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authorNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2018-06-21 12:46:11 -0400
committerNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2018-06-21 13:14:14 -0400
commit25ccfff86a5b29c9c1ec9b3d01fe1dc796e9afa0 (patch)
tree1c23ec9dd2cea5d00e4262fa4574ffdb9e250aa7 /src/common/crypto_curve25519.c
parent49d7c9ce53daa13daae59eedceb07d28e06e4395 (diff)
downloadtor-25ccfff86a5b29c9c1ec9b3d01fe1dc796e9afa0.tar.gz
tor-25ccfff86a5b29c9c1ec9b3d01fe1dc796e9afa0.zip
Split crypto and tls libraries into directories
I am calling the crypto library "crypt_ops", since I want higher-level crypto things to be separated from lower-level ones. This library will hold only the low-level ones, once we have it refactored.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/common/crypto_curve25519.c')
-rw-r--r--src/common/crypto_curve25519.c359
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diff --git a/src/common/crypto_curve25519.c b/src/common/crypto_curve25519.c
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-/* Copyright (c) 2012-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * \file crypto_curve25519.c
- *
- * \brief Wrapper code for a curve25519 implementation.
- *
- * Curve25519 is an Elliptic-Curve Diffie Hellman handshake, designed by
- * Dan Bernstein. For more information, see https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html
- *
- * Tor uses Curve25519 as the basis of its "ntor" circuit extension
- * handshake, and in related code. The functions in this module are
- * used to find the most suitable available Curve25519 implementation,
- * to provide wrappers around it, and so on.
- */
-
-#define CRYPTO_CURVE25519_PRIVATE
-#include "orconfig.h"
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#endif
-#include "common/container.h"
-#include "common/crypto_curve25519.h"
-#include "common/crypto_digest.h"
-#include "common/crypto_format.h"
-#include "common/crypto_rand.h"
-#include "common/crypto_util.h"
-#include "common/util.h"
-#include "common/torlog.h"
-
-#include "ed25519/donna/ed25519_donna_tor.h"
-
-/* ==============================
- Part 1: wrap a suitable curve25519 implementation as curve25519_impl
- ============================== */
-
-#ifdef USE_CURVE25519_DONNA
-int curve25519_donna(uint8_t *mypublic,
- const uint8_t *secret, const uint8_t *basepoint);
-#endif
-#ifdef USE_CURVE25519_NACL
-#ifdef HAVE_CRYPTO_SCALARMULT_CURVE25519_H
-#include <crypto_scalarmult_curve25519.h>
-#elif defined(HAVE_NACL_CRYPTO_SCALARMULT_CURVE25519_H)
-#include <nacl/crypto_scalarmult_curve25519.h>
-#endif
-#endif /* defined(USE_CURVE25519_NACL) */
-
-static void pick_curve25519_basepoint_impl(void);
-
-/** This is set to 1 if we have an optimized Ed25519-based
- * implementation for multiplying a value by the basepoint; to 0 if we
- * don't, and to -1 if we haven't checked. */
-static int curve25519_use_ed = -1;
-
-/**
- * Helper function: call the most appropriate backend to compute the
- * scalar "secret" times the point "point". Store the result in
- * "output". Return 0 on success, negative on failure.
- **/
-STATIC int
-curve25519_impl(uint8_t *output, const uint8_t *secret,
- const uint8_t *point)
-{
- uint8_t bp[CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN];
- int r;
- memcpy(bp, point, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
- /* Clear the high bit, in case our backend foolishly looks at it. */
- bp[31] &= 0x7f;
-#ifdef USE_CURVE25519_DONNA
- r = curve25519_donna(output, secret, bp);
-#elif defined(USE_CURVE25519_NACL)
- r = crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(output, secret, bp);
-#else
-#error "No implementation of curve25519 is available."
-#endif /* defined(USE_CURVE25519_DONNA) || ... */
- memwipe(bp, 0, sizeof(bp));
- return r;
-}
-
-/**
- * Helper function: Multiply the scalar "secret" by the Curve25519
- * basepoint (X=9), and store the result in "output". Return 0 on
- * success, -1 on failure.
- */
-STATIC int
-curve25519_basepoint_impl(uint8_t *output, const uint8_t *secret)
-{
- int r = 0;
- if (BUG(curve25519_use_ed == -1)) {
- /* LCOV_EXCL_START - Only reached if we forgot to call curve25519_init() */
- pick_curve25519_basepoint_impl();
- /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
- }
-
- /* TODO: Someone should benchmark curved25519_scalarmult_basepoint versus
- * an optimized NaCl build to see which should be used when compiled with
- * NaCl available. I suspected that the ed25519 optimization always wins.
