a week */
+
+/** Static strings of guardfraction files. */
+#define GUARDFRACTION_DATE_STR "written-at"
+#define GUARDFRACTION_INPUTS "n-inputs"
+#define GUARDFRACTION_GUARD "guard-seen"
+#define GUARDFRACTION_VERSION "guardfraction-file-version"
+
+/** Given a guardfraction file in a string, parse it and register the
+ * guardfraction information to the provided vote routerstatuses.
+ *
+ * This is the rough format of the guardfraction file:
+ *
+ * guardfraction-file-version 1
+ * written-at <date and time>
+ * n-inputs <number of consesuses parsed> <number of days considered>
+ *
+ * guard-seen <fpr 1> <guardfraction percentage> <consensus appearances>
+ * guard-seen <fpr 2> <guardfraction percentage> <consensus appearances>
+ * guard-seen <fpr 3> <guardfraction percentage> <consensus appearances>
+ * guard-seen <fpr 4> <guardfraction percentage> <consensus appearances>
+ * guard-seen <fpr 5> <guardfraction percentage> <consensus appearances>
+ * ...
+ *
+ * Return -1 if the parsing failed and 0 if it went smoothly. Parsing
+ * should tolerate errors in all lines but the written-at header.
+ */
+STATIC int
+dirserv_read_guardfraction_file_from_str(const char *guardfraction_file_str,
+ smartlist_t *vote_routerstatuses)
+{
+ config_line_t *front=NULL, *line;
+ int ret_tmp;
+ int retval = -1;
+ int current_line_n = 0; /* line counter for better log messages */
+
+ /* Guardfraction info to be parsed */
+ int total_consensuses = 0;
+ int total_days = 0;
+
+ /* Stats */
+ int guards_read_n = 0;
+ int guards_applied_n = 0;
+
+ /* Parse file and split it in lines */
+ ret_tmp = config_get_lines(guardfraction_file_str, &front, 0);
+ if (ret_tmp < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Error reading from guardfraction file");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* Sort routerstatuses (needed later when applying guardfraction info) */
+ if (vote_routerstatuses)
+ smartlist_sort(vote_routerstatuses, compare_vote_routerstatus_entries);
+
+ for (line = front; line; line=line->next) {
+ current_line_n++;
+
+ if (!strcmp(line->key, GUARDFRACTION_VERSION)) {
+ int num_ok = 1;
+ unsigned int version;
+
+ version =
+ (unsigned int) tor_parse_long(line->value,
+ 10, 0, INT_MAX, &num_ok, NULL);
+
+ if (!num_ok || version != 1) {
+ log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Got unknown guardfraction version %d.", version);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ } else if (!strcmp(line->key, GUARDFRACTION_DATE_STR)) {
+ time_t file_written_at;
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+
+ /* First line is 'written-at <date>' */
+ if (parse_iso_time(line->value, &file_written_at) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Guardfraction:%d: Bad date '%s'. Ignoring",
+ current_line_n, line->value);
+ goto done; /* don't tolerate failure here. */
+ }
+ if (file_written_at < now - MAX_GUARDFRACTION_FILE_AGE) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Guardfraction:%d: was written very long ago '%s'",
+ current_line_n, line->value);
+ goto done; /* don't tolerate failure here. */
+ }
+ } else if (!strcmp(line->key, GUARDFRACTION_INPUTS)) {
+ char *err_msg = NULL;
+
+ if (guardfraction_file_parse_inputs_line(line->value,
+ &total_consensuses,
+ &total_days,
+ &err_msg) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Guardfraction:%d: %s",
+ current_line_n, err_msg);
+ tor_free(err_msg);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ } else if (!strcmp(line->key, GUARDFRACTION_GUARD)) {
+ char *err_msg = NULL;
+
+ ret_tmp = guardfraction_file_parse_guard_line(line->value,
+ vote_routerstatuses,
+ &err_msg);
+ if (ret_tmp < 0) { /* failed while parsing the guard line */
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Guardfraction:%d: %s",
+ current_line_n, err_msg);
+ tor_free(err_msg);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Successfully parsed guard line. Check if it was applied properly. */
+ guards_read_n++;
+ if (ret_tmp > 0) {
+ guards_applied_n++;
+ }
+ } else {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Unknown guardfraction line %d (%s %s)",
+ current_line_n, line->key, line->value);
+ }
+ }
+
+ retval = 0;
+
+ log_info(LD_CONFIG,
+ "Successfully parsed guardfraction file with %d consensuses over "
+ "%d days. Parsed %d nodes and applied %d of them%s.",
+ total_consensuses, total_days, guards_read_n, guards_applied_n,
+ vote_routerstatuses ? "" : " (no routerstatus provided)" );
+
+ done:
+ config_free_lines(front);
+
+ if (retval < 0) {
+ return retval;
+ } else {
+ return guards_read_n;
+ }
+}
+
+/** Read a guardfraction file at <b>fname</b> and load all its
+ * information to <b>vote_routerstatuses</b>. */
+int
+dirserv_read_guardfraction_file(const char *fname,
+ smartlist_t *vote_routerstatuses)
+{
+ char *guardfraction_file_str;
+
+ /* Read file to a string */
+ guardfraction_file_str = read_file_to_str(fname, RFTS_IGNORE_MISSING, NULL);
+ if (!guardfraction_file_str) {
+ log_warn(LD_FS, "Cannot open guardfraction file '%s'. Failing.", fname);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return dirserv_read_guardfraction_file_from_str(guardfraction_file_str,
+ vote_routerstatuses);
+}
diff --git a/src/feature/dirauth/guardfraction.h b/src/feature/dirauth/guardfraction.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..38a0781dbb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/feature/dirauth/guardfraction.h
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file guardfraction.h
+ * \brief Header file for guardfraction.c
+ **/
+
+#ifndef TOR_GUARDFRACTION_H
+#define TOR_GUARDFRACTION_H
+
+#ifdef GUARDFRACTION_PRIVATE
+STATIC int
+dirserv_read_guardfraction_file_from_str(const char *guardfraction_file_str,
+ smartlist_t *vote_routerstatuses);
+#endif /* defined(DIRSERV_PRIVATE) */
+
+int dirserv_read_guardfraction_file(const char *fname,
+ smartlist_t *vote_routerstatuses);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/feature/dirauth/process_descs.c b/src/feature/dirauth/process_descs.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2c2fefca77
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/feature/dirauth/process_descs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,835 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file process_descs.c
+ * \brief Make decisions about uploaded descriptors
+ *
+ * Authorities use the code in this module to decide what to do with just-
+ * uploaded descriptors, and to manage the fingerprint file that helps
+ * them make those decisions.
+ **/
+
+#include "core/or/or.h"
+#include "feature/dirauth/process_descs.h"
+
+#include "app/config/config.h"
+#include "core/or/policies.h"
+#include "feature/dirauth/keypin.h"
+#include "feature/dirauth/reachability.h"
+#include "feature/dircache/directory.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/routerlist.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/routerparse.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/torcert.h"
+#include "feature/relay/router.h"
+
+#include "core/or/tor_version_st.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/extrainfo_st.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/node_st.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/routerinfo_st.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/routerstatus_st.h"
+
+#include "lib/encoding/confline.h"
+
+/** How far in the future do we allow a router to get? (seconds) */
+#define ROUTER_ALLOW_SKEW (60*60*12)
+
+static void directory_remove_invalid(void);
+struct authdir_config_t;
+static was_router_added_t dirserv_add_extrainfo(extrainfo_t *ei,
+ const char **msg);
+static uint32_t
+dirserv_get_status_impl(const char *fp, const char *nickname,
+ uint32_t addr, uint16_t or_port,
+ const char *platform, const char **msg,
+ int severity);
+
+/* 1 Historically used to indicate Named */
+#define FP_INVALID 2 /**< Believed invalid. */
+#define FP_REJECT 4 /**< We will not publish this router. */
+/* 8 Historically used to avoid using this as a dir. */
+#define FP_BADEXIT 16 /**< We'll tell clients not to use this as an exit. */
+/* 32 Historically used to indicade Unnamed */
+
+/** Target of status_by_digest map. */
+typedef uint32_t router_status_t;
+
+static void add_fingerprint_to_dir(const char *fp,
+ struct authdir_config_t *list,
+ router_status_t add_status);
+
+/** List of nickname-\>identity fingerprint mappings for all the routers
+ * that we name. Used to prevent router impersonation. */
+typedef struct authdir_config_t {
+ strmap_t *fp_by_name; /**< Map from lc nickname to fingerprint. */
+ digestmap_t *status_by_digest; /**< Map from digest to router_status_t. */
+} authdir_config_t;
+
+/** Should be static; exposed for testing. */
+static authdir_config_t *fingerprint_list = NULL;
+
+/** Allocate and return a new, empty, authdir_config_t. */
+static authdir_config_t *
+authdir_config_new(void)
+{
+ authdir_config_t *list = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(authdir_config_t));
+ list->fp_by_name = strmap_new();
+ list->status_by_digest = digestmap_new();
+ return list;
+}
+
+/** Add the fingerprint <b>fp</b> to the smartlist of fingerprint_entry_t's
+ * <b>list</b>, or-ing the currently set status flags with
+ * <b>add_status</b>.
