Now that crypto_rand() cannot fail, it should return void.

4 files changed, 9 insertions, 13 deletions

diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c
index 1ca86ea8f3..9e27ad30c4 100644
--- a/src/common/crypto.c
+++ b/src/common/crypto.c
@@ -270,8 +270,7 @@ crypto_init_siphash_key(void)
   if (have_seeded_siphash)
     return 0;
 
-  if (crypto_rand((char*) &key, sizeof(key)) < 0)
-    return -1;
+  crypto_rand((char*) &key, sizeof(key));
   siphash_set_global_key(&key);
   have_seeded_siphash = 1;
   return 0;
@@ -2368,27 +2367,26 @@ crypto_seed_rng(void)
 /** Write <b>n</b> bytes of strong random data to <b>to</b>. Return 0 on
  * success, -1 on failure, with support for mocking for unit tests.
  */
-MOCK_IMPL(int,
+MOCK_IMPL(void,
 crypto_rand, (char *to, size_t n))
 {
-  return crypto_rand_unmocked(to, n);
+  crypto_rand_unmocked(to, n);
 }
 
 /** Write <b>n</b> bytes of strong random data to <b>to</b>. Return 0 on
  * success, -1 on failure.  Most callers will want crypto_rand instead.
  */
-int
+void
 crypto_rand_unmocked(char *to, size_t n)
 {
   int r;
   if (n == 0)
-    return 0;
+    return;
 
   tor_assert(n < INT_MAX);
   tor_assert(to);
   r = RAND_bytes((unsigned char*)to, (int)n);
   tor_assert(r >= 0);
-  return 0;
 }
 
 /** Return a pseudorandom integer, chosen uniformly from the values
diff --git a/src/common/crypto.h b/src/common/crypto.h
index 60f9e28902..3b471c2956 100644
--- a/src/common/crypto.h
+++ b/src/common/crypto.h
@@ -260,8 +260,8 @@ int crypto_expand_key_material_rfc5869_sha256(
 
 /* random numbers */
 int crypto_seed_rng(void) ATTR_WUR;
-MOCK_DECL(int,crypto_rand,(char *to, size_t n));
-int crypto_rand_unmocked(char *to, size_t n);
+MOCK_DECL(void,crypto_rand,(char *to, size_t n));
+void crypto_rand_unmocked(char *to, size_t n);
 int crypto_strongest_rand(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len);
 int crypto_rand_int(unsigned int max);
 int crypto_rand_int_range(unsigned int min, unsigned int max);
diff --git a/src/common/crypto_curve25519.c b/src/common/crypto_curve25519.c
index ac0b08a552..00302a2ff0 100644
--- a/src/common/crypto_curve25519.c
+++ b/src/common/crypto_curve25519.c
@@ -113,8 +113,7 @@ curve25519_rand_seckey_bytes(uint8_t *out, int extra_strong)
 {
   uint8_t k_tmp[CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN];
 
-  if (crypto_rand((char*)out, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN) < 0)
-    return -1;
+  crypto_rand((char*)out, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN);
   if (extra_strong && !crypto_strongest_rand(k_tmp, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN)) {
     /* If they asked for extra-strong entropy and we have some, use it as an
      * HMAC key to improve not-so-good entropy rather than using it directly,
diff --git a/src/common/tortls.c b/src/common/tortls.c
index 536043e558..e3c6859828 100644
--- a/src/common/tortls.c
+++ b/src/common/tortls.c
@@ -601,8 +601,7 @@ tor_tls_create_certificate(crypto_pk_t *rsa,
     goto error;
 
   { /* our serial number is 8 random bytes. */
-    if (crypto_rand((char *)serial_tmp, sizeof(serial_tmp)) < 0)
-      goto error;
+    crypto_rand((char *)serial_tmp, sizeof(serial_tmp));
     if (!(serial_number = BN_bin2bn(serial_tmp, sizeof(serial_tmp), NULL)))
       goto error;
     if (!(BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(serial_number, X509_get_serialNumber(x509))))