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author | Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org> | 2006-02-13 10:43:29 +0000 |
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committer | Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org> | 2006-02-13 10:43:29 +0000 |
commit | d38f5fe5cdb056aea82c11c7dc7d614d1008dca8 (patch) | |
tree | 5147c7853ee925d9d8d0c5b5174f0fe2ad39eb02 /doc/incentives.txt | |
parent | 8262b7d1dbb390a1cb7d04553cefca46f1b7cff6 (diff) | |
download | tor-d38f5fe5cdb056aea82c11c7dc7d614d1008dca8.tar.gz tor-d38f5fe5cdb056aea82c11c7dc7d614d1008dca8.zip |
work out a few more details of the dirserver-based reputation
scheme.
svn:r6008
Diffstat (limited to 'doc/incentives.txt')
-rw-r--r-- | doc/incentives.txt | 31 |
1 files changed, 19 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/doc/incentives.txt b/doc/incentives.txt index 30f8f9e6da..cd08101285 100644 --- a/doc/incentives.txt +++ b/doc/incentives.txt @@ -271,22 +271,29 @@ directory to see if they really do offer roughly the bandwidth they advertise. Include these observations in the directory. (For simplicity, the directory servers could be the measurers.) Then Tor - servers weight priority for other servers depending on advertised - bandwidth, giving particularly low priority to connections not - listed or that failed their spot-checks. The spot-checking can be - done anonymously to prevent selectively performing only for the - measurers, because hey, we have an anonymity network. + servers give priority to other servers. We'd like to weight the + priority by advertised bandwidth to encourage people to donate more, + but it seems hard to distinguish between a slow server and a busy + server. + + The spot-checking can be done anonymously to prevent selectively + performing only for the measurers, because hey, we have an anonymity + network. We could also reward exit nodes by giving them better priority, but like above this only will affect their first hop. Another problem is that it's darn hard to spot-check whether a server allows exits - to all the pieces of the Internet that it claims to. A last problem - is that since directory servers will be doing their tests directly - (easy to detect) or indirectly (through other Tor servers), then - we know that we can get away with poor performance for people that - aren't listed in the directory. Maybe we can turn this around and - call it a feature though -- another reason to get listed in the - directory. + to all the pieces of the Internet that it claims to. If necessary, + perhaps this can be solved by a distributed reporting mechanism, + where clients that can reach a site from one exit but not another + anonymously submit that site to the measurers, who verify. + + A last problem is that since directory servers will be doing their + tests directly (easy to detect) or indirectly (through other Tor + servers), then we know that we can get away with poor performance for + people that aren't listed in the directory. Maybe we can turn this + around and call it a feature though -- another reason to get listed + in the directory. 5. Recommendations and next steps. |