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author | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2012-12-03 12:20:05 -0500 |
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committer | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2012-12-06 01:54:09 -0500 |
commit | 6921d1fd2520df54b29125221eea06f230d78e61 (patch) | |
tree | 98d47e0bda7deee04f04f24ffe36816129b1f65c /src/common | |
parent | 4f60bca1c1cb5ba07730d8f20a4647cc9494b6c6 (diff) | |
download | tor-6921d1fd2520df54b29125221eea06f230d78e61.tar.gz tor-6921d1fd2520df54b29125221eea06f230d78e61.zip |
Implement HKDF from RFC5869
This is a customizable extract-and-expand HMAC-KDF for deriving keys.
It derives from RFC5869, which derives its rationale from Krawczyk,
H., "Cryptographic Extraction and Key Derivation: The HKDF Scheme",
Proceedings of CRYPTO 2010, 2010, <http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/264>.
I'm also renaming the existing KDF, now that Tor has two of them.
This is the key derivation scheme specified in ntor.
There are also unit tests.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/common')
-rw-r--r-- | src/common/crypto.c | 76 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/common/crypto.h | 11 |
2 files changed, 78 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index 37d8433966..2147738b41 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -2184,8 +2184,8 @@ crypto_dh_compute_secret(int severity, crypto_dh_t *dh, goto error; } secret_len = result; - if (crypto_expand_key_material(secret_tmp, secret_len, - secret_out, secret_bytes_out)<0) + if (crypto_expand_key_material_TAP((uint8_t*)secret_tmp, secret_len, + (uint8_t*)secret_out, secret_bytes_out)<0) goto error; secret_len = secret_bytes_out; @@ -2211,15 +2211,18 @@ crypto_dh_compute_secret(int severity, crypto_dh_t *dh, * <b>key_out</b> by taking the first <b>key_out_len</b> bytes of * H(K | [00]) | H(K | [01]) | .... * + * This is the key expansion algorithm used in the "TAP" circuit extension + * mechanism; it shouldn't be used for new protocols. + * * Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */ int -crypto_expand_key_material(const char *key_in, size_t key_in_len, - char *key_out, size_t key_out_len) +crypto_expand_key_material_TAP(const uint8_t *key_in, size_t key_in_len, + uint8_t *key_out, size_t key_out_len) { int i; - char *cp, *tmp = tor_malloc(key_in_len+1); - char digest[DIGEST_LEN]; + uint8_t *cp, *tmp = tor_malloc(key_in_len+1); + uint8_t digest[DIGEST_LEN]; /* If we try to get more than this amount of key data, we'll repeat blocks.*/ tor_assert(key_out_len <= DIGEST_LEN*256); @@ -2228,7 +2231,7 @@ crypto_expand_key_material(const char *key_in, size_t key_in_len, for (cp = key_out, i=0; cp < key_out+key_out_len; ++i, cp += DIGEST_LEN) { tmp[key_in_len] = i; - if (crypto_digest(digest, tmp, key_in_len+1)) + if (crypto_digest((char*)digest, (const char *)tmp, key_in_len+1)) goto err; memcpy(cp, digest, MIN(DIGEST_LEN, key_out_len-(cp-key_out))); } @@ -2244,6 +2247,65 @@ crypto_expand_key_material(const char *key_in, size_t key_in_len, return -1; } +/** Expand some secret key material according to RFC5869, using SHA256 as the + * underlying hash. The <b>key_in_len</b> bytes at <b>key_in</b> are the + * secret key material; the <b>salt_in_len</b> bytes at <b>salt_in</b> and the + * <b>info_in_len</b> bytes in <b>info_in_len</b> are the algorithm's "salt" + * and "info" parameters respectively. On success, write <b>key_out_len</b> + * bytes to <b>key_out</b> and return 0. On failure, return -1. + */ +int +crypto_expand_key_material_rfc5869_sha256( + const uint8_t *key_in, size_t key_in_len, + const uint8_t *salt_in, size_t salt_in_len, + const uint8_t *info_in, size_t info_in_len, + uint8_t *key_out, size_t key_out_len) +{ + uint8_t prk[DIGEST256_LEN]; + uint8_t tmp[DIGEST256_LEN + 128 + 1]; + uint8_t mac[DIGEST256_LEN]; + int i; + uint8_t *outp; + size_t tmp_len; + + crypto_hmac_sha256((char*)prk, + (const char*)salt_in, salt_in_len, + (const char*)key_in, key_in_len); + + /* If we try to get more than this amount of key data, we'll repeat blocks.*/ + tor_assert(key_out_len <= DIGEST256_LEN * 256); + tor_assert(info_in_len <= 128); + memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); + outp = key_out; + i = 1; + + while (key_out_len) { + size_t n; + if (i > 1) { + memcpy(tmp, mac, DIGEST256_LEN); + memcpy(tmp+DIGEST256_LEN, info_in, info_in_len); + tmp[DIGEST256_LEN+info_in_len] = i; + tmp_len = DIGEST256_LEN + info_in_len + 1; + } else { + memcpy(tmp, info_in, info_in_len); + tmp[info_in_len] = i; + tmp_len = info_in_len + 1; + } + crypto_hmac_sha256((char*)mac, + (const char*)prk, DIGEST256_LEN, + (const char*)tmp, tmp_len); + n = key_out_len < DIGEST256_LEN ? key_out_len : DIGEST256_LEN; + memcpy(outp, mac, n); + key_out_len -= n; + outp += n; + ++i; + } + + memwipe(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); + memwipe(mac, 0, sizeof(mac)); + return 0; +} + /** Free a DH key exchange object. */ void diff --git a/src/common/crypto.h b/src/common/crypto.h index eb8b1de163..2d31e8d8bb 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.h +++ b/src/common/crypto.h @@ -239,8 +239,15 @@ ssize_t crypto_dh_compute_secret(int severity, crypto_dh_t *dh, const char *pubkey, size_t pubkey_len, char *secret_out, size_t secret_out_len); void crypto_dh_free(crypto_dh_t *dh); -int crypto_expand_key_material(const char *key_in, size_t in_len, - char *key_out, size_t key_out_len); + +int crypto_expand_key_material_TAP(const uint8_t *key_in, + size_t key_in_len, + uint8_t *key_out, size_t key_out_len); +int crypto_expand_key_material_rfc5869_sha256( + const uint8_t *key_in, size_t key_in_len, + const uint8_t *salt_in, size_t salt_in_len, + const uint8_t *info_in, size_t info_in_len, + uint8_t *key_out, size_t key_out_len); /* random numbers */ int crypto_seed_rng(int startup); |