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| author | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2006-08-09 06:41:29 +0000 |
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| committer | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2006-08-09 06:41:29 +0000 |
| commit | 8b2b28a5ef3224f89e3e6bebb518c420f4ac4d10 (patch) | |
| tree | 30755b04e1b44cbb2609a8a9e741c59c37f5b0de /doc | |
| parent | 070d5555d2431cb0037647ede82915bce1167ad2 (diff) | |
| download | tor-8b2b28a5ef3224f89e3e6bebb518c420f4ac4d10.tar.gz tor-8b2b28a5ef3224f89e3e6bebb518c420f4ac4d10.zip | |
r7056@Kushana: nickm | 2006-08-08 23:40:53 -0700
Add a comment about v0 fallback approach. Why did we dislike discriminating on X.509 certs again?
svn:r6996
Diffstat (limited to 'doc')
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/tor-spec.txt | 17 |
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/doc/tor-spec.txt b/doc/tor-spec.txt index 2a1ec39993..1179f131f6 100644 --- a/doc/tor-spec.txt +++ b/doc/tor-spec.txt @@ -138,8 +138,8 @@ when do we rotate which keys (tls, link, etc)? additional fields to existing structures; implementations are constrained to ignore fields they do not expect. - Parties negotiate OR connection versions as described below in section - + Parties negotiate OR connection versions as described below in sections + 4.1 and 4.2. 2. Connections @@ -305,13 +305,22 @@ when do we rotate which keys (tls, link, etc)? 0 when the other side is recognized as a router running version 0.1.2.??-alpha or earlier. - If a server finds that it wants to send a cell (for example because a + [If a server finds that it wants to send a cell (for example because a circuit wants to extend to that client, and the TLS connection is already established) yet no cell has arrived yet, we can't distinguish between a version 0 client and a slow network. We can't assume that the other side approves of version 0, so we can't just start using version 0. Perhaps the right answer is to then launch a - new TLS connection because you don't have a usable one after all? + new TLS connection because you don't have a usable one after all? -RD] + + [That would seem to be thrashy. Let's see if we can do better. Remember, + normal v0 clients always send something after connecting, so if we have + had a connection for a while and gotten nothing over it, we could get away + with assuming it's bad. Alternatively, we could identify V0 clients by + the OU=Tor field in the certificates: we don't check for it, and we never + documented it. We might break other people's clients by sending them + hello cells, but only if those clients are nonconformant. Am I right? + In any case, this seems way more reliable. -NM] 5. Circuit management |