+ */
+/* static */ void
+add_fingerprint_to_dir(const char *fp, authdir_config_t *list,
+ router_status_t add_status)
+{
+ char *fingerprint;
+ char d[DIGEST_LEN];
+ router_status_t *status;
+ tor_assert(fp);
+ tor_assert(list);
+
+ fingerprint = tor_strdup(fp);
+ tor_strstrip(fingerprint, " ");
+ if (base16_decode(d, DIGEST_LEN,
+ fingerprint, strlen(fingerprint)) != DIGEST_LEN) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIRSERV, "Couldn't decode fingerprint \"%s\"",
+ escaped(fp));
+ tor_free(fingerprint);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ status = digestmap_get(list->status_by_digest, d);
+ if (!status) {
+ status = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(router_status_t));
+ digestmap_set(list->status_by_digest, d, status);
+ }
+
+ tor_free(fingerprint);
+ *status |= add_status;
+ return;
+}
+
+/** Add the fingerprint for this OR to the global list of recognized
+ * identity key fingerprints. */
+int
+dirserv_add_own_fingerprint(crypto_pk_t *pk)
+{
+ char fp[FINGERPRINT_LEN+1];
+ if (crypto_pk_get_fingerprint(pk, fp, 0)<0) {
+ log_err(LD_BUG, "Error computing fingerprint");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (!fingerprint_list)
+ fingerprint_list = authdir_config_new();
+ add_fingerprint_to_dir(fp, fingerprint_list, 0);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Load the nickname-\>fingerprint mappings stored in the approved-routers
+ * file. The file format is line-based, with each non-blank holding one
+ * nickname, some space, and a fingerprint for that nickname. On success,
+ * replace the current fingerprint list with the new list and return 0. On
+ * failure, leave the current fingerprint list untouched, and return -1. */
+int
+dirserv_load_fingerprint_file(void)
+{
+ char *fname;
+ char *cf;
+ char *nickname, *fingerprint;
+ authdir_config_t *fingerprint_list_new;
+ int result;
+ config_line_t *front=NULL, *list;
+
+ fname = get_datadir_fname("approved-routers");
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL,
+ "Reloading approved fingerprints from \"%s\"...", fname);
+
+ cf = read_file_to_str(fname, RFTS_IGNORE_MISSING, NULL);
+ if (!cf) {
+ log_warn(LD_FS, "Cannot open fingerprint file '%s'. That's ok.", fname);
+ tor_free(fname);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ tor_free(fname);
+
+ result = config_get_lines(cf, &front, 0);
+ tor_free(cf);
+ if (result < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Error reading from fingerprint file");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ fingerprint_list_new = authdir_config_new();
+
+ for (list=front; list; list=list->next) {
+ char digest_tmp[DIGEST_LEN];
+ router_status_t add_status = 0;
+ nickname = list->key; fingerprint = list->value;
+ tor_strstrip(fingerprint, " "); /* remove spaces */
+ if (strlen(fingerprint) != HEX_DIGEST_LEN ||
+ base16_decode(digest_tmp, sizeof(digest_tmp),
+ fingerprint, HEX_DIGEST_LEN) != sizeof(digest_tmp)) {
+ log_notice(LD_CONFIG,
+ "Invalid fingerprint (nickname '%s', "
+ "fingerprint %s). Skipping.",
+ nickname, fingerprint);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (!strcasecmp(nickname, "!reject")) {
+ add_status = FP_REJECT;
+ } else if (!strcasecmp(nickname, "!badexit")) {
+ add_status = FP_BADEXIT;
+ } else if (!strcasecmp(nickname, "!invalid")) {
+ add_status = FP_INVALID;
+ }
+ add_fingerprint_to_dir(fingerprint, fingerprint_list_new, add_status);
+ }
+
+ config_free_lines(front);
+ dirserv_free_fingerprint_list();
+ fingerprint_list = fingerprint_list_new;
+ /* Delete any routers whose fingerprints we no longer recognize */
+ directory_remove_invalid();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* If this is set, then we don't allow routers that have advertised an Ed25519
+ * identity to stop doing so. This is going to be essential for good identity
+ * security: otherwise anybody who can attack RSA-1024 but not Ed25519 could
+ * just sign fake descriptors missing the Ed25519 key. But we won't actually
+ * be able to prevent that kind of thing until we're confident that there isn't
+ * actually a legit reason to downgrade to 0.2.5. Now we are not recommending
+ * 0.2.5 anymore so there is no reason to keep the #undef.
+ */
+
+#define DISABLE_DISABLING_ED25519
+
+/** Check whether <b>router</b> has a nickname/identity key combination that
+ * we recognize from the fingerprint list, or an IP we automatically act on
+ * according to our configuration. Return the appropriate router status.
+ *
+ * If the status is 'FP_REJECT' and <b>msg</b> is provided, set
+ * *<b>msg</b> to an explanation of why. */
+uint32_t
+dirserv_router_get_status(const routerinfo_t *router, const char **msg,
+ int severity)
+{
+ char d[DIGEST_LEN];
+ const int key_pinning = get_options()->AuthDirPinKeys;
+
+ if (crypto_pk_get_digest(router->identity_pkey, d)) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error computing fingerprint");
+ if (msg)
+ *msg = "Bug: Error computing fingerprint";
+ return FP_REJECT;
+ }
+
+ /* Check for the more usual versions to reject a router first. */
+ const uint32_t r = dirserv_get_status_impl(d, router->nickname,
+ router->addr, router->or_port,
+ router->platform, msg, severity);
+ if (r)
+ return r;
+
+ /* dirserv_get_status_impl already rejects versions older than 0.2.4.18-rc,
+ * and onion_curve25519_pkey was introduced in 0.2.4.8-alpha.
+ * But just in case a relay doesn't provide or lies about its version, or
+ * doesn't include an ntor key in its descriptor, check that it exists,
+ * and is non-zero (clients check that it's non-zero before using it). */
+ if (!routerinfo_has_curve25519_onion_key(router)) {
+ log_fn(severity, LD_DIR,
+ "Descriptor from router %s is missing an ntor curve25519 onion "
+ "key.", router_describe(router));
+ if (msg)
+ *msg = "Missing ntor curve25519 onion key. Please upgrade!";
+ return FP_REJECT;
+ }
+
+ if (router->cache_info.signing_key_cert) {
+ /* This has an ed25519 identity key. */
+ if (KEYPIN_MISMATCH ==
+ keypin_check((const uint8_t*)router->cache_info.identity_digest,
+ router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key.pubkey)) {
+ log_fn(severity, LD_DIR,
+ "Descriptor from router %s has an Ed25519 key, "
+ "but the <rsa,ed25519> keys don't match what they were before.",
+ router_describe(router));
+ if (key_pinning) {
+ if (msg) {
+ *msg = "Ed25519 identity key or RSA identity key has changed.";
+ }
+ return FP_REJECT;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* No ed25519 key */
+ if (KEYPIN_MISMATCH == keypin_check_lone_rsa(
+ (const uint8_t*)router->cache_info.identity_digest)) {
+ log_fn(severity, LD_DIR,
+ "Descriptor from router %s has no Ed25519 key, "
+ "when we previously knew an Ed25519 for it. Ignoring for now, "
+ "since Ed25519 keys are fairly new.",
+ router_describe(router));
+#ifdef DISABLE_DISABLING_ED25519
+ if (key_pinning) {
+ if (msg) {
+ *msg = "Ed25519 identity key has disappeared.";
+ }
+ return FP_REJECT;
+ }
+#endif /* defined(DISABLE_DISABLING_ED25519) */
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Return true if there is no point in downloading the router described by
+ * <b>rs</b> because this directory would reject it. */
+int
+dirserv_would_reject_router(const routerstatus_t *rs)
+{
+ uint32_t res;
+
+ res = dirserv_get_status_impl(rs->identity_digest, rs->nickname,
+ rs->addr, rs->or_port,
+ NULL, NULL, LOG_DEBUG);
+
+ return (res & FP_REJECT) != 0;
+}
+
+/** Helper: As dirserv_router_get_status, but takes the router fingerprint
+ * (hex, no spaces), nickname, address (used for logging only), IP address, OR
+ * port and platform (logging only) as arguments.
+ *
+ * Log messages at 'severity'. (There's not much point in
+ * logging that we're rejecting servers we'll not download.)
+ */
+static uint32_t
+dirserv_get_status_impl(const char *id_digest, const char *nickname,
+ uint32_t addr, uint16_t or_port,
+ const char *platform, const char **msg, int severity)
+{
+ uint32_t result = 0;
+ router_status_t *status_by_digest;
+
+ if (!fingerprint_list)
+ fingerprint_list = authdir_config_new();
+
+ log_debug(LD_DIRSERV, "%d fingerprints, %d digests known.",
+ strmap_size(fingerprint_list->fp_by_name),
+ digestmap_size(fingerprint_list->status_by_digest));
+
+ if (platform) {
+ tor_version_t ver_tmp;
+ if (tor_version_parse_platform(platform, &ver_tmp, 1) < 0) {
+ if (msg) {
+ *msg = "Malformed platform string.";
+ }
+ return FP_REJECT;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Versions before Tor 0.2.4.18-rc are too old to support, and are
+ * missing some important security fixes too. Disable them. */
+ if (platform && !tor_version_as_new_as(platform,"0.2.4.18-rc")) {
+ if (msg)
+ *msg = "Tor version is insecure or unsupported. Please upgrade!";
+ return FP_REJECT;
+ }
+
+ /* Tor 0.2.9.x where x<5 suffers from bug #20499, where relays don't
+ * keep their consensus up to date so they make bad guards.
