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author | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2006-10-01 20:50:11 +0000 |
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committer | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2006-10-01 20:50:11 +0000 |
commit | ce72a9914e5e996f3c47cc9ec368309e0f1c861e (patch) | |
tree | 785572be5289ef84e5f846007a62713494d4ea68 /doc/tor-spec.txt | |
parent | 7ed921708f94b23653a65173a5b61ddeff6e9125 (diff) | |
download | tor-ce72a9914e5e996f3c47cc9ec368309e0f1c861e.tar.gz tor-ce72a9914e5e996f3c47cc9ec368309e0f1c861e.zip |
r8822@totoro: nickm | 2006-10-01 16:24:22 -0400
Fix bug 303: reject attempts to use Tor as a one-hop proxy.
svn:r8566
Diffstat (limited to 'doc/tor-spec.txt')
-rw-r--r-- | doc/tor-spec.txt | 5 |
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/doc/tor-spec.txt b/doc/tor-spec.txt index 17ebf4a02a..bca3ebe5c5 100644 --- a/doc/tor-spec.txt +++ b/doc/tor-spec.txt @@ -410,6 +410,11 @@ TODO: [Versions of Tor before 0.1.0.6-rc did not support these cell types; clients should not send CREATE_FAST cells to older Tor servers.] + If an OR sees a circuit created with CREATE_FAST, the OR is sure to be the + first hop of a circuit. ORs SHOULD reject attempts to create streams with + RELAY_BEGIN exiting the circuit at the first hop: letting Tor be used as a + single hop proxy makes exit nodes a more attractive target for compromise. + 5.2. Setting circuit keys Once the handshake between the OP and an OR is completed, both can |