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authorMike Perry <mikeperry-git@torproject.org>2016-09-06 11:35:53 -0700
committerNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2017-05-08 13:49:21 -0400
commitb0e92634d85a3bf7612a6ce0339b96e4aad1e0bb (patch)
tree43a2d03fb5c35e203b5d284882c05c1d273dd887 /doc
parent515e1f663ad4a5f1023ef2d2bbcb2de0152d0a47 (diff)
downloadtor-b0e92634d85a3bf7612a6ce0339b96e4aad1e0bb.tar.gz
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Netflow record collapsing defense.
This defense will cause Cisco, Juniper, Fortinet, and other routers operating in the default configuration to collapse netflow records that would normally be split due to the 15 second flow idle timeout. Collapsing these records should greatly reduce the utility of default netflow data for correlation attacks, since all client-side records should become 30 minute chunks of total bytes sent/received, rather than creating multiple separate records for every webpage load/ssh command interaction/XMPP chat/whatever else happens to be inactive for more than 15 seconds. The defense adds consensus parameters to govern the range of timeout values for sending padding packets, as well as for keeping connections open. The defense only sends padding when connections are otherwise inactive, and it does not pad connections used solely for directory traffic at all. By default it also doesn't pad inter-relay connections. Statistics on the total padding in the last 24 hours are exported to the extra-info descriptors.
Diffstat (limited to 'doc')
-rw-r--r--doc/tor.1.txt24
1 files changed, 24 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt
index de2e2b4a04..eb4e02ad6c 100644
--- a/doc/tor.1.txt
+++ b/doc/tor.1.txt
@@ -832,6 +832,22 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
and fast enough. The current behavior is simply that Tor is a client
unless ORPort, ExtORPort, or DirPort are configured.) (Default: 0)
+[[ConnectionPadding]] **ConnectionPadding** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
+ This option governs Tor's use of padding to defend against some forms of
+ traffic analysis. If it is set to 'auto', Tor will send padding only
+ if both the client and the relay support it. If it is set to 0, Tor will
+ not send any padding cells. If it is set to 1, Tor will still send padding
+ for client connections regardless of relay support. Only clients may set
+ this option. This option should be offered via the UI to mobile users
+ for use where bandwidth may be expensive.
+ (Default: auto)
+
+[[ReducedConnectionPadding]] **ReducedConnectionPadding** **0**|**1**::
+ If set to 1, Tor will not not hold OR connections open for very long,
+ and will send less padding on these connections. Only clients may set
+ this option. This option should be offered via the UI to mobile users
+ for use where bandwidth may be expensive. (Default: 0)
+
[[ExcludeNodes]] **ExcludeNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
A list of identity fingerprints, country codes, and address
patterns of nodes to avoid when building a circuit. Country codes are
@@ -2031,6 +2047,14 @@ is non-zero):
If ExtraInfoStatistics is enabled, it will published as part of
extra-info document. (Default: 0)
+[[PaddingStatistics]] **PaddingStatistics** **0**|**1**::
+ Relays only.
+ When this option is enabled, Tor collects statistics for padding cells
+ sent and received by this relay, in addition to total cell counts.
+ These statistics are rounded, and omitted if traffic is low. This
+ information is important for load balancing decisions related to padding.
+ (Default: 1)
+
[[DirReqStatistics]] **DirReqStatistics** **0**|**1**::
Relays and bridges only.
When this option is enabled, a Tor directory writes statistics on the