+ * The simple fix is to just drop them from the network. */
+ if (platform &&
+ tor_version_as_new_as(platform,"0.2.9.0-alpha") &&
+ !tor_version_as_new_as(platform,"0.2.9.5-alpha")) {
+ if (msg)
+ *msg = "Tor version contains bug 20499. Please upgrade!";
+ return FP_REJECT;
+ }
+
+ status_by_digest = digestmap_get(fingerprint_list->status_by_digest,
+ id_digest);
+ if (status_by_digest)
+ result |= *status_by_digest;
+
+ if (result & FP_REJECT) {
+ if (msg)
+ *msg = "Fingerprint is marked rejected -- if you think this is a "
+ "mistake please set a valid email address in ContactInfo and "
+ "send an email to bad-relays@lists.torproject.org mentioning "
+ "your fingerprint(s)?";
+ return FP_REJECT;
+ } else if (result & FP_INVALID) {
+ if (msg)
+ *msg = "Fingerprint is marked invalid";
+ }
+
+ if (authdir_policy_badexit_address(addr, or_port)) {
+ log_fn(severity, LD_DIRSERV,
+ "Marking '%s' as bad exit because of address '%s'",
+ nickname, fmt_addr32(addr));
+ result |= FP_BADEXIT;
+ }
+
+ if (!authdir_policy_permits_address(addr, or_port)) {
+ log_fn(severity, LD_DIRSERV, "Rejecting '%s' because of address '%s'",
+ nickname, fmt_addr32(addr));
+ if (msg)
+ *msg = "Suspicious relay address range -- if you think this is a "
+ "mistake please set a valid email address in ContactInfo and "
+ "send an email to bad-relays@lists.torproject.org mentioning "
+ "your address(es) and fingerprint(s)?";
+ return FP_REJECT;
+ }
+ if (!authdir_policy_valid_address(addr, or_port)) {
+ log_fn(severity, LD_DIRSERV,
+ "Not marking '%s' valid because of address '%s'",
+ nickname, fmt_addr32(addr));
+ result |= FP_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+/** Clear the current fingerprint list. */
+void
+dirserv_free_fingerprint_list(void)
+{
+ if (!fingerprint_list)
+ return;
+
+ strmap_free(fingerprint_list->fp_by_name, tor_free_);
+ digestmap_free(fingerprint_list->status_by_digest, tor_free_);
+ tor_free(fingerprint_list);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Descriptor list
+ */
+
+/** Return -1 if <b>ri</b> has a private or otherwise bad address,
+ * unless we're configured to not care. Return 0 if all ok. */
+static int
+dirserv_router_has_valid_address(routerinfo_t *ri)
+{
+ tor_addr_t addr;
+ if (get_options()->DirAllowPrivateAddresses)
+ return 0; /* whatever it is, we're fine with it */
+ tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, ri->addr);
+
+ if (tor_addr_is_internal(&addr, 0)) {
+ log_info(LD_DIRSERV,
+ "Router %s published internal IP address. Refusing.",
+ router_describe(ri));
+ return -1; /* it's a private IP, we should reject it */
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Check whether we, as a directory server, want to accept <b>ri</b>. If so,
+ * set its is_valid,running fields and return 0. Otherwise, return -1.
+ *
+ * If the router is rejected, set *<b>msg</b> to an explanation of why.
+ *
+ * If <b>complain</b> then explain at log-level 'notice' why we refused
+ * a descriptor; else explain at log-level 'info'.
+ */
+int
+authdir_wants_to_reject_router(routerinfo_t *ri, const char **msg,
+ int complain, int *valid_out)
+{
+ /* Okay. Now check whether the fingerprint is recognized. */
+ time_t now;
+ int severity = (complain && ri->contact_info) ? LOG_NOTICE : LOG_INFO;
+ uint32_t status = dirserv_router_get_status(ri, msg, severity);
+ tor_assert(msg);
+ if (status & FP_REJECT)
+ return -1; /* msg is already set. */
+
+ /* Is there too much clock skew? */
+ now = time(NULL);
+ if (ri->cache_info.published_on > now+ROUTER_ALLOW_SKEW) {
+ log_fn(severity, LD_DIRSERV, "Publication time for %s is too "
+ "far (%d minutes) in the future; possible clock skew. Not adding "
+ "(%s)",
+ router_describe(ri),
+ (int)((ri->cache_info.published_on-now)/60),
+ esc_router_info(ri));
+ *msg = "Rejected: Your clock is set too far in the future, or your "
+ "timezone is not correct.";
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (ri->cache_info.published_on < now-ROUTER_MAX_AGE_TO_PUBLISH) {
+ log_fn(severity, LD_DIRSERV,
+ "Publication time for %s is too far "
+ "(%d minutes) in the past. Not adding (%s)",
+ router_describe(ri),
+ (int)((now-ri->cache_info.published_on)/60),
+ esc_router_info(ri));
+ *msg = "Rejected: Server is expired, or your clock is too far in the past,"
+ " or your timezone is not correct.";
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (dirserv_router_has_valid_address(ri) < 0) {
+ log_fn(severity, LD_DIRSERV,
+ "Router %s has invalid address. Not adding (%s).",
+ router_describe(ri),
+ esc_router_info(ri));
+ *msg = "Rejected: Address is a private address.";
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ *valid_out = ! (status & FP_INVALID);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Update the relevant flags of <b>node</b> based on our opinion as a
+ * directory authority in <b>authstatus</b>, as returned by
+ * dirserv_router_get_status or equivalent. */
+void
+dirserv_set_node_flags_from_authoritative_status(node_t *node,
+ uint32_t authstatus)
+{
+ node->is_valid = (authstatus & FP_INVALID) ? 0 : 1;
+ node->is_bad_exit = (authstatus & FP_BADEXIT) ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+/** True iff <b>a</b> is more severe than <b>b</b>. */
+static int
+WRA_MORE_SEVERE(was_router_added_t a, was_router_added_t b)
+{
+ return a < b;
+}
+
+/** As for dirserv_add_descriptor(), but accepts multiple documents, and
+ * returns the most severe error that occurred for any one of them. */
+was_router_added_t
+dirserv_add_multiple_descriptors(const char *desc, uint8_t purpose,
+ const char *source,
+ const char **msg)
+{
+ was_router_added_t r, r_tmp;
+ const char *msg_out;
+ smartlist_t *list;
+ const char *s;
+ int n_parsed = 0;
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+ char annotation_buf[ROUTER_ANNOTATION_BUF_LEN];
+ char time_buf[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
+ int general = purpose == ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL;
+ tor_assert(msg);
+
+ r=ROUTER_ADDED_SUCCESSFULLY; /*Least severe return value. */
+
+ format_iso_time(time_buf, now);
+ if (tor_snprintf(annotation_buf, sizeof(annotation_buf),
+ "@uploaded-at %s\n"
+ "@source %s\n"
+ "%s%s%s", time_buf, escaped(source),
+ !general ? "@purpose " : "",
+ !general ? router_purpose_to_string(purpose) : "",
+ !general ? "\n" : "")<0) {
+ *msg = "Couldn't format annotations";
+ /* XXX Not cool: we return -1 below, but (was_router_added_t)-1 is
+ * ROUTER_BAD_EI, which isn't what's gone wrong here. :( */
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ s = desc;
+ list = smartlist_new();
+ if (!router_parse_list_from_string(&s, NULL, list, SAVED_NOWHERE, 0, 0,
+ annotation_buf, NULL)) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(list, routerinfo_t *, ri, {
+ msg_out = NULL;
+ tor_assert(ri->purpose == purpose);
+ r_tmp = dirserv_add_descriptor(ri, &msg_out, source);
+ if (WRA_MORE_SEVERE(r_tmp, r)) {
+ r = r_tmp;
+ *msg = msg_out;
+ }
+ });
+ }
+ n_parsed += smartlist_len(list);
+ smartlist_clear(list);
+
+ s = desc;
+ if (!router_parse_list_from_string(&s, NULL, list, SAVED_NOWHERE, 1, 0,
+ NULL, NULL)) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(list, extrainfo_t *, ei, {
+ msg_out = NULL;
+
+ r_tmp = dirserv_add_extrainfo(ei, &msg_out);
+ if (WRA_MORE_SEVERE(r_tmp, r)) {
+ r = r_tmp;
+ *msg = msg_out;
+ }
+ });
+ }
+ n_parsed += smartlist_len(list);
+ smartlist_free(list);
+
+ if (! *msg) {
+ if (!n_parsed) {
+ *msg = "No descriptors found in your POST.";
+ if (WRA_WAS_ADDED(r))
+ r = ROUTER_IS_ALREADY_KNOWN;
+ } else {
+ *msg = "(no message)";
+ }
+ }
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+/** Examine the parsed server descriptor in <b>ri</b> and maybe insert it into
+ * the list of server descriptors. Set *<b>msg</b> to a message that should be
+ * passed back to the origin of this descriptor, or NULL if there is no such
+ * message. Use <b>source</b> to produce better log messages.
+ *
+ * If <b>ri</b> is not added to the list of server descriptors, free it.
+ * That means the caller must not access <b>ri</b> after this function
+ * returns, since it might have been freed.
+ *
+ * Return the status of the operation.
+ *
+ * This function is only called when fresh descriptors are posted, not when
+ * we re-load the cache.