- */
- if (PREDICT_LIKELY(curve25519_use_ed == 1)) {
- curved25519_scalarmult_basepoint_donna(output, secret);
- r = 0;
- } else {
- static const uint8_t basepoint[32] = {9};
- r = curve25519_impl(output, secret, basepoint);
- }
- return r;
-}
-
-/**
- * Override the decision of whether to use the Ed25519-based basepoint
- * multiply function. Used for testing.
- */
-void
-curve25519_set_impl_params(int use_ed)
-{
- curve25519_use_ed = use_ed;
-}
-
-/* ==============================
- Part 2: Wrap curve25519_impl with some convenience types and functions.
- ============================== */
-
-/**
- * Return true iff a curve25519_public_key_t seems valid. (It's not necessary
- * to see if the point is on the curve, since the twist is also secure, but we
- * do need to make sure that it isn't the point at infinity.) */
-int
-curve25519_public_key_is_ok(const curve25519_public_key_t *key)
-{
- return !safe_mem_is_zero(key->public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
-}
-
-/**
- * Generate CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN random bytes in <b>out</b>. If
- * <b>extra_strong</b> is true, this key is possibly going to get used more
- * than once, so use a better-than-usual RNG. Return 0 on success, -1 on
- * failure.
- *
- * This function does not adjust the output of the RNG at all; the will caller
- * will need to clear or set the appropriate bits to make curve25519 work.
- */
-int
-curve25519_rand_seckey_bytes(uint8_t *out, int extra_strong)
-{
- if (extra_strong)
- crypto_strongest_rand(out, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN);
- else
- crypto_rand((char*)out, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/** Generate a new keypair and return the secret key. If <b>extra_strong</b>
- * is true, this key is possibly going to get used more than once, so
- * use a better-than-usual RNG. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */
-int
-curve25519_secret_key_generate(curve25519_secret_key_t *key_out,
- int extra_strong)
-{
- if (curve25519_rand_seckey_bytes(key_out->secret_key, extra_strong) < 0)
- return -1;
-
- key_out->secret_key[0] &= 248;
- key_out->secret_key[31] &= 127;
- key_out->secret_key[31] |= 64;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * Given a secret key in <b>seckey</b>, create the corresponding public
- * key in <b>key_out</b>.
- */
-void
-curve25519_public_key_generate(curve25519_public_key_t *key_out,
- const curve25519_secret_key_t *seckey)
-{
- curve25519_basepoint_impl(key_out->public_key, seckey->secret_key);
-}
-
-/**
- * Construct a new keypair in *<b>keypair_out</b>. If <b>extra_strong</b>
- * is true, this key is possibly going to get used more than once, so
- * use a better-than-usual RNG. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */
-int
-curve25519_keypair_generate(curve25519_keypair_t *keypair_out,
- int extra_strong)
-{
- if (curve25519_secret_key_generate(&keypair_out->seckey, extra_strong) < 0)
- return -1;
- curve25519_public_key_generate(&keypair_out->pubkey, &keypair_out->seckey);
- return 0;
-}
-
-/** Store the keypair <b>keypair</b>, including its secret and public
- * parts, to the file <b>fname</b>. Use the string tag <b>tag</b> to
- * distinguish this from other Curve25519 keypairs. Return 0 on success,
- * -1 on failure.
- *
- * See crypto_write_tagged_contents_to_file() for more information on
- * the metaformat used for these keys.*/
-int
-curve25519_keypair_write_to_file(const curve25519_keypair_t *keypair,
- const char *fname,
- const char *tag)
-{
- uint8_t contents[CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN + CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN];
- int r;
-
- memcpy(contents, keypair->seckey.secret_key, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN);
- memcpy(contents+CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN,
- keypair->pubkey.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
-
- r = crypto_write_tagged_contents_to_file(fname,
- "c25519v1",
- tag,
- contents,
- sizeof(contents));
-
- memwipe(contents, 0, sizeof(contents));
- return r;
-}
-
-/** Read a curve25519 keypair from a file named <b>fname</b> created by
- * curve25519_keypair_write_to_file(). Store the keypair in
- * <b>keypair_out</b>, and the associated tag string in <b>tag_out</b>.
