Remove the debian directory from the main git repository

Once upon a time it made sense to keep all the Debian files in the
main Tor distribution, since repeatedly merging them back in was hard.
Now that we're on git, that's no longer so.

Peter's debian repository at debian/tor.git on our git server has the
most recent version of the tor-on-debian packaging stuff, and the versions
in our own repository have gotten out of date.

Resolves bug #1735.

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 74 deletions

diff --git a/debian/control b/debian/control
deleted file mode 100644
index 79ba422307..0000000000
--- a/debian/control
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
-Source: tor
-Section: comm
-Priority: optional
-Maintainer: Peter Palfrader <weasel@debian.org>
-Build-Depends: debhelper (>= 5), libssl-dev, dpatch, zlib1g-dev, libevent-dev (>= 1.1), texlive-base-bin, texlive-latex-base, texlive-fonts-recommended, transfig, ghostscript, binutils (>= 2.14.90.0.7)
-Standards-Version: 3.8.1
-Homepage: https://www.torproject.org/
-
-Package: tor
-Architecture: any
-Depends: ${shlibs:Depends}, adduser, tsocks
-Conflicts: libssl0.9.8 (<< 0.9.8g-9)
-Recommends: privoxy | polipo (>= 1), socat, logrotate, tor-geoipdb
-Suggests: mixmaster, mixminion, anon-proxy
-Description: anonymizing overlay network for TCP
- Tor is a connection-based low-latency anonymous communication system which
- addresses many flaws in the original onion routing design.
- .
- In brief, Onion Routing is a connection-oriented anonymizing communication
- service. Users choose a source-routed path through a set of nodes, and
- negotiate a "virtual circuit" through the network, in which each node
- knows its predecessor and successor, but no others. Traffic flowing down
- the circuit is unwrapped by a symmetric key at each node, which reveals
- the downstream node.
- .
- Basically Tor provides a distributed network of servers ("onion
- routers"). Users bounce their tcp streams (web traffic, ftp, ssh, etc)
- around the routers, and recipients, observers, and even the routers
- themselves have difficulty tracking the source of the stream.
- .
- Note that Tor does no protocol cleaning.  That means there is a danger that
- application protocols and associated programs can be induced to reveal
- information about the initiator.  Tor depends on Privoxy and similar protocol
- cleaners to solve this problem.
- .
- Client applications can use the Tor network by connecting to the local
- onion proxy.  If the application itself does not come with socks support
- you can use a socks client such as tsocks.  Some web browsers like mozilla
- and web proxies like privoxy come with socks support, so you don't need an
- extra socks client if you want to use Tor with them.
- .
- This package enables only the onion proxy by default, but it can be configured
- as a relay (server) node.
- .
- Remember that this is development code -- don't rely on the current Tor
- network if you really need strong anonymity.
- .
- The latest information can be found at https://www.torproject.org/, or on the
- mailing lists, archived at http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/ or
- http://archives.seul.org/or/announce/.
-
-Package: tor-dbg
-Architecture: any
-Depends: tor (= ${binary:Version})
-Suggests: gdb
-Priority: extra
-Section: debug
-Description: debugging symbols for Tor
- This package provides the debugging symbols for Tor, The Onion Router.
- Those symbols allow your debugger to assign names to your backtraces, which
- makes it somewhat easier to interpret core dumps.
-
-Package: tor-geoipdb
-Architecture: all
-Priority: extra
-Depends: tor (>= ${source:Version})
-Description: geoIP database for Tor
- This package provides a geoIP database for Tor, i.e. it maps IPv4 addresses
- to countries.
- .
- Bridges (special Tor relays that aren't listed in the main Tor directory) use
- this information to report which countries they get access from.  This allows
- the Tor network operators to learn if certain countries started blocking
- access to bridges.