+ */
+was_router_added_t
+dirserv_add_descriptor(routerinfo_t *ri, const char **msg, const char *source)
+{
+ was_router_added_t r;
+ routerinfo_t *ri_old;
+ char *desc, *nickname;
+ const size_t desclen = ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len +
+ ri->cache_info.annotations_len;
+ const int key_pinning = get_options()->AuthDirPinKeys;
+ *msg = NULL;
+
+ /* If it's too big, refuse it now. Otherwise we'll cache it all over the
+ * network and it'll clog everything up. */
+ if (ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len > MAX_DESCRIPTOR_UPLOAD_SIZE) {
+ log_notice(LD_DIR, "Somebody attempted to publish a router descriptor '%s'"
+ " (source: %s) with size %d. Either this is an attack, or the "
+ "MAX_DESCRIPTOR_UPLOAD_SIZE (%d) constant is too low.",
+ ri->nickname, source, (int)ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len,
+ MAX_DESCRIPTOR_UPLOAD_SIZE);
+ *msg = "Router descriptor was too large.";
+ r = ROUTER_AUTHDIR_REJECTS;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /* Check whether this descriptor is semantically identical to the last one
+ * from this server. (We do this here and not in router_add_to_routerlist
+ * because we want to be able to accept the newest router descriptor that
+ * another authority has, so we all converge on the same one.) */
+ ri_old = router_get_mutable_by_digest(ri->cache_info.identity_digest);
+ if (ri_old && ri_old->cache_info.published_on < ri->cache_info.published_on
+ && router_differences_are_cosmetic(ri_old, ri)
+ && !router_is_me(ri)) {
+ log_info(LD_DIRSERV,
+ "Not replacing descriptor from %s (source: %s); "
+ "differences are cosmetic.",
+ router_describe(ri), source);
+ *msg = "Not replacing router descriptor; no information has changed since "
+ "the last one with this identity.";
+ r = ROUTER_IS_ALREADY_KNOWN;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /* Do keypinning again ... this time, to add the pin if appropriate */
+ int keypin_status;
+ if (ri->cache_info.signing_key_cert) {
+ ed25519_public_key_t *pkey = &ri->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key;
+ /* First let's validate this pubkey before pinning it */
+ if (ed25519_validate_pubkey(pkey) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIRSERV, "Received bad key from %s (source %s)",
+ router_describe(ri), source);
+ routerinfo_free(ri);
+ return ROUTER_AUTHDIR_REJECTS;
+ }
+
+ /* Now pin it! */
+ keypin_status = keypin_check_and_add(
+ (const uint8_t*)ri->cache_info.identity_digest,
+ pkey->pubkey, ! key_pinning);
+ } else {
+ keypin_status = keypin_check_lone_rsa(
+ (const uint8_t*)ri->cache_info.identity_digest);
+#ifndef DISABLE_DISABLING_ED25519
+ if (keypin_status == KEYPIN_MISMATCH)
+ keypin_status = KEYPIN_NOT_FOUND;
+#endif
+ }
+ if (keypin_status == KEYPIN_MISMATCH && key_pinning) {
+ log_info(LD_DIRSERV, "Dropping descriptor from %s (source: %s) because "
+ "its key did not match an older RSA/Ed25519 keypair",
+ router_describe(ri), source);
+ *msg = "Looks like your keypair has changed? This authority previously "
+ "recorded a different RSA identity for this Ed25519 identity (or vice "
+ "versa.) Did you replace or copy some of your key files, but not "
+ "the others? You should either restore the expected keypair, or "
+ "delete your keys and restart Tor to start your relay with a new "
+ "identity.";
+ r = ROUTER_AUTHDIR_REJECTS;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /* Make a copy of desc, since router_add_to_routerlist might free
+ * ri and its associated signed_descriptor_t. */
+ desc = tor_strndup(ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, desclen);
+ nickname = tor_strdup(ri->nickname);
+
+ /* Tell if we're about to need to launch a test if we add this. */
+ ri->needs_retest_if_added =
+ dirserv_should_launch_reachability_test(ri, ri_old);
+
+ r = router_add_to_routerlist(ri, msg, 0, 0);
+ if (!WRA_WAS_ADDED(r)) {
+ /* unless the routerinfo was fine, just out-of-date */
+ log_info(LD_DIRSERV,
+ "Did not add descriptor from '%s' (source: %s): %s.",
+ nickname, source, *msg ? *msg : "(no message)");
+ } else {
+ smartlist_t *changed;
+
+ changed = smartlist_new();
+ smartlist_add(changed, ri);
+ routerlist_descriptors_added(changed, 0);
+ smartlist_free(changed);
+ if (!*msg) {
+ *msg = "Descriptor accepted";
+ }
+ log_info(LD_DIRSERV,
+ "Added descriptor from '%s' (source: %s): %s.",
+ nickname, source, *msg);
+ }
+ tor_free(desc);
+ tor_free(nickname);
+ return r;
+ fail:
+ {
+ const char *desc_digest = ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest;
+ download_status_t *dls =
+ router_get_dl_status_by_descriptor_digest(desc_digest);
+ if (dls) {
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Marking router with descriptor %s as rejected, "
+ "and therefore undownloadable",
+ hex_str(desc_digest, DIGEST_LEN));
+ download_status_mark_impossible(dls);
+ }
+ routerinfo_free(ri);
+ }
+ return r;
+}
+
+/** As dirserv_add_descriptor, but for an extrainfo_t <b>ei</b>. */
+static was_router_added_t
+dirserv_add_extrainfo(extrainfo_t *ei, const char **msg)
+{
+ routerinfo_t *ri;
+ int r;
+ was_router_added_t rv;
+ tor_assert(msg);
+ *msg = NULL;
+
+ /* Needs to be mutable so routerinfo_incompatible_with_extrainfo
+ * can mess with some of the flags in ri->cache_info. */
+ ri = router_get_mutable_by_digest(ei->cache_info.identity_digest);
+ if (!ri) {
+ *msg = "No corresponding router descriptor for extra-info descriptor";
+ rv = ROUTER_BAD_EI;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /* If it's too big, refuse it now. Otherwise we'll cache it all over the
+ * network and it'll clog everything up. */
+ if (ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len > MAX_EXTRAINFO_UPLOAD_SIZE) {
+ log_notice(LD_DIR, "Somebody attempted to publish an extrainfo "
+ "with size %d. Either this is an attack, or the "
+ "MAX_EXTRAINFO_UPLOAD_SIZE (%d) constant is too low.",
+ (int)ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len,
+ MAX_EXTRAINFO_UPLOAD_SIZE);
+ *msg = "Extrainfo document was too large";
+ rv = ROUTER_BAD_EI;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = routerinfo_incompatible_with_extrainfo(ri->identity_pkey, ei,
+ &ri->cache_info, msg))) {
+ if (r<0) {
+ extrainfo_free(ei);
+ return ROUTER_IS_ALREADY_KNOWN;
+ }
+ rv = ROUTER_BAD_EI;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ router_add_extrainfo_to_routerlist(ei, msg, 0, 0);
+ return ROUTER_ADDED_SUCCESSFULLY;
+ fail:
+ {
+ const char *d = ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest;
+ signed_descriptor_t *sd = router_get_by_extrainfo_digest((char*)d);
+ if (sd) {
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Marking extrainfo with descriptor %s as "
+ "rejected, and therefore undownloadable",
+ hex_str((char*)d,DIGEST_LEN));
+ download_status_mark_impossible(&sd->ei_dl_status);
+ }
+ extrainfo_free(ei);
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/** Remove all descriptors whose nicknames or fingerprints no longer
+ * are allowed by our fingerprint list. (Descriptors that used to be
+ * good can become bad when we reload the fingerprint list.)
+ */
+static void
+directory_remove_invalid(void)
+{
+ routerlist_t *rl = router_get_routerlist();
+ smartlist_t *nodes = smartlist_new();
+ smartlist_add_all(nodes, nodelist_get_list());
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(nodes, node_t *, node) {
+ const char *msg = NULL;
+ const char *description;
+ routerinfo_t *ent = node->ri;
+ uint32_t r;
+ if (!ent)
+ continue;
+ r = dirserv_router_get_status(ent, &msg, LOG_INFO);
+ description = router_describe(ent);
+ if (r & FP_REJECT) {
+ log_info(LD_DIRSERV, "Router %s is now rejected: %s",
+ description, msg?msg:"");
+ routerlist_remove(rl, ent, 0, time(NULL));
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (bool_neq((r & FP_INVALID), !node->is_valid)) {
+ log_info(LD_DIRSERV, "Router '%s' is now %svalid.", description,
+ (r&FP_INVALID) ? "in" : "");
+ node->is_valid = (r&FP_INVALID)?0:1;
+ }
+ if (bool_neq((r & FP_BADEXIT), node->is_bad_exit)) {
+ log_info(LD_DIRSERV, "Router '%s' is now a %s exit", description,
+ (r & FP_BADEXIT) ? "bad" : "good");
+ node->is_bad_exit = (r&FP_BADEXIT) ? 1: 0;
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node);
+
+ routerlist_assert_ok(rl);
+ smartlist_free(nodes);
+}
diff --git a/src/feature/dirauth/process_descs.h b/src/feature/dirauth/process_descs.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ad9d5c3d4c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/feature/dirauth/process_descs.h
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file process_descs.h
+ * \brief Header file for process_descs.c.
+ **/
+
+#ifndef TOR_RECV_UPLOADS_H
+#define TOR_RECV_UPLOADS_H
+
+int dirserv_load_fingerprint_file(void);
+void dirserv_free_fingerprint_list(void);
+int dirserv_add_own_fingerprint(crypto_pk_t *pk);
+
+enum was_router_added_t dirserv_add_multiple_descriptors(
+ const char *desc, uint8_t purpose,
+ const char *source,
+ const char **msg);
+enum was_router_added_t dirserv_add_descriptor(routerinfo_t *ri,
+ const char **msg,
+ const char *source);
+
+int authdir_wants_to_reject_router(routerinfo_t *ri, const char **msg,
+ int complain,
+ int *valid_out);
+uint32_t dirserv_router_get_status(const routerinfo_t *router,
+ const char **msg,
+ int severity);
+void dirserv_set_node_flags_from_authoritative_status(node_t *node,
+ uint32_t authstatus);
+
+int dirserv_would_reject_router(const routerstatus_t *rs);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/feature/dirauth/reachability.c b/src/feature/dirauth/reachability.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..abc7249b65
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/feature/dirauth/reachability.c
@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file reachability.c
+ * \brief Router reachability testing; run by authorities to tell who is
+ * running.
