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authorNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2007-03-10 07:39:17 +0000
committerNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2007-03-10 07:39:17 +0000
commit887b87614d60cbbc6beb5b4e86d28663cd38392e (patch)
treed26eda0304e1f3044ade8a6f0768b59c7978f7c9 /doc
parent97b61b9889b3b201a32345bcf69c31f9ae472b74 (diff)
downloadtor-887b87614d60cbbc6beb5b4e86d28663cd38392e.tar.gz
tor-887b87614d60cbbc6beb5b4e86d28663cd38392e.zip
r12520@Kushana: nickm | 2007-03-10 00:57:59 -0500
add initial uptime-sanity-checking proposal by Kevin Buaer and Damon McCoy. svn:r9791
Diffstat (limited to 'doc')
-rw-r--r--doc/spec/proposals/000-index.txt2
-rw-r--r--doc/spec/proposals/107-uptime-sanity-checking.txt48
2 files changed, 49 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/doc/spec/proposals/000-index.txt b/doc/spec/proposals/000-index.txt
index cdf92540b0..0ad5ad0eb6 100644
--- a/doc/spec/proposals/000-index.txt
+++ b/doc/spec/proposals/000-index.txt
@@ -25,4 +25,4 @@ Proposals by number:
104 Long and Short Router Descriptors [OPEN]
105 Version negotiation for the Tor protocol [OPEN]
106 Checking fewer things during TLS handshakes [CLOSED]
-
+107 Uptime Sanity Checking [OPEN]
diff --git a/doc/spec/proposals/107-uptime-sanity-checking.txt b/doc/spec/proposals/107-uptime-sanity-checking.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..57ec841903
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/spec/proposals/107-uptime-sanity-checking.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+Filename: 107-uptime-sanity-checking.txt
+Title: Uptime Sanity Checking
+Version:
+Last-Modified:
+Author: Kevin Buaer and Damon McCoy
+Created: 8-March-2007
+Status: Open
+
+Overview:
+
+ This document describes how to cap the uptime that is used when computing
+ which routers are maked as stable such that highly stable routers cannot
+ be displaced by malicious routers that report extremely high uptime
+ values.
+
+ This is similar to how bandwidth is capped at 1.5MB/s.
+
+Motivation:
+
+ It has been pointed out that an attacker can displace all stable nodes and
+ entry guard nodes by reporting high uptimes. This is an easy fix that will
+ prevent highly stable nodes from being displaced.
+
+Security implications:
+
+ It should decrease the effectiveness of routing attacks that report high
+ uptimes while not impacting the normal routing algorithms.
+
+Specification:
+
+ We propose that uptime be capped at two months. Currently there are
+ approximetly 50 nodes with this amount of uptime, and the average uptime
+ is around 9 days. This cap would prevent these 50 nodes from being
+ displaced by an attacker.
+
+Compatibility:
+
+ There should be no compatiblity issues due to uptime capping.
+
+Implementation:
+
+ #define MAX_BELIEVABLE_UPTIME 60*24*60*60
+ dirserv.c
+ 1448: *up = (uint32_t) real_uptime(ri, now);
+ if(*up > MAX_BELIEVABLE_UPTIME) {
+ *up = MAX_BELIEVABLE_UPTIME;
+ }
+