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| author | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2003-11-05 04:30:35 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2003-11-05 04:30:35 +0000 |
| commit | 1520e93c148f6271dfebc608b3991c88012317ce (patch) | |
| tree | 5141aa165fec84e083470c80a450f14310bd3328 /doc/tor-design.tex | |
| parent | 26744718b29427f42777fc0fe6e65df91ae6803c (diff) | |
| download | tor-1520e93c148f6271dfebc608b3991c88012317ce.tar.gz tor-1520e93c148f6271dfebc608b3991c88012317ce.zip | |
s/web server/webserver/
svn:r772
Diffstat (limited to 'doc/tor-design.tex')
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/tor-design.tex | 4 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/doc/tor-design.tex b/doc/tor-design.tex index e1192f0c67..c0bf9e8842 100644 --- a/doc/tor-design.tex +++ b/doc/tor-design.tex @@ -1012,7 +1012,7 @@ Exit abuse is a serious barrier to wide-scale Tor deployment. Anonymity presents would-be vandals and abusers with an opportunity to hide the origins of their activities. Attackers can harm the Tor network by implicating exit servers for their abuse. Also, applications that commonly -use IP-based authentication (such as institutional mail or web servers) +use IP-based authentication (such as institutional mail or webservers) can be fooled by the fact that anonymous connections appear to originate at the exit OR. @@ -1482,7 +1482,7 @@ need for this approach, when the German government successfully ordered them to add a backdoor to all of their nodes \cite{jap-backdoor}. -\emph{Run a recipient.} By running a Web server, an adversary +\emph{Run a recipient.} By running a webserver, an adversary trivially learns the timing patterns of users connecting to it, and can introduce arbitrary patterns in its responses. This can greatly facilitate end-to-end attacks: If the adversary can induce |