+ */
+
+#include "core/or/or.h"
+#include "feature/dirauth/reachability.h"
+
+#include "app/config/config.h"
+#include "core/or/channel.h"
+#include "core/or/channeltls.h"
+#include "core/or/command.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/routerlist.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/torcert.h"
+#include "feature/relay/router.h"
+#include "feature/stats/rephist.h"
+
+#include "feature/nodelist/node_st.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/routerinfo_st.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/routerlist_st.h"
+
+/** Called when a TLS handshake has completed successfully with a
+ * router listening at <b>address</b>:<b>or_port</b>, and has yielded
+ * a certificate with digest <b>digest_rcvd</b>.
+ *
+ * Inform the reachability checker that we could get to this relay.
+ */
+void
+dirserv_orconn_tls_done(const tor_addr_t *addr,
+ uint16_t or_port,
+ const char *digest_rcvd,
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id_rcvd)
+{
+ node_t *node = NULL;
+ tor_addr_port_t orport;
+ routerinfo_t *ri = NULL;
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+ tor_assert(addr);
+ tor_assert(digest_rcvd);
+
+ node = node_get_mutable_by_id(digest_rcvd);
+ if (node == NULL || node->ri == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ ri = node->ri;
+
+ if (get_options()->AuthDirTestEd25519LinkKeys &&
+ node_supports_ed25519_link_authentication(node, 1) &&
+ ri->cache_info.signing_key_cert) {
+ /* We allow the node to have an ed25519 key if we haven't been told one in
+ * the routerinfo, but if we *HAVE* been told one in the routerinfo, it
+ * needs to match. */
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *expected_id =
+ &ri->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key;
+ tor_assert(!ed25519_public_key_is_zero(expected_id));
+ if (! ed_id_rcvd || ! ed25519_pubkey_eq(ed_id_rcvd, expected_id)) {
+ log_info(LD_DIRSERV, "Router at %s:%d with RSA ID %s "
+ "did not present expected Ed25519 ID.",
+ fmt_addr(addr), or_port, hex_str(digest_rcvd, DIGEST_LEN));
+ return; /* Don't mark it as reachable. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ tor_addr_copy(&orport.addr, addr);
+ orport.port = or_port;
+ if (router_has_orport(ri, &orport)) {
+ /* Found the right router. */
+ if (!authdir_mode_bridge(get_options()) ||
+ ri->purpose == ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE) {
+ char addrstr[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN];
+ /* This is a bridge or we're not a bridge authority --
+ mark it as reachable. */
+ log_info(LD_DIRSERV, "Found router %s to be reachable at %s:%d. Yay.",
+ router_describe(ri),
+ tor_addr_to_str(addrstr, addr, sizeof(addrstr), 1),
+ ri->or_port);
+ if (tor_addr_family(addr) == AF_INET) {
+ rep_hist_note_router_reachable(digest_rcvd, addr, or_port, now);
+ node->last_reachable = now;
+ } else if (tor_addr_family(addr) == AF_INET6) {
+ /* No rephist for IPv6. */
+ node->last_reachable6 = now;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/** Called when we, as an authority, receive a new router descriptor either as
+ * an upload or a download. Used to decide whether to relaunch reachability
+ * testing for the server. */
+int
+dirserv_should_launch_reachability_test(const routerinfo_t *ri,
+ const routerinfo_t *ri_old)
+{
+ if (!authdir_mode_handles_descs(get_options(), ri->purpose))
+ return 0;
+ if (!ri_old) {
+ /* New router: Launch an immediate reachability test, so we will have an
+ * opinion soon in case we're generating a consensus soon */
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (ri_old->is_hibernating && !ri->is_hibernating) {
+ /* It just came out of hibernation; launch a reachability test */
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (! routers_have_same_or_addrs(ri, ri_old)) {
+ /* Address or port changed; launch a reachability test */
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Helper function for dirserv_test_reachability(). Start a TLS
+ * connection to <b>router</b>, and annotate it with when we started
+ * the test. */
+void
+dirserv_single_reachability_test(time_t now, routerinfo_t *router)
+{
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ channel_t *chan = NULL;
+ const node_t *node = NULL;
+ tor_addr_t router_addr;
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id_key;
+ (void) now;
+
+ tor_assert(router);
+ node = node_get_by_id(router->cache_info.identity_digest);
+ tor_assert(node);
+
+ if (options->AuthDirTestEd25519LinkKeys &&
+ node_supports_ed25519_link_authentication(node, 1) &&
+ router->cache_info.signing_key_cert) {
+ ed_id_key = &router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key;
+ } else {
+ ed_id_key = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* IPv4. */
+ log_debug(LD_OR,"Testing reachability of %s at %s:%u.",
+ router->nickname, fmt_addr32(router->addr), router->or_port);
+ tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&router_addr, router->addr);
+ chan = channel_tls_connect(&router_addr, router->or_port,
+ router->cache_info.identity_digest,
+ ed_id_key);
+ if (chan) command_setup_channel(chan);
+
+ /* Possible IPv6. */
+ if (get_options()->AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity == 1 &&
+ !tor_addr_is_null(&router->ipv6_addr)) {
+ char addrstr[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN];
+ log_debug(LD_OR, "Testing reachability of %s at %s:%u.",
+ router->nickname,
+ tor_addr_to_str(addrstr, &router->ipv6_addr, sizeof(addrstr), 1),
+ router->ipv6_orport);
+ chan = channel_tls_connect(&router->ipv6_addr, router->ipv6_orport,
+ router->cache_info.identity_digest,
+ ed_id_key);
+ if (chan) command_setup_channel(chan);
+ }
+}
+
+/** Auth dir server only: load balance such that we only
+ * try a few connections per call.
+ *
+ * The load balancing is such that if we get called once every ten
+ * seconds, we will cycle through all the tests in
+ * REACHABILITY_TEST_CYCLE_PERIOD seconds (a bit over 20 minutes).
+ */
+void
+dirserv_test_reachability(time_t now)
+{
+ /* XXX decide what to do here; see or-talk thread "purging old router
+ * information, revocation." -NM
+ * We can't afford to mess with this in 0.1.2.x. The reason is that
+ * if we stop doing reachability tests on some of routerlist, then
+ * we'll for-sure think they're down, which may have unexpected
+ * effects in other parts of the code. It doesn't hurt much to do
+ * the testing, and directory authorities are easy to upgrade. Let's
+ * wait til 0.2.0. -RD */
+// time_t cutoff = now - ROUTER_MAX_AGE_TO_PUBLISH;
+ routerlist_t *rl = router_get_routerlist();
+ static char ctr = 0;
+ int bridge_auth = authdir_mode_bridge(get_options());
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(rl->routers, routerinfo_t *, router) {
+ const char *id_digest = router->cache_info.identity_digest;
+ if (router_is_me(router))
+ continue;
+ if (bridge_auth && router->purpose != ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE)
+ continue; /* bridge authorities only test reachability on bridges */
+// if (router->cache_info.published_on > cutoff)
+// continue;
+ if ((((uint8_t)id_digest[0]) % REACHABILITY_MODULO_PER_TEST) == ctr) {
+ dirserv_single_reachability_test(now, router);
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(router);
+ ctr = (ctr + 1) % REACHABILITY_MODULO_PER_TEST; /* increment ctr */
+}
diff --git a/src/feature/dirauth/reachability.h b/src/feature/dirauth/reachability.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6e4bf28ca9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/feature/dirauth/reachability.h
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file reachability.h
+ * \brief Header file for reachability.c.
+ **/
+
+#ifndef TOR_REACHABILITY_H
+#define TOR_REACHABILITY_H
+
+/** What fraction (1 over this number) of the relay ID space do we
+ * (as a directory authority) launch connections to at each reachability
+ * test? */
+#define REACHABILITY_MODULO_PER_TEST 128
+
+/** How often (in seconds) do we launch reachability tests? */
+#define REACHABILITY_TEST_INTERVAL 10
+
+/** How many seconds apart are the reachability tests for a given relay? */
+#define REACHABILITY_TEST_CYCLE_PERIOD \
+ (REACHABILITY_TEST_INTERVAL*REACHABILITY_MODULO_PER_TEST)
+
+void dirserv_orconn_tls_done(const tor_addr_t *addr,
+ uint16_t or_port,
+ const char *digest_rcvd,
+ const struct ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id_rcvd);
+int dirserv_should_launch_reachability_test(const routerinfo_t *ri,
+ const routerinfo_t *ri_old);
+void dirserv_single_reachability_test(time_t now, routerinfo_t *router);
+void dirserv_test_reachability(time_t now);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/feature/dirauth/recommend_pkg.c b/src/feature/dirauth/recommend_pkg.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..41c091455e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/feature/dirauth/recommend_pkg.c
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file recommend_pkg.c
+ * \brief Code related to the recommended-packages subsystem.
+ *
+ * Currently unused.
+ **/
+
+#include "core/or/or.h"
+#include "feature/dirauth/recommend_pkg.h"
+
+/** Return true iff <b>line</b> is a valid RecommendedPackages line.
+ */
+/*
+ The grammar is:
+
+ "package" SP PACKAGENAME SP VERSION SP URL SP DIGESTS NL
+
+ PACKAGENAME = NONSPACE
+ VERSION = NONSPACE
+ URL = NONSPACE
+ DIGESTS = DIGEST | DIGESTS SP DIGEST
+ DIGEST = DIGESTTYPE "=" DIGESTVAL
+
+ NONSPACE = one or more non-space printing characters
+
+ DIGESTVAL = DIGESTTYPE = one or more non-=, non-" " characters.