- * Return 0 on success, and -1 on failure. */
-int
-curve25519_keypair_read_from_file(curve25519_keypair_t *keypair_out,
- char **tag_out,
- const char *fname)
-{
- uint8_t content[CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN + CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN];
- ssize_t len;
- int r = -1;
-
- len = crypto_read_tagged_contents_from_file(fname, "c25519v1", tag_out,
- content, sizeof(content));
- if (len != sizeof(content))
- goto end;
-
- /* Make sure that the public key matches the secret key */
- memcpy(keypair_out->seckey.secret_key, content, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN);
- curve25519_public_key_generate(&keypair_out->pubkey, &keypair_out->seckey);
- if (tor_memneq(keypair_out->pubkey.public_key,
- content + CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN,
- CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN))
- goto end;
-
- r = 0;
-
- end:
- memwipe(content, 0, sizeof(content));
- if (r != 0) {
- memset(keypair_out, 0, sizeof(*keypair_out));
- tor_free(*tag_out);
- }
- return r;
-}
-
-/** Perform the curve25519 ECDH handshake with <b>skey</b> and <b>pkey</b>,
- * writing CURVE25519_OUTPUT_LEN bytes of output into <b>output</b>. */
-void
-curve25519_handshake(uint8_t *output,
- const curve25519_secret_key_t *skey,
- const curve25519_public_key_t *pkey)
-{
- curve25519_impl(output, skey->secret_key, pkey->public_key);
-}
-
-/** Check whether the ed25519-based curve25519 basepoint optimization seems to
- * be working. If so, return 0; otherwise return -1. */
-static int
-curve25519_basepoint_spot_check(void)
-{
- static const uint8_t alicesk[32] = {
- 0x77,0x07,0x6d,0x0a,0x73,0x18,0xa5,0x7d,
- 0x3c,0x16,0xc1,0x72,0x51,0xb2,0x66,0x45,
- 0xdf,0x4c,0x2f,0x87,0xeb,0xc0,0x99,0x2a,
- 0xb1,0x77,0xfb,0xa5,0x1d,0xb9,0x2c,0x2a
- };
- static const uint8_t alicepk[32] = {
- 0x85,0x20,0xf0,0x09,0x89,0x30,0xa7,0x54,
- 0x74,0x8b,0x7d,0xdc,0xb4,0x3e,0xf7,0x5a,
- 0x0d,0xbf,0x3a,0x0d,0x26,0x38,0x1a,0xf4,
- 0xeb,0xa4,0xa9,0x8e,0xaa,0x9b,0x4e,0x6a
- };
- const int loop_max=200;
- int save_use_ed = curve25519_use_ed;
- unsigned char e1[32] = { 5 };
- unsigned char e2[32] = { 5 };
- unsigned char x[32],y[32];
- int i;
- int r=0;
-
- /* Check the most basic possible sanity via the test secret/public key pair
- * used in "Cryptography in NaCl - 2. Secret keys and public keys". This
- * may catch catastrophic failures on systems where Curve25519 is expensive,
- * without requiring a ton of key generation.
- */
- curve25519_use_ed = 1;
- r |= curve25519_basepoint_impl(x, alicesk);
- if (fast_memneq(x, alicepk, 32))
- goto fail;
-
- /* Ok, the optimization appears to produce passable results, try a few more
- * values, maybe there's something subtle wrong.
- */
- for (i = 0; i < loop_max; ++i) {
- curve25519_use_ed = 0;
- r |= curve25519_basepoint_impl(x, e1);
- curve25519_use_ed = 1;
- r |= curve25519_basepoint_impl(y, e2);
- if (fast_memneq(x,y,32))
- goto fail;
- memcpy(e1, x, 32);
- memcpy(e2, x, 32);
- }
-
- goto end;
- // LCOV_EXCL_START -- we can only hit this code if there is a bug in our
- // curve25519-basepoint implementation.
- fail:
- r = -1;
- // LCOV_EXCL_STOP
- end:
- curve25519_use_ed = save_use_ed;
- return r;
-}
-
-/** Choose whether to use the ed25519-based curve25519-basepoint
- * implementation. */
-static void
-pick_curve25519_basepoint_impl(void)
-{
- curve25519_use_ed = 1;
-
- if (curve25519_basepoint_spot_check() == 0)
- return;
-
- /* LCOV_EXCL_START
- * only reachable if our basepoint implementation broken */
- log_warn(LD_BUG|LD_CRYPTO, "The ed25519-based curve25519 basepoint "
- "multiplication seems broken; using the curve25519 "
- "implementation.");
- curve25519_use_ed = 0;
- /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
-}
-
-/** Initialize the curve25519 implementations. This is necessary if you're
- * going to use them in a multithreaded setting, and not otherwise. */
-void
-curve25519_init(void)
-{
- pick_curve25519_basepoint_impl();
-}
-