Merge remote branch 'origin/maint-0.2.1' into maint-0.2.2

Conflicts:
	doc/Makefile.am
	doc/spec/Makefile.am
	doc/spec/address-spec.txt
	doc/spec/bridges-spec.txt
	doc/spec/control-spec-v0.txt
	doc/spec/control-spec.txt
	doc/spec/dir-spec-v1.txt
	doc/spec/dir-spec-v2.txt
	doc/spec/dir-spec.txt
	doc/spec/path-spec.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/000-index.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/001-process.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/098-todo.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/099-misc.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/100-tor-spec-udp.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/101-dir-voting.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/102-drop-opt.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/103-multilevel-keys.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/104-short-descriptors.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/105-handshake-revision.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/106-less-tls-constraint.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/107-uptime-sanity-checking.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/108-mtbf-based-stability.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/109-no-sharing-ips.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/110-avoid-infinite-circuits.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/111-local-traffic-priority.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/112-bring-back-pathlencoinweight.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/113-fast-authority-interface.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/114-distributed-storage.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/115-two-hop-paths.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/116-two-hop-paths-from-guard.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/117-ipv6-exits.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/118-multiple-orports.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/119-controlport-auth.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/120-shutdown-descriptors.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/121-hidden-service-authentication.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/122-unnamed-flag.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/123-autonaming.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/124-tls-certificates.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/125-bridges.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/126-geoip-reporting.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/127-dirport-mirrors-downloads.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/128-bridge-families.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/129-reject-plaintext-ports.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/130-v2-conn-protocol.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/131-verify-tor-usage.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/132-browser-check-tor-service.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/134-robust-voting.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/135-private-tor-networks.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/137-bootstrap-phases.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/138-remove-down-routers-from-consensus.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/140-consensus-diffs.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/141-jit-sd-downloads.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/142-combine-intro-and-rend-points.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/143-distributed-storage-improvements.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/145-newguard-flag.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/146-long-term-stability.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/147-prevoting-opinions.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/148-uniform-client-end-reason.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/149-using-netinfo-data.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/150-exclude-exit-nodes.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/151-path-selection-improvements.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/152-single-hop-circuits.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/153-automatic-software-update-protocol.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/154-automatic-updates.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/155-four-hidden-service-improvements.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/156-tracking-blocked-ports.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/157-specific-cert-download.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/158-microdescriptors.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/159-exit-scanning.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/ideas/xxx-hide-platform.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/ideas/xxx-port-knocking.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/ideas/xxx-separate-streams-by-port.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/ideas/xxx-what-uses-sha1.txt
	doc/spec/proposals/reindex.py
	doc/spec/rend-spec.txt
	doc/spec/socks-extensions.txt
	doc/spec/tor-spec.txt
	doc/spec/version-spec.txt

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 90 deletions

diff --git a/doc/spec/proposals/109-no-sharing-ips.txt b/doc/spec/proposals/109-no-sharing-ips.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 5438cf049a..0000000000
--- a/doc/spec/proposals/109-no-sharing-ips.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
-Filename: 109-no-sharing-ips.txt
-Title: No more than one server per IP address.
-Author: Kevin Bauer & Damon McCoy
-Created: 9-March-2007
-Status: Closed
-Implemented-In: 0.2.0.x
-
-Overview:
-  This document describes a solution to a Sybil attack vulnerability in the
-  directory servers. Currently, it is possible for a single IP address to
-  host an arbitrarily high number of Tor routers. We propose that the
-  directory servers limit the number of Tor routers that may be registered at
-  a particular IP address to some small (fixed) number, perhaps just one Tor
-  router per IP address.
-
-  While Tor never uses more than one server from a given /16 in the same
-  circuit, an attacker with multiple servers in the same place is still
-  dangerous because he can get around the per-server bandwidth cap that is
-  designed to prevent a single server from attracting too much of the overall
-  traffic.
-
-Motivation:
-  Since it is possible for an attacker to register an arbitrarily large
-  number of Tor routers, it is possible for malicious parties to do this
-  as part of a traffic analysis attack.
-
-Security implications:
-  This countermeasure will increase the number of IP addresses that an
-  attacker must control in order to carry out traffic analysis.
-
-Specification:
-
-  For each IP address, each directory authority tracks the number of routers
-  using that IP address, along with their total observed bandwidth.  If there
-  are more than MAX_SERVERS_PER_IP servers at some IP, the authority should
-  "disable" all but MAX_SERVERS_PER_IP servers.  When choosing which servers
-  to disable, the authority should first disable non-Running servers in
-  increasing order of observed bandwidth, and then should disable Running
-  servers in increasing order of bandwidth.
-
-  [[  We don't actually do this part here. -NM
-
-  If the total observed
-  bandwidth of the remaining non-"disabled" servers exceeds MAX_BW_PER_IP,
-  the authority should "disable" some of the remaining servers until only one
-  server remains, or until the remaining observed bandwidth of non-"disabled"
-  servers is under MAX_BW_PER_IP.
-  ]]
-
-  Servers that are "disabled" MUST be marked as non-Valid and non-Running.
-
-  MAX_SERVERS_PER_IP is 3.
-
-  MAX_BW_PER_IP is 8 MB per s.
-
-Compatibility:
-
-  Upon inspection of a directory server, we found that the following IP
-  addresses have more than one Tor router:
-
-  Scruples    68.5.113.81     ip68-5-113-81.oc.oc.cox.net     443
-  WiseUp      68.5.113.81     ip68-5-113-81.oc.oc.cox.net     9001
-  Unnamed     62.1.196.71     pc01-megabyte-net-arkadiou.megabyte.gr  9001
-  Unnamed     62.1.196.71     pc01-megabyte-net-arkadiou.megabyte.gr  9001
-  Unnamed     62.1.196.71     pc01-megabyte-net-arkadiou.megabyte.gr  9001
-  aurel       85.180.62.138   e180062138.adsl.alicedsl.de     9001
-  sokrates    85.180.62.138   e180062138.adsl.alicedsl.de     9001
-  moria1      18.244.0.188    moria.mit.edu   9001
-  peacetime   18.244.0.188    moria.mit.edu   9100
-
-  There may exist compatibility issues with this proposed fix.  Reasons why
-  more than one server would share an IP address include:
-
-  * Testing. moria1, moria2, peacetime, and other morias all run on one
-    computer at MIT, because that way we get testing. Moria1 and moria2 are
-    run by Roger, and peacetime is run by Nick.
-  * NAT. If there are several servers but they port-forward through the same
-    IP address, ... we can hope that the operators coordinate with each
-    other. Also, we should recognize that while they help the network in
-    terms of increased capacity, they don't help as much as they could in
-    terms of location diversity. But our approach so far has been to take
-    what we can get.
-  * People who have more than 1.5MB/s and want to help out more. For
-    example, for a while Tonga was offering 10MB/s and its Tor server
-    would only make use of a bit of it. So Roger suggested that he run
-    two Tor servers, to use more.
-
-[Note Roger's tweak to this behavior, in
-http://archives.seul.org/or/cvs/Oct-2007/msg00118.html]
-