diff options
author | Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org> | 2009-08-28 03:42:09 -0400 |
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committer | Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org> | 2009-08-28 03:42:09 -0400 |
commit | 64f393d56f8ff58223db56f3b8e64f0074877616 (patch) | |
tree | 0849d2d72e12be11036892c038f06000c790aed4 /doc | |
parent | d52284559b7e06521cff2c7e8f3c710922b73dc6 (diff) | |
download | tor-64f393d56f8ff58223db56f3b8e64f0074877616.tar.gz tor-64f393d56f8ff58223db56f3b8e64f0074877616.zip |
Only send netinfo clock_skew to controller if an authority told us so
We were triggering a CLOCK_SKEW controller status event whenever
we connect via the v2 connection protocol to any relay that has
a wrong clock. Instead, we should only inform the controller when
it's a trusted authority that claims our clock is wrong. Bugfix
on 0.2.0.20-rc; starts to fix bug 1074. Reported by SwissTorExit.
Diffstat (limited to 'doc')
-rw-r--r-- | doc/spec/control-spec.txt | 22 |
1 files changed, 14 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/doc/spec/control-spec.txt b/doc/spec/control-spec.txt index 576c5dcd53..0cc3bb2928 100644 --- a/doc/spec/control-spec.txt +++ b/doc/spec/control-spec.txt @@ -1255,20 +1255,26 @@ $Id$ CLOCK_SKEW SKEW="+" / "-" SECONDS MIN_SKEW="+" / "-" SECONDS. - SOURCE="DIRSERV:IP:Port" / "NETWORKSTATUS:IP:PORT" / "CONSENSUS" + SOURCE="DIRSERV:" IP ":" Port / + "NETWORKSTATUS:" IP ":" Port / + "OR:" IP ":" Port / + "CONSENSUS" If "SKEW" is present, it's an estimate of how far we are from the time declared in the source. (In other words, if we're an hour in the past, the value is -3600.) "MIN_SKEW" is present, it's a lower bound. If the source is a DIRSERV, we got the current time from a connection to a dirserver. If the source is a NETWORKSTATUS, we decided we're skewed because we got a v2 networkstatus from far in - the future. If the source is CONSENSUS, we decided we're skewed - because we got a networkstatus consensus from the future. - - {Controllers may want to warn the user if the skew is high, or if - multiple skew messages appear at severity WARN. Controllers - shouldn't blindly adjust the clock, since the more accurate source - of skew info (DIRSERV) is currently unauthenticated.} + the future. If the source is OR, the skew comes from a NETINFO + cell from a connection to another relay. If the source is + CONSENSUS, we decided we're skewed because we got a networkstatus + consensus from the future. + + {Tor should send this message to controllers when it thinks the + skew is so high that it will interfere with proper Tor operation. + Controllers shouldn't blindly adjust the clock, since the more + accurate source of skew info (DIRSERV) is currently + unauthenticated.} BAD_LIBEVENT "METHOD=" libevent method |