+
+ SP = " "
+ NL = a newline
+
+ */
+int
+validate_recommended_package_line(const char *line)
+{
+ const char *cp = line;
+
+#define WORD() \
+ do { \
+ if (*cp == ' ') \
+ return 0; \
+ cp = strchr(cp, ' '); \
+ if (!cp) \
+ return 0; \
+ } while (0)
+
+ WORD(); /* skip packagename */
+ ++cp;
+ WORD(); /* skip version */
+ ++cp;
+ WORD(); /* Skip URL */
+ ++cp;
+
+ /* Skip digesttype=digestval + */
+ int n_entries = 0;
+ while (1) {
+ const char *start_of_word = cp;
+ const char *end_of_word = strchr(cp, ' ');
+ if (! end_of_word)
+ end_of_word = cp + strlen(cp);
+
+ if (start_of_word == end_of_word)
+ return 0;
+
+ const char *eq = memchr(start_of_word, '=', end_of_word - start_of_word);
+
+ if (!eq)
+ return 0;
+ if (eq == start_of_word)
+ return 0;
+ if (eq == end_of_word - 1)
+ return 0;
+ if (memchr(eq+1, '=', end_of_word - (eq+1)))
+ return 0;
+
+ ++n_entries;
+ if (0 == *end_of_word)
+ break;
+
+ cp = end_of_word + 1;
+ }
+
+ /* If we reach this point, we have at least 1 entry. */
+ tor_assert(n_entries > 0);
+ return 1;
+}
diff --git a/src/feature/dirauth/recommend_pkg.h b/src/feature/dirauth/recommend_pkg.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..29a41d6dff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/feature/dirauth/recommend_pkg.h
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file recommend_pkg.h
+ * \brief Header file for recommend_pkg.c
+ **/
+
+#ifndef TOR_RECOMMEND_PKG_H
+#define TOR_RECOMMEND_PKG_H
+
+int validate_recommended_package_line(const char *line);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/feature/dirauth/voteflags.c b/src/feature/dirauth/voteflags.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d5ace761d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/feature/dirauth/voteflags.c
@@ -0,0 +1,644 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file voteflags.c
+ * \brief Authority code for deciding the performance thresholds for flags,
+ * and assigning flags to routers.
+ **/
+
+#define VOTEFLAGS_PRIVATE
+#include "core/or/or.h"
+#include "feature/dirauth/voteflags.h"
+
+#include "app/config/config.h"
+#include "core/mainloop/main.h"
+#include "core/or/policies.h"
+#include "feature/dirauth/bwauth.h"
+#include "feature/dirauth/reachability.h"
+#include "feature/hibernate/hibernate.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/dirlist.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/routerlist.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/routerset.h"
+#include "feature/relay/router.h"
+#include "feature/stats/rephist.h"
+
+#include "feature/nodelist/node_st.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/routerinfo_st.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/vote_routerstatus_st.h"
+
+#include "lib/container/order.h"
+
+/** If a router's uptime is at least this value, then it is always
+ * considered stable, regardless of the rest of the network. This
+ * way we resist attacks where an attacker doubles the size of the
+ * network using allegedly high-uptime nodes, displacing all the
+ * current guards. */
+#define UPTIME_TO_GUARANTEE_STABLE (3600*24*30)
+/** If a router's MTBF is at least this value, then it is always stable.
+ * See above. (Corresponds to about 7 days for current decay rates.) */
+#define MTBF_TO_GUARANTEE_STABLE (60*60*24*5)
+/** Similarly, every node with at least this much weighted time known can be
+ * considered familiar enough to be a guard. Corresponds to about 20 days for
+ * current decay rates.
+ */
+#define TIME_KNOWN_TO_GUARANTEE_FAMILIAR (8*24*60*60)
+/** Similarly, every node with sufficient WFU is around enough to be a guard.
+ */
+#define WFU_TO_GUARANTEE_GUARD (0.98)
+
+/* Thresholds for server performance: set by
+ * dirserv_compute_performance_thresholds, and used by
+ * generate_v2_networkstatus */
+
+/** Any router with an uptime of at least this value is stable. */
+static uint32_t stable_uptime = 0; /* start at a safe value */
+/** Any router with an mtbf of at least this value is stable. */
+static double stable_mtbf = 0.0;
+/** If true, we have measured enough mtbf info to look at stable_mtbf rather
+ * than stable_uptime. */
+static int enough_mtbf_info = 0;
+/** Any router with a weighted fractional uptime of at least this much might
+ * be good as a guard. */
+static double guard_wfu = 0.0;
+/** Don't call a router a guard unless we've known about it for at least this
+ * many seconds. */
+static long guard_tk = 0;
+/** Any router with a bandwidth at least this high is "Fast" */
+static uint32_t fast_bandwidth_kb = 0;
+/** If exits can be guards, then all guards must have a bandwidth this
+ * high. */
+static uint32_t guard_bandwidth_including_exits_kb = 0;
+/** If exits can't be guards, then all guards must have a bandwidth this
+ * high. */
+static uint32_t guard_bandwidth_excluding_exits_kb = 0;
+
+/** Helper: estimate the uptime of a router given its stated uptime and the
+ * amount of time since it last stated its stated uptime. */
+static inline long
+real_uptime(const routerinfo_t *router, time_t now)
+{
+ if (now < router->cache_info.published_on)
+ return router->uptime;
+ else
+ return router->uptime + (now - router->cache_info.published_on);
+}
+
+/** Return 1 if <b>router</b> is not suitable for these parameters, else 0.
+ * If <b>need_uptime</b> is non-zero, we require a minimum uptime.
+ * If <b>need_capacity</b> is non-zero, we require a minimum advertised
+ * bandwidth.
+ */
+static int
+dirserv_thinks_router_is_unreliable(time_t now,
+ routerinfo_t *router,
+ int need_uptime, int need_capacity)
+{
+ if (need_uptime) {
+ if (!enough_mtbf_info) {
+ /* XXXX We should change the rule from
+ * "use uptime if we don't have mtbf data" to "don't advertise Stable on
+ * v3 if we don't have enough mtbf data." Or maybe not, since if we ever
+ * hit a point where we need to reset a lot of authorities at once,
+ * none of them would be in a position to declare Stable.
+ */
+ long uptime = real_uptime(router, now);
+ if ((unsigned)uptime < stable_uptime &&
+ (unsigned)uptime < UPTIME_TO_GUARANTEE_STABLE)
+ return 1;
+ } else {
+ double mtbf =
+ rep_hist_get_stability(router->cache_info.identity_digest, now);
+ if (mtbf < stable_mtbf &&
+ mtbf < MTBF_TO_GUARANTEE_STABLE)
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (need_capacity) {
+ uint32_t bw_kb = dirserv_get_credible_bandwidth_kb(router);
+ if (bw_kb < fast_bandwidth_kb)
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Return 1 if <b>ri</b>'s descriptor is "active" -- running, valid,
+ * not hibernating, having observed bw greater 0, and not too old. Else
+ * return 0.
+ */
+static int
+router_is_active(const routerinfo_t *ri, const node_t *node, time_t now)
+{
+ time_t cutoff = now - ROUTER_MAX_AGE_TO_PUBLISH;
+ if (ri->cache_info.published_on < cutoff) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!node->is_running || !node->is_valid || ri->is_hibernating) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Only require bandwidth capacity in non-test networks, or
+ * if TestingTorNetwork, and TestingMinExitFlagThreshold is non-zero */
+ if (!ri->bandwidthcapacity) {
+ if (get_options()->TestingTorNetwork) {
+ if (get_options()->TestingMinExitFlagThreshold > 0) {
+ /* If we're in a TestingTorNetwork, and TestingMinExitFlagThreshold is,
+ * then require bandwidthcapacity */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* If we're not in a TestingTorNetwork, then require bandwidthcapacity */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/** Return true iff <b>router</b> should be assigned the "HSDir" flag.
+ *
+ * Right now this means it advertises support for it, it has a high uptime,
+ * it's a directory cache, it has the Stable and Fast flags, and it's currently
+ * considered Running.
+ *
+ * This function needs to be called after router-\>is_running has
+ * been set.
+ */
+static int
+dirserv_thinks_router_is_hs_dir(const routerinfo_t *router,
+ const node_t *node, time_t now)
+{
+
+ long uptime;
+
+ /* If we haven't been running for at least
+ * get_options()->MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2 seconds, we can't
+ * have accurate data telling us a relay has been up for at least
+ * that long. We also want to allow a bit of slack: Reachability
+ * tests aren't instant. If we haven't been running long enough,
+ * trust the relay. */
+
+ if (get_uptime() >
+ get_options()->MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2 * 1.1)
+ uptime = MIN(rep_hist_get_uptime(router->cache_info.identity_digest, now),
+ real_uptime(router, now));
+ else
+ uptime = real_uptime(router, now);
+
+ return (router->wants_to_be_hs_dir &&
+ router->supports_tunnelled_dir_requests &&
+ node->is_stable && node->is_fast &&
+ uptime >= get_options()->MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2 &&
+ router_is_active(router, node, now));
+}
+
+/** Don't consider routers with less bandwidth than this when computing
+ * thresholds. */
+#define ABSOLUTE_MIN_BW_VALUE_TO_CONSIDER_KB 4
+
+/** Helper for dirserv_compute_performance_thresholds(): Decide whether to
+ * include a router in our calculations, and return true iff we should; the
+ * require_mbw parameter is passed in by
+ * dirserv_compute_performance_thresholds() and controls whether we ever
+ * count routers with only advertised bandwidths */
+static int
+router_counts_toward_thresholds(const node_t *node, time_t now,
+ const digestmap_t *omit_as_sybil,
+ int require_mbw)
+{
+ /* Have measured bw? */
+ int have_mbw =
+ dirserv_has_measured_bw(node->identity);
+ uint64_t min_bw_kb = ABSOLUTE_MIN_BW_VALUE_TO_CONSIDER_KB;
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+
+ if (options->TestingTorNetwork) {
+ min_bw_kb = (int64_t)options->TestingMinExitFlagThreshold / 1000;
+ }
+
+ return node->ri && router_is_active(node->ri, node, now) &&
+ !digestmap_get(omit_as_sybil, node->identity) &&
+ (dirserv_get_credible_bandwidth_kb(node->ri) >= min_bw_kb) &&
+ (have_mbw || !require_mbw);
+}
+
+/** Look through the routerlist, the Mean Time Between Failure history, and
+ * the Weighted Fractional Uptime history, and use them to set thresholds for
+ * the Stable, Fast, and Guard flags. Update the fields stable_uptime,
+ * stable_mtbf, enough_mtbf_info, guard_wfu, guard_tk, fast_bandwidth,
+ * guard_bandwidth_including_exits, and guard_bandwidth_excluding_exits.
