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| author | Karsten Loesing <karsten.loesing@gmx.net> | 2009-10-25 23:47:05 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Karsten Loesing <karsten.loesing@gmx.net> | 2009-10-25 23:47:05 -0700 |
| commit | d2b4b49ff043df43c048b6f1f52a34dd5c4c0108 (patch) | |
| tree | 6ef8d55c438685668bc0333171305761dcdfd02d /src/common/crypto.h | |
| parent | fa23430496f2675c2dca5dbc0c6455c404c184fe (diff) | |
| download | tor-d2b4b49ff043df43c048b6f1f52a34dd5c4c0108.tar.gz tor-d2b4b49ff043df43c048b6f1f52a34dd5c4c0108.zip | |
Reduce log level for someone else sending us weak DH keys.
See task 1114. The most plausible explanation for someone sending us weak
DH keys is that they experiment with their Tor code or implement a new Tor
client. Usually, we don't care about such events, especially not on warn
level. If we really care about someone not following the Tor protocol, we
can set ProtocolWarnings to 1.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/common/crypto.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/common/crypto.h | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/src/common/crypto.h b/src/common/crypto.h index c0a4526255..d9adb16f80 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.h +++ b/src/common/crypto.h @@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ int crypto_dh_get_bytes(crypto_dh_env_t *dh); int crypto_dh_generate_public(crypto_dh_env_t *dh); int crypto_dh_get_public(crypto_dh_env_t *dh, char *pubkey_out, size_t pubkey_out_len); -ssize_t crypto_dh_compute_secret(crypto_dh_env_t *dh, +ssize_t crypto_dh_compute_secret(int severity, crypto_dh_env_t *dh, const char *pubkey, size_t pubkey_len, char *secret_out, size_t secret_out_len); void crypto_dh_free(crypto_dh_env_t *dh); |