+ *
+ * Also, set the is_exit flag of each router appropriately. */
+void
+dirserv_compute_performance_thresholds(digestmap_t *omit_as_sybil)
+{
+ int n_active, n_active_nonexit, n_familiar;
+ uint32_t *uptimes, *bandwidths_kb, *bandwidths_excluding_exits_kb;
+ long *tks;
+ double *mtbfs, *wfus;
+ smartlist_t *nodelist;
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+
+ /* Require mbw? */
+ int require_mbw =
+ (dirserv_get_last_n_measured_bws() >
+ options->MinMeasuredBWsForAuthToIgnoreAdvertised) ? 1 : 0;
+
+ /* initialize these all here, in case there are no routers */
+ stable_uptime = 0;
+ stable_mtbf = 0;
+ fast_bandwidth_kb = 0;
+ guard_bandwidth_including_exits_kb = 0;
+ guard_bandwidth_excluding_exits_kb = 0;
+ guard_tk = 0;
+ guard_wfu = 0;
+
+ nodelist_assert_ok();
+ nodelist = nodelist_get_list();
+
+ /* Initialize arrays that will hold values for each router. We'll
+ * sort them and use that to compute thresholds. */
+ n_active = n_active_nonexit = 0;
+ /* Uptime for every active router. */
+ uptimes = tor_calloc(smartlist_len(nodelist), sizeof(uint32_t));
+ /* Bandwidth for every active router. */
+ bandwidths_kb = tor_calloc(smartlist_len(nodelist), sizeof(uint32_t));
+ /* Bandwidth for every active non-exit router. */
+ bandwidths_excluding_exits_kb =
+ tor_calloc(smartlist_len(nodelist), sizeof(uint32_t));
+ /* Weighted mean time between failure for each active router. */
+ mtbfs = tor_calloc(smartlist_len(nodelist), sizeof(double));
+ /* Time-known for each active router. */
+ tks = tor_calloc(smartlist_len(nodelist), sizeof(long));
+ /* Weighted fractional uptime for each active router. */
+ wfus = tor_calloc(smartlist_len(nodelist), sizeof(double));
+
+ /* Now, fill in the arrays. */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(nodelist, node_t *, node) {
+ if (options->BridgeAuthoritativeDir &&
+ node->ri &&
+ node->ri->purpose != ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE)
+ continue;
+
+ routerinfo_t *ri = node->ri;
+ if (ri) {
+ node->is_exit = (!router_exit_policy_rejects_all(ri) &&
+ exit_policy_is_general_exit(ri->exit_policy));
+ }
+
+ if (router_counts_toward_thresholds(node, now, omit_as_sybil,
+ require_mbw)) {
+ const char *id = node->identity;
+ uint32_t bw_kb;
+
+ /* resolve spurious clang shallow analysis null pointer errors */
+ tor_assert(ri);
+
+ uptimes[n_active] = (uint32_t)real_uptime(ri, now);
+ mtbfs[n_active] = rep_hist_get_stability(id, now);
+ tks [n_active] = rep_hist_get_weighted_time_known(id, now);
+ bandwidths_kb[n_active] = bw_kb = dirserv_get_credible_bandwidth_kb(ri);
+ if (!node->is_exit || node->is_bad_exit) {
+ bandwidths_excluding_exits_kb[n_active_nonexit] = bw_kb;
+ ++n_active_nonexit;
+ }
+ ++n_active;
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node);
+
+ /* Now, compute thresholds. */
+ if (n_active) {
+ /* The median uptime is stable. */
+ stable_uptime = median_uint32(uptimes, n_active);
+ /* The median mtbf is stable, if we have enough mtbf info */
+ stable_mtbf = median_double(mtbfs, n_active);
+ /* The 12.5th percentile bandwidth is fast. */
+ fast_bandwidth_kb = find_nth_uint32(bandwidths_kb, n_active, n_active/8);
+ /* (Now bandwidths is sorted.) */
+ if (fast_bandwidth_kb < RELAY_REQUIRED_MIN_BANDWIDTH/(2 * 1000))
+ fast_bandwidth_kb = bandwidths_kb[n_active/4];
+ guard_bandwidth_including_exits_kb =
+ third_quartile_uint32(bandwidths_kb, n_active);
+ guard_tk = find_nth_long(tks, n_active, n_active/8);
+ }
+
+ if (guard_tk > TIME_KNOWN_TO_GUARANTEE_FAMILIAR)
+ guard_tk = TIME_KNOWN_TO_GUARANTEE_FAMILIAR;
+
+ {
+ /* We can vote on a parameter for the minimum and maximum. */
+#define ABSOLUTE_MIN_VALUE_FOR_FAST_FLAG 4
+ int32_t min_fast_kb, max_fast_kb, min_fast, max_fast;
+ min_fast = networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "FastFlagMinThreshold",
+ ABSOLUTE_MIN_VALUE_FOR_FAST_FLAG,
+ ABSOLUTE_MIN_VALUE_FOR_FAST_FLAG,
+ INT32_MAX);
+ if (options->TestingTorNetwork) {
+ min_fast = (int32_t)options->TestingMinFastFlagThreshold;
+ }
+ max_fast = networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "FastFlagMaxThreshold",
+ INT32_MAX, min_fast, INT32_MAX);
+ min_fast_kb = min_fast / 1000;
+ max_fast_kb = max_fast / 1000;
+
+ if (fast_bandwidth_kb < (uint32_t)min_fast_kb)
+ fast_bandwidth_kb = min_fast_kb;
+ if (fast_bandwidth_kb > (uint32_t)max_fast_kb)
+ fast_bandwidth_kb = max_fast_kb;
+ }
+ /* Protect sufficiently fast nodes from being pushed out of the set
+ * of Fast nodes. */
+ if (options->AuthDirFastGuarantee &&
+ fast_bandwidth_kb > options->AuthDirFastGuarantee/1000)
+ fast_bandwidth_kb = (uint32_t)options->AuthDirFastGuarantee/1000;
+
+ /* Now that we have a time-known that 7/8 routers are known longer than,
+ * fill wfus with the wfu of every such "familiar" router. */
+ n_familiar = 0;
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(nodelist, node_t *, node) {
+ if (router_counts_toward_thresholds(node, now,
+ omit_as_sybil, require_mbw)) {
+ routerinfo_t *ri = node->ri;
+ const char *id = ri->cache_info.identity_digest;
+ long tk = rep_hist_get_weighted_time_known(id, now);
+ if (tk < guard_tk)
+ continue;
+ wfus[n_familiar++] = rep_hist_get_weighted_fractional_uptime(id, now);
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node);
+ if (n_familiar)
+ guard_wfu = median_double(wfus, n_familiar);
+ if (guard_wfu > WFU_TO_GUARANTEE_GUARD)
+ guard_wfu = WFU_TO_GUARANTEE_GUARD;
+
+ enough_mtbf_info = rep_hist_have_measured_enough_stability();
+
+ if (n_active_nonexit) {
+ guard_bandwidth_excluding_exits_kb =
+ find_nth_uint32(bandwidths_excluding_exits_kb,
+ n_active_nonexit, n_active_nonexit*3/4);
+ }
+
+ log_info(LD_DIRSERV,
+ "Cutoffs: For Stable, %lu sec uptime, %lu sec MTBF. "
+ "For Fast: %lu kilobytes/sec. "
+ "For Guard: WFU %.03f%%, time-known %lu sec, "
+ "and bandwidth %lu or %lu kilobytes/sec. "
+ "We%s have enough stability data.",
+ (unsigned long)stable_uptime,
+ (unsigned long)stable_mtbf,
+ (unsigned long)fast_bandwidth_kb,
+ guard_wfu*100,
+ (unsigned long)guard_tk,
+ (unsigned long)guard_bandwidth_including_exits_kb,
+ (unsigned long)guard_bandwidth_excluding_exits_kb,
+ enough_mtbf_info ? "" : " don't");
+
+ tor_free(uptimes);
+ tor_free(mtbfs);
+ tor_free(bandwidths_kb);
+ tor_free(bandwidths_excluding_exits_kb);
+ tor_free(tks);
+ tor_free(wfus);
+}
+
+/* Use dirserv_compute_performance_thresholds() to compute the thresholds
+ * for the status flags, specifically for bridges.
+ *
+ * This is only called by a Bridge Authority from
+ * networkstatus_getinfo_by_purpose().
+ */
+void
+dirserv_compute_bridge_flag_thresholds(void)
+{
+ digestmap_t *omit_as_sybil = digestmap_new();
+ dirserv_compute_performance_thresholds(omit_as_sybil);
+ digestmap_free(omit_as_sybil, NULL);
+}
+
+/** Give a statement of our current performance thresholds for inclusion
+ * in a vote document. */
+char *
+dirserv_get_flag_thresholds_line(void)
+{
+ char *result=NULL;
+ const int measured_threshold =
+ get_options()->MinMeasuredBWsForAuthToIgnoreAdvertised;
+ const int enough_measured_bw =
+ dirserv_get_last_n_measured_bws() > measured_threshold;
+
+ tor_asprintf(&result,
+ "stable-uptime=%lu stable-mtbf=%lu "
+ "fast-speed=%lu "
+ "guard-wfu=%.03f%% guard-tk=%lu "
+ "guard-bw-inc-exits=%lu guard-bw-exc-exits=%lu "
+ "enough-mtbf=%d ignoring-advertised-bws=%d",
+ (unsigned long)stable_uptime,
+ (unsigned long)stable_mtbf,
+ (unsigned long)fast_bandwidth_kb*1000,
+ guard_wfu*100,
+ (unsigned long)guard_tk,
+ (unsigned long)guard_bandwidth_including_exits_kb*1000,
+ (unsigned long)guard_bandwidth_excluding_exits_kb*1000,
+ enough_mtbf_info ? 1 : 0,
+ enough_measured_bw ? 1 : 0);
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+/* DOCDOC running_long_enough_to_decide_unreachable */
+int
+running_long_enough_to_decide_unreachable(void)
+{
+ return time_of_process_start
+ + get_options()->TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability < approx_time();
+}
+
+/** Each server needs to have passed a reachability test no more
+ * than this number of seconds ago, or it is listed as down in
+ * the directory. */
+#define REACHABLE_TIMEOUT (45*60)
+
+/** If we tested a router and found it reachable _at least this long_ after it
+ * declared itself hibernating, it is probably done hibernating and we just
+ * missed a descriptor from it. */
+#define HIBERNATION_PUBLICATION_SKEW (60*60)
+
+/** Treat a router as alive if
+ * - It's me, and I'm not hibernating.
+ * or - We've found it reachable recently. */
+void
+dirserv_set_router_is_running(routerinfo_t *router, time_t now)
+{
+ /*XXXX This function is a mess. Separate out the part that calculates
+ whether it's reachable and the part that tells rephist that the router was
+ unreachable.
+ */
+ int answer;
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ node_t *node = node_get_mutable_by_id(router->cache_info.identity_digest);
+ tor_assert(node);
+
+ if (router_is_me(router)) {
+ /* We always know if we are shutting down or hibernating ourselves. */
+ answer = ! we_are_hibernating();
+ } else if (router->is_hibernating &&
+ (router->cache_info.published_on +
+ HIBERNATION_PUBLICATION_SKEW) > node->last_reachable) {
+ /* A hibernating router is down unless we (somehow) had contact with it
+ * since it declared itself to be hibernating. */
+ answer = 0;
+ } else if (options->AssumeReachable) {
+ /* If AssumeReachable, everybody is up unless they say they are down! */
+ answer = 1;
+ } else {
+ /* Otherwise, a router counts as up if we found all announced OR
+ ports reachable in the last REACHABLE_TIMEOUT seconds.
+
+ XXX prop186 For now there's always one IPv4 and at most one
+ IPv6 OR port.
+
+ If we're not on IPv6, don't consider reachability of potential
+ IPv6 OR port since that'd kill all dual stack relays until a
+ majority of the dir auths have IPv6 connectivity. */
+ answer = (now < node->last_reachable + REACHABLE_TIMEOUT &&
+ (options->AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity != 1 ||
+ tor_addr_is_null(&router->ipv6_addr) ||
+ now < node->last_reachable6 + REACHABLE_TIMEOUT));
+ }
+
+ if (!answer && running_long_enough_to_decide_unreachable()) {
+ /* Not considered reachable. tell rephist about that.
+
+ Because we launch a reachability test for each router every
+ REACHABILITY_TEST_CYCLE_PERIOD seconds, then the router has probably
+ been down since at least that time after we last successfully reached
+ it.
+
+ XXX ipv6
+ */
+ time_t when = now;
+ if (node->last_reachable &&
+ node->last_reachable + REACHABILITY_TEST_CYCLE_PERIOD < now)
+ when = node->last_reachable + REACHABILITY_TEST_CYCLE_PERIOD;
+ rep_hist_note_router_unreachable(router->cache_info.identity_digest, when);
+ }
+
+ node->is_running = answer;
+}
+
+/** Extract status information from <b>ri</b> and from other authority
+ * functions and store it in <b>rs</b>. <b>rs</b> is zeroed out before it is
+ * set.
+ *
+ * We assume that ri-\>is_running has already been set, e.g. by
+ * dirserv_set_router_is_running(ri, now);
+ */
+void
+set_routerstatus_from_routerinfo(routerstatus_t *rs,
+ node_t *node,
+ routerinfo_t *ri,
+ time_t now,
+ int listbadexits)
+{
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ uint32_t routerbw_kb = dirserv_get_credible_bandwidth_kb(ri);
+
+ memset(rs, 0, sizeof(routerstatus_t));
+
+ rs->is_authority =
+ router_digest_is_trusted_dir(ri->cache_info.identity_digest);
+
+ /* Already set by compute_performance_thresholds. */
+ rs->is_exit = node->is_exit;
+ rs->is_stable = node->is_stable =
+ !dirserv_thinks_router_is_unreliable(now, ri, 1, 0);
+ rs->is_fast = node->is_fast =
+ !dirserv_thinks_router_is_unreliable(now, ri, 0, 1);
+ rs->is_flagged_running = node->is_running; /* computed above */
+
+ rs->is_valid = node->is_valid;
+
+ if (node->is_fast && node->is_stable &&
+ ri->supports_tunnelled_dir_requests &&
+ ((options->AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee &&
+ routerbw_kb >= options->AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee/1000) ||
+ routerbw_kb >= MIN(guard_bandwidth_including_exits_kb,
+ guard_bandwidth_excluding_exits_kb))) {
+ long tk = rep_hist_get_weighted_time_known(
+ node->identity, now);
+ double wfu = rep_hist_get_weighted_fractional_uptime(
+ node->identity, now);
+ rs->is_possible_guard = (wfu >= guard_wfu && tk >= guard_tk) ? 1 : 0;
+ } else {
+ rs->is_possible_guard = 0;
+ }
+
+ rs->is_bad_exit = listbadexits && node->is_bad_exit;
+ rs->is_hs_dir = node->is_hs_dir =
+ dirserv_thinks_router_is_hs_dir(ri, node, now);
+
+ rs->is_named = rs->is_unnamed = 0;
+
+ rs->published_on = ri->cache_info.published_on;
+ memcpy(rs->identity_digest, node->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
+ memcpy(rs->descriptor_digest, ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest,
+ DIGEST_LEN);
+ rs->addr = ri->addr;
+ strlcpy(rs->nickname, ri->nickname, sizeof(rs->nickname));
+ rs->or_port = ri->or_port;
+ rs->dir_port = ri->dir_port;
+ rs->is_v2_dir = ri->supports_tunnelled_dir_requests;
+ if (options->AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity == 1 &&
+ !tor_addr_is_null(&ri->ipv6_addr) &&
+ node->last_reachable6 >= now - REACHABLE_TIMEOUT) {
+ /* We're configured as having IPv6 connectivity. There's an IPv6
+ OR port and it's reachable so copy it to the routerstatus. */
+ tor_addr_copy(&rs->ipv6_addr, &ri->ipv6_addr);
+ rs->ipv6_orport = ri->ipv6_orport;
+ } else {
+ tor_addr_make_null(&rs->ipv6_addr, AF_INET6);
+ rs->ipv6_orport = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (options->TestingTorNetwork) {
+ dirserv_set_routerstatus_testing(rs);
+ }
+}
+
+/** Use TestingDirAuthVoteExit, TestingDirAuthVoteGuard, and
+ * TestingDirAuthVoteHSDir to give out the Exit, Guard, and HSDir flags,
+ * respectively. But don't set the corresponding node flags.
+ * Should only be called if TestingTorNetwork is set. */
+STATIC void
+dirserv_set_routerstatus_testing(routerstatus_t *rs)
+{
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+
+ tor_assert(options->TestingTorNetwork);
+
+ if (routerset_contains_routerstatus(options->TestingDirAuthVoteExit,
+ rs, 0)) {
+ rs->is_exit = 1;
+ } else if (options->TestingDirAuthVoteExitIsStrict) {
+ rs->is_exit = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (routerset_contains_routerstatus(options->TestingDirAuthVoteGuard,
+ rs, 0)) {
+ rs->is_possible_guard = 1;
+ } else if (options->TestingDirAuthVoteGuardIsStrict) {
+ rs->is_possible_guard = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (routerset_contains_routerstatus(options->TestingDirAuthVoteHSDir,
+ rs, 0)) {
+ rs->is_hs_dir = 1;
+ } else if (options->TestingDirAuthVoteHSDirIsStrict) {
+ rs->is_hs_dir = 0;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/src/feature/dirauth/voteflags.h b/src/feature/dirauth/voteflags.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2f0e061ea4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/feature/dirauth/voteflags.h
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file voteflags.h
+ * \brief Header file for voteflags.c
+ **/
+
+#ifndef TOR_VOTEFLAGS_H
+#define TOR_VOTEFLAGS_H
+
+void dirserv_set_router_is_running(routerinfo_t *router, time_t now);
+char *dirserv_get_flag_thresholds_line(void);
+void dirserv_compute_bridge_flag_thresholds(void);
+int running_long_enough_to_decide_unreachable(void);
+
+void set_routerstatus_from_routerinfo(routerstatus_t *rs,
+ node_t *node,
+ routerinfo_t *ri, time_t now,
+ int listbadexits);
+
+void dirserv_compute_performance_thresholds(digestmap_t *omit_as_sybil);
+
+#ifdef VOTEFLAGS_PRIVATE
+STATIC void dirserv_set_routerstatus_testing(routerstatus_t *rs);
+#endif
